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Abstract
This thesis analyses legal disputes between village communities and oil 
companies in Nigeria. We have three principal aims. First, the thesis is an attempt to 
provide a detailed analysis of the nature of legal disputes between oil companies and 
village communities in Nigeria, particularly in the light of the rise in oil related 
litigation. Second, the study of litigation is meant to serve as a window to an 
understanding of social conflicts between village communities and oil companies. 
Third, the thesis is aimed at making a contribution to the research and the debate on 
the role of multinational companies in developing countries and on the day-to-day 
operations of African legal systems.
The thesis is organised as follows. Section two analyses the political context 
of oil operations. Section thi*ee provides an introduction to the legal framework by 
discussing Nigeria’s formal legal institutions and oh related statute law. An analysis of 
a suiwey of Nigerian lawyers in section four is aimed at evaluating the constraints and 
opportunities faced by potential and actual litigants in oh related litigation which can 
either encourage or discourage litigants from engaging in litigation. Focusing on 
issues such as oh sphls and compensation payments for land acquisition, factual 
evidence from court cases in section five illusti'ates the adverse impact of oh 
exploration and production on village communities with a view to identifying the 
sources of conflict between oil companies and the local populace. A detailed analysis 
of litigation in section six reveals the principles of tort law upon which oil related 
cases are based, the legal defences employed by oil companies and legal innovations in 
oil related cases. Section seven concludes the thesis.
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Section 1 : Introduction and Methodology
1.1. Introduction
This thesis analyses the legal disputes between oil companies and village 
communities in Nigeria. We place these disputes in relation to the constraints faced by 
litigants, the oil activity externalities leading to conflicts and the legal principles governing 
disputes, and attempt to derive conclusions relevant to the academic community. The 
thesis has three main aims.
First, the thesis is an attempt to provide a detailed analysis of the nature of legal 
disputes between oil companies and village communities in Nigeria, given the dynamic 
processes of legal change in a developing society such as that of Nigeria. In the last one 
or two decades, oil related litigation has increased in frequency. Chevron alone, for 
instance, was involved in over 200 pending court cases in Nigeria in early 1998, while the 
company reportedly only had up to 50 cases in the whole of the 1980s. ^  An impoitant 
factor in the rise in litigation against multinational oil companies appears to have been the 
increased prospect of success for litigants as well as substantially higher compensation 
payments than before. In the 1990s, a number of liigh profile cases have been won by 
village communities, notably Shell v. Farah^, in which ca. 4.6 million Naira (ca. US$
’ Personal interview with Ned ‘Temi Mojuetan, attorney at the Law & Contracts Department of Chevron (Lagos, 
March 1998).
 ^ [1995] 3 NWLR.
210,000 at the official exchange rate) was awarded as damages to a community/ The 
Farah case and other lawsuits appear to have been brought about by legal changes. These 
may have benefited village communities, albeit litigants may still face problems in bringing 
claims. We believe that legal disputes in the Nigerian oü industry, particularly in the light 
of their transformation, deserve to be the focus of an academic study.
Second, the study of litigation is aimed at seiwing as a window to an 
understanding of social conflicts between village communities and oU companies. 
Litigation typically evolves from individual and collective social conflicts. It echoes, 
rather than anticipates, changing situations and changing institutions. Before tiiey can act, 
courts have to wait until conflicts arise and litigants file their lawsuits. In the words of 
Tocque ville, 'there is nothing naturally active about judicial power; to act, it must be set 
in motion’ (quoted in Hall 1989,109). Writing on the development of American law. Hall 
has argued that issues of economic development set the judiciary ‘in motion’ as they bring 
about a dramatic rise in the demands placed on judiciaries. According to this view, the 
business of the courts mirrors the economic and social changes brought by economic 
development, while judges play a part in allocating the costs, risks and benefits of this 
development (Hall 1989). By implication, an analysis of litigation may, therefore, miiTor 
the economic and social dynamic in relation to disputes between oü companies and village 
communities in Nigeria. In this context, such an investigation may throw some light on 
the social relations in Nigerian society.
 ^ In a number of other recent oil related cases, a higher compensation award was awarded to those affected by oil |
operations. For instance, in Anare v. Shell Unreported Suit No. HCB/35/89 in Delta State HC, a number of village 1
communities were awarded 30 million Naira (US$ 1,370,000 at the official exchange rate). However, the Farah 
case was an important legal precedent.
Third, the thesis is aimed at making a contribution to the research and the debate 
on the role of multinational companies in developing countries and on the dffy^to-day 
operations of African legal systems. While numerous studies have addressed the role of 
multinational business, our analysis is motivated by the perception of a paucity of studies 
on the interactions between those affected by business operations and the companies, 
particulaiiy in the field of litigation. Our analysis is also motivated by a perceived lack of 
studies on the day-to-day operations of Afiican legal systems. Above aU, there appears to 
be a gap in the academic writing on the Nigerian oü industry in terms of a socio-legal 
analysis of legal disputes between oü companies and viUage communities (see sub-section 
1.2. below). This thesis is an attempt to fill this gap.
The framework of analysis in this project is provided by the contemporary 
Nigerian legal system. This includes an examination of the evidence on oü related 
litigation avaüable, including exemplary cases from Nigerian courts and a survey of 154 
Nigerian legal practitioners, which ülustrates the conflicts between oü companies and 
communities and elucidates the relevant issues. An analysis of a survey of Nigerian 
lawyers is aimed at evaluating the constraints and opportunities faced by potential and 
actual litigants in oil related Htigation which can either encourage or discourage litigants 
from engaging in litigation. Focusing on issues such as oü spüls and compensation 
payments for land acquisition, factual evidence from court cases ülustrates the impact of 
0 Ü exploration and production on vülage communities including the resulting 
environmental damage with a view to identifying the sources of conflict between oil 
companies and the local populace. A detaüed analysis of litigation reveals the principles i
iof tort law upon which oü related cases are based, tiie legal defences employed by oil
companies and legal innovations in oil related cases. The discussion of legal change forms 
a key part in this analysis.
1.2. Literature on Nigeria’s Oii industry
Our analysis is guided by the perception of a gap in the literature on the Nigerian 
oil industry in tenus of legal disputes between oü companies and vülage communities. 
The literature on the Nigerian oü industry is extensive because of the industry’s long 
history and its importance for the country’s economy. However, it does not, on the 
whole, address the issue of field operations and the resultant legal conflicts.
The first serious scholarly study on the Nigerian oü industry was undertaken by 
Schatzl (1969) who focused on the evolution of the industry’s operations in the light of 
the importance of oü for the country’s futme energy needs. A second study by Pearson 
(1970) has concentrated on the impact of the oü indusdy on the Nigerian economy and 
investment patterns. A number of other studies have foUowed, most of which have dealt 
with the impact of the oÜ industry on Nigeria’s economic development and the business 
side of O Ü  operations (Emembolu 1975; Odofin 1979; Onoh 1983; Soremekun 1995; 
Eromosele 1997) and the impact of the oü industry on the country’s political 
development (Turner 1977; Ihonvbere and Shaw 1988). The most important study to- 
date was Sarah Ahmad Khan’s pathbreaking book on the Nigerian oü industry entitled 
'Nigeria: The Political Economy o f  O il’ (1994). Khan’s study focuses on business 
operations. It discusses the government’s peti'oleum policy, the commercial activities of 
the oil companies and the nature of oil prices, among other issues.
While these studies have provided a more or less detailed analysis of business 
operations as well as economic and political development, they have tended to neglect- the 
effects of 0 Ü companies on vülage communities and the role of the legal system as 
mediator and adjudicator. Some of these issues have been addressed by a smaU set of 
studies by both Nigerian and British authors. Ogbonna (1979) has studied the geographic 
consequences of the oü industry, pointing to the combined environmental consequences 
of 0 Ü operations in the oü producing areas. A number of other studies have noted the 
environmental and social impact of oü operations (Ikpah 1981, Ashton-Jones 1998).
In this context, two studies by Peter Usutu Onyige (1979) and Daniel Omoweh 
(1994) are particularly relevant to conflicts between oü companies and vülage 
communities. Both Onyige and Omoweh have analysed the impact of oü operations on 
the local populace, based on their own field studies in the oü producing areas.'* The 
str ength of their work has been in the analysis of interactions between oü companies and 
communities, which had been largely neglected in other studies. Onyige has been able to 
portray some aspects of the impact of oÜ operations on vülage communities and the 
attitudes of viUagers towards oü companies. Omoweh meanwhÜe elucidated how the 
mechanics of the oü industry’s field operations such as seismic surveys and drilling affect 
viUage communities. He described some of the resulting conflicts such as popular protests 
and compensation claims for damage.
However, both studies by Onyige and Omoweh have some deficiencies. Onyige’s 
study lacks a social science basis and hence does not allow for a consistent analysis of the
Onyige investigated the operations of Elf and Agip, while Omoweh concentrated on Shell’s Nigerian operations.
data. His major asset - 305 questionnaires returned by villagers - has been under-utilised 
within the framework of the study which provided little beyond the use of frequency 
distributions for some of the replies. Omoweh’s analysis is based on biased assumptions 
about the relationship between the State, oil companies and communities, which 
precludes a more balanced study of the subject. By emphasising colonialism as the root of 
economic underdevelopment in the oü producing areas, Omoweh’s essentiaUy Marxist 
outlook presupposes an adverse role for the oü companies from the outset before 
presenting empirical evidence. In addition, the adverse impact of oü operations may have 
been overemphasised by the author who claimed, for instance, that SheU was causing a 
land scarcity crisis in the oü producing areas without Omoweh having investigated other 
related factors. More importantly, neither Onyige’s nor Omoweh’s studies discuss the 
modem legal framework of community disputes in any detail.
There are a number of important studies by legal scholars on the role of law in 
relation to the Nigerian oü industry. Much of this literatme, however, has largely faded to 
analyse the interaction between Nigerian petroleum legislation and the environmental and 
other laws related to field operations. This is due to an almost exclusive focus on either 
petroleum statutes or the environmental and other statutes related to field operations but 
not on both simultaneously. Neither of the two approaches has provided a complete 
picture of the legal framework in the oü industry. Major studies of Nigerian petroleum 
legislation by legal scholars, who have focused on the legal framework of the oil 
industry’s commercial activities (Etikerentse 1985; Olisa 1987; Atsegbua 1993), have 
provided a detaüed analysis of substantive law, particularly the provisions of the 
Petroleum Act 1969. Meanwhüe, they have largely ignored either community-relevant
environmental or land legislation or the legal framework in relation to oil operations in 
village communities. Those legal scholars, who have discussed environmental law and 
land law in relation to the oü industry (Omotola 1990), meanwhüe, have often faüed to 
discuss the rationales behind the commercial activities of the oil industry.
Whüe many of these Nigerian legal studies have had strengths with regar d to their 
analysis of the legal framework of multinational oü operations, they rarely address the 
socio-legal problems such as the actual enforcement of legislation or barriers to justice 
faced by viUage communities. A  number of legal scholars, most notably Adewale (1989), 
have discussed socio-legal constraints in oü related litigation in articles or scholarly 
papers. However, these studies have tended to confine their analysis to the formal legal 
problems involved. This is because legal scholars who engage in discussing legislation and 
Htigation relating to village communities have often analysed law in isolation from social 
reality. Prototypical for this approach was an article on the relevance of the Federal 
Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Act to the oü industry by Guobadia (1993). 
Guobadia’s article included a very brief sub-section on the enforcement of the Act, which 
was limited to a discussion of the parts of the legal text that deal with enforcement, but 
which faüed to mention actual enforcement.
What emerges from the above survey of literature on the Nigerian oü industry and 
the legal framework of community disputes is that there is a lack o f a socio-legal study on 
the 0 Ü industry m Nigeria, which provides a detaüed analysis of the legal disputes 
between oü companies and vülage communities in relation to the institutional framework 
which mediates and adjudicates disputes. Faüure to properly analyse the legal framework, 
especiaüy in the Hght of its transformation, is probably the greatest, if not the only, gap in
the analysis of the interactions between oil companies and village communities. As 
indicated earlier, the objective of the thesis is to fill this gap within the limitations of the 
available material.
One of the reasons for the absence of a socio-legal study of oil related 
community conflicts may be the prevailing ideas with regards to the nature of the state 
and with regards to social change in Africa, which rely heavily on a macro-analytical 
framework. Take the example of Omoweh’s study mentioned above. Based on a macro- 
analytical approach to the state, Omoweh ignores the dynamic processes, which have 
governed Nigerian legal development. This fact can be explained in part by Omoweh’s 
view of the state as a ‘monolithic block’, which has led him to the misleading impression 
that the judiciary, as an integral part of the state structures, lacks a dynamic of its own. In 
his most recent study, Omoweh (1998) states: 'Since the judiciary is part o f  the state 
structure, the law court cannot be the last hope o f the people in the rural oil areas in the 
on-going protests against the state and the oil companies over land crisis’. This 
mechanistic view fails to make the distinction between political decisions at tlie apex of 
the State, on the one hand, and dynamic processes at work within the judiciary or other 
public bodies, on the other. This problem is characteristic of the general African Studies 
literature which often fails to make a distinction between the different spheres of the state 
apparatus.^
 ^ As a typical exponent of this view, William D. Graf (1988,209) has commented: 'Contrary to received notions 
about a separate branch o f government, the judicature (the Nigerian version of ‘judiciary’) is related to and 
resembles the state bureaucracy. Like it, the judicature performs public functions In contrast to several other 
scholars, Graf observed that the courts in Africa are struggling to maintain a relative autonomy. Graf (1988, 211) 
has recognised that ‘unfortunately, the comparatively large corpus of works on the structures and functions of the 
judiciary has not been matched by studies of its actual operation and political significance’.
A further reason for a literature gap may have been the prevailing ideas about 
social change in Africa among scholar's. As Whitaker (1991, 357) has pointed out, the 
common feature of ideas about social change was that the essential impetus to change 
was assumed to be extei*nal. In particular, theories of ‘development’ and ‘dependency’ 
tend to concern themselves primarily with explaining the influence of Western 
institutions, values and power in the African context. By implication, Africans are said to 
be merely able to succumb, evade or obstruct the process of change, not necessarily 
influence it. Whitaker, on the other hand, has argued that the transformation 'signifies the 
autonomous capacity o f  African social actors to generate significant change \  The 
reluctance of African scholars to study this ‘autonomous capacity’ has led to mechanistic 
rather than dynamic theories of change and thus to a failure to understand the underlying 
causes of the transformation of law, which can be found within the legal system and its 
social environment In addition, as Whitaker (1991, 357-358) has pointed out, the 
scholars’ use of dichotomised concepts - development/underdevelopment, 
radical/conservative, modem/traditional - is also unhelpful to the study of change in 
Africa.
The formal legal approach has been unhelpful to the study of change and the legal 
process in Africa because it fails to take account of socio-economic influences on legal 
decisions and the more dynamic aspects of the legal framework. The emphasis of African 
scholars on the formal legal approach may have pai'ti.y been responsible for a lack of 
awaieness of the day-to-day operations of legal systems. In contrast, a socio-legal 
approach can provide a more holistic picture of the disputes between oil companies and 
village communities, which is not offered by either a purely socio-economic or a purely
legal study. This approach precludes to some degree the use of the macro-analytical 
analysis of disputes between oil companies and village communities. A macro-analytical 
analysis may not be able to capture the complexity of the legal process and the dynamic 
processes of change which may be slow and subtle. By implication, therefore, this thesis 
is based on the assumption that a micro-analytical study is needed to investigate the 
nature of the legal process. A micro-analytical study could take different approaches. Our 
approach combines the analysis of concrete institutional arrangements with an 
investigation of personal experiences and perception of the legal system.
1.3. Methodology and Structure
On the most basic level, our methodology combines three main elements: an 
investigation of the context of oil operations, a discussion of a lawyers’ survey and a 
detailed analysis of oü related litigation.
We are of the view tliat a discussion of the context of oü operations is necessary 
in order to provide explanations which are both causaUy and meaningfuUy adequate in the 
Weberian sense. To this purpose, the thesis sets out by presenting the political and legal 
context which forms sections two and three.
Section two, which briefly discusses the making of the Nigerian oü industry and 
the government petroleum policy, serves as a basic background to our subsequent 
analysis of legal disputes. Furthermore, this section investigates whether the Nigerian 
state is biased in favour of oü companies or vülage communities or whether it can be 
considered neutral.
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A discussion of the making of Nigeria’s oü industry prepares the ground for a 
discussion of the legal system, which is at the core of the thesis. Section three provides an 
introduction to the legal framework by discussing the foimal legal institutions and oü 
related legislation. Issues discussed include the EngHsh Common Law, Nigerian 
customary law and the court system. A discussion of the legislative framework consists of 
petroleum legislation, enviionmental legislation and other legal provisions including land 
law, and legislative provisions for compensation payments to those affected by oü 
operations.
The contextual sections are foUowed by the statistical results of a survey of 154 
Nigerian lawyers from Lagos, Nigeria’s commercial centre, and from Port Harcourt, the 
main centre of the Nigerian oü industry which forms section four, one of the two core 
sections of the thesis. The survey reflects a formidable pool of expert knowledge on oü 
operations since as many as 128 lawyers surveyed reported that they had previously had 
some professional contact with the oü industry, of which 85 have previously acted as 
legal counsel for an oü company, its subsidiary or a sub-contractor and 97 have 
previously acted as counsel in a lawsuit against an oÜ company (survey methodology wiU 
be discussed in greater detaü in section four ).
The survey respondents were asked about their personal knowledge of the legal 
proceedings and their experiences with oÜ companies in court. The survey allows for the 
use of frequency distributions and non-parametric tests to investigate the quality of the 
Nigerian legal system by analysing answers to questions on issues such as the 
enforcement of court orders, extra-judicial pressures from outside institutions and 
problems of access to courts. Our survey analysis indicates that the judiciary and the legal
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process may be more biased in favour of oil companies rather than the opposing litigants 
in oil related litigation.
The survey sets the stage for the analysis of 68 court cases involving disputes 
arising from oü operations on the ground. The collection of cases was aided by Nigerian 
legal professionals, a Nigerian judge and the author’s judgment. Reported cases were 
gathered from publicly avaüable law reports, whüe a number of unreported cases were 
obtained from practising lawyers in Nigeria. The sampling of cases was arbitrary to some 
extent because it was impossible to obtain aU past judgments involving oü companies in 
Nigeria. Cases that have been reported may not necessarüy be consider-ed typical as they 
were pubüshed in a law report solely on the basis of involving a new and unfamiliar legal 
precedent. The selection of unreported cases utilised in the thesis, moreover, might not 
necessarily be considered typical because it relied on personal contact with legal 
practitioners in Nigeria. Nonetheless, one advantage of Nigerian court cases is that case 
transcripts are very extensive, presenting a host of evidence, expert material and legal 
analysis. The reliance on personal contact with Nigerian lawyers dealing with oü related 
cases ensured that the most important legal precedents in oü related litigation were 
obtained.
Using court judgments on topics such as oil spiUs and seismic surveys, section five 
assesses the externalities arising from oü exploration and production on the ground 
including the r*esulting environmental damage. Rather than using court judgments as legal 
material, we utüise them as a source of factual evidence of the impact of oü operations on 
viUage communities. This enables us to identify some of the sources of conflicts between
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oil companies and village communities. The use of factual evidence from court cases 
serves as a window to an understanding of social conflicts in the Nigerian oil industry.
Section six, the second core section of the thesis, provides a detailed discussion of 
the court cases in terms of substantive law. The section discusses the legal principles of 
tort law which aie used as a basis for the court cases. A discussion of the legal liability 
under tort law and the legal defences used by oil companies exemplifies that litigation 
against oü companies faces severe obstacles. However, in the last decade or so, 
communities have been given more favourable judgments in court and some communities 
have been awarded relatively high compensation payments for oü company damage. This 
legal change, the existence of which constitutes an important finding of the thesis, is 
discussed in some detail and potential reasons are given to account for it.
Section seven draws the findings of the entiie thesis together by re-assessing the 
methods used and the evidence presented. This is followed by suggestions for future 
research.
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Section 2: The Making of the Nigerian Oil 
Industry - Oil and the Nigerian State
2.1. Introduction
This section of the thesis, which briefly discusses the making of the Nigerian oil 
industry and the government peholeum policy, seives as a basic background to our 
subsequent analysis of legal disputes. In order to fully understand conflicts between oil 
companies and village communities in Nigeria, it is instructive to examine the relationship 
between the foreign oÜ companies and the state in Nigeria. Foreign oü companies depend 
on the Nigerian state. The state provides access to the country's natural resources 
through the granting of oü licences as well as providing the regulatory framework such as 
petroleum tax and royalty, which defines the terms and conditions of operations and the 
financial incentives for oü companies. The state can impose minimum drilling obligations, 
price controls, enviionmental protection measures, control over the development of oil 
fields (including restrictions on production) and, in some cases, it can expropriate the 
assets of oÜ companies or cancel contracts. Political decisions may directly influence the 
day-to-day operations of the oÜ industry, particularly if the state has a shareholding 
interest in joint-ventures with private oil companies as in the case of Nigeria. The state 
provides security protection for companies. Last but not least, the judiciary is part of the 
state institutions, thus legal disputes involving oÜ companies are regulated by the state.
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The nature of the state and its institutions is, therefore, relevant to the operations of oil 
companies and the resulting litigation.
Our discussion of the political background of oil operations in this section is not 
exhaustive. Other scholars (e.g. Turner 1977; Ihonvbere and Shaw 1988) have provided a 
much more extensive account of Nigeria’s political economy o f oil. In this section, we 
attempt to investigate a different angle to this discussion by exploring the link between 
political decision-making and community conflicts in the oil producing areas.
We conduct this analysis by examining the political context within which 
community conflicts in the oü producing areas have evolved. Om main concern is 
whether the Nigerian state is biased in favour of oü companies or viUage communities or 
whether it can be considered neutral. A number of scholars such as Terisa Turner (1976, 
1977, 1978) have argued that the Nigerian state is predisposed m favour of oü interests. 
If it is assumed that the state is prejudiced in favour of oü companies, it has to be 
assumed that the state would restrict litigation against foreign investors. In order to 
understand the litigation between oü companies and vülage communities, it is thus 
necessary to investigate the bias of the Nigerian state in favour of foreign oü companies. 
This section of the thesis examines the basic elements of Nigeria’s political economy as 
they pertain to the relationship between the state and foreign oÜ companies as to the 
possibility of tlie state supporting or blocking litigation.
Our material is organised as foUows. First, we discuss the colonial origins of the 
0 Ü industry, including the colonial oü related legislation. Then we examine the evolution
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of Nigeria’s oü industry after independence in 1960. We conclude with an assessment of 
the political economy of oü in Nigeria and community protests against oil companies.
2.2. Colonial Origins of Nigeria’s Oil
Until 1960, Nigeria was a British colony. In 1938, a joint-venture between the 
two major British oü companies SheU and BP was granted a licence to explore oü 
covering the entire territory of Nigeria.^ This gave them a monopoly over oü exploration 
in the country. Shell-BP began its drilling activities from 1951.^ In 1953, some 450 
barrels of oü were discovered at the Akata-1 weU. In 1956, the Shell-BP venture found 
0 Ü in commercial quantities for the first time at Oloibiri. Encouraged by early successes, 
Shell-BP greatly expanded its drilling activities between 1958 and 1960. As a result of 
expanded operations, it was able to make important discoveries, of which the most 
promising one was the Bomu oü field in the Ogoni area in 1958. Exports of crude oü 
began in December 1957 (Shell-BP 1960).
InitiaUy, Nigeria’s economy was not dependent on oü. Other commodities, 
particularly agricultural exports such as palm oil and palm kernels as weU as coal and tin, 
played a much greater role. However, the role of crude oil in Nigeria’s export portfolio 
increased rapidly. By 1960, crude oü exports came to provide the bulk of the mineiTils 
exports. In 1960, 847,000 tons of crude oü were exported, compared with only 10,000
 ^ In 1937, Shell D’Arcy (later renamed Shell-BP) was formed as a joint-venture between Shell and Anglo-Iranian 
(British Petroleum from 1954) to operate in Nigeria. As a result of the Second World War, Shell D’Arcy 
withdrew from Nigeria in 1941. The company returned in 1946 to resume exploration work (Shell-BP 1960, 5).
 ^ According to Shell’s figures, 1959 was the peak year of drilling with 53 wells drilled by Shell-BP (see Appendix 
D. Table D.I.).
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tons of tin and 2,000 tons of columbite (see Annex C, Table C.I.). Not surprisingly, by 
1960, 0 Ü operations had come to play a greater role in government affairs. Petroleum 
matters were on the agenda of the Nigerian Council of Ministers in 6 out of 43 meetings 
and in 10 out of 31 meetings in 1958 and in 1959 respectively.^
From an international perspective, however, Nigeria’s initial oil production was 
not substantial. In 1960, at the time of Nigeria’s independence, four oil producing 
countries of the British Commonwealth - Canada, Qatai*, Bmnei and Tiinidad - produced 
more crude oil than Nigeria (see Appendix C, Table C.2.). In percentage terms, Nigeria 
provided only 1.8% of the crude oil production of the Commonwealth in 1960. This had 
changed by 1971 when Nigeria had become the largest Commonwealth oü producing 
country with a production of 74,100,000 long tons, which amounted to 41.1% of the 
total crude oü production of the Commonwealth. By the end of the colonial era, 
therefore, the significance of Nigeria’s oü industry did not lie so much in the actual oü 
production but rather in its potential for future expansion.
On the eve o f Nigeria’s independence in 1960, SheU and BP were the dominant 
0 Ü companies in the country and SheU (SheU-BP until 1979) has remained the dominant 
company in the Nigerian oü industry from the colonial era to-date."  ^ However, by the 
early 1960s, Shell-BP had been joined by competitors. Until 1951, the venture had 
exclusive concessions over aU Nigerian oil resources. In that year, the original exploration
 ^ Conclusions of Meetings of the Council of Ministers 1958 and 1959, CO1039/86, CO1039/87, C01039/107,
C01039/108, Public Record Office (PRO), Kew, London. Despite an increase in oil related discussions, other 
policy matters such as those on the Coal Corporation still took precedence over the oil industry. Petroleum policy 
was addressed in only 7 memos of the Council in 1958 and in 18 memos in 1959, compared with a total of almost 
700 Government memos in 1959 alone. The greater number of discussions on petroleum matters in 1959 stemmed 
primarily from the need to regulate petroleum legislation before the end of the colonial era and to issue permits i
for oil pipelines. I
The Nigerian assets of BP were nationalised in 1979 (see sub-section 2.6. below). j
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licence covering 357,000 square miles was reduced to an area of 58,000 square miles in 
Southern Nigeria. Between 1955 and 1957, Shell-BP’s exploration area was further 
reduced to 40,000 square miles, mainly in the Niger Delta (Schatzl 1969, 1). The choice 
of exploration areas for newcomers in Nigeria was limited to areas previously abandoned 
by SheU-BP. Attracted by Shell-BP’s successes and encouraged by the British 
Government, other oU companies were interested in exploration work because of the 
suspected oU wealth. From the late 1950s, concessions were granted to a number of non- 
British oU companies. Socony-Vacuum (later Mobil) obtained its first oU exploration 
licence in 1955, Tennessee (also known as Tenneco) in 1960, Gulf (later Chevron) m 
1961, American Overseas (also known as Amoseas) in 1961, Agip^ in 1962, SAFRAP^ 
(later Elf) in 1962, Phillips in 1965 and Esso^ in 1965 (Schatzl 1969, 4-5; Whiteman 
1982, 340-342). As a result, nine foreign oU companies were engaged in exploration in 
Nigeria by 1965.
AU six major foreign oU companies, which dominate the Nigerian oU industry 
today (Shell, MobU, Chevron, Elf, Agip and Texaco), were already present in Nigeria by 
the early 1960s and were aU producing by 1971 (see Appendix D, Table D.8.). AU 
newcomers were confined to market niches left behind by SheU-BP. The most important 
of these market niches were the oU resources in Nigeria’s offshore area. Shell-BP had to 
compete with several other oU companies in offshore exploration from the start. In
 ^ Affiliate of the Italian Government owned oil company ENI.
® SAFRAP (Société Anonyme Française des Recherches et d’Exploitation de Petrole) Nigeria Ltd was jointly owned 
by SAFRAP (50%), RAP (Regie Autonome des Petroles) (40%) and SOGERAP (Société de Gestion des 
Participants de la RAP) (10%). The equity share of the French Government in SAFRAP and RAP was 64% and 
100% respectively.
 ^ Subsidiary of the US oil company Exxon.
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respect to new licences, the Council of Ministers in 1959 agreed ‘that not more than four 
blocks o f  1,000 square miles each should be granted in the Continental Shelf area to any 
one company. This early diversification explains in part why Shell was not able to 
extend its dominant position in onshore operations to those offshore/ Almost 
immediately after the award of offshore licences in December 1961, Gulf (later Chevron) 
discovered the Okan oil field, the first commercial field to be found on Nigeria’s 
continental shelf, which began to produce oil in 1965 (Whiteman 1982, 315). Gulf thus 
became established in offshore operations owing to its early discoveries and remained the 
second largest oil producing company m Nigeria into the early 1990s. Mobil made its first 
discovery in 1964 and began production from the offshore Idaho field in 1970 
(http://www.mobil.com/world/nigeria/mobnigeria.html, January 1998). Mobü remained 
the thii’d largest oü company m Nigeria untü 1992 when it overtook Chevron to become 
the second largest. Texaco/Califomia Asiatic made its first offshore discovery in 1963 
(Madujibeya 1975, 3). Due to Shell’s early focus on onshore areas located close to 
human settlements, community conflicts in Nigeria resulted in significantly more litigation 
against the company and its sub-contractors to-date than for oil companies operating 
offshore such as Mobil and Chevron.
Conclusions of the 19th Meeting of the Council of Ministers (22 July 1959), FUe C01039/108, PRO.
 ^ Of the 314 successful oil and gas discoveries made by 1975, 73% were in onshore areas and 27% in offshore 
areas. Shell-BP accounted for 77% of onshore discoveries, while three US companies - Gulf, Mobil and 
Texaco/Califomia Asiatic - accounted for 76% of offshore discoveries (Madujibeya 1975, 3).
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2.3. Oil Related Legal Arrangements under Colonial Rule
For Shell and BP to expand oil operations in Nigeria, a sympathetic system of oü 
licensing and a business conducive legal framework were necessary. Following Nigeria’s 
unification in 1914, a key piece of petroleum legislation was passed in the form of the 
Mineral Oü Ordinance No. 17 of 1914, which was amended in 1925, 1950 and 1958.^  ^
The Mineral Oü Ordinance was ostensibly passed ‘to regulate the right to search for, win 
and work mineral o ils’ (Ajomo 1976; Etikerentse 1985, 1).
One of the main provisions of the 1914 Ordinance was that only British oü 
companies were permitted to obtain oü licences in Nigeria.“ Despite its explicit wording, 
this provision could be circumvented, if the colonial administration was willing to do 
so.^  ^ When Socony-Vacuum Oil (later Mobü) - a US company - was aüowed into Nigeria 
in 1955, they formed a locaUy registered company with a British chairman and a board of 
dnectors, of whom the majority were British citizens. Since the investment of Socony- 
Vacuum was welcomed and even encouraged by the British Government, no political 
objections were r a ise d .T h e  provision of the Ordinance, winch disqualified non-British 
companies, was eventuaUy repealed in 1958 in order to attract US investment.
Until 1914, oil companies in Nigeria operated under the Mining Regulation (Oil) Ordinance 1907 of Southern 
Nigeria, which was amended by Mining Regulation (Oil) Ordinances 1907 and 1909.
Nigeria Mineral Oils Ordinance (Colonial Mineral Ordinance No.l7) of 1914, section 6(l)(a) stipulated that: 
No lease or licence shall be granted except to a British subject or to a British company and its 
principal place of business within Her Majesty’s dominions; The chairman and the managing 
director (in any) and the majority of the other directors of which are British subjects.
A similar provision, which formally disqualified non-British companies, existed under the Mining Regulation 
(Oil) Ordinance 1907, Section 15. However, the British authorities allowed the Nigerian Bitumen Company, a 
subsidiary of a German company and registered in Nigeria, to operate from 1907 to 1914.
" Reported in FUe CO 1029/255, PRO.
Section 2 of the Mineral Oils (Amendment) Act 1958, reported in Atsegbua (1993, 8).
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The main problem of colonial peholeum legislation under the Mineral Oil 
Ordinance and subsidiary legislation was that it did not presciil^ the terms and conditions 
of oil operations. These terms and conditions were fixed by oil licences issued by the 
colonial government. Every licence set out the specific rights and obligations of the 
licence holder. An oü company had to apply for each licence separately. Once a licence 
was granted, the company had to fulfU the conditions and obligations proscribed by the 
licence and had to pay the stipulated fees. There were three types of licences: the oü 
exploration licence (OEL), the oü prospecting licence (OPL), and the oü mining lease 
(OML). In addition to these three types of licences, an oü company had to apply 
separately for a licence to buüd a pipeline under the Oü Pipelines Act 1956. At fiist, an 
OEL was granted, which aüowed the oÜ company to explore, search and drül for oü but 
prohibited oil production. Once the OEL for an area expired, the same oü company could 
either surrender the exploration area or apply for an OPL for the area in question. The 
OPL aüowed the company to explore, search and drül for oü as weü as to produce oü. 
Once the OPL expired, the oil company could surrender the area or apply for an OML for 
the ar ea in question. The OML was a long-term agreement between the company and the 
Government to produce oil. The specific terms and fees differed between OELs, OPLs 
and OMLs. The most distinctive provision of an OML was the exclusive privüege to 
produce oü in a specific area for a period of 30 years in land areas and territorial waters 
and of 40 years in the Niger Delta and the Continental Shelf (see Table 2.1.).
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Table 2.1. Selected Provisions of Oil Licences, August 1959
Oil Exploration Licence (OEL) Oil Prospecting Licence (OPL) Oil Mining Lease (OML)
Type of Right Non exclusive (areas north of 
latitude 7°N)
Exclusive Exclusive
Rental £50 per year 2/- per square mile per year 2/6d per acre for first year 
rising to 10/- in sixth and 
subsequent years
Area Up to 10,000 sq. miles Up to 2,000 sq. miles onshore or 
1,000 sq. miles in the 
Continental Shelf areas
Any size approved by 
Government
Period 1 year 3 years 30 years
Renewal 1 year (followed by 1 year at 2 years (on whole or part 30 years
(land areas incl. £50 premium) provided work done satisfactory
territorial to C.I.M.)
waters)
Period 1 year 4 years 40 years
Renewal 1 year (followed by I year at 3 years 40 years
(Niger Delta £50 premium)
incl. Continental
Shelf)
Conditions j&rplore and search by 1) Explore, search and drill for 1) Search, bore-for, win and
geological and/or geophysical oil, carry out geological. work aU petroleum.
means with topographical geophysical and topographical 2) If not already started, a
examination and drilling may work. training scheme for
be undertaken, no production of 2) Carry away and dispose of oil. technical training of staff
oil allowed. 3) Not later than the third year 
start training schemes for the 
technical training of Nigerian 
staff.
must be started or 
contributed to.
Obligations i) Commence geologically i) All reasonable dispatch i) As clause 42 in Shell
and/or geophysically to commence and to continue OML (work according to
examine with reasonable examination geologically and by good oil-field practice)
dispatch and continue to do so. geophysical methods. ii) Monthly drilling record
ii) Quarterly reports to D.G.S. ii) Within 6 months of date of to C.IJM. and D.G.S.
and C J.M. grant commence seismic iii) Quarterly progress
iii) Topographical and cadastral investigation and be continuos report to C.I.M. and D.G.S.
maps to Federal Surveys. until drilling operations are iv) Such other records as to
iv) Samples to be given D.G.S. commenced or licence production and exports as
as required. Details any drilling determined. required by C.I.M.
to D.G.S. and C.I.M. iii) Before the end of the third 
year have drilled a minimum of 
12,000 feet and no well shall be 
less than 6,000 feet in depth. 
This obligation will be modified 
if one operator is granted two (or 
multiples thereof) concession 
areas when the single concession 
obligation will apply to each 2 
areas in Continental Shelf.
iv) Monthly drilling reports and 
quarterly progress reports to 
D.G.S. and C.I.M.
Source: Circular Letter of A.C.F. Armstrong, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Lagos Affairs, Mines and Power 
to Shell-BP, Gulf, Pan American, Standard Oil, Mobil and California Bcploration Company (4 August 1959),
POWE 33/421, PRO.
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An obvious and crucial explanation for Shell’s dominance in Nigeria’s oü industry 
is that Shell-BP held the majority of oü licences at independence. In Januaiy 1960 and in 
January 1962, the oü prospecting licences (OPLs) granted to Shell-BP under colonial mle 
had expired. By the terms of the OPLs, the venture had the right to take up to 50% of the 
area under oü mining leases (OMLs) for a period of 30 or 40 years. SheU-BP, 
unaffected by competitors, was able to acquhe 46 oü mining leases (OMLs) covering 
15,000 squaie mües (approximately 38,850 sq kms) for 30 or 40 years in areas with the 
best geological indications for oü deposits (Schatzl 1969, 1). As a comparison, the area 
of the Niger Delta, where the bulk of Nigerian oü operations have taken place since, was 
recently estimated at only approximately 9,900 sq mÜes (25,640 sq km) or 66% of SheU- 
BP’s licence area (Ashton-Jones 1998, 116).^  ^ The nature of the licensing process and 
the role played by Shell-BP within it enabled the company to pre-empt rivals by securing 
long-temi leases in the most promising exploration areas. By 1960, Shell-BP had 
established its base in the oü-rich onshore areas of south-eastern Nigeria, which allowed 
SheU to retain a dominant position in Nigeria to-date. Shell’s continuing dominance can 
explain why the company was involved in significantly more Utigation in Nigeria than 
otlier 0 Ü companies operating onshore such as Agip and Elf.
Circular Letter of A.C.F.Armstrong, Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Lagos Affairs, Mines and Power to 
Shell-BP, Gulf, Pan American, Standard Oil, Mobil and California Diploration Company (4 August 1959), 
POWE 33/421, PRO.
The comparison between the area of Shell-BP’s licences and the area of the Niger Delta merely serves to 
emphasise the substantial size of Shell-BP’s holdings. In reality, Shell-BP bad to surrender some licence areas in 
the Niger Delta when the company’s OPLs had expired in 1960 and in 1962.
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2.4. Evolution of Nigeria’s Oil Industry after Independence
From the start of oil production by Shell-BP in December 1957, Nigerian crude 
oü production was steadily expanding and, more recently, billions of dollars were 
invested into the development of gas production. From a level of 20,000 b/d (barrels/day) 
in 1960, Nigeria’s oü production made a giant leap to weü over 2,000,000 b/d today. In 
the 1960s, production was stül rather insignificant but was increasing from 20,000 b/d in 
1960 to 540,000 b/d in 1969.^  ^ From then, production was continuously increasing jI
reaching over 2,000,000 b/d in 1973, a simüar production level to the late 1990s. The 
expansion of Nigeria’s oü production did not follow a linear trend. After a high point in 
1974 and again in 1979, Nigeria’s oü production had declined between 1980 and 1983 in 
line with the decline in world mai'ket demand (see Appendix C, Table C.3). In order to 
stimulate oü exploration and production, the Nigerian government introduced better 
financial terms for oü companies, especiaUy the Memorandum of Understanding in 1986 
(this WÜ1 be shown in some detail later on). As profit margins and world-wide demand 
were rising, Nigerian oü production started to rise quickly from the late 1980s onwards.
In the early 1990s, foreign oü companies have committed substantial investments to 
extend productive capacity in Nigeria which can account for a rise in production from 
1992 onwards (Khan 1994, 55-56).
In percentage tenns, Nigeria’s share of world cmde oü production rose from 
0.03% in 1958 to 0.09% in 1960 to 0.35% in 1968. From then, Nigeria’s share was rising 
enormously to 1.23% in 1969, to 2.25% in 1970, reaching 3.86% m 1974. In the 1980s,
The Civil War 1967-70 disrupted oil operations, but then production recovered and made a major leap from 
540,000 b/d in 1969 to 1,530,000 b/d in 1971.
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the country’s share dropped to a low of 2.18% in 1983 and again 2.18% in 1987, rising 
to 3.16% in 1997 (see Appendix C, Table C.3.).
The destination of Nigeria’s oü exports in terms of the world market fluctuated 
considerably over the years. In the first phase 1958-61, virtuaUy the entire oü production 
was exported to Britain and the Netherlands, the home countries of SheU-BP. In the 
1960s, new export markets were found m Western Emope, the US, Latin America, 
Africa and Japan. In the early 1970s, the US became the largest single buyer of Nigerian 
oil. In 1973, for example, over half of the Nigerian oü exports went to Western Europe, 
27% to the US, 13% to the Caribbean and 5% to Japan (Madujibeya 1975, 5). The share 
of Nigerian oü exports to the US declined to 14.1% in 1984 and then peaked at 52.6% in 
1989, foUowing a decline of oü exports to Western Europe and Latin America as a result 
of the world-wide recession in the eaiiy 1980s.^  ^ By that time, the Nigerian oü exports to 
Japan had already almost disappeared. Increased production of North Sea oü in the 1980s 
also contributed to a decline of Nigerian oil exports to Western Europe (Khan 1994, 117- 
121).^  ^ The main exports markets for Nigerian oü remain the US and Western Europe, 
with a shai*e of 45.2% and 41.0% of the total respectively in 1996 (see Appendix C, 
Table C.5.). France was the largest Western European importer of Nigerian oil, followed 
by Germany and the Netherlands {OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 1997).
In the early 1980s, Nigeria’s total oil exports declined from 1,960,000 b/d n 1980 to a low of 935,000 b/d in 
1983. The US exports reached their lowest point at 154,000 b/d in 1984, while Western European exports 
reached a lowest point in 1982 with 482,000 b/d. The decline in exports to Western Europe and Latin America 
was, on the whole, more significant than the decline of US exports (Khan 1994, 118-119).
The oil production in the North Sea played a significant role for the marketing of Nigeria’s oil because the 
Nigerian crudes are similar in quality to North Sea crudes, their prices are related to the crude called Brent, so 
they compete directly with crudes in the North Sea (Khan 1994,101).
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In addition to oil, gas production was becoming increasingly important to Nigeria. 
In an international comparison, Nigerian gas production is still relatively insignificant (see 
Appendix C, Table C.6.). In 1997, for example, the Nigerian gas production was roughly 
4.3 million tonnes oil equivalent, which was equal to roughly 30 million barrels of crude 
oil or, in other words, equal to approximately only two weeks of the Nigerian oil 
production at 1997 levels.^® While gas production was rather insignificant, the country’s 
known gas reserves in 1997 amounted to 2.1% of the world total (BP Statistical Review 
o f  World Energy 1998). Until recently, companies were unwilling to exploit gas because 
there was no domestic market for gas in Nigeria, exports of gas were difficult and profit 
margins were low.^  ^ In the late 1990s, however, the Nigerian government gave the oil 
companies favourable fiscal incentives for gas exploitation, which can explain an upsurge 
in fresh investments into gas related projects.^  ^ Shell together with Agip and Elf engaged 
in the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) Project worth ca. US$ 3.8 billion. Chevron 
launched its US$ 550 million Escravos Gas Project, while Mobil launched a natural gas 
liquids (NGL) project worth over US$ 800 million (AFP, 17 August 1998). When the 
new projects start producing, Nigeria’s gas production is bound to expand significantly 
but Nigeria has so far remained primarily an oil producing country rather tiian a gas 
producing country.
^ 1 million tonnes oil equivalent of gas is equivalent to 7.33 million barrels of oil.
In 1965, BP discovered a large gas field in the North Sea. By then, it was clear that the European market for gas 
could be well served by North Sea, Libyan and Algerian gas and did not provide real opportunities for Nigerian 
gas exports. Difficulties with securing markets for gas and the price attached by foreign companies to gas were 
important obstacles to gas utilisation (Turner 1977, 171).
Among other incentives to gas projects, companies involved in the exploitation of natural gas have been taxed 
under the Companies Income Tax rate of 30% rather than under the nominal Petroleum Profits Tax of 85% (as 
amended by the Memorandum of Understanding) with effect from 1998 (Onyenkpa 1998).
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On the surface, the recent expansion in oil and gas projects may seem surprising, 
given the high political risk in Nigeria, the escalation of community conflicts and the rise 
in oil related litigation. Multinational oil companies can choose between the former Soviet 
Union, Latin America, Southeast Asia and Africa, so may be instructive to identify 
factors, which make Nigeria more attractive to them than alternative investment outlets/^ 
Actual profits and profit potential in the oil exploration and production sectors appear to 
be the key reason for Nigeria’s importance to foreign investors.
According to a 1996 survey on the Nigerian oü industry by the consultancy fiiras 
Arthur Andersen and Andersen Consulting, Nigeria and the Middle East were ranked as 
the most attractive areas for oil exploration and production investments over the next five 
years. The high rating for Nigeria was influenced among other factors by the low cost of 
exploration and production, size and number of unappraised discoveries, and the 
prefeiTed quality of the Nigerian oü (Arthur Andersen 1997), which we briefly examine 
here.
The low cost of exploration and production cannot be documented in detail 
because oü companies do not reveal the actual cost structure of their operations. 
HistoricaUy, production costs in Nigeria were reportedly relatively high by international 
comparison and they were said to have been increasing due to the use of more 
sophisticated technologies (Khan 1994, 85-86). Due to a shift in focus from onshore to 
offshore aieas, investment costs per banel in Nigeria became higher than in the Middle 
East. However, the costs of oÜ production m Nigeria can be increasingly regarded as
^ In most other oil producing countries, perception of political risk is compai-able or lower than in Nigeria. For 
instance, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Russia as well as Nigeria are rated by the Control Risks Group as medium-risk 
countries, while Turkmenistan and Kyrgyzstan are rated as low-risk countries (1997).
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relatively low because the Middle East no longer serves as the main comparison for oil 
companies. While the production costs in Nigeria may be higher than in the Middle East, 
they may be significantly lower than in several new production areas such as the North 
Sea or the Gulf of Mexico. In comparison with the North Sea or the Gulf of Mexico, 
Nigeria may be regarded as a low cost area.^ In any case, technical costs cannot explain 
the profitability of oü production in Nigeria. The fiscal regime of a country largely 
determines the profits earned by oü companies and thus the attractiveness of a country to 
oil companies.
The fiscal regime of Nigeria is not unfavourable to oü companies if compared 
with other countries in the world (Petroconsultants 1996). Whüe comparisons are always 
difficult, the ‘after tax profit o il’ for companies in Nigeria is higher than in several 
comparable countries in the world (see Appendix C, Table C.14.).^^ The government 
share of ‘profit oiV in Nigeria may be as low as 20%, whüe some other comparable 
countries have a share of between 60% and 90%. However, many of the arrangements 
gave the companies much less than 80%.^  ^ As Khan (1994, 93) has noted, there is a 
marked difference between the old joint-venture arrangements and the new production- 
sharing contr acts. WhÜe the fiscal arrangements of the joint-ventures were said by Khan 
to carry a high tax burden, the new production-sharing contracts and gas projects from 
the late 1980s reflected much more favourable fiscal terms. For instance, the Nigeria
^ The insight on the relative merits of Nigeria’s production costs in an international comparison was largely owed 
to personal communication with Martin Quinlan, journalist at the Petroleum Economist, London (September 
1998).
^ Profit oil is the gross revenue remaining after royalty oil, cost oü and tax oü recovery.
^  For instance, the terms of new contracts for offshore licences in 1991 gave the companies a share of only 11.7%, 
after allowing 30% of oil produced for cost recoveiy {Petroleum Economist, March 1991).
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Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) contract provides for various concessions, waivers and 
exemptions from the provisions of Nigerian law, including a tax holiday of up to 10 years 
starting from the first day of production - not expected until 1999 (Udoma and Belo- 
Osagie 1995). There may also be hidden benefits of operating in the country owing to the 
companies’ operational control over joint-ventures (Frynas 1998).^^
In addition to low operating costs and high profits, Nigeria was considered 
attractive to oil company managers tlianks to the size and number of unappraised 
discoveries, most of which are suspected in the Niger Delta and the adjacent offshore 
areas. Nigeria’s producing oü fields are mostly concentrated in the Niger Delta, which 
covers over 20,000 sq km in the south-east of the country. The Niger Delta (both 
onshore and offshore areas) is particularly conducive to the formation and accumulation 
of oil and gas for geological reasons (Hyne 1995, 90-98).
Whüe the actual size of Nigerian oü wells is smaU, a key advantage of Nigeria for 
0 Ü companies was the high rate of success in driUing operations, that means, the number 
of successful 0 Ü and gas weü discoveries divided by the total number of drillings.^* In 
other words, oü and gas could be found relatively easüy in Nigeria. A good indicator of 
this success is the ratio of dry wells (i.e. driUings which do not result in any oü or gas
^ Government officials openly suggested to the Nigerian press that oil companies bribe state officials in order to be 
able to deflate the operating costs in the joint-ventures. Minister of Petroleum Resources Anthony Ani suggested 
tliat corrupt state officials benefited from the joint-ventures at the expense of the government revenue {Tell, 24 
February 1997).
^ The actual average size of oil wells in Nigeria is relatively small for geological conditions. Of Nigeria’s 252 oÜ 
fields in 1995, 169 fields were below 100 million barrels. There were only sixteen so-called ‘giant oil fields’ with 
over 400 million barrels (see Appendix D, Table D.4.), most of which were discovered before 1970. The presence 
of smaller oil fields, thus, renders oü exploration and production in Nigeria more expensive as more oü 
installations are required. It also requires continuos exploration for new fields in order to replace the existing ones 
and in order to increase production. At the 1996 levels of production, Nigerian oü production could continue for 
another 20 or so years (see Appendix D, Table D.6.). At current levels of production, Nigeria could produce gas 
for over 100 years (see Appendix D, Table D.6.), though the figures are misleading as production is stiU relatively 
insignificant.
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findings) to total completed wells, which was rather insignificant m Nigeria (see 
Appendix D, Table D.5.).
As another important geological advantage, the quality of the Nigerian oil is 
generally better than elsewhere. The Nigerian light crude oil is of high °API gravity, 
which stands for the American Petroleum Institute standard. Nigerian crude oÜ streams 
have a low sulphur content if compared with crude oil from most other countries (see 
Appendix D, Table D.7.).^^ Refineries often prefer crude oü with a low sulphur content 
because they must remove the sulphur from the oü (Hyne 1995, 14). As a result, the 
international price of crude oü from Nigeria is higher than that from many other 
countries.^^
On the whole, Nigeria is very attiactive to oü companies tiianks to high profits, 
the presence of significant oü and gas reserves as weü as the preferred quahty of the 
Nigerian oü. Particularly high profits can help to explain why oü companies have 
expanded their investments in Nigeria despite considerable pohtical risks in the country 
and the escalation of conflicts between oil companies and viüage communities.
From the point of view of viüage communities, the intensified oü and gas 
exploration and production activity from the late 1980s has increased the physical 
presence of oü companies in the oü producing areas and contacts with viüage
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^ Currently, Nigeria’s biggest oil stream is Qua Iboe, produced by Mobil’s joint venture. !iFor instance, in December 1996, Nigerian ‘Bonny Light’ fetched 24.53 US$/barrel compared with 23.05 j
US$/barrel for ‘Arabian Light’ and 21.82 US$/barrel for ‘Dubai’ {OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 1997). In i
comparison with the price tag of crude oil from the Middle East, the Nigerian crude oil is also more precious !
because of lower transport costs. Nigeria is closer to the markets of Europe and the US than the Middle East, so 
an oil tanker journey from Nigeria is at least several days shorter. The buyer can therefore save money on the 
payment of tanker charter and insurance. This insight was largely owed to personal communication with Martin 
Quinlan, journalist at the Petroleum Economist, London (October 1998).
communities. This in turn is likely to have incmased the probability of conflicts - and thus 
litigation - between oü companies and the local people.
2.5. Nigeria’s Political Economy of Oil
Expanding oü production as weü as oü price rises stimulated by the Organisation 
of OÜ Exporting Countries (OPEC), particulaiiy in 1973-74 and in 1979, rendered 
Nigeria almost entirely dependent on oü.^  ^ The importance of oü to the country was 
reflected in the contribution of oil revenues to total government revenue, which rose from 
26.3% in 1970 to over 80% in 1974. Oü revenues have sustained the Nigerian 
government budgets since the 1970s.^  ^ According to Nigerian official figmes, oÜ revenue 
accounted for 63.3% of the total federaüy coüected revenue in 1997 {Guardian, Lagos, 
19 Febmary 1998). Even more impressively, the oü industry provided 96.0% of Nigeria’s 
dollar receipts in 1997 (see Appendix C, Table C.8.).
Fonest (1994, 133) has indicated that one of the most noticeable consequences of 
the surge in oil revenues in the early 1970s was the neglect of non-oil tax revenues, of 
which some were a b o lis h e d .B y  the mid-1970s, the shai'e of non-oil revenue in
Export revenues from oil rose by over 180% in 1974 and by over 70% in 1979. With this export boom, oil exports 
became Nigeria’s major earner of foreign currency in the 1970s. In 1963, oil exports made up 10.75% of 
Nigeria’s total exports. Ten years later, the figure had risen to 83.14%. In 1995, the share of oil exports in 
Nigeria’s total exports was 95.7% (see Appendix C, Table C.4.).
Oil revenues have fluctuated, falling below 70% of the total government revenue in 1978,1982-83 and 1986 (see 
Appendix C, Table C.7.).
Forrest (1993,133-134) has concluded that the expansion of state revenues was accompanied by a ‘deterioration 
in financial discipline and accountability as the struggle to gain access to state resources intensified'. Forrest 
(1993, 133-134 and 142) has noted that, with rising expenditure, the government was able to afford massive tax 
reductions, an expansion of the public sector and subsidies to Nigerian public enterprises. A large proportion of 
oü revenues was spent on consumption, particularly on imported goods, which further increased Nigeria’s 
dependence on oil.
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government revenue had maikedly declined, in particular, the contribution of agriculture 
(Ohiorhenuan 1984; Ikein 1990). The contribution of the agiicultural sector to Nigeria’s 
gross domestic product fell from around 60% in 1960 to less than 10% in 1978 (Ikein 
1990, 19-20). The displacement of the agricultural sector made Nigeria’s economy 
almost exclusively dependent on a single commodity - crude oil.
Dependence on oü exposed Nigeria to fluctuations in the international oü market. 
Unlike the low populated oü producing countries in the Middle East, the Nigerian 
government did not invest oü revenues in the West in order to secure a future income 
flow. Nor did the government set money aside in stabüisation or development funds 
(Forrest 1993,142). This lack of long-term investments was not a problem as long as the 
0 Ü revenues were increasing in the 1970s. But fluctuations in the oü market could throw 
Nigeria’s public finances into disarray. The Nigerian government budget for 1998, for 
example, was based on the assumption of an average oü price of $17 per barrel. In the 
same month that the budget was announced, the crude oÜ price feU from $16 to $14.73 
per barrel, thus threatening the viability of the entire budget {Newswatch, 16 February 
1998). In the first quarter of 1998 alone, Nigeria reportedly lost US$ 700 million as a 
result of the global drop in oü prices out of US$ 8 billion lost by aU OPEC countries 
combined {AP, 19 Aprü 1998). The state lacked alternative sources of financial revenue 
to those of oil and was thus unable to dispense with investments of foreign oil companies.
The nature of Nigeria’s political economy, characterised by its dependence on oü 
revenues, was captured in the concept of a ‘rentier state’. According to this concept 
(Forrest 1977; Graf 1988, 218-222), the Nigerian state revenues were extracted from
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taxes and ‘rents’, largely in the form of oil revenues from foreign companies, rather than 
from ‘productive’ activity. Nigerian business was said to be restricted to ‘unproductive’ 
activities, which included (in the words of Forrest) ‘commercial and service activities, 
small-scale capitalism and non-capitalist formations’ (Forrest 1977, 43). Forrest (1977) 
argued that Nigerian business has forged an alliance with foreign capital, which continued 
to dominate Nigeria’s political economy. In other words, the Nigerian state was biased in 
favom* of oil interests. '^*
As an extension to the concept of a rentier state, Turner (1978) has introduced 
the concept of a ‘comprador state’. The concept of a comprador state was based on the 
observation that tliere was little indigenous capitalist production of final consumer goods 
in Nigeria. In general. Turner (1978, 166) has declared that contemporary political 
economies characterised by ‘commercial capitalism’ such as Nigeria are ‘those which 
depend on foreign industrial production fo r virtually all locally-consumed manufactured 
goods’. Within this system of ‘commercial capitalism’, indigenous business could only 
play a facilitating role for foreign capital within a triangular system of economic 
relationships, which involved foreign businessmen, Nigerian middlemen and the
^  The concept of the rentier state in Nigeria rests implicitly on the assumption of dependency theories that Nigeria 
lies at the periphery of the international capitalist system, while the foreign companies are located within the 
centre of the system. Johan Galtung (1971) has provided a sophisticated exposition of this theme. On the most 
basic level, Galtung’s main idea was that the world consists of Centre and Periphery nations; and each nation, in 
turn, has its centre and periphery (Galtung 1971, 81). Within this Centre-Periphery structure, the Centre exploits 
the Periphery. Galtung (1971) has argued that the centre could only extract something from the periphery nation, 
if there was (in Galtung’s words) a ‘bridgehead’ between the Centre nation and the Periphery nation. According 
to this view, a necessary condition for imperialism was a harmony of interest between the centre in the Centre 
nation and the centre in the Periphery nation and a disharmony of interest within the Periphery nation. In order to 
continue the relation of dominance, the centre of the Centre nation needed intermediaries in the centre of the 
Periphery nation (in Galtung’s words a ‘transmission belt’ in the form of commercial firms or trading companies) 
who provided the ‘bridgehead’ for foreign capital and benefit from the economic exchange at the expense of the 
periphery of the Periphery nation (Galtung 1971, 84). If applied to the Nigerian rentier state, this would imply 
that foreign oü companies (located at the centre of the Centre nation) would need the Nigerim business elite 
(located at the centre of the Periphery nation) as commercial intermediaries to carry out oil exploitation.
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collaborating ‘state compradors’/^ According to this view, a foreign business hired a 
local middleman as a go-between with the state. If the foreign businessman was awarded 
a contract, the middleman would receive a payment by the businessman, while the state 
comprador would receive a payment negotiated by the middleman. Turner (1978) has 
indicated that foreign businessmen could sometimes deal directly with the state without 
the help of middlemen. In either case, the Nigerian state was said to serve foreign 
business interests to a lesser or greater extent (Turner 1978).
This view of the post-colonial state in West Africa has been challenged by Collins 
(1983) who has suggested that the concept of the Nigerian state as ‘rentier’ or 
‘comprador’ did not reflect reality. Instead, he has suggested that the role of the state 
‘reflects a complex interplay o f  sectional, group and class interests’. In practice, the 
state role was said to be variable. That means, the state could sometimes support 
nationalist interests, sometimes indigenous capitalist interests and, at other times, it might 
favour foreign business interests. The arguments of scholars such as Collins seemed to 
have been substantiated by the rise of a class of indigenous industrialists in African states 
which appeared to be distinct from the commercial or ‘comprador’ class. In his more 
recent studies, Fonest (1993, 9) has argued that the new capitalist group in Nigeria ‘is 
not an auxiliary comprador class. It is an active component o f  capital that has grown 
partly through collaboration with foreign capital, partly in competition with it, and 
partly independently’ which was a striking departure from Forrest’s earlier position on 
the ‘rentier state’. Criticism of the ‘rentier state’ concept rested primarily on the
‘Comprador’ is a Portuguese word for ‘buyer’. According to Turner (1978), a comprador would perform the task 
of providing access to local markets for foreign firms. In other words, a ‘state comprador’ performed the role of a 
‘gatekeeper’ for foreign firms.
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assumption that indigenisation^^ of the economy may have enhanced the position of the 
post-colonial state in Africa vis-à-vis foreign business interests.
Indigenisation measures in Africa were rooted in the nationalist African 
movements during colonial rule and after de-colonisation. Chazan et al. (1988,156) have 
argued that African political ideologies in the post-colonial period came to share a basic 
concern to overcome poverty and underdevelopment, which resulted in some sort of 
economic nationalism across Africa. In general, the intellectual climate in Africa’s post- 
colonial states appeared to favour economic nationalism which usually implied the 
assertion of broadly defined national economic interests as opposed to interests of 
foreigners.
Measures of indigenisation were capable of causing serious adverse impact on the 
profits of foreign-owned enterprises, including those of oü companies, so the effects of 
African nationalism could be potentiaUy higlily damaging to oü company interests. Like 
most other African countries, Nigeria has undertaken many measures of indigenisation of 
foreign enterprises (e.g. Biersteker 1987). Tlie partial nationalisation of the Nigerian 
subsidiaries of foreign oü companies in the 1970s was only one of those measures. But 
Biersteker’s (1987) pathbreaking study on indigenisation in Nigeria has suggested that 
the state and the business elite has largely faüed to wrest control over the economy from 
foreign capital. Biersteker (1987, 299) has concluded that ‘indigenisation has certainly 
not contributed significantly to Nigerians’ control o f their economy’ despite its limited 
success. By implication, indigenisation did not result in the demise of the ‘rentier state’.
That means, measures designed to increase local (state or private) participation and control of significant business 
ventures.
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The concept of the ‘rentier state’ indirectly implies that the state would not 
support litigation against foreign oü companies in Nigeria. The concept assumes that the 
state lacks autonomy vis-à-vis foreign capital. By implication, since foreign oü companies 
are said to have unrestricted access to the state officials, they could use their influence 
with state officials to increase their prospects of success in court cases filed against them. 
The key question in the subsequent sub-sections is, therefore, to what extent is the 
Nigerian post-colonial state biased in favour of foreign oü companies, given measures of 
indigenisation undertaken in the oü industry. The government petroleum policy and the 
role of the state in community conflicts are key factors in this analysis.
2.6. Nigerian Petroleum Policy
In terms o f the state involvement in the Nigerian oü industry. Obi and Soremekun 
(1995) have distinguished three distinct historical phases. According to this typology, the 
first phase extended from the colonial period until the end of the 1960s and involved little 
state participation in the oil industry. The second phase, as a response to political changes 
during the Civü War* 1967-1970, was said to have been marked by an increase in state 
participation in the 1970s. Obi and Soremekun (1995) have argued tliat Nigeria moved 
from the collection of oü rents to direct intervention in the running of the oil industry. 
The third phase, as a response to the economic crisis of the 1980s and the introduction of 
the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP), was said to be a reversal of some of the 
earlier policies of state intervention. Greater fiscal incentives to the oü industry were said
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to be the key element of the third phase. All three phases are briefly outlined below with a 
view to a link between petroleum policy and state bias in favour of oü companies.
During the first phase of state involvement in tlie Nigerian oü industry untü the 
end of the 1960s, the role of the Nigerian government in the oü industry was largely 
limited to the collection of tax and rent or royalty from foreign oü companies. The most 
notable change in petroleum policy in the 1960s was the increase in the amount of oü 
rents paid to the federal government. The government was assigned an increasingly 
higher share of oü revenues at the expense of oü companies. But it did not attempt to 
intervene directly in the running of the oü exploration and production sectors in Nigeria. 
The only notable exception to the rule was the government participation in the 
construction of an oü refinery in Port Harcourt initiated by Shell-BP.^* From the point of 
view of vülage communities, virtuaUy nothing had changed since the government largely 
abstained from directly inteiwening in the iimning of the oü exploration and production 
work on the ground.
Obi and Soremekun (1995) have suggested that the second phase of state 
involvement in the Nigerian oü industry started during the CivÜ War 1967-70, which 
changed the perception of the oü industry in government circles. Pearson (1970, 139) has
In 1967, Nigeria’s government proclaimed the Petroleum Profits Tax (Amendment) Decree 1967, which adopted 
new terms for tax assessment and allowed for higher government revenue. Pearson (1970, 24-29) has estimated 
that the new arrangements were capable of increasing the government share of profits from 50 to as much as 66%, 
although any comparison of actual profits was difficult as profits depended on changing oil prices. In the 1970s, 
the petroleum profits tax was further increased from 50% to 55% in 1973, to 67.75% in 1974 and to 85% in 1975, 
while royalty rates were increased from 12.5% to 16.67% in 1974 and to 20% in 1975 (Khan 1994, 16-18).
Initially, the government agreed to take up only a 40% stake in the refinery and the oil companies seemed 
satisfied (Letter from J.S.Sadler, the UK Trade Commissioner in Lagos, to J.A.Davidson, Commonwealth 
Relations Office (18 September 1961), DO 177/33, PRO). Later the government share was increased to 50%. A 
joint venture was formed between the government (50%), BP (25%) and Shell (25%) as a separate company 
called the Nigerian Petroleum Refining Company (NPRC). The NPRC refinery was commissioned in 1965 near 
Port Harcourt in Rivers State under the management of BP (Pearson 1970, 92).
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suggested that the Civil War made the government realise the strategic importance of oü 
for Western countries because foreign intervention had drawn Nigeria into the 
international politics of oil. Furthermore, the war required stricter government control of 
the oil industry and the state came to rely on oil revenue to promote economic 
development (Pearson 1970, 139).
Following the Civil War, Nigeria joined the OPEC in 1971. The most important 
effect of the OPEC membership on Nigeria’s oil policy was in regards to indigenisation 
which was encouraged by the OPEC.^^
At this stage, it must be pointed out that some indigenisation measmes beneficial 
to the Nigerian economy were not inherently contrary to the interests of foreign 
companies. In line with the government’s indigenization policy, for instance, the foreign 
oil companies have increasingly replaced expatriate managers with Nigerians. Yet this 
process was already under way before the promulgation of the Petroleum Decree in 1969 
since it may make good business sense to employ indigenous managers. In fact, Shell-BP 
was committed to greater nigerianization from the 1950s, but the oü companies 
experienced the problem of finding educated recruits.'^  ^ Nigerian institutions had also
^ A resolution at the OPEC Conference in 1968 advised member countries to acquire ‘participation in the 
ownership o f the concession-holding companies’ (OPEC 1992, 21). Indigenisation measures in the Nigerian oil 
industry had already been launched before the country joined the OPEC. As early as 1968, the Companies’ Act 
forced all companies to become incorporated in Nigeria. This provided the government with a greater access to 
company accounts, a move resented by the US oil companies in Nigeria (Turner 1977, 48-49). In 1969, the 
Petroleum Act forced oil companies to recruit and train a greater number of Nigerians. According to the 
Petroleum Act, at least 75% of the total number of employees in senior and supervisory positions should be 
Nigerians within ten years from the grant of an oil mining lease. Companies were further obliged to restrict all 
employment opportunities for skilled, semi-skilled and unskilled work to Nigerians (Petroleum Act No.51 of 
1969, section 37). The Petroleum Act also proclaimed that only companies incorporated in Nigeria could be 
granted oil licenses (Petroleum Act No.51 of 1969, section 2, sub-section 2).
E.J. Pearce, the British Trade Commissioner at Enugu, wrote as early as 1959 that Shell-BP were committed to 
greater Nigerianisation and were ‘indeed anxious to fulfil their promise’. Pearce also noted that it is ‘extremely 
difficult to secure and train the right type o f Nigerian’ (Report of a visit of Mr. E. J. Pearce, the United Kingdom 
Trade Commissioner at Enugu, to the Shell-BP Exploration Company’s installations at Owerri, Port Harcourt and 
in the field, 31 August - 3 September 1959, POWE 33/421, PRO). The proportion of Nigerians in senior and
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problems to fill positions with qualified Nigerians, particularly during the shortage of 
trained staff in the early 1970s (Turner 1977, 68), It could be suggested that some 
indigenisation measures have served the broader objectives of both the foreign oil 
companies and the state in Nigeria.
Indigenisation measures in the Nigerian oü industry were gieatly expanded in the 
1970s. From 1971, the government gradually set up joint ventures with the oü 
exploration and production companies in Nigeria and acquired shareholdings in these 
ventures (Tm*ner 1980, 107-109). By July 1979, the government had acquired a 60% 
ownership in aU the major foreign oü companies except for the production-sharing 
agreement with Ashland and the Tenneco-Mobil-Sunray venture (Khan 1994, 70) (see 
Appendix C, Table C.IO.).'^^
Tlie nationalisation of BP in 1979 ülustrated tiiat the Nigerian government was 
able to fiiUy nationalise a foreign oü company, if it was determined to do so (Khan 1994, 
70-71). The nationalisation of BP, however, was conducted out of considerations for 
foreign policy, not for economic reasons."^  ^ For the Nigerian oü industry, the 
nationalisation of BP changed httle. In the exploration and production sector, SheU
supervisory positions at Shell-BP increased from 7% to 45% between 1957 and 1970 despite the fact that no legal 
provision forced them to employ Nigerians (Madujibeya 1976, 300). Since Shell-BP was voluntarily prepared to 
employ Nigerians, it has to be assumed that the company had commercial reasons to employ them.
As a result of nationalisations in the 1970s, the share of foreign capital in Nigeria’s mining industry had declined 
from 100% in 1971 to 40.8% in 1977, to 21.8% in 1989 (see Appendix C, Table C .ll.).
The government aimed at influencing British policies on Rhodesia (which later became Zimbabwe), which was 
then ruled by a white supremacist regime. The Nigerian government under General Obasanjo was committed to 
the cause of black majority rule in Rhodesia. The government wanted to exert political influence on the British 
foreign policy towards Rhodesia. The British government looked set to lift sanctions against Rhodesia, which 
finally prompted the Nigerian decision to nationalise BP. The nationalisation of BP was undertaken shortly before 
the Commonwealth Conference in Lusaka where Britain was expected to take a softer approach to sanctions 
against Rhodesia. An official excuse for nationalisation was coincidentally provided by an arrangement between 
BP and the US company Conoco. According to this arrangement, BP was to sell North Sea oil to Conoco in return 
for Conoco’s supply of non-OPEC oil to South Africa (Aluko 1990).
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continued to operate the joint-venture on behalf of the government, which was previously 
jointly operated by Shell and BP (Khan 1994,70).
From the perspective of village communities, the nationalisation of BP and 
indigenisation of the oil industry changed virtually nothing since the foreign oil companies 
retained managerial control of the joint-ventures. Despite the fact that foreign companies 
operate the joint-ventures with a minority shareholding, two out of three of the 
multinational oü companies intei'viewed by Biersteker claimed that they had retained 
effective control over venture operations (Biersteker 1987, 241). In general, Terisa 
Tmmer (1977, 152) has argued that ‘as long as they [oil companies in Nigeria] remained 
operators, participation had little more than financial implications fo r them’. Whüe the 
NNPC formaUy commands the joint-ventures with its ownership equity, the foreign oü 
companies control the day-to-day operations of the joint-venture.'^  ^ Despite 
indigenisation measmes, the same oü companies thus continued their operations in viUage 
communities.
Indigenisation measures were accompanied by a re-structuring of the state oü 
administration. In Aprü 1971, the Nigerian National Oü Coiporation (NNOC) was 
created to acquire any liabilities and interests in existing oü companies on behalf of the 
government."^ In 1977, the NNOC was merged with the Ministry of Petroleum 
Resources (MPR) into the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC).'^  ^ Untü
Nominally, the NNPC owned roughly 58% of Nigeria’s total oil production in April 1997. But the foreign oil I
operators - including Shell, Chevron, Mobil, Agip, Elf, Texaco - produced roughly 98% of Nigeria’s total daily oil |
output in April 1997 {Weekly Petroleum Argus, 21 April 1997).
NNOC ActNo.18 of 1971. }
NNPC Act No.33 of 1977. !
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1986 when the MPR was re-established, the NNPC combined functions of an oil 
company with extended regulatoiy powers of a ministry. This peculiar role allowed the 
NNPC, for instance, to issue licences to its so-called competitors. The NNPC’s ambitious 
goal was to eventually control the entire oil industry in Nigeria including oil exploration 
and production (NNPC 1986,27)."^
The NNPC never carried out its threat to fully nationalise the oil industry. In the 
same year the NNPC was established, the government paradoxically introduced new 
financial incentives for foreign oil companies in order to stimulate new exploration. Alii 
(1997) has observed that a decline in oil exploration by foreign companies in the 1970s 
had forced the government into a more accommodating tone towards the foreign oil 
companies. Between 1977 and 1983, the fiscal incentives for foreign oil companies were 
improved four times, although the new fiiscal terms failed to significantly increase foreign 
investment in oü exploration (AUi 1997). According to Aluko (1990, 386), when NNPC 
officials were summoned by general Obasanjo in 1979 to opine on the potential impact of 
BP’s nationalisation, they reportedly showed little enthusiasm for nationalisation of the oil 
industry. They were said to have aigued that the nationalisation of BP would slow down 
0 Ü production, which would in turn result in a fall of Nigeria’s oü revenues in the short­
term (Aluko 1990, 386). This cautious attitude towards nationalisation exemplified a 
marked shift from the earlier caUs for fuU nationalisation of the oü industry among NNOC 
officials only a few years earlier. It has to be assumed that government officials have
The NNPC was intended to become ‘a commercial, integrated, international oil company, engaged in 
exploration, production, processing, transportation and marketing of crude oil, gas, by-products and derivatives ’ 
(NNPC 1986, 27). In negotiations between companies and the government, the ultimate threat of complete 
nationalisation of the oil industry was less effective because of the inability of the NNOC to operate successfully. 
Among other advantages, the creation of an effective state oil corporation could allow the government to do more 
than just bluff in negotiations (Turner 1977, 209).
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recognised in the late 1970s that they could not dispense with foreign investment. 
Contrary to the assertion of Obi and Soremekun (1995), it thus appears that the third 
phase in Nigeria’s petroleum policy has started in the late 1970s rather than in the late 
1980s.
In the 1980s, faced with the immediate problems of falling oil revenues and 
political crises, the government further improved the fiscal terms for oil company 
operators in order to woo foreign investors (AUi 1997). Most importantly, the so-called 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) was introduced in 1986 as a comprehensive 
improved financial agreement between the government and the oü companies."*  ^ Changes 
in fiscal arrangements from the 1970s onwards signified the state’s greater reliance on 
revenues from foreign oÜ companies. It is likely that this reliance rendered the state more 
receptive to the needs of oü companies rather than vülage communities in the oü 
producing areas.
During the thkd phase of petroleum policy in the oü industry, the government has 
continued to pursue measures of indigenisation in the oü industry. Above aU, private 
indigenous oü companies have come to own a significant number of oü licences in the 
1990s."^  ^ The rise of private indigenous oü companies is important because it could mean
The MOU of 1986 ensured a guaranteed so-called minimum fiscal margin of US$ 2.00/barrel of oü (after royalty 
and tax payments), which was an increase from US$ 1.60 in 1982 (see Appendix C, Table 0.12.).“^’ Calculation 
of tax was changed from the so-called Official Selling Price (OSP) to a market based price, which allowed higher 
profits for the oü companies. Other incentives included the reduction of the petroleum profits tax, security of 
tenure and investments, generous tax holidays, guaranteed export earnings including permission to operate 
offshore escrow accounts and reserves addition bonuses. In 1991, the MOU was reviewed and the financial 
incentives were slightly increased (Adepetun 1996). In 1993, the government introduced further incentives for 
exploration in deepwater offshore areas, including lower royalty rates and higher cost recovery allowances 
(Barrows 1995).
Until the late 1980s, there was virtually no serious indigenous oil companies in Nigeria, except for Henry Stevens 
in the 1970s and Nigus Petroleum in the 1980s, of which both have not survived (Avuru 1997, 292). From the late 
1980s, many new indigenous oü companies were founded starting with Dubri 0Ü which bought an oil licence
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that the Nigerian state is no longer dependent on oil rents from foreign firms. It is thus 
instinctive to explore whether the rise of indigenous oil companies resulted in less state 
bias in favour of foreign oil companies.
From the early 1990s, indigenous oil companies have expanded their exploration 
and production operations."^  ^ Yet only a handful of indigenous oU companies have 
actually set up operating companies, which are properly equipped. Since these companies 
often lacked tlie technical know-how and the financial resources to develop their oil 
licences, they generally sought experienced Western partners and formed joint-ventures, 
in which the foreign company h£d usually a 40% equity share (see Appendix C, Table 
C.13.). Of the nine ‘active’ companies in 1996, seven were operating with a foreign 
technical partner (Avuru 1997, 293).^®
Indeed, the rise of indigenous oil companies has increased the penetiation of 
Nigeria’s oil exploration and production sectors by foreign oü companies. Technical 
partnerships with Nigerian companies proved as an effective strategy for smaUer foreign 
O Ü  companies such as the Canada-based Abacan to set foot in oü exploration and 
production in Nigeria.^  ^ Whüe it is too early to make a prediction on the success of the
from the foreign oU company Philips Oil in 1987. By the end of 1993, the Minister of Petroleum Resources Jubiil 
Aminu had allocated oU licences to almost 40 indigenous oil companies (see Appendix C, Table C.13.).
Their total production rose from 5,000 b/d in 1993 (Avuru 1997, 300) to 55,500 b/d at the end of 1996 and was 
further rising (PostExpress, 19 March 1998). According to Avuru (1997, 301), indigenous oil companies and their 
business partners have invested over US$ 800 million in the Nigerian oil industry in the period 1991-1996.
Of the 38 indigenous oü companies in 1996, Avmn (1997, 293) considered 20 as entirely inactive. Avuru (1997, 
293) has only considered 9 companies as active in the sense that they have been ‘engaged in a sustained effort at 
exploration and production’.
In early 1998, for example, Abacan had a 40% equity share in five joint-ventures with Nigerian companies, which 
covered six oü prospecting licences (OPLs): Yinka Folawiyo (GPL 309), Optimum Petroleum (OPL 310), 
Petroleum Products (OPL 233), Alfred James Petroleum (OPL 302) and Amni International (OPL 237 and 
469).®’ Abacan and its Nigerian partners made a number of oil discoveries such as Amni’s Ima Field offshore 
(Petroconsultants 1998).
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indigenous oil companies, their combined share of oil production is likely to remain 
insignificant for some time. In April 1997, the two largest indigenous producers Amni 
International and Consolidated Oil accounted for only 0.7% of Nigeria’s total oil 
production each {Petroleum Argus, 21 April 1997). The impact of the indigenous oil 
producers was thus too smaU to significantly alter the position of the Nigerian state vis-â- 
vis foreign oil companies.
The position of the Nigerian state vis-â-vis foreign capital appeared to have been 
strengthened under the oü minister Dan Etete in the period 1995-1998 who introduced a 
number of policy measures, which ran counter to the interests of the foreign oü 
companies.^^ Above aU, Etete inflicted a blow to foreign oü companies with the 
Petroleum (Amendment) Decree No.23 of 1996 (also known as the Marginal Fields 
Decree), which empowered the government to recover aU undeveloped marginal oü fields 
from foreign oü companies and re-allocate the same to indigenous oü companies 
(Adepetun 1996; Atsegbua 1997). The Decree is an important test case of the bias of the 
Nigerian state in favour of foreign capital because it violated the interests of foreign oü 
companies. Most foreign oil companies considered this compulsory acquisition of paits of 
existing concessions as a breach of existing agreements (Adepetun 1996; Atsegbua
1997). Foreign oil companies have previously claimed that the development of marginal 
fields was unprofitable. Yet a large number of oü companies, mostly foreign, have
There was a delay over the re-negotiation of the MOU from 1996 because the foreign oil companies could not 
agree with the government on new fiscal provisions. In 1997, Etete launched two new committees to monitor the 
oil industry: the Joint Venture Cash Calls Monitoring Committee and the LNG Project Monitoring Committee. 
Several months earlier, Etete accused the foreign oil companies of tax evasion, spurious contracts, lack of 
accountability and other transgressions. The new committees were charged with greater scrutiny of operating 
budgets of oil companies and greater physical monitoring of projects, among other things {The Guardian, Lagos, 
24 January 1997).
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reportedly indicated an interest to exploit these oilfields following the Decree No.23 
(Vanguard, Lagos, 13 August 1998). According to Avuru (1997, 301), mai-ginal fields 
can often be more economically exploited by smaller oil companies with smaller overhead 
costs than by large multinational companies. The government’s decision to develop the 
mai'ginal oil fields thus potentially benefited the Nigerian state, which would receive 
greater oil revenues, and small indigenous oil companies, which would be able to start oil 
production from marginal fields without the financial bui*den of oil explomtion. At the 
same time, the Decree would constitute a substantial loss of capital assets for the 
established foreign oil companies.^^
The Marginal Fields Decree, however, had a number of legal loopholes and was 
not yet enforced by 1998, which left the profit potential of the foreign oil companies 
unaffected. The lack of enforcement of the Marginal Fields Decree underlines the ad hoc 
nature of policy making in Nigeria. The one-page decree was hastily drafted and even 
failed to define the word ‘marginal field’, so the oil companies could, legally speaking, 
claim that they do not have any marginal fields. SheU indeed claimed that it did not have 
any marginal fields and refused to declare any of its fields as marginal (Post Express, 19 
March 1998). In any case, the reluctance of the government to enforce the Decree 
suggests that the government is weU aware of the adverse consequences of alienating the 
foreign oil companies, which could result in diminished foreign investment that Nigeria is 
dependent on. In any case, it must be remembered that marginal fields only constitute a 
peripheral asset of the foreign oil companies. One could thus consider the use of marginal
According to Avuru (1997, 303), there were 183 marginal fields in Nigeria with an estimated proven reserves of 
2.3 billion barrels of oil. Based on the low oü price of US$ 14, the marginal fields could yield US$ 32.2 bülion in 
gross OÜ revenues.
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fields by indigenous producers as merely a profitable niche within the foreign-dominated 
oil sector. The Marginal Fields Decree does not put into question the concept of -the 
rentier state in Nigeria, which explicitly allows for those indigenous business 
opportunities within the foreign dominated sector of the economy.
In general, the government largely continued to offer attractive financial 
incentives to foreign oil companies in order to ensure the flow of foreign investment. 
The 1998 budget of the federal government, for example, provided for fiscal incentives 
for gas development projects, including a tax rate of 30% instead of the nominal 
petroleum profits tax rate of 85% (Oil and Gas Update, January 1998). Greater fiscal 
incentives to oü companies from the late 1970s underline a continuing contradiction in 
Nigeria’s petroleum policy. On the one hand, the government pursued the goal of 
tr ansferring control over the oü industry to Nigerians. The mdigenization measures of the 
1970s were not reversed. The foreign oü companies in Nigeria continue to operate joint- 
ventures, which are majority government-owned. On the other hand, the government and 
the emerging indigenous oü companies continued to require the foreign companies’ 
technical expertise and investment. Therefore, the plans for the complete nationalisation 
of the oil industry were never carried out and the government was consistently attempting 
to avoid alienating the foreign oü companies. The third phase of petroleum policy making 
thus suggests that state bias in favour of oü companies was ensured by the continuing
It is not yet clear in what way petroleum policy will be altered under the current Abubakar regime or following 
the announced transition to civilian rule in 1999. Since the death of general Abacha in 1998, the Department of 
Petroleum Resources - the government’s monitoring agency for the oil industry - was abolished and Garry Aret 
Adams, NNPC’s former managing director, was appointed as the President’s Special Adviser on Petroleum 
Resources (PostExpress, 31 August 1998 and 8 October 1998). The impact of this decision on petroleum policy 
cannot be fully predicted at this stage.
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reliance of the state and the business elite on foreign oil and gas investment It is likely 
that this bias rendered the state less receptive to the needs of village communities.
Even if the Nigerian state were not biased in favour of oil companies, an adequate 
policy on the oil producing aieas would be hindered by corruption among government 
officials who benefit from private deals with oil companies. Indeed, it appears that a 
significant part of Nigeria’s public resources has been used for private gain by private 
middlemen and state officials (or in the words of Turner ‘state compradors’). According 
to Soremekun (1995), during the civihan rule 1979-1983, the Nigerian state lost 12.5 
billion Naira in oü revenue as a result of fraudulent practices, largely as a result of private 
middlemanship. As a comparison, Nigeria’s total government revenue from oü was 8.9 
billion Naira in 1979 (Cential Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, June 
1982). The respectable periodical Africa Confidential has revealed that some US$ 3-4 
billion were reportedly siphoned off in oÜ deals by the ruling elite and its business 
partners in less than four years from November 1993, when general Abacha came to 
power (Africa Confidential, 24 October 1997). As a comparison, Nigeria’s total 
government revenue from oü was US$ 12 billion in 1997 (Guardian, Lagos, 19 February
1998).“
Until today, coiTuption in the oü industry has persisted and middlemen as weU as 
state officials have continued to provide access for foreign com panies.U nder general
®® Among other financial arrangements, more than US$ 2 billion allocated to the NNPC for refinery repairs in the 
period 1993-95 had gone missing. From general Abacha’s rise to power in 1993, financial transfers involving the 
oü industry had to go through the presidential office, which suggests that the government was fully informed 
about the extent of corruption and financial deals in the oil industry (Africa Confidential, 24 October 1997).
Conversely, the faÜure to pay bribes could endanger a company’s survival. In 1997, the oil ministry demanded a 
‘signature bonus’ on top of the required fee, before awarding the oü mining leases (OMLs). The indigenous firms 
Amni and Yinka Folawiyo, which complained about paying those bribes, had problems obtaining their respective 
OMLs (Africa Confidential, 24 October 1997).
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Abacha’s rule 1993-1998, foreign trading companies such as Glencore, Addax (both 
Swiss-based) and Arcadia (British-based) reportedly paid commissions of about 10-15% 
to government officials for the allocation of term-contracts (Africa Confidential, 24 
October 1997)/^ The term-contracts exemplified the role of Nigeria’s private middlemen 
such as the businessman Mike Adenuga, owner of the indigenous oü fiim Consolidated 
OÜ. Adenuga acqmred term-contracts in the names of Tradoil and Crownway Enterprises 
from the Nigerian state. The fuel cargoes were in turn handled by the British-based firm 
Aicadia (Africa Confidential, 21 June 1996). Evidence on the prevalent corruption m 
Nigeria seems to confirm one of the key elements of Turner’s model of the ‘comprador 
state’, in wliich a foreign business partner may seek a contract from the government 
through bribes.^^
From the perspective of vülage communities, the question arises whether the 
Nigerian government would have pursued more beneficial policies for the people in the 
0 Ü producing areas, if the state was less biased in favom* of oü companies and 
government officials had less to benefit from commercial deals with foreign oü 
companies. While this question is largely hypothetical, the persisting government 
dependence on oil and corruption appear to restrict the range of choices avaüable to 
policy-makers in Nigeria. In the face of those constraints, the Nigerian state is likely to be
In 1997, those three forcign companies were said to control roughly 80% of Nigeria’s term-contracts between 
them, exporting 1.1 million b/d of crude oil from Nigeria (Africa Confidential, 24 October 1997). As a 
comparison, Nigeria’s total oil production was 2.3 million b/d of crude oü in April 1997 (Weekly Petroleum 
Argus, 21 April 1997).
OÜ trading contracts have also remained an important source of political patronage. In early 1998, for example, 
General Abacha reportedly approved oU trading contracts for key members of the five government-backed 
political parties who chose him as a their presidential candidate in the transition programme to civilian rule 
(Nigerian News Du Jour, 13 February 1998).
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more receptive to the needs of oil companies rather than village communities in the oil 
producing areas.
2.7. Ethnic Factionalism and Allocation of Resources
The bias of the Nigerian state in favour of oil companies has an ethnic dimension. 
Crude oil has been almost exclusively located on the land of ethnic minority groups in the 
south-east of the country. Because of their small numbers, these groups - the Ijaw, the 
Urhobo, the Isoko, the Ogoni and other smaller groups - wielded little political power.^  ^
At Nigeria’s independence in 1960, political power was distributed between three major 
ethnic groups - the Hausa-Fulani, the Ibos and the Yorubas, who dominated the 
Northern, the Eastern and the Western regions, representing roughly 66% of Nigeria’s 
population. In each of the regions, the dominant ethnic group lived alongside many 
smaller groups.^®
While the oü producing areas have been mainly located in the Chiistian-Animist 
South, the mainly Muslim North wielded more political power thioughout Nigeria’s 
history to-date.^  ^ Out of eleven Nigerian heads of state since independence in 1960, nine
However, ethnic loyalty has limits. Government participation of ethnic minority leaders does not necessarily 
result in a better treatment for those minorities. Dan Etete (oil minister 1995-98), for example, was an Ijaw from 
an oil producing area (Africa Confidential, 9 May 1997). But Etete was busy arranging lucrative business deals in 
the oil industry for himself rather than assisting the Ijaws (Africa Confidential, 24 October 1997).
^  Olowu (1990, 200-201) has estimated the number of ethnic groups at between 250 and 400.
Nmoma (1995, 314) has argued that the religious divide between the northern-Muslim and the southern 
predominantly Christian cultures was probably greater than the purely ethnic divide. Nigeria’s population has 
diverse religious backgrounds comprising of Islam, Christianity and Animism unevenly spread in the regions. 
According to Ibrahim (1991, 115), Muslims, Christians and ‘pagans’ made up 47, 34.6 and 18.2% of the 
population in 1963 respectively, though the true extent of Animism may have been much greater.
49
came from Northern groups (including three from the so-called Middle Belt of Nigeria)^^, 
two were Yorubas, one was Ibo/^ Heads of state from the North also tended to rule 
much longer than their Southern counter-paits (see Table 2.2.).^
Table 2.2, Nigerian Governments, 1960-1999
Period of Rule Head of State Type of Government Ethnic Origin How the Rule Ended
1960-1966 Balewa Civilian Hausa Attempted Coup/ Assassination
1966 Ironsi Military Ibo Coup/Assassination
1966-1975 Gowon Military Angas/Middle Belt Coup
1975-1976 Mohammad Military Hausa Attempted Coup/Assassination
1976-1979 Obasanjo Military Yoruba Elections
1979-1983 Shagari Civilian Fulani Coup
1984-85 Buhari Military Fulani Coup
1985-1993 Babingida Military Minority Group in the 
Niger State
Elections results nullified in June 
1993, stepped down in August 
1993
1993 Shonekan Civilian Yoraba Head of Interim Government, 
Coup
1993-1998 Abacha Military Kanuri* Presiuned heart attack
1998-1999 Abubakar Military Middle Belt tribe
* Abacha grew up in Kano, Central Hausaland 
Source; Khan (1994, 13), various newspapers.
With Nigeria being dominated by the Northern elite, resource allocation was 
biased against the interests of the people in the oÜ producing areas. As federal budgets
The Middle Belt are largely non-Muslim areas populated by northern ethnic minorities. Some of the conflicts 
within Nigeria’s ruling elite were instigated by Middle Belt officers (Othman 1989).
From 1966 until today, control of the armed forces has remained in the hands of officers from the North. The 
change of governments in Nigeria was largely determined by the conflicts within this Northern-dominated military 
rather than by ethnic conflicts. That means, different factions of the military battled over the distribution of 
government posts (Othman 1989). But ethnic causes of political instability have continued to play an important 
role in Nigeria’s history. President Babangida’s cancellation of the democratic election in 1993, for example, was 
said to have been designed to prevent the South from taking control. Abiola, the election victor, was a Yoruba 
from Western Nigeria who had no approval of the traditional rulers in the North (Nmoma 1995, 340).
The rule of Ironsi, an Ibo from the Southern region, in 1966 and Shonekan, a Yoruba fiom Western Nigeria, in 
1993, whose power was very weak, only lasted for a few months each.
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were becoming increasingly dependent on oil revenues, the Nigerian regions and later 
states were allocated a smaller proportion of the locally collected revenue. Following 
Nigeria’s independence in 1960, the federal government was required to pay each region 
50% of the revenues derived from that area. The allocation on the basis of derivation was 
reduced to 45% in 1970 and to 20% in 1975. Subsequently the derivation principle was 
abolished (Suberu 1996, 29-31). This was to the detriment of the people in the oü 
producing areas because a higher share of the oÜ revenues generated in thek local areas 
was allocated to states that were non-oil producing.
A comparison of revenue aUocation from 1960 to-date is not entirely conclusive
Îsince only a smaU fraction of locaUy raised revenues ever reached village communities in j
the oil producing aieas.^  ^ WiUiams (1992, 106 and 117) noted that the cuixent principle i
1I
of resource allocation in Nigeria is flawed because aUocation takes places on the basis of I
Ithe states rather than on the basis of ethnic minorities, yet state boundaries do not j
correspond to ethnic boundaiies. Members of the dominant ethnic group in an area I
usually control spending of a region, a state or a local government council. They might, j
I
therefore, put other minorities of that area at a disadvantage in terms of allocation. Within j
that system, ethnic minorities in the oil producing areas are marginalised because they 1
tend to have little control over spending decisions. j
In 1997, the federal funds were officially allocated as follows: 48.5% for the federal government, 24% for the 
federal states and 20% for the local government councils, whüe the rest went to ‘special funds’, which included 
3% for the oil producing areas. Of the government’s net payments to the federal states in 1997, the three main oU 
producing states - Delta, Rivers and Bay els a - received a share of 3.36%, 2.85% and 2.38% respectively 
(Guardian, Lagos, 19 February 1998).
^  Between 1960 and 1963, for example, the government of the Eastern Region was entitled to 50% of the oü
revenues. But the Eastern Region, of which oil producing areas formed a small fraction, was ruled by members of 
the Ibo ethnic group from non-oü producing areas. It is thus likely that only a small fraction of the oil revenues 
reached the oil producing areas.
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Because of the current system of revenue allocation, as Osaghae (1998, 11) has 
argued, the creation of separate states and local government areas 'has been highly 
positive for minorities’ because it provided ‘a pedestal for direct access to and 
participation in the federation’s politics and governance’ Ethnic or other interest 
groups in the oil producing areas often lobbied for a new state or a local government area 
to be created witliin thek respective ai’ea with the view to be able to allocate financial 
resources themselves. The Ogoni leaders, for example, have long advocated a federal 
state of thek own, although they have failed so far (Osaghae 1995). Ethnic competition 
over resource allocation in the oü producing areas persisted, or even intensified, as a 
result of the creation of new states and local government areas. For instance, the 
relocation of a local government headquarters led to ethnic clashes in Mai'ch 1997 
between Ijaws and Itsekkis at Wani in Delta State, which forced SheU to close several oü 
weUs {AFP News Agency, 31 March 1997; Africa Confidential, 9 May 1997).
As a concession to the people in the oü producing areas, 1.5% of the government 
revenue was earmarked for those areas in 1982. As a result of protests against oÜ 
companies in the early 1990s, the Nigerian government increased the amount of financial 
contributions to the oil producing areas from 1.5 to 3% and the Oü Mineral Producing 
Ai'eas Development Commission (OMPADEC) was estabUshed in 1992 as a sort of 
development agency to distribute the 3% aUocation to the oü producing areas. The
^  Under pressures from various ethnic and interest groups, Nigeria has gone from being divided into four regions in 
1967 to 36 states by 1996 (see table below). The number of local government areas rose from 301 in 1976 to over 
750 in 1996 (Osaghae 1998, 11). This allowed more ethnic groups to participate in the allocation of resources.
Table: Creation of Nigerian Regions and States, 1954-1996
1954 1963 1967 1976 1987 1991 1996
3 regions 4 regions 12 states 19 states 21 states 30 states 36 states
Sources: Forrest (1993, 50); The Guardian (Lagos, 19 February 1998).
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example of the OMPADEC is instructive for an understanding of the conflicts arising 
from the allocation of oil revenues. Osaghae (1998) has observed that conflicts have 
arisen between different ethnic and common interest groups over the composition of the 
OMPADEC board and over the fonnula for distributing the OMPADEC budget. 
Projects were supposed to be distributed in proportion to a community’s share of the 
current oil production. This formula was considered as unjust by some communities such 
as Oloibiri, on whose land oil companies had produced a significant fraction of the oil in 
the past, but were no longer producing. In addition, the data used by the OMPADEC was 
said to be unreliable (Osaghae 1998).
While a number of communities in the oü producing areas were able to benefit 
from OMPADEC projects such as electricity and water provision, a significant proportion 
of the funds aUocated to the OMPADEC was mismanaged. OMPADEC’s chairman 
Albert K. HorsfaU was to report directly to the head of state, but there was no 
supeiwisory authority over the agency. Okonta and Douglas (1998) have obseiwed that 
HorsfaU and the other commissioners were empowered to undertake any projects they 
Uked anywhere they liked, including setting up banks and manufacturing companies and 
awarding substantial public contracts. With the absence of any performance guidelines or 
controls, the OMPADEC proved inefficient and co rru p t.In  the face of inefficiency and 
under public pressure, the Nigerian government launched an investigation into the 
running of the OMPADEC in 1996 and Albert K. HorsfaU was sacked in December 1996
In 1996, ten of the twelve members of the OMPADEC board were from the oil producing areas (Osaghae 1998, 
23).
In a single project, for example, the OMPADEC reportedly financed the construction of the Eleme Gas Turbine in 
Port Harcourt at the cost of US$ 20.7 million in 1993. At the end of 1995, the project was still uncompleted and it 
transpired that more funds were needed to conclude the project (Okonta and Douglas 1998).
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(Okonta and Douglas 1998). The appointment of Eric Opia as OMPADEC’s sole 
administrator in 1996 did not appear to have improved efficiency as the structures o f the 
agency did not, by and large, change. In 1998, Opia was removed from the OMPADEC 
after he failed to account for 6.7 billion Naira (almost US$ 80 million) he received on 
behalf of the OMPADEC {Post Express, 19 July 1998) and the OMPADEC was re­
structured {Post Express, 2 October 1998 and 13 November 1998).
Even if the OMPADEC had been successful in effectively distributing funds to the 
people in the oil producing areas, a 3% share of government revenue was considered as 
too low by many community leaders.^  ^ The most wide-spread demand of communities in 
the oil-producing areas, as Subem (1996, 29-31) pointed out, is that a significant 
proportion of the oü revenues should be returned to their areas on the basis of 
derivation.^  ^ This would result in fewer funds for non-oil producing areas which, untü 
now, was unacceptable to those who mle Nigeria, particularly the Northern elite.
The mere establishment of the OMPADEC suggests that political pressures on the 
microlevel can influence government policy on the oü industry, even though the state may 
remain biased in favour of oü companies. The faÜure of the OMPADEC to channel 
resources to the oü producing areas ülustrates the use of public oü revenues for the 
private benefit of specific individuals at the expense of vülage communities affected by oü 
operations on the ground.
The Ogoni leader Ken Saro-Wiwa considered the OMPADEC as an ‘insult’ and decried that the agency was 
designed to ‘bait us and destroy our will to resist justice’ (quoted in Suberu 1996, 38).
One of the major demands of the leaders of minorities in the oil producing areas at Nigeria’s constitutional 
conference of 1994-95, as Osaghae (1998,12) noted, was that communities from those areas should be part- 
owners of the oil, jointly with the federal government, and should receive a part of the oil revenues.
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2.8. Community Protests against Oil Companies
The failure of the Nigerian state to channel a significant amount of financial 
resources to the oil producing areas resulted in protests against the state and oil 
companies. Osaghae (1998) has argued that, in the last decade or so, ethnic groups in the 
oil producing areas became more militant in their demands as more and more people 
came to realise that they received little investment in their areas, while Nigeria’s economy 
was thriving on oil revenues extracted from their land. Since the late 1980s, these groups 
such as the Ogoni, Ijaw, Urhobo, Isoko and other smaUer groups have intensified their 
demands for increased investment and started to protest against oil companies. As a result 
of the rising militancy of protesters, the number of community disruptions to oü 
operations in Nigeria have risen in the 1990s. SheU was mostly affected because of the 
company’s large onshore concessions.^^
Organisations advocating the rights of the people in the oü producing areas have 
grown in numbers and appear to have become more influential in the last decade or so. 
The main political threat to oü company operations in the 1990s came from the formation 
of the Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP) under the leadership of 
Ken Sai’o-Wiwa, whose protests targeted SheU. Like many other tribes in Nigeria, the 
Ogonis - a minority group of 500,000 people - felt that they should receive greater 
benefits from oü operations in their communal areas. Although the crude oü was 
produced in their areas by Shell’s venture, the communities received Htüe economic 
benefit and were marginalised politicaUy in Nigeria. Another reason for anti-SheU protests
In 1997, Shell reportedly lost 67 working days to community disturbances out of 117 lost in the Nigerian oil 
industry. Shell was followed by the indigenous company Consolidated Oil with a reported loss of 34 working days 
(Guardian, Lagos, 24 February 1998).
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was that environmental damage had left many communities more impoverished than 
before because of destroyed crops, fish and community lands (Fabig 1998; Mittler 1996). 
In October 1990, the leaders of MOSOP and traditional Ogoni rulers presented the 
‘Ogoni Bill o f Rights’ to the Federal Military government, in which they demanded 
political autonomy for the Ogonis. In December 1992, MOSOP asked Shell, Chevron and 
the NNPC for billions of US doUars in compensation for damages from oil operations and 
the Ogoni protests became more militant (Osaghae 1995). The Ogoni protests received 
international support from Western non-governmental organisations such as Amnesty 
International and Greenpeace which further put pressure on the Nigerian government and 
the oil companies, particularly SheU (Mittler 1996).
Until 1993 when SheU officiaUy withdrew from the Ogoni area, oU operations 
were disturbed either in spontaneous protests or under the direction of MOSOP or the 
more radical National Youth CouncU of Ogoni People (NYCOP) and the Ethnic 
Minorities Rights Organisation of Africa (EMIROAF). For instance, vUlagers at Bomu in 
Ogoni protested against the pipeline construction by SheU, which prompted the 
withdrawal of the sub-contractor firm WUlbros.^  ^ When WiUbros returned to the area in 
April 1993, a crowd successfuUy prevented the company’s work.
The ‘Ogoni uprising’ helped to spark off anti-oil protests elsewhere m Nigeria. 
Many new local associations were formed with the aim of advocating the rights of the 
people in the oil producing areas such as the Ijaw National Congress (INC), the Ogba
This has been described in a report for Shell in Nigeria, prepared by Shell’s sub-contractor Willbros. „Review of 
Events Leading to the Withdrawal of Workforce from the Bomu Area,” Willbros West Africa Inc. for Shell 
Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, 3 May 1993.
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Solidarity, the Urhobo Progressive Union, the Niger Delta Environmental Forum, among 
others (Ogbnigwe 1996).
Until today, conflicts between oil companies and village communities have 
continued, particularly in ethnic Ijaw communities. In March 1997, for example, over 100 
Shell workers were taken hostage by Ijaws armed with automatic rifles and oil 
installations were occupied by groups of Ijaws. Eleven oü pumping stations of SheU, 
accounting for 210,000 b/d, were shut down during the hostage-crisis {Phone News 
International, 25 March and 7 April 1997). Privately industry officials admit that the 
threat from the millions of Ijaws, behind the bulk of the recent incidents, is greater than 
from the 500,000 strong Ogonis.
An example of how local protests against oU companies can escalate in violence 
was provided by an official inquiry into the Urauechem massacre (Rivers State of Nigeria 
1991). On 30 and 31 October 1990, local youths at Umuechem demonstrated against 
SheU. SheU was operating in the area from the late 1950s, resulting in the poUution of a 
stream, destruction of farm crops and other losses to property. The community had 
received no or Uttle compensation, whüe viUagers caUed for social amenities such as 
provision of electricity. SheU did not respond to the dissatisfied community members, but 
decided to rely on its structural links. On October 29, J.R. Udofia, Shell’s Eastern 
Division manager wrote a letter to the Commissioner of PoUce in Rivers State infoiming 
him of an ‘impending attack’ on oü facüities aUegedly planned for the next day. Udofia 
requested the Commissioner to ‘urgently provide us with security protection (preferably 
Mobile Police Force) at this location’ (Rivers State of Nigeria 1991, Appendix G). In
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the course of the next few days, the mobile police moved in with teargas and gunfiie, 
killing around 80 people and destroying almost 500 houses. In the wake of the incident, a 
judicial commission of inquiry was set up by Colonel Godwin Osagie Abbe, the Rivers 
State Military Governor. The inquiry found that there was no imminent threat of attack 
and that the demonstrators were neither violent nor aimed (Rivers State of Nigeria 1991).
The incident at Umuechem exemplifies oil company reliance on security co­
operation in dealing with conflicts in village communities. Rather than engaging in 
negotiations with the Umuechem people. Shell had decided at an early stage of a peaceful 
protest to call on the security forces for assistance. There have other occasions on which 
the Mobile Police Force moved in to deal with anti-Shell protests such as at Iko in Akwa 
Ibom State in 1987 and at Shell’s Bonny Terminal in 1991 (Rowell 1996, 294-297). 
There are indications that security forces have also intervened on behalf of other oil 
companies. Between December 1998 and February 1999, for instance, dozens of anti-oü 
protesters were killed by the security forces {Reuters, 31 December 1998; AP, 1 February
1999).
In addition to assistance by state security services, aU oil companies maintain their* 
own security force. These security men are drawn from the Nigerian police and perfonn 
duties at oü instaUations. Paid by the oü companies, they are known as SheU PoUce or 
Mobü Police. The best evidence on security co-operation comes from the court case 
XM .Federal Limited v. S h e l f , in which an ar*ms supplier sued SheU over breach of 
contract m the Federal High Court of N igeria .A m on g  others, the court case revealed
Unreported Suit No. FHC/L/CS/849/95.
58
that the Nigerian government provides policemen to guard oil installations. In a letter 
dated 1 December 1993, Shell’s Managing Director applied for an increase m 
‘supernumerary police guards’ (also known as ‘spy police’) from 1,200 in 1993 to 1,400 
in 1995 for the company. According to the figures for 1993, 200 men were stationed m 
Shell’s headquarters in Lagos, 400 men were stationed m Warri (Shell’s Western 
Division) and 600 men were stationed in Port Harcourt (Shell’s Eastern Division). 
Furtheimore, Shell applied for a contingent of additional 650 policemen for whom the 
company was to provide ‘complete logistics, accoutrement and welfare support’.
Evidence from the court case X.M.Federal Limited v. Shelf ^  also revealed that 
SheU was negotiating to import weapons into Nigeria in breach of an arms embargo 
between 1993 and 1995. According to court evidence, SheU sought tenders from 
Nigerian arms suppliers to procure weapons worth over US$ 500,000. These included 
130 Beretta 9mm caUbre sub-machine guns, 200,000 rounds of buUets and 500 smoke 
hand grenades. Nigeria’s Inspector General of PoUce approved the arms purchase under 
pressure from SheU managers. Following revelations in the British press on Shell’s arms 
deaUngs in 1996, SheU International spokesman later admitted that one of three bids for 
arms purchases had been ‘selected’ by SheU in March 1995, although the arms deal had 
not gone ahead {Observer, 11 February 1996).
The first plaintiff was X.M. Federal, an international arms dealer. The second plaintiff was Humanitex Nigeria 
Limited, a Nigerian arms dealer approved by the government. Humanitex was employed by X.M. Federal as 
security adviser and its Nigerian agent. SheU ordered arms from Humanitex but later withdrew its order, most 
likely because the arms were considered by Shell too expensive. Brian Anderson, Shell’s managing director, 
wrote in a letter in September 1994; ‘We consider this quotation to be excessive, based upon our own 
investigations from other sources of supply’ (Letter from Brian Anderson, SheU’s Chairman and Managing 
Director, to Alhaji Coomassie, Inspector-General of Police, 12 September 1994). The arms supplier subsequently 
filed a lawsuit.
Unreported Suit No. FHC/L/CS/849/95.
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The government’s suppression of the anti-oil protests and the companies’ reliance 
on security protection exemplified that the ruling Northern elite was unwilling to yield to 
the demands of community leaders in the oü producing areas. Anti-SheU protests of the 
Ogonis, as Human Rights Watch (1995) has documented, were met with violence by the 
state, which involved extrajudicial killings, arrests and floggings of protesters. In 
November 1995, Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight other Ogoni leaders were executed, which 
was widely seen as linked to anti-SheU protests (e.g. Observer, 19 November 1995).^  ^
The government has blamed some of the violence in the Ogoni area on ‘ethnic clashes’. It 
was claimed that over 1000 Ogonis were küled in ethnic clashes with the Andoni and 
Oki’ika ethnic groups in 1993 (Osaghae 1995). However, Human Rights Watch (1995, 
11) provided evidence that the government has played an active role in ‘fomenting such 
ethnic antagonism’ and that ‘some attacks attributed to rural minority communities were 
in fact carried out by army troops in plainclothes’. Osaghae (1995, 337) has aigued that 
such views were ‘plausible because Andoni leaders interviewed denied having any 
problems with the Ogoni neighbours’. Whüe the existence of ethnic conflicts cannot be 
denied, it appears that the government has used ethnic factionalism as a weapon against 
protesters in the oü producing areas. According to Osaghae (1995, 342), the ‘Ogoni 
uprising’ of the eaiiy 1990s illustrated that ‘the state exists to further the interests o f  the 
majority groups against those o f  the minorities and that it colludes with the 
multinational oil companies’. hi other words, the Ogoni uprising suggested that the
The Observer (19 November 1995) indeed reported that Shell had refused to help Saro-Wiwa unless anti-SheU 
protests were called off.
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Nigerian state is biased in favour of oil companies. This could be seen as an important 
factor in the escalation of conflicts between oil companies and village communities. -
2.9. Conclusion
This section of the thesis served as a basic background to our subsequent analysis 
of legal disputes by examining the making of the Nigerian oil industry and Nigeria’s 
government petroleum policy. We have seen that despite partial nationalisation and 
nominal contiol of the Nigerian government, oü companies have lar gely retained effective 
managerial control over joint venture operations. Operational control implies the legal 
Habüity of foreign oü companies as operators (both in joint-ventures and production- 
sharing contracts) for any damage caused in the course of oü operations. Within the 
framework of the thesis, it can thus be ar gued that government policy plays orüy a limited 
direct role in the viUage community as far as day-to-day oü operations are concerned. If 
oil operations cause damage, those affected have to deal with the foreign oü companies 
rather than with the government, which is important for the study of litigation between 
vülage communities and the oü industry, not least because companies, not the 
government, are usuaüy named as defendants in court cases involving damage from oil
operations. j
!
In addition to providing the historical background to the subsequent analysis of ]
i
legal disputes, we have investigated the basic elements of Nigeria’s political economy i
with a view of exploring the question of whether the Nigerian state is biased in favour of j
0 Ü companies. On the surface, evidence on the bias of the state in favour of foreign i
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capital puts into question the concept of the rentier state. Some policies such as the 
Marginal Fields Decree indeed ran counter to the interests of the foreign companies. The 
notion of a rentier state can be supported, however, to the extent that foreign oil 
companies have largely continued to dominate the economic development of the Nigerian 
oil industry and government revenue. In the 1970s, the Nigerian federal finances came to 
rely primarily on oil rents and the state was forced to continuously attract foreign 
investment in the oil sector in order to ensure a continuation of oil exploration and 
production. While foreign oil companies could not dictate petroleum policy, it has to be 
assumed that the state largely avoided to impose policy measures, which would alienate 
foreign investors. The Marginal Fields Decree, for instance, was promulgated in the best 
interests of the state and the indigenous business interests, but it was never being 
implemented as it contravened the interests of the foreign oil companies and their* aUies in 
the state administration and the state was too weak to attack those vested interests. 
Judging by secondary sources discussed in this section of the thesis, there are indications 
that the Nigerian state is predisposed in favour of oil companies at the expense of those 
affected by oil operations.
This speculative finding on the bias of the state finds support in the government’s 
inadequate budgetary contributions to the oil producing areas. The failure to satisfy the 
monetary demands of the community leaders in those areas could, in turn, be assumed to 
trigger* anti-oil protests. By implication, the rise in social unrest and litigation may be 
partly attributed to the unequal allocation of benefits and externalities arising from oil
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operations within Nigerian society, a fact which cannot be directly derived from an 
analysis of court cases.
With the executive arm of the government being biased in favour of oil interests, 
it could be expected that the state would restrict litigation against oil companies. 
However, the discussion in this section of the thesis cannot answer the question of 
whether there also exist biases within Nigeria’s formal legal system and the judiciary. 
These questions will be explored in the two subsequent sections of the thesis.
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Section 3: Nigeria’s Formai Legal System and Oil Related Legislation
3.1. Introduction
Legal disputes between village communities and oü companies are constrained by 
the str uctural character of the legal system and oü related statute law which are discussed 
in this section of the thesis/ The structural character of the legal system determines the 
venues in winch legal disputes between companies and communities are located. Statute 
law determines the legal rights and obligations of village communities and oü companies 
when dealing with each other. The constraints and opportunities provided by the legal 
system partly determine the responses of village communities and oü companies to socio­
economic conflicts. In other words, the structural character of the legal system and 
statute law determine what is feasible in litigation between vülage communities and oü 
companies.
In addition to providing a legal background to the subsequent analysis of legal 
disputes, we investigate whether the Nigerian legal system is biased in favour of oü 
companies. If the Nigerian state is indeed prejudiced in favour of oil companies as our 
previous discussion suggested, it has to be assumed that it would restrict the legal rights 
of those adversely affected by oü operations. In this context, this section of the thesis 
examines those factors within Nigeria’s formal legal system and statute law which may
 ^ For an introduction to the Nigerian legal system, see Obilade (1979), Akande (1982) and Okonkwo (1980). For an 
introduction to Nigerian petroleum law, see Etikerentse (1985), Olisa (1987) and Atsegbua (1993).
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have given rise to an advantageous legal position for oil companies vis-à-vis those 
adversely affected by oil operations on the ground.
The Nigerian legal system has much in common with other legal systems in 
Africa, particularly those in former British colonies, in which English Common Law was 
introduced under colonial rule. Despite its importance to socio-economic development, 
however, the Nigerian legal system (and Africa’s legal systems in general) has rarely been 
studied in greater detail from a socio-legal perspective. There are at least three reasons 
why a study of legal systems in Africa is very important. First, legal systems in Africa aie 
very complex and rich. There has been a basic agreement between scholars on the main 
characteristic and the main heritage of colonial legal systems in Sub-Saharan Africa: the 
plurality of two or more legal systems. In general, as Ahott (1965, 220-221) has noted, 
the British colonial government introduced the legal system of the mother country, while, 
at the same time, permitting the regulated continuation of traditional African law and 
judicial institutions unless the latter were deemed contrary to the interests or morals of 
the colonisers. This plurality (in Ahott’s words, duality) of legal systems was often 
accompanied by the existence of different systems of courts. African customary law 
usually consisted of unwritten indigenous customs and traditions and was largely tribal in 
origin. It commonly applied to Africans only witli some exceptions in the so-called ‘native 
courts’. English law was commonly applied to non-Africans as weU as to transactions 
between non-Africans and Africans in the territorial or British courts (Allott 1965, 220- 
222).^ For the oil industiy, the existence of tliis plurality meant that companies were able
 ^ AMcan customary law could also be applied to non-Africans in West Africa and Northern Rhodesia in cases where 
a non-African contracted with an African and a court found that to rely strictly on English law would result in 
substantial injustice to either party (Allott 1965, 222).
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to operate in a village setting according to Western colonial laws and contracts, while the 
local population was able to continue living according to customary legal systems. In 
other words, the oil companies and the village communities came to live according to 
different legal systems during colonial rule.
Second, legal systems in Africa are not stable but dynamic, particularly owing to 
the nature of customary law.  ^ It is accepted among scholars that African customary law 
is far from being ‘immutable’ but rather is subject to constant change. Thus the content of 
legal rules in Africa may be highly flexible (Allott et a l  1969, 9-15). As Park (1963, 67) 
has noted, customary law in Nigeria develops from time to time and modifies itself in 
order to keep pace with changes in social conditions. Not unUke US or English law, 
Allott et a l  (1969, 10) maintained that African judges as well as researchers have to 
select from a variety of principles and rules in a particular case, which marks any Hiving, 
adaptable, functional system o f law ’. In their view, the crucial problem is that of a time 
factor. Given the flexible nature of law, law may undergo changes at different levels - 
principles, norms or rules - at any time, so it may be difficult to reconstruct the contents 
of traditional law at a particular’ period (Allott et a l  1969, 9-15). By implication, oü 
companies may sometimes be unaware of the changing customary law in their areas of 
operations.
Third, the significance of African law to Africa’s socio-economic development 
may be greater than some observers think. Standard Western sociological studies
 ^ Scholarly research on the introduction and development of legal systems in Africa, particularly in former British 
colonies in West Africa, has a rich tradition going back to the early 1960s (Allott 1960 and 1962, Elias 1962, 
Daniels 1964) but there has been surprisingly little emphasis on the dynamic change of legal systems. Scholars 
have researched some administrative and judicial innovations introduced in colonial as well as post-colonial states 
in Africa, yet there has been little research on the changing nature of the Common Law applied in Nigeria.
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recognise that society is governed by rules and norms, although many of them are not 
called ‘laws’. Anthony Giddens (1989, 117), for example, has stated that the world 
'would collapse into chaos if  we did not stick to rules which define some kinds o f  
behaviour as appropriate in given contexts, and others as inappropriate’. In the African 
context, Gluckman (1965, 2-3) has argued that societies which have no formal legal 
system, nonetheless, abide by well-established and widely accepted customary mles.'  ^
Since customary rules do not resemble written Western law, it is possible that oil 
company staff may sometimes underestimate the significance of those rules and norms 
when dealing with village communities.
The three features of legal systems in Africa mentioned above may have had wide 
repercussions for conflicts between village communities and oil companies. Conflicts 
between the companies and communities may aiise if one party does not recognise the 
validity of the other party’s laws. As shown below in greater detail with the example of 
land legislation, village communities continued to recognise customary land rights despite 
the introduction of the Land Use Act in 1978, which redefined the legal position on land 
ownership in Nigeria. A company’s ignorance regarding land titles may render it difficult 
to identify the correct receiver of compensation payments for land acquisition, which may 
lead to conflicts with the local people over land for oil operations (this will be explained 
in greater detail in section five of the thesis). In general terms, the existence of competing 
legal systems may thus lead to conflicts between oil companies and village communities.
Writing on African customary law, Gluckman (1965, 2-3) has stated that societies without any formal institutions 
of government such as courts and powere to legislate may have such 'well-established and well-known codes of 
morals and law, o f convention and ritual, that even though they have no written histories, we may reasonably 
assume that they have persisted for many generations ’, so they are far from living in a state of lawlessness.
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By implication, in order to reduce the quantity of community conflicts, oil companies 
must address the presence of customary law when dealing with village communities.
To sum up, in order to understand the impact of Nigerian law on community 
conflicts, it is instructive to analyse both the structure and the substance of the legal 
system as the two components play a different role. For this description of the Nigerian 
legal system, we use the thiee-fold typology of the pre-colonial, colonial and post­
colonial law, as suggested in Allott’s (1965, 220) analysis of African legal history. In 
other words, one could say that, substantively, Nigeria’s cumulative legal system 
comprises three core elements: the pre-colonial, colonial and post-colonial law.
3.2. Pre-colonial Law
Before the British government took possession of the AMcan colonies, Nigeria 
(or rather the area of what later became Nigeria) was ruled by customary law. The 
development of the plurality of legal systems mentioned earlier ensured that customary 
law has continued to play a role in the Nigerian legal system until today.^
In theory, customary law is derived from ancient custom. In practice, as Allott 
(1965, 220) has pointed out, customary mles in Africa have sometimes been modified by 
the pronouncements of state, tribal and local authorities as well as by formulations of 
adjudicators and arbitrators.^ Customary law in Nigeria is not a single uniform set of
 ^ While the main characteristics of the formal-legal institutions of colonial and post-colonial states were largely 
undisputed among academic scholars of law in Africa, African customary law became the main focus of study and 
a source of academic debate. The research on customary African laws was undertaken by both legal scholars 
(Saibah 1968 - first published 1897, Danquah 1928, Allot 1960) and anthropologists (Schapera 1935, Gluckman 
1965, Roberts 1972).
® Writing on the content of customary law in the actual enforcement process, several scholars (Chanock 1985, 
Snyder 1981) have argued that the so-called customary law implemented in ‘native courts’ was not necessarily a
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Nigerian customs, but operates only within a tribe or a community living in the same area. 
As Park (1963, 65) has noted, there may also be local variations between communities of 
the same tribal group. Unwritten customary law on a particular matter in one part of the 
Ibo land, for example, is usually, but not always, the same as that in another part of the 
Ibo land. Written Islamic Law is also considered as customary law, although it originates 
from outside Nigeria, so it is not, strictly speaking, customary to Nigeria at aU. In 
Northern Nigeria, Islamic Law has largely supplanted local customs (Park 1963, 65-68). 
The oil producing areas in south-eastern Nigeria, however, are almost exclusively non- 
Islamic, so Islamic Law is not relevant to this thesis. Tribal customary law is important to 
an understanding of oü related litigation because vülage communities in oü producing 
areas stül tend to observe customary rules. From the perspective of oü companies in 
Nigeria, it may have been better if the oü reserves had been located in Muslim areas since 
Islamic Law is codified as weU as being more static and more predictable. The dynamic 
and unpredictable nature of tribal customary law may lead to misunderstandings and thus 
conflicts between oil companies and vÜlage communities.
relic of a traditional society but rather a historical constiuct of the colonial rule, influenced by a struggle between 
the colonisers and those colonised. In Senegal, for example, Francis Snyder (1981) has found that modernising 
elites often took a leading role in defining ‘indigenous law’. In this context, the nature of law changed as it was 
reshaped from an adaptable traditional, mostly unwritten, system into fixed, formal and written rules enforced by 
native courts. Martin Chanock (1985), for example, has traced the development of customary law in Zambia and 
Malawi from the late 19th century to independence in the 1960s. His research demonstrated that customary law 
was reconstructed from a fluid, shifting set of principles and procedures to a fixed, written sets of codes. These 
written (or ‘invented’) codes, nevertheless, claimed continuity with an African past and were used as the basis for 
the formation of a new national legal system of the post-colonial state (Chanock 1985, 55). Far from being a set of 
pre-colonial African social rules, customary law became a historical product created by colonial administrators 
and the merging African elites who shaped the law to meet their own, often changing, political and economic 
interests (Chanock 1985,145). While this type of research may have yielded important insights on the nature of 
the formal-legal institutions in Africa, it may have overstated the actual influence of colonial rule and its 
manipulation of local customary laws, particularly in Britain’s West African colonies where virtually no European 
colonists settled.
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Today, customary law is used in the so-called customary courts, which are headed 
by an indigene from the area who has special knowledge of local customs and traditions 
of the local people. With some exceptions, these courts only involve indigenes from the 
same community or the same tribe. Customary courts are thus never directly involved in 
litigation against oil companies. Those cases are always adjudicated by higher Nigerian 
courts, which make a different use of customary law. As Adaramola (1992, 73) has 
observed, contemporary customary courts accept customary law as given law, while 
higher courts accept Nigerian law and English Common Law as given law. As a result, 
customary law is merely treated as fact or evidence in a court case in a higher court, not 
as law (Adaramola 1992, 73). Since all court cases involving oü companies are located in 
a higher court, the significance of customary law is limited as far as oü related litigation is 
concerned. In other words, the venue of oil-related court cases limits the exercise of 
customary law in oil related cases.
Customary law, however, continues to be used in oil-related litigation when facts 
are disputed, for example, when the ownership of a piece of land is disputed. As 
Adaramola (1992, 73) has noted, in order to establish customary law in a higher court, 
witnesses must prove the existence of customary rules by oral evidence, alternatively 
books or manuscripts must be presented, which are recognised as established authority in 
the specific locality. Customary law can also be established by judicial notice (Adaramola 
1992, 73), in which case the judge simply assumes that a customary rule exists without 
asking for evidential proof.^ A customary rule is established witliin the legal context of a
’ As Park (1963, 92) has argued, certain customary rules and institutions become so well known to the judges that 
they no longer need to be proved. When these rules and institutions are established in a court case by judicial 
notice, they effectively cease to be questions of fact and are converted into matters of law.
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particular case. For instance, a particular law of inheritance among the Ogoni may help a 
judge to establish the ownership of a specific house, which is disputed in a court case; but 
only after the customaiy rule was either accepted by the judge outright or was proved 
through oral or written evidence.
Courts may allow factual evidence of different type depending on the particulars 
of the case or the available evidence. In reference to land property, for example, Fatayi- 
Williams, J.S.C., in the case Idundun v. Okumagba^, defined five ways in which 
ownership of land may be proved in Nigeria.^ First, ownership of land may be proved by 
traditional evidence. Second, it may be proved by production of written documents of 
title. Third, acts of the person (or persons) claiming the land such as selling, leasing or 
renting out a part of the land or farming on it, are also evidence of ownership, provided 
that the acts extend over a sufficient length of time and are numerous enough. Fourth, 
acts of long possession and enjoyment of the land may also be prima facie evidence of 
ownership. Fifth, proof of possession of connected or adjacent land may also be used to 
prove ownership. To sum up, evidence presented in court cases involving oil companies 
may combine elements of customary law and formal Nigerian law.
Not all customary rules are admitted by courts, however. In order to be 
recognised by Nigerian courts, customaiy law must, above all, fulfil a number of 
conditions. A customary rule is subject to four legal ‘tests’ of validity called the criterion 
of repugnancy, the criterion of incompatibility, the criterion of public policy and the
“ (1976)9&  lOS.C.
 ^ As Aluko (1998, 14) has pointed out, however, the precedent in Idundun v. Okumagba does not apply where 
boundaries of the land between communities have previously been demarcated. In this case, the court will resolve 
the issue of ownership by referring to the boundaries demarcated, for instance, by a previous customary court 
ruling.
71
criterion of applicability. First, a customary rule is only valid, if it is not 'repugnant to 
natural justice, equity and good conscience’. These terms are difficult to define, as 
Obilade has argued (quoted in Adaramola 1992, 74), but generally the purpose of the rule 
under colonial administration was to invalidate ‘uncivilised’ customs. The problem with 
the rule is that Nigerian judges can use the rule of repugnancy in an hoc manner, 
paiticulaiiy if they perceive a particular rule as 'uncivilised’ or unjust. In one case, for 
instance, the Supreme Court invalidated a rule of Maliki Law that prevented persons 
accused of highway robbery from defending them selves.Second, a customary rule is 
only valid, if it is not incompatible with any Nigerian legislation or regulation. As 
indicated earlier, certain customary rules may be abolished by legislation. For instance, 
Nigeria’s Eastern Regional government eradicated the so-called Osu customary law. 
Under the Osu law, certain persons, known as ‘Osu’ (outcasts) were subject to legal and 
social disabilities. Tliis practice was abolished by legislation in 1956 (Park 1963, 47). In 
addition to the explicit legislative abolition of customary rules, a rule may be invalid, if it 
is considered to be inconsistent with the intention of legislation, even though the piece of 
legislation did not expressly abohsh the specific customary rule. For instance, in the case 
Agbai V. Okogbue^^, Nigeria’s Supreme Court ruled that a certain customary law was 
incompatible with Nigeria’s Constitution.^^ Third, a customary rule is invalid, if it is
Guri V. Hadejia Native Authority, cited by Park (1963, 71).
" [1991J7NWLR.
In that case, Samuel Okogbue from Abia State was invited to become a member in a so-called age grade in his 
community. In his community, it was a custom to group community members into age grades for the purpose of 
community development. The Amankalu age grade, to which Okogbue was assigned, decided to construct a 
community hospital and decided to impose a compulsory levy on its members in order to pay for the construction. 
Okogbue refused to join the grade and to pay the levy on the ground that he was a Jehovah’s Witness. Upon his 
refusal to join the age grade and to pay the levy, members of the age grade entered Okogbue’s premises and 
seized his sewing machine, claiming that they acted on the authority of the custom of the people. In the first
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contrary to public policy, although this criterion is rarely used in Nigeria. On one 
occasion, it was held that the Yoruba law of legitimisation was contrary to public policy 
because it would encourage promiscuity (Adaramola 1992, 76). As Adaramola (1992, 
74-78) has argued, the fourth criterion of applicability derives from the three above 
ciiterions. In order to be applicable, a customary rule must be shown to be in existence at 
a particular time and must be recognised and adhered to by the community. It is not 
enough for a custom to have been in use in the past, it must still exist and still be 
accepted. Any customary rule must fulfil all the above four conditions in order to be 
admitted by a judge of a higher court. However, even if a judge refuses to adopt a 
particular customary rule in a court case, the rule stül remains law within the given 
community as it continues to be accepted as law within that community (Adaramola 
1992, 74-78).
Nigerian judges may find it particularly difficult to adjudicate oil-related cases 
involving disputes over questions of customary law.^  ^ It is not always clear* to what 
extent specific litigants stül abide by specific rules of customary law. It is likely that 
customary law is less prevalent in bigger towns where members of different ethnic groups
instance, the Magistrate Court ruled that a custom, which made it compulsory for a person to belong ‘wiUy nilly’ 
to an association, violated the 1963 Constitution. In addition, the court ruled that, since the plaintiff refused to 
join the age grade on religious grounds, a compulsory membership further violated his constitutional right to 
freedom of religion. On appeal, the High Court reversed the judgement of the Magistrate Court. The Supreme 
Court, to which the matter went from the Court of Appeal, agreed with the Magistrate Court that the above 
mentioned custom violated the Constitution. Said Nwokedi, J.S.C.:
Much as one would welcome development projects in the Community, there must be caution to 
ensure that the fundamental rights o f citizens are not trampled upon by popular enthusiasm.
These rights have been enshrined in the Constitution which enjoys superiority over local custom.
Section 217(2)(b) of the 1979 Constitution provided that at least 3 out of the 15 judges of the Court of Appeal 
must be learned in customary law. But the judges of the Court of Appeal, like those of any other court, are not 
likely to be knowledgeable in all aieas of customaiy law. Since there are many systrans of customaiy law in 
Nigeria, no Nigerian judge can be an expert on all areas of customary law. By implication, any courts except the 
local customary courts may find it difficult to adjudicate court cases involving the knowledge of customaiy law.
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live side by side and have adapted to modem urban lifestyles. It is very likely that 
customary law is still prevalent in rural areas, particularly where communities are less 
exposed to modem lifestyles. But the use of specific customaiy mles may vary from 
community to community and is likely to change over time. The use of customary mles 
also vaiies according to the subject matter of dispute. A survey by Uwazie (1994) among 
mral and urban membeis of the Ibo ethnic group indicated that community members 
prefeiTed to resolve disputes according to customary mles and infoimal channels of 
dispute-resolution, rather than thiough the country’s formal legal system. According to 
the survey, potential litigants tended to use formal legal institutions, police and customaiy 
or higher courts, to handle cases of murder, injurious assault, grand theft, rape and 
divorce. However, they were least likely to resolve land disputes in courts. About 98% of 
the respondents said that they would solve land disputes in indigenous institutions, 
including village and family tiibunals, while only 2% would seek redress from the courts 
or police. '^* These results suggest that informal modes of dispute resolution and
Table: Survey among Ibos on the question ‘To whom would you complain about the following cases?’
Type of Case Complaint to Police or Court 
(percent)
Informal dispute resolution* 
(percent)
Total Number of 
Respondents
Land 2 98 212
Murder 76 24 208
Injurious assault 66 34 207
Grand theft 71 29 207
Petty theft 32 68 199
Minor assault 22 78 178
Adultery 15 85 179
Spousal abuse 4 96 178
Rape 71 29 147
Divorce 60 40 159
* Includes village/family tribunals and other indigenous institutions 
Source; Uwazie (1994).
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customary law have sui'vived in Nigeria, even though their use varies according to subject 
matter (Uwazie 1994)/^ The significance of customaiy law in disputes over land 
ownership is paiticularly important to oil companies since the acquisition of land rights in 
mral areas plays a key role in oil operations.
To sum up, customary law is likely to continue playing a limited role in oil-related 
litigation as far as factual evidence is concerned. But the use of customary law is severely 
constrained in court cases involving damage from oil operations. Oü related cases are 
located in Mgher courts, in which legal mles are derived from colonial and post-colonial 
law, so litigants from village communities cannot rely on the legal principles of customary 
laws with which they are famüiai*. Local customaiy laws designed to protect the village 
communities such as customary environmental laws are not effective in oil related 
c a s e s . I n  this sense, the legal system is biased against village community litigants.
3.3. Colonial Law
The imposition of colonial mle in Nigeria resulted in the introduction of English 
law. The Nigerian post-colonial state inherited the general foimal-legal structure of the 
colonial period which has formally continued to form the basis of the Nigerian legal 
system untü today.
Uwazie (1994) has concluded in general that ‘despite the rise of national legal systems in Africa, indigenous 
modes of justice persist'. In the context of Nigeria, Uwazie has concluded that the future of indigenous justice 
seems assured despite the impact of economic development, missionary activity and Western education.
As Douglas (1997) has shown, Niger Delta communities recognise a multitude of environmental customary laws 
aimed at protecting their environment. These include laws for the protection of forests, the soil and the aqueous 
environment.
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English law introduced in Nigeria comprises English Common Law, the so-called 
doctrines of equity and vaiious British statutes. Some of tlie British statutes have ceased 
to be in force. Some of them have been specifically repealed and replaced by Nigerian 
legislation. English statutes only apply in Nigeria in so far as local circumstances and the 
Nigerian legislation perniit and these aie mainly very old statutes which were operating in 
England before 1900. In theory, English Common Law and doctrines of equity formally 
apply in Nigeria as they exist in England today. Until the establishment of the Supreme 
Court of Nigeria, the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in Britain acted as the 
highest court for Nigeria. As Obilade (1979, 123) has noted, court decisions of the Privy 
Council given before the establishment of the Supreme Court are still binding on Nigerian 
courts, which means that a Nigerian court must follow them. Park (1963, 62-63) has 
argued that contemporaiy decisions of the British House of Lords are also binding on 
Nigerian courts as they 'present the conclusive expositions o f English law and that being 
so it will not be open to the Nigerian courts to depart from them’. This view has been put 
into question by Obilade (1979, 134).^  ^ While it is not entirely cleai* to what extent the 
Nigerian legal system is still embedded into the English Common Law, the structural 
character of the legal system is firmly based on the legal principles of the English 
Common Law.
Obilade (1979, 134) has argued that 'no English court forms part of any Nigerian court hierarchy. Therefore, no 
Nigerian court is bound by a decision of any English Court under the doctrine'. Obilade (1979, 134-135) has 
concluded that decisions of English courts can only have a persuasive authority on Nigerian courts, that means, a 
Nigerian court can decide whether to follow an Enghsh precedent or not. In any case, the Nigerian legal 
profession and the judiciary continue, to a large extent, to accept English court precedents as guiding principles in 
their work. Nigerian legal textbooks also continue to rely on many English rather than Nigerian court cases. The 
use of English court precedents depends on the area of law. In some areas of law, English court precedents are 
used almost exclusively. For instance, a textbook on tort law by Kodilinye (1982,190-194) cited English court 
cases on the issue of trespass to chattels 21 times, while it cited Nigerian court cases only twice.
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In practice, however, it is unclear how far African legal systems have deviated 
from the English Common Law doctrine. AUott (1960, 24-25) has argued that practically 
all African legal systems allow for some modification of English law. In addition to the 
inherent possibility of judges modifying legal rules, colonial and post-colonial statute law 
in Africa contained express provisions, which allowed for substantial changes in the law 
applied. Article 17 of the Tanganyika Order m Council, for example, referred to by Allott 
(1960, 22), stated that 'the said common law, doctrines o f equity and statutes o f general 
application shall be in force in the territory... subject to such qualijîcations as local 
circumstances may render necessary’. The Nigerian Constitution 1979, for instance, was 
interpreted by courts as having abolished the distinction between the so-called ‘public’ 
and ‘private nuisance’ in Nigeria, a distinction which persists in England, More 
importantly than statute law, as Allott (1960, 24-27) has shown, African judges had a 
great scope to modify English law in the African context, which is why we do not know 
to what extent Nigerian law can still be called English Common Law.
While Nigerian judges observe English court judgements made in the past, they 
also rely heavily on Nigerian judicial precedents. To a large extent, the application of 
English Common Law and the doctrines of equity in Nigeria ties judicial decisions to the 
pattern of legal development in England. Nevertheless, like in most other post-colonial 
states in Africa, Nigerian judges may reject an objectionable rule of English law outright
Kaiibi-Whyte, J.S.C. pronounced: ‘The restriction imposed at common law on the right of action in public 
nuisance is inconsistent with the provisions of section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution, 1979 and to that extent is 
void. ’. Per Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C. in Adediran v. Interland Transport [1991] 9 NWLR at page 180. Karibi-Whyte, 
J.S.C. further stated: ‘Having held that in the institution of actions, the distinction between public and private 
nuisance in this country has been abolished by the Constitution 1979, the exercise of the right of action for  
nuisance is no longer based on or determined by the distinction. Per Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C. at page 182. In other 
words, the 1979 Constitution clearly abolished the common law distinction between public and private nuisance 
as far as the right to institute actions in nuisance before Nigerian courts is concerned.
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and adapt or modify the objectionable rule, which can lead to considerable modification 
of English precedents (Allott 1960, 24). Nigerian judges often cite Nigerian precedents 
rather than English ones even if the same legal rule applies. In the case Shell v. Farah^^ , 
for instance, the judge of the Court of Appeal cited 36 Nigerian court cases and only 12 
foreign cases. A number of procedural practices also differ. For instance, Nigerian judges 
have on some occasions physically visited the site of a disputed subject matter in a civil 
court case, a practice uncommon in England. Most important of all, Nigerian precedents 
sometimes apply somewhat different legal mles from English ones. The greatest 
difference between Nigerian judicial precedents and the English Common Law is that 
Nigerian courts make limited use of Nigerian customary law, which stems from the need 
to adapt English law to the actual reality of Nigerian society. In referring to Africa in 
general, Allott (1960, 25) has argued that it would be indeed impossible to leave English 
law unadapted in the face of different social norms and customs in A f r i c a . L i k e  
property law in several other West African countries, Nigerian property law, for example, 
is quite different from English law as far as land ownership is concerned, which finds an 
expression in Nigerian court precedents. As Daniels (1964, 377-378) has pointed out, 
transactions in land may be governed either by the received English law or by the 
appropriate customary law.^  ^ As shown in the sub-section on land law below, Nigerian
[1995] 3 NWLR.
^ Writing on the local modification of colonial law in Africa, Allott (1960, 25) has concluded: ‘The most important 
single factor requiring the adaptation of English law is the existence of local African populations, to whom the 
English law is to be applied. The African populations are living under their own forms of society, having their 
own customs, own religion, beliefs, social organisation, patterns oftrmrriage and divorce, land law, etc. How can 
English law be applied to them unadapted?'.
English law was usually applied ‘where English conveyancing fonns have been used to transfer land’ (Daniels 
1964, 377). On the other hand, land originally held under customary law is not necessarily converted to land held 
under English law as a result of subsequent transactions. In a number of West African court cas^ under colonial
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court precedents continue to recognise the existence of communal and family land 
ownership, which exists under Nigerian customary law, but not under the English 
Common Law.
IiTespective of the degree to which the Nigerian legal system has deviated from 
the traditional English Common Law, the introduction of the Common Law has often 
been regarded by scholars and administrators as inherently conducive to economic 
development. In general terms, Posner (1986) has argued that the Common Law is 
economically efficient. Posner (1986, 229-230) has stated that the Common Law 
doctrines ‘form a system fo r inducing people to behave efficiently, not only in explicit 
markets but across the whole range o f  social interactions’. This ‘efficiency theory of the 
Common Law’ does not imply that every Common Law mle is inherently efficient. 
Posner (1986, 21), for instance, merely suggests that the ‘Common Law is best (not 
perfectly) explained as a system for maximising the wealth o f society’. According to 
Posner (1986, 230), one example of an efficient Common Law mle is the doctrine of the 
‘eminent domain’, which allows private companies to compulsorily obtain private 
property for the sake of economic development. While the doctrine limits private 
property rights, Posner (1986, 230) has argued that it allows a value-maximising 
exchange.
In the African context, both radical and liberal scholar's have agreed that the 
introduction of the Common Law was conducive to capitalist development.^^ Nigerian
rule, it was held that customary law applied to a transaction, although a mortgage was executed in accordance 
with English law (Daniels 1964, 377-378).
^ The role of law in Africa’s socio-economic change has been directly addressed by several scholarly studies 
(Seidman 1968; Ghai et al. 1987). According to radical scholars such as those in the edited work of Ghai et al. 
(1987), received colonial law was indeed seen as a precondition for capitalist development in Africa as it served 
to integrate peripheral areas into the world economy. According to more moderate scholars such as Allott et al.
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legal scholars have often supported the retention of British colonial law (as opposed to a 
re-enaction of African customary law) after the country’s independence from Britain 
because of its perceived benefits to business. T.O. Elias (1989, 5), Nigeria’s most eminent 
legal scholar to-date and former Chief Justice of Nigeria, has argued that the main 
function of jmispmdence in a developing society was indeed ‘to promote economic 
growth and social well-being \  From the perspective of oü companies and other private 
enteiprises, the legal continuity ensured through English Common Law, particularly 
English commercial law, was considered the best method of promoting economic growth 
as African customary law was considered incapable of providing a coherent framework 
for commercial transactions. Said A.A. SchiUer: It is generally recognised that the 
indigenous systems o f  law in Africa are deficient in the areas o f commerce, finance and 
social welfare. Further, the indigenous law is considered inadequate in the field  o f  
obligations and property (quoted in Seidman 1968, 31). English common law, 
supplemented by statute law such as petroleum legislation, has therefore continued to 
guide the economic decisions of oü companies. From the perspective of oü companies, 
the intr oduction of English law into Nigeria was beneficial as companies required a stable 
legal framework in order to make investments with some degree of security. 
Furthermore, in legal disputes with vülage communities, oil companies are able to use 
legal principles of Common Law with which company lawyers are familiar rather than
(1969, 11), ‘legal development does not keep exactly in step with socio-economic development; and that more 
general development itself is not precisely phased in all its parts’. However, judge-made law as well as 
legislation is likely to keep law in some accord with socio-economic developments. The problem Allott et al. 
faced was that of a time factor: when does the judicial or popular disregard of a traditional rule mean that the rule 
is abrogated and loses the force of law? Individual Kipsingis in Kenya, for example, began to enclose and 
appropriate community grazing lands, which raises the question at what point in time does what was originally a 
flagrant disregard of established rights become an approved method of acquiring property? Allott et al. (1969, 11 - 
12) concluded that there is generally a time-lag between social and legal evolution.
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customary laws. The introduction of English law into Nigeria was hence ultimately to the 
advantage of oil companies.
3.4. Post-colonial Law
The basic framework of colonial law as well as the plurality of legal systems have 
largely remained in place in African post-colonial states, as Jacques Vanderhnden (1983, 
95) has argued. According to Vanderlinden (1983, 95), most legal modifications have 
been undertaken in the area of public law. Most importantly, as Vanderlinden (1983, 97) 
has noted, the formal legal structures became in theory accessible to all citizens, while 
hitherto they were merely accessible to non-Africans and a small group of ‘civilised’ 
Africans. In practice, however, the formal legal system has been opened to the 
Europeanised parts of the population, mostly in urban areas, while the rural majority 
continued to rely more on customary law and its institutions (Vanderlinden 1983, 97). As 
a consequence for the oü industry, membei-s of village communities in oü producing areas 
were allowed to use the general law courts, if only in theory, to freely litigate against oü 
companies in the formal legal institutions.
In the former British colonies in Africa, as AUott (1965, 222) has argued, the 
most sti'ikiiig changes to the legal system occurred with regards to the unification of the 
courts systems, which involved four main changes. First, the appellate court structure was 
integrated by permitting appeals from lower, formerly ‘native’, courts to the superior 
courts. Second, the practice and procedure of the formerly ‘native’ courts was anglicised 
and standardised, by applying the procedure of the general, formerly British, law courts.
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Third, the laws administered by courts were harmonised by applying statutory law in the 
local courts and customary law in the general law courts. Fourth, the jurisdiction of local 
courts was extended to non-Africans in some places (Allott 1965, 222).
While the Common Law has remained the basis of the fbimal-legal structure in 
Nigeria, the post-colonial Nigerian state introduced a multitude of statutes. Nigerian 
statute law comprises statutes and subsidiary legislation, both at the federal and the state 
level. From the beginning of military rule in 1966, the legislative powers of the federal 
government were gradually expanded at the expense of state governments. Most of the 
important matters of government are within the Exclusive Legislative List established by 
the Constitution of 1979. States may only legislate on matters not on the Exclusive List. 
Any state laws may be declared inconsistent with the Nigerian Constitution. The 
Exclusive Legislative List includes ‘mines and minerals, including oil fields, oil mining, 
geological surveys and natural gas’P  That means, the federal government has the 
exclusive right to legislate on any issues related to the oil industry. The federal 
government and state governments sometimes delegate power to government officials, 
departments or other public authority to make subsidiary laws. These aie regulations and 
orders to supplement the so-called primaiy legislation or statutes. For instance, the 
federal government established the Petroleum Act 1969 which can be considered as 
primaiy legislation, while the minister responsible for petroleum affairs established the 
Peti'oleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations of 1969 which can be considered as 
subsidiary legislation. The Peü'oleum Act established a general legal framework for oil 
companies, while the Regulations established specific legal provisions for oil operations.
Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, schedule 2, part I, Exclusive Legislative List, item 37.
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In general, if judged by the evidence from secondary sources, the evolution of 
post-colonial law, both statute law and judicial precedents, does not appear to support 
the ‘efficiency theory of the Common Law’. First, the existence of the rentier state meant 
that the formulation of legal rules did not follow a completely nationalist agenda. By 
implication, it could be expected that legal rules were on occasion beneficial to the ruling 
elite and the oil companies at the expense of economic development in Nigerian society 
as a whole (see section two of the thesis). Second, the Common Law was generally 
biased in favour of corporate interests. '^  ^ Most important of all, the introduction of 
Common Law in Nigeria put commercial capitalist interests expressed in Common Law 
doctrines above the rules of Nigeria’s customary law. For instance, in Nigeria, the 
doctrine of the ‘eminent domain’, mentioned by Posner as an efficiency maximising 
device, often led to the expropriation of land of village communities by the government 
for the benefit of foreign oil companies at an inadequately low cost (as will be shown m 
greater detail in the sub-section on land law below).
The example of the environmental law and the Federal Environmental Protection 
Agency (FEPA) is indicative of the inherent contradictions in the making of post-colonial
^ In general terms, some scholars in the field of sociology of law would argue that law usually serves as a vehicle of 
domination by the ruling classes. As a prototypical exponent of this view, Alan Hunt (1993, 21) has argued that 
‘law plays an important part in sustaining the domination of the ruling class’. Hunt has distinguished between 
coercive and ideological domination. Coercive domination refers to the organised power of the state (including 
courts, the prison system and the police) which may be used to coerce individuals or groups to behave in a certain 
manner. According to Hunt, the main application of coercion is to protect the ‘general conditions’ of the capitalist 
order, above all, to protect and reinforce the capitalist property relations. Ideological domination refers to 
activities and processes whereby (in Hunt’s words) ‘the assent of the existing social order is produced and 
mobilised’ (Hunt 1993, 25). Law is said to transmit ideological attitudes and values prevalent in society. These 
attitudes and values in turn reinforce and legitimise the existing social order. Coercive and ideological domination 
are closely related. For instance, the coercion of an offender reinforces the general values and attitudes associated 
with the existence of private property in society as a whole. As shown in this section of the thesis, evidence on 
both substantive law and the structural character of the legal system provides substantial support for the view that 
Nigerian law is a vehicle of domination for the ruling elite. The elite’s economic well-being is in turn dependent 
on the corporate interests of foreign oil companies. It could be argued that the elite is thus inevitably compelled to 
protect those corporate interests by using law or other means available.
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law (as shown in greater detail in the sub-section on environmental law below). Before 
the establishment of the FEPA, the Common Law doctrines proved as laigely insufficient 
to curb environmental pollution by oil companies. This was despite the fact that village 
communities in the oil producing areas were adversely affected by oü operations without 
receiving adequate compensation from oü companies. The formation and the continuing 
existence of the FEPA were a result of a nationalist agenda in policy-making and of 
popular pressures at the micro-level. However, the non-enforcement of FEPA mles in the 
0 Ü industry could be seen pai'tiy as a result of an alliance between tlie Nigerian elite and 
the foreign oü companies. Tliis may help to explain why environmental mles were usuaUy 
not properly enforced, although Nigeria as a whole was losing billions of dollars in 
revenues due to financial losses fi'om gas flaring and oÜ spills. The case of the Nigerian 
environmental law and the FEPA questions the view that the Common Law is efficient.
While the economic efficiency of the Common Law is questionable in the Nigerian 
context, the post-colonial legal system confiimed the applicability of Common Law to 
Nigeria as opposed to the re-inti'oduction of customaiy law. As previously argued, the 
displacement of customary mles in higher courts and the introduction of English law 
ultimately prejudiced the legal system in favour of oü companies and against the 
community litigants.
Until today, the legal mles of both the colonial and post-colonial law have 
continued to determine what is possible in legal disputes between oÜ companies and 
viUage communities. In the context of oü operations, the most relevant substantive mles 
are statutory. They include statutes on land, petroleum matters and the environment.
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^ On problems of terminology, see, e.g., James (1973, chapter 2). 
^ (1974) 1 All N.L.R.
which we examine in some detail below. Of those three types of statutes, Nigerian land 
legislation is the oldest
3.5. Customary Land Rights and Land Legislation
Land acquisition is a precondition for oil operations since crude oil is located 
under the earth’s surface. While land legislation determines the legal principles of land j
acquisition for economic activities, land allocation in village communities continues to be !
regulated by customary land rights. Oil companies are legally bound to pay monetaiy j
icompensation for land acquisition, so they are forced to deal with customary landowners |
I
and/or their tenants in the course of acquiring land. j
From the point of view of oil companies, proof of land ownership can be difficult j
1in Nigeria’s rural areas as land is usually held according to local unwritten customary I
ilaws, which differ from tribe to tribe and from village to village. Above all, the Western ,
concept of ‘ownership ’ is in itself foreign to Nigerian customary law and was introduced i
into Nigeria under British rule.^  ^ Customaiy law distinguishes, nevertheless, between j
some sort of permanent land ownership and mere possession of land. In the case Shell-BP \
V. Abedf'^ in 1974, the plaintiffs sued Shell-BP for having damaged a piece of land !
I
previously cultivated by them. The Abadiama people claimed that they were the land '
owners. The trial judge established that the plaintiffs were ‘in actual occupation o f the
land’ but were not ‘de jure owners o f  the land’. In other words, they were merely j
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customaiy tenants, while the people of Gbekebor were the owners. The plaintiffs would 
have won compensation, if they had pleaded possession of the land rather than ownership 
and if they had successfully provided a proof of an agreement of tenancy. They lost the 
case on appeal because the basis of their claim was as owners of the land so they could 
not claim compensation as customaiy tenants. Said the appeal judge that ‘A de facto  
possession o f  land gives right to retain the possession and to undisturbed possession o f  
it as against all wrong doers but it is not sufficient against the lawful owner or those 
claiming under the lawful owner’. Although one must remember that customaiy rights 
may sometimes be ambiguous, the Abedi case indicates that customary law distinguishes 
between ownership and mere possession of land and that land can be leased to a tenant.
The nature of ownership under customary law is different from Western concepts 
of ownership. In the West, ownership relates to a named individual or a group of 
individuals, who can administer, rent out or sell a particular plot of land. In Nigeria, on 
the most basic level, the land is Uaditionaliy held by village communities or families, not 
by individuals. A useful starting point is the court judgement in Tijani v. Secretary o f  
Southern Nigeria^^ of the eaiiy 1920s, in which Viscount Haldane said:
(1923), 4 N.L.R. 18.
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The next fact which it is important to bear in mind in order to understand 
the native land law is that the notion o f  individual ownership is quite 
foreign to native ideas. Land belongs to the community, the village or the 
family, never to the individual. All the members o f the community, the 
village or family have an equal right to the land, but in every case the 
Chief or Headman o f the community or village, or head o f the family, has 
charge o f  the land, and in loose mode o f speech is sometimes called the 
owner. He is to some extent in the position o f a trustee, and as such holds 
the land fo r the use o f  the community or family. He has control o f it, and 
any member who wants a piece o f  it to cultivate or build upon, goes to 
him for it. But the land still remains the property o f the community or 
family. He cannot make any important disposition o f the land without 
consulting the elders o f  the community or family, and their consent must 
in all cases be given before a grant can be made to a stranger (quoted in 
Elias 1971, 72).
In line with the above judgement, this thesis makes the distinction between 
communal, family and individual land. Communal land belongs to all members of the 
village community. By customary law, each member of the community is entitled to 
acquire a portion of land, which is usually used for agricultural purposes. Members who 
seek grants of communal land must approach the chief who decides on their applications. 
The Chief or Headman is not an owner of communal land but merely a quasi trustee. The 
most important prerogative of the chief is distiibution of land, in particulai' virgin land.
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Grants of land are usually made subject to conditions which may vary according to tribe 
or village and relate to the length and form of grant. For instance, in Ebiama, an Ijaw 
village, pai’cels of land were held indefinitely as long as they were farmed, while in some 
other Ijaw communities land was usually redistiibuted among its members every year. In 
the same manner, the laws of succession vary according to tribe and village,^* Land may 
have to be returned to the community after a period of time depending on local 
customary law such as after one farming season or after the death of the occupiers. When 
land is returned to the community, it may be reallocated once again. The chief has the 
right to revoke a grant of land and to evict the occupier under certain circumstances, in 
which case the land is returned to the c o m m u n i t y I n  any land conflicts involving 
communal land, the chief legally represents the commimity to the outside world.^° 
However, a ch iefs powers as a trustee are limited. He cannot sell communal land without 
the consent of the commimity members. Any money collected by the chief on behalf of 
communal land must be shared within the community.
Real world forms of ownership, as opposed to the world of legal categories, may 
be even more complex. Leis (1972, 16) has described an Ijaw village in the Niger Delta 
where most farm land and fishing sites are owned by sections and subsections of the 
village rather than by the village at large. But in those cases one can also speak of 
communal land. Family property in Nigeria is distinct from communal property and 
requires an understanding of the distinction between a family and a community. On the
^ On general laws of succession in Nigeria, see, e.g. Okoro (1966). 
On the right of revocation and eviction, see Elias (1971, 87-96). 
On the chief's representative status, see Elias (1971, 84-86).
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most basic level, a family is understood here as a kinship group of people who trace 
descent from the same ancestor, who usually live together and share the economic 
benefits of the same area of land/^ The smallest family can be composed of only a man, 
his wife or wives and theii* children, but a family can have many more members related 
through marriage, kinship or adoption. The composition of a family and the rights to 
family land ar e determined by local custom and can vary considerably according to tribe 
and community, but a family is always a kinship group. In contrast, a village community is 
a settlement inhabited by families linked by common economic, cultural and historic 
relationships, not necessarily kinship.^  ^ A chief or a headman is a leader within a 
community, while a family head exercises family rights within the family.
Communal land can become family land through allotment by the chief, that 
means, the communal land is partitioned and is henceforth controlled by the family. An 
allotment is different from the mere allocation of communal land to a family for 
cultivation because it means permanent transfer of ownership. In the case of allocation, 
land is allocated to a family for a period of time after which it is returned to the 
community for reallocation. However, family heads sometimes claim allocated plots as 
family land after a few generations, especially when no one in the community can 
remember the original land allocation (James 1973,56). In effect, as James (1973,46) has
In everyday speech, the word ‘family’ usually refers to a group of people linked together by kinship, irrespective 
of whether or not they live together. Since one could go a long way back in tracing descent, the common sense 
meaning of the word ‘family’ cannot form the basis of any sociological inquiry. In this study, the word ‘family’ 
only refers to persons who are linked by close kinship bonds, live together and typically engage in common 
economic activities. On the basic concepts of rural sociology in general, see Galeski (1972).
Oral history of Nigerian villages sometimes traces the community’s distant origins from a common ancestor, but 
its value is largely symbolic.
Elias (1971, 84) used the term 'partition of land’ rather than allotment. However, the use of different definitions 
should not obscure the issues. Whether one speaks of partition, allotment or gift, the meaning signifies permanent 
rather than temporary transfer of ownership.
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argued, with increased population and allotment of communal land to families, there has 
been a gradual shift from communal to family land holdings in Nigeria.
The family head, usually the oldest male member of the family, is in chaige of 
distributing family land. He allocates plots to family members and others for cultivation, 
collects the rents and represents the land in disputes with outsiders. The rights of a family 
head over family land aie much the same as that of a chief in chaige of communal land 
(EHas 1971, 107). However, if the entire family dies out or if the family land is 
abandoned, the land holdings are returned to the community and may be reallocated once 
again.
Land rights in Nigeria remain collective, whether communal or family-based, but 
they have become increasingly more individualised. As indicated eai’lier, the rapid 
increase in population has led to an increased pressure on land and land conflicts may 
aiise as a by-product. Typically, a farmer may insist on being allowed to faim on the same 
plot where his ancestors did. Since the land value increases, even smaller sections of the 
community may acquke the right to alienate land by lease or sale to individuals. As a 
consequence, land shortage often leads to increasing individualisation of land holdings. In 
West Africa, this process has probably advanced most among the Ibos of south-eastern 
Nigeria with population densities of one thousand per squaie mile and more (Lloyd 
1980, 96-97). Collective land rights have, neveitheless, continued to exist during the 
colonial period and after independence.
The colonial administrators recognised the existence of collective land ownership 
in Nigeria, even though they generally held that a change towards Westem-style
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individual land rights was both inevitable and beneficial to N i g e r i an sS i n c e  no white 
British settlers in Nigeria ran laige-scale plantations, in contrast to Eastern Africa; the 
British colonialists largely refrained from expropriating the land of the Niger Delta tribes. 
However, colonial mining legislation vested the ownership of natural resources such as 
oil in the colonial state. The Minerals Ordinance 1916 provided that ‘The entire property 
and control o f all minerals, and mineral oils in, under or upon any lands in Nigeria, and 
o f all rivers, streams and watercourses throughout Nigeria, is and shall be vested in the 
C r o w n ' After Nigeria’s independence, oil rights remained vested in the state under 
section 1 of the Petroleum Act 1969.
Oil rights, however, were distinct from land ownership. Oil companies could only 
get access to the oil resources by applying to the government, not the local land owner, 
for a licence (see section two of the thesis). In return, the oil company paid rents and 
royalties to the government. Once an oil company obtained an oil licence from the 
government, it had to separately negotiate with the village community or families over the 
sale or the lease of specific pieces of land. That means, the government reserved for itself 
sole right to dispose of oil resour ces, while the land itself was left in the hands of the local 
people, a distinction which largely survived until 1978.
Oil companies encountered problems in dealing with collective land rights because 
the chiefs as protectors of the tribal heritage were sometimes unwilling to sell or allocate 
tribal land to outsiders. Europeans already encountered the problem in the pre-colonial
^ Frederick Lugard, Nigeria’s first Governor in the period 1914-1919, stated that ‘conceptions as to the tenure of ;
land are subject to a steady evolution, side by side with the evolution of social progress, from the most primitive i
stages to the organisation of the modem state’. He continued: ‘These processes of natural evolution, leading up \
to individual ownership, may, I believe, be traced in every civilisation known to history’ (Lugard 1965, 280-281). =
Section 3(1). '
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era when collective land holding hindered European penetration of the African interior. 
The Castle of Sao Jorge di Msia, the most important base of the Portuguese in pre­
colonial West Africa, was accordingly built not on purchased but on leased land because 
the local mler opposed the sale of land (Dike 1956). Since land owners were often 
reluctant to seU or allocate land to outsiders, including land for oil operations and may 
have taken an uncompromising stance in negotiations with oü companies over 
compensation, the government in Nigeria gradually introduced specific legislation in 
order to compulsorily acquire land for economic development
Unth the promulgation of the Land Use Act in 1978, nonetheless, the government 
was not legally empowered to expropriate land for the private need of oil companies. It 
was only empowered to expropriate land for public purposes by the Public Lands 
Ordinance 1876, later re-enacted as Public Lands Acquisition Act 1917, and other similai’ 
statutes. In cases of land acquisition, compensation was to be paid to the owners 
(Olawoye 1982, 15-16). Despite the legal Hmitations, the government had often 
compulsorily acquhed land for oÜ companies before 1978 under the so-called ‘power of 
eminent domain’, that means, the power to seize private property for public use. Oil 
operations were generally considered by the government to seiwe ‘public interest’. Both 
the OÜ Pipelines Act 1956 and the Petroleum Act 1969 specifically provided for powers 
of ‘eminent domain’ provided that compensation was paid to the land owners.
In the court case Nzekwu v. Attorney-General East-Central State^^, for example, 
the Ogbo family sued the government for compulsory acquisition of their land. According
Oil Pipelines Act 1956, sections 19(4) and (5); Petroleum Regulations, section 17(l)(c). 
(1972) All N.L.R.
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to the government representatives, the land acquisition was intended for ‘economic 
development’ of the area. At the time of public acquisition, ownership of the land was 
disputed between the people of Onitsha and the people of Obosi. Christian Onyedike, 
chartered surveyor and government witness at the trial, said that ‘it was a big risk fo r  an 
investor to invest his money on it [the land] fo r fear that if  his vendor lost his claim he 
would lose his money’. This quote appears to restate one of the main rationales behind 
compulsory land acquisition in Nigeria in general. Compulsory land acquisition allows 
land to be developed economically notwithstanding the conflicting claims of different land 
owners. In the Nzekwu case, the plaintiffs did not refuse to deal with the oil companies or 
the government but demanded higher compensation than they were actually offered.
The above case and similar' ones exemplify that land owners did not necessarily 
challenge compulsory land acquisition for oil operations, but were often more concerned 
with the quantum of compensation owed to them.^* Until 1978, however, the land 
owners were able to challenge compulsory acquisition by suing the government, even 
though it is unclear whether many owners took this comse of action. An important case 
was Ereku v. the Military Governor o f Mid-Western State^^, in which the Itsekiri 
Communal Land Trustees and other community representatives sued the government for 
expropriation of land on behalf of McDermott Overseas, an oil company sub-contr actor. 
In that case, McDei'mott attempted to acquire approximately 50 acres of land near 
Igbudu in the then Warri Division of the Delta province in the Mid-Western State of
In the case Aghenghen v. Waghoreghor (1974) All N.L.R., two communities were engaged in a dispute 
concerning a compensation payment for land compulsorily acquired for Shell-BP’s oU operations. Another 
example is the case Okwuosa v. Adizua IIMSLR (1977), which involved a dispute on the compensation payment 
for land compulsorily acquired for Agip’s oil operations.
(1974) 10 S.C.
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Nigeria for the company’s operations, hi April 1966, the government published an 
acquisition notice declaring that the land had been acquired for public purposes under the 
Public Lands Acquisition Law of Western Nigeria 1959. Subsequently, the government 
granted a lease for 99 years to McDermott. The plaintiffs sued the government seeking a 
declaration tliat the notice of acquisition was invalid and seeking an order setting aside 
the compulsory acquisition. They lost in the first instance, but won the case on appeal to 
the Supreme Court. The lawyers representing the government had argued that the oü 
company benefited the public not least because it ‘employs a large number o f Nigerians’. 
The court was unmoved by those arguments and declared that the government was not 
empowered to acquire land for McDennott even though the court pronounced that the 
company had the same objectives as the government and served the Nigerian public. It 
held that the acquisition was on behalf of a private company and not the government. 
T.O. Ehas, Chief Justice of Nigeria, accordingly allowed the appeal and declared the 
notice of acquisition ‘unconstitutional, ultra vires and void’.
The Supreme Court went even further declaring that the Public Lands Acquisition 
Law (Amendment) Edict 1972, of Mid-Western State, was invalid. The Edict was 
specifically intioduced by the government of the Mid-Western State in order to allow 
expropriation of land on behalf of private companies. The Edict allowed compulsory land 
acquisition ‘required by any company or industrialist for industrial purposes’, which 
broadened the meaning of ‘public purpose’. The Supreme Court declared that the Edict 
was ‘unconstitutional, ultra vires and vo id’.
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The above case reveals some of the potential legal difficulties that oil companies 
could encounter in acquiring land for economic development before 1978. The situation 
changed dramatically with the promulgation of the Land Use Act 1978. The 1978 Act 
vested the ownership of all land within a state m the state governor. The most important 
provision of the Act read:
Subject to the provisions o f this Decree, all land comprised in the 
territory o f each State in the Federation are hereby vested in the Military 
Governor o f that State and such land shall be held in trust and 
administered fo r the use and common benefit o f all Nigerians in 
accordance with the provisions o f this Decree
The Act makes explicit references to the oil industry. In particular', section 28 
stipulates that the military governor can revoke a right of occupancy for ‘overriding 
public interests % which included the ‘requirement o f the land for mining purposes or oil 
pipelines or for any purpose connected therewith’ These provisions empowered the 
governor to use any land holdings in Nigeria for oil operations. In theory, a governor 
could legally acquire the entire state territory and then assign it to a single company. In 
practise, the procedure for acquiring land for oil operations did not change significantly. 
Before and after 1978, an oü company had to acquire an oü licence for a given area. 
Subsequently, the company approached the State Ministry of Lands in order to work out 
the conditions for entry into the land in question and the compensation to be paid to 
communities (Ajomo 1982, 339). In this respect, little changed for oil companies.
Section 1.
Sections 28(1), (2c) and (3b).
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However, there have been major changes which concern village communities. 
Fh'st, a community has no right to question the entry of an oil company onto their 
communal land. The governor can acquire any land on behalf of private or public oil 
companies. The precedent established in Ereku v. the Military Governor o f  Mid-Western 
State no longer apphes. Second, compensation for land is paid to the governor and no 
longer to the community. A distinction is made between compensation for land and 
compensation for improvements on land. Until 1978, oil companies either paid annual 
rent to the land owners for the use of their land or purchased a plot of land. In addition, 
they were legally bound to make compensation payments for any improvements on the 
land such as destroyed buildings and crops. Since 1978, oil companies have merely paid 
for improvements on the said land (Omotola 1980, 38-39). In practice, a community only 
receives a single payment, if any, from the oil company when something has been 
desti'oyed. Thkd, according to the Land Use Act, no court has the jurisdiction to inquire 
into any question concerning the adequacy of compensation paid to land owners 
(Ekemike 1978, 16).
From the perspective of the oil companies, the Land Use Act brought advantages 
and disadvantages. Perhaps the main advantage is that community conflicts or prolonged 
negotiations over land can no longer delay land acquisition for oil operations. Previously, 
conflicts over land could delay oü operations. For instance, in the case Ereku v. the 
Military Governor o f  Mid-Western State described earlier, McDermott’s operations were 
delayed by a local dispute with the Itsekiri Communal Land Trustees. From the 
perspective of oü companies, compulsory land acquisition by the government renders the
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process of acquiring land quicker and more efficient A key disadvantage of the Land Use 
Act for companies is the payment of rent to the governor rather than to the actual land 
owners. Since the land owners receive less compensation from the companies, they may 
become more aggrieved by oil operations. It could be more beneficial for an oil company 
to pay compensation to the actual land owners rather than to the governor in order to 
prevent any potential dissatisfaction with oil operations within the community (section 
five of the thesis discusses the link between such dissatisfaction and community protests 
against oil companies, which can dismpt oü operations).
On the whole, the advantages to oü companies appear to have outweighed the 
disadvantages. The Land Use Act has aUowed the government and oü companies to 
obtain land for economic development, which was one of the key objectives of the Act. In 
1977, Brigadier Musa Ya’Ardua said at the inauguiation of the Land Use Panel that 
‘Both the Anti-Inflationary Task Force and the Rent Panel Reports identified land as 
one o f  the major bottlenecks to development efforts in the country’ (quoted in Olawoye 
1982,14). By implication, the 1978 Act eliminated this bottleneck.
In terms of customary law, the Act has changed httle. Admittedly, there has been 
confusion among lawyers as to the true meanmg of the Act."^  ^ In paiticular, according to 
the Act, a community, a family or an individual no longer owns the land but has a mere
Even though the Act is beneficial to oil company interests, there are no indications that oil companies lobbied for 
a change in Nigeria’s land use legislation. Said Olisa Agbakoba, a prominent Nigerian lawyer:
Clearly, the reason behind the Land Use Act was to acquire land for what the government 
considered the economic development of Nigeria. Because of customary rights, land was not 
readily available for oil exploration or other activity. So, clearly, the Act benefits the oil 
companies, but one cannot say that there is a link between oil company activities and the Act 
(Personal interview with Olisa Agbakoba, Lagos, February 1997).
Among other things, there was a long standing argument between lawyers over whether the Land Use Act 
amounts to the nationalisation of land in Nigeria by the state. See, e.g. Umezulike (1986).
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right of occupancy. Despite the promulgation of the Land Use Act and despite growing 
pressures on land, there is strong evidence that land owners’ attitudes to land have not 
changed markedly and collective land rights persist in Nigeria’s rural areas."^
Interesting evidence on land ownership is provided by a survey conducted by 
Winston Bell-Gam (1990) in the Bonny Local government Area."^  ^ The survey is of 
interest to the present study because Bonny Island has served as the site of Shell’s crude 
oil export terminal for several decades (SPDC 1995). According to the survey, in the 
Bonny area, 53.8% of the land used for house construction was vhgin land allocated by 
the local chief and 26.7% was land inherited by the present owner. Only 6.9% of the land 
was purchased by the owner (Bell-Gam 1990, 62). In some places, no land purchases 
took place whatsoever such as in the village of Finima. These results are significant since 
the area around Bonny experienced a steady growth in population and was heavily 
affected by oil company operations, so one could expect a dynamic market for land 
property to have developed. More importantly, the results are significant since collective 
land rights have survived not only in remote villages but also in towns such as in Bonny
For instance, Oshio (1990, 91) has argued that ‘the institution of family property with its incidents under 
customary law largely survive the Land Use Act, 1978’ despite several court judgements to the contrary. On the 
impact of the Act on customary systems of tenure, see e.g. Omotola (1980, chapter 2). According to Omotola 
(1982, 40), ‘the land struggle continues as if the Act had not come into effect’.
Bell-Gam was not interested in ownership rights as such, but the findings on ownership were incidental to the 
survey. The survey investigated the nature of land use with regards to land obtained for house construction, not on 
land in general. Nonetheless, since Bonny Island is largely made up of non-farming communities and is not 
industrialised, land is mainly required for house construction. Bell-Gam's evidence on house construction can 
hence provide a fair indication of the form of ownership rights. In the course of the survey, Bell-Gam asked the 
question ‘how was land obtained for this house?’. The respondents’ replies included land allocation by the chief, 
inheritance and purchase. It is assumed here that land allocated by the chief indicates communal ownership. 
Inheiited land may be both family and individual owned, so it is a worse indicator of ownership structures.
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Town where land for house construction could be expected to be more scarce than in 
villages/^
In any case, the survey of Bonny Island shows that individuals as well as families 
continue to acquire land through allocation by the chief, inheritance or purchase, not 
through a grant by the state governor. By implication, the land owner can still expect to 
enjoy his or her land rights until the government or an oil company becomes interested in 
a paiticular* piece of land. In that case, land can be compulsorily acquired while the 
owners receive no compensation for the land.
The Land Use Act remains the most significant piece of legislation on land issues 
in Nigeria to-date. The provisions of the Land Use Act are valid from 1978 onwards and 
do not apply to events before 1978. In spite of this, oil company lawyers have 
unsuccessfully attempted to use the Act in order to discharge of their obligations to
Table: Results of a survey in Bonny on the question ‘how was land obtained for this house?’
Place
(estimated population)
Bonny
(18,075)
Opobo
(23,580)
Okrika
(26,425)
Finima
(2,760)
Queenstown
(2,379)
Oloma/Ayaminima
(946)
1. Virgin land allocated by local chief 77.88% 28.90% 37.75% 54.72% 51.52% 56.41%
2. Site of former house inherited by 5.76% 50.78% 34.69% 45.28% 36.36% 43.59%
present owner
3. Site of former house obtained by 3.84% 12.50% 3.06% - 6.06% -
arrangement with former owners
4. Virgin land purchased by present 11.54% 0.78% 7.14% - 3.03% -
owner
5. Site of former house purchased by - 1.56% 1.02% - 3.03% -
present owner
6. Any other (specify) - - - - - -
7. Don’t know 1.04% 6.25% 2.04% - - -
8. No response - 14.28% - - -
Source: Bell-Gam (1990, 96, 146, 171, 183, 189, 199 and 205).
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village communities for operations before 1978. In the case Adomba v. Odiesf^, two 
families were involved in a dispute over who should receive a compensation payment 
from Agip. Agip had entered communal land near Oloibiii in Rivers State in 1977, a yeai* 
before the Land Use Act was promulgated. In court, Agip as the second defendant 
claimed that Hhe plaintiffs had no right to institute the claim because o f the Land Use 
Decree ’ as they allegedly failed to fulfil certain requirements of the Act. The judge rightly 
considered Agip’s statement as irrelevant. Even though the court judgement was made in 
1980, Agip had to pay compensation for the land because the company entered the land 
before 1978. The Adomba case suggests that the year 1978 was a clear-cut dividing line 
in teiTTis of compensation for oil company land acquisition in Nigeria. From 1978, village 
communities enjoyed fewer land rights in relation to oil companies.
To sum up, the Land Use Act allowed oü companies to gain access to the oÜ 
resources and to the land through the government more easüy. Companies were no 
longer obliged to negotiate over the sale or allocation of land with the customary land 
owners, albeit they were stül required to pay compensation for destroyed crops and other 
improvements on land. As a consequence, companies had a lesser economic incentive to 
investigate the local patterns of land ownership, which can partly explain the carelessness 
with which oil companies deal with viUage communities (this wiU be explained in some 
detail in section five of the thesis). At the same time, the Land Use Act failed to safeguard 
the rights of customary land owners, despite recommendations made to the government
1 R.S.L.R. (1980).
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by the Land Use Panel in 197?/^ In this sense, the Nigerian land legislation after 1978 
was biased in favour of oil companies at the expense of village communities.
3.6. Petroleum Legislation and Operating Arrangements
Once oil companies acquired land in village communities, they still required the 
backing of a business conducive legal framework to expand their operations. In order to 
fully understand tlie nature of legal disputes between oü companies and vülage 
communities, it is instructive to broadly outline the general legislative framework for the 
functioning of the oil industry in Nigeria.
The main oü related statute in Nigeria is the Petroleum Act 1969. The 
promulgation of the Act repealed the colonial Mineral OÜs Ordinance, the main piece of 
petroleum legislation until 1969. Whüe the Act was a creation of the post-colonial state, 
it largely confirmed provisions of the colonial oü legislation. The mechanism for the 
granting of oü licences under the Petroleum Act was much the same as under the colonial 
rule (see section two of the thesis). As Atsegbua (1993, 35) has observed, provisions 
related to the assignment and l'évocation of oü licences as weU as the rights and powers 
of licence holders remained much the same as under colonial rule. The greatest changes 
concerned oü mining leases (OMLs). Untü 1969, OMLs were granted for a period of 30 
or 40 year's. After 1969, OMLs were merely granted for 20 years. In addition, the oil
In preparation of the Land Use Act 1978, the Nigerian government convened the Land Use Panel between May |
and November 1977, under Justice Chukwunwelke Idigbe as chairman. Referring specifically to the oil industry, Jj
the Panel recommended that the ‘Federal government should take a serious look at the effects of oil exploration I
and exploitation' with the view to ‘improving the quantum of compensation payable to land owners ’ and to I
compelling oil companies into ‘complete reclamation’ of all leased land (Land Use Panel 1977). But these 
recommendations have never been adhered to. ;
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company was obliged to relinquish one-half of the area of the lease ten years after the 
grant of an OML. This new provision encouraged a faster rate of exploration because oil 
company managers were aware that they would have to relinquish part of the area and 
were likely to speed up exploration (Atsegbua 1993, 35-37).
While the nature of oü licences remained largely unchanged, the nature of the 
aixangements between oü companies and the government changed significantly. From 
1971, the foreign oü companies were not merely granted oü licences by the government, 
but had to operate joint-ventures witii the government (see section two of the thesis). 
Perhaps surprisingly, for many years to come, no foimal operating agreements were 
signed between the joint-venture partners. Operating agreements spell out the legal 
relationship between the partners and also lay out the rules and procedures for the 
specific areas of responsibility as weU as the meaning of joint property. In the joint- 
venture between Shell and the Nigerian government, which has been operating since April 
1973, no formal operating agreement was signed untü July 1991."^  ^ The agreement in 
1991 was the first formal legal agreement to formalise the working relationship between 
SheU - the joint-venture operator - and the other joint-venture partners - NNPC, Elf and 
Agip (Atsegbua 1993, 43).
The participation arrangements with foreign oü companies were divided into two parts; the financial agreement 
and the operating agreement. The financial agreement with Shell-BP, for example, was signed in 1973. A draft 
operating agreement was drawn up in 1973 but it was not acceptable to the management of the NNOC. In their 
view, the agreement gave the NNOC little direct control over oil operations. While NNOC staff would be 
represented as directors in the joint-ventures, no powers were provided for day-to-day running of the oU 
operations. In addition, the government was to abide by the terms of the oil mining leases and concession 
agreements. The Ministry of Mines and Power refused to present an alternative draft, so the issue remained 
umosolved. The joint-ventures were forced to operate according to informal and formal procedures agreed with 
government officials. The draft agreements provided a basis for interim operational procedures (Turner 1977, 
146-148).
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More recently, production-sharing contracts, first introduced in an agreement 
with Ashland in 1973, were becoming more popular than joint-venture arrangements, 
particularly in offshore operations. The same company may indeed have different 
arrangements with the government. For instance. Shell operates a joint-venture on behalf 
of the government under the name SheU Petroleum Development Company (SPDC) of 
Nigeria. In addition. Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company (SNEPCO) has 
been operating since 1993 in deep-water acreage offshore and in so-caUed frontier areas 
onshore under a production-sharing arrangement with the government.^® Both SPDC and 
SNEPCO are wholly-SheU owned, but they operate under different legal arrangements 
which, above aU, affect the financing of oil activities.
In a production-sharing contract such as Shell’s SNEPCO offshore venture, the 
contractor advances all funds towards running costs. In a joint-venture such as SPDC, the 
operator and the other joint-venture partners share the operating costs. Since SheU owns 
a 30% share in the SPDC venture, the company pays 30% of the lunning costs. A similai* 
Operating Agreement with Topcon Company (Texaco Overseas) of 1988 read:
All costs and expenses incurred by the Operator shall be borne by the 
Parties in proportion to their respective Participating Interest.
As another wholly-owned Shell subsidiary. Shell Nigeria Gas (SNG) was launched in 1998 to market natural gas 
{Vanguard, 20 July 1998). SNG is not directly involved in oil exploration and production.
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Operator shall initially advance and pay all expenditures o f  whatever 
nature and kind incurred in Joint Operations. Operator may at its 
election, require each Non-Operator to advance its share o f Joint 
Operation net cash requirements ( ‘Cash Call’). Operator shall have a 
first and prior lien on all rights and interests o f  each Party in the Leases,
Joint Property, and in production to secure payment (BaiTows Company 
1995,772-779).
Thus, on the most basic level, in a production-shaiing contract, the government 
does not have to invest anything, wliile in a joint-venture, it must advance substantial 
funds at regular intervals. While the old joint-venture aiTangements continue to exist, new 
airangements in the 1990s have tended to be production-shaiing contracts. In the 1990s, 
many of the large foreign oil companies in Nigeria have signed a production-sharing 
contiact, including Shell, Mobil, Elf, Exxon and BP-Statoil Alliance (Khan 1994, 74). 
Both under joint-venture and production-sharing contracts, the foreign oil company has 
retained effective operating control over day-to-day operations in village communities. 
The company rather than die government has continued to be legally liable for any breach 
of law or for any damage aiising from oil operations in village communities. From the 
perspective of village communities, the post-colonial petroleum statutes hence change 
little.
With regard to the day-to-day operations of oü companies, the Petroleum Act 
1969 and other pieces of legislation (see below) contain various legal provisions designed 
to discourage viUage communities from hindering oÜ activities. The Oü Pipelines Act
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imposed a penalty of fifty Naira or imprisonment for three months for obstructing any 
activities related to the possession of any oÜ pipelines or any ancillary installations of oil 
pipelines/^ The Petroleum Act^  ^ extended these sanctions to other types of oil 
operations by providing that:
Any person who interferes with or obstructs the holder o f a licence or 
lease granted under section 2 o f this Decree (or his servants or agents) in 
the exercise o f  any rights, power or liberty conferred by the licence or 
lease shall be guilty o f  an offence and on conviction shall be liable to a 
fine not exceeding £100 or to imprisonment for a period not exceeding 
six months, or both.
Punishment for interference and sabotage became stiffer over the following two 
decades. The Petroleum Production and Distribution Anti-Sabotage Decree No.35 of 
1975 created the offences of sabotage in respect of wilful acts calculated to prevent, 
disrupt or interfere with the production or distribution of petroleum products. Under the 
Decree, offenders are to be tried by military tribunals and, if found guilty, are liable to 
death sentence or to imprisonment for up to twenty-one years. As if death penalty were 
not enough, the Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offences) Decree No.20 of 1984 
prescribed that those who unlawfully and wilfully break, damage, disconnect or otherwise 
tamper with any pipe for the tr ansportation of crude oü or refined oü or gas shaU be tried 
by the MisceUaneous Offences Tribunal. Those found guilty are liable to death by firing 
squad (Olisa 1987, 155-156). The death sentence was changed to a term of life
Section 25. 
Section 12(1).
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imprisonment by the Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offences) Amendment Decree 1986 
(Adewale 1989).
The common feature of all the above anti-sabotage statutes was trial by military 
tribunals. As Nwabueze (1992, chapter 3) has shown, the legal rights of those tried by 
militaiy tribunals are severely constrained. By implication, the anti-sabotage statutes were 
designed to offer security protection to oÜ companies without offering adequate legal 
safeguards to those suspected of tampering with oil installations. This would suggest that 
anti-sabotage statutes were biased in favour of oil interests. This does not imply, 
however, that petr oleum legislation as a whole or the administration of justice was biased 
against village communities in the oil producing areas. Above all, anti-sabotage legislation 
was rarely applied in practice.^  ^ Furthermore, a number of petroleum statutes, which j
specifically deal with oil company field operations, contain legal provisions for protection j
and compensation of those adversely affected by oil activity externalities (provisions on !
I
compensation will be discussed in sub-section 3.9. below). More importantly, a number }
!
of environmental statutes contain provisions which are capable of limiting the adverse j
effects of oil operations on village communities and offering legal recourse to those 
affected. An analysis of those statutes is instructive in discussing the question of whether i
iithe legal system is biased in favour of oil interests. ;
In one case, five men were accused of attempting to break a pipeline of the NNPC in Ogun state and were tried by 
a military tribunal in accordance with the provisions of the Special Tribunal (Miscellaneous Offences) Decree 
1984 {ThisDay, 23 January 1997). Cases such as this are rather infrequent, however. It appears that oil companies 
have exaggerated the extent of sabotage in order to avoid compensation payments to communities, although one 
cannot deny the existence of sabotage (this will be shown in section six of the thesis).
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3.7. Oil-Related Environmental Legislation
While Nigerian petroleum statutes may or may not be biased in favour of oil 
companies, envii'onmental law is likely to be capable of acting as a constraint on oil 
operations in village communities. The most important piece of environmental legislation 
in Nigeria is the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Act 1988, as amended 
by Act No.59 of 1992. The Act created the FEPA as a public body with tlie responsibility 
to protect, develop and manage the Nigerian environment. It was also meant to advise the 
government on national environmental policies and priorities and on activities affecting 
the environment.^"  ^ Until 1988, Nigeria had no national institution and no comprehensive 
detailed legislation to deal with environmental issues.
In addition to the general provisions of 1988 and 1992, the FEPA established 
detailed guidelines and standards for environmental control (FEPA 1991). The Agency 
co-operates with other governmental bodies. It is headed by a governing council with 
members drawn from various federal ministries. In addition, since 1992, the Agency has 
had a technical committee, also mostly drawn from Federal Mmistries, to advise the 
governing council on technical issues.^  ^ In addition to the creation of FEPA, the Act of 
1988 encouraged the federal states and the local government councils to set up their own 
Environmental Protection Bodies to deal with environmental issues in their respective 
a r e a s .S in c e  1988, various federal states have created State Environmental Protection 
Agencies (SEPAs).
Section 4. 
Section 2. 
Section 24.
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The creation of the FEPA illustrates the growing interest in environniental issues 
in Nigeria which started in the 1970s. In 1979, the Nigerian National Petroleum 
Coiporation (NNPC) held the first conference on environmental issues in the oü industry. 
The 1979 Conference caUed for the enactment of an environmental law simüar to the 
Envii'onmental Protection Agency (EPA) in the US. Since 1979, the NNPC has organised 
an environmental conference twice a year. Calls for environmental legislation have 
became louder (Odogwu 1991). The final creation of the Agency in 1988 was in direct 
response to the so-caUed Koko incident when toxic waste from Europe had been brought 
to Nigeria, which was followed by an outcry in the Nigerian press (Hegbune 1994, 93). In 
other words, FEPA’s creation was directly sparked off by public pressure at the micro­
level.
The FEPA was given broad legal powers to enforce environmental controls m the 
0 Ü industry and, thus, to intei*vene in the running of the industry. The FEPA Act and 
guidelines regulate areas such as water quality, effluent limitation and aii* quality. Section 
20 of the Act prohibits the discharge „ o f any hazardous substances into the air or upon 
the land and the waters o f  Nigeria ’. PoUution of Nigeria’s natural environment is also 
made a crime and monetary penalties are imposed for poUuters. Under section 20, a 
company may be fined up to 500,000 Naira for non-compliance with the Act and an 
additional 1,000 for evei'y day that the offence continues. Section 21 of the Act makes 
specific reference to spÜler’s Üabüity. If the text of section 21 were foUowed, in the case 
of an 0 Ü spin, the company would be liable for a penalty, the cost of removal including
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any governmental expenditures and the cost of thkd parties in the form of reparation, 
restoration, restitution or compensation.
However, the limitations on FEPA’s de facto envkonmental control in the oil 
industiy aie substantial. The FEPA Act provided for representatives of the Ministry of 
Petroleum Resouices to sit on both the governing council and the technical committee. 
Petroleum officials could thus potentially influence FEPA’s policy initiatives in favour of 
oil companies. Most importantly, the oil industry was explicitly mentioned in the FEPA 
Act. Section 23 of the Act reads:
The Agency shall co-operate with the Ministry o f Petroleum Resources 
(Petroleum Resources Department) for the removal o f oil related 
pollutants discharged into the Nigerian environment and play such 
supportive role as the Ministry o f Petroleum Resources (Petroleum 
Resources Department) may from  time to time request from the Agency.
Section 23 is sufficiently vague to leave doubt about the relationship between 
FEPA and the Ministiy of Peholeum Resources. The words ‘co-operate’ and ‘request’ 
indicate that FEPA may be restrained from acting on matters relating to oil pollution 
without the consent of the oil ministry. As Adewale (1992, 64) has argued, section 23 
makes the Department of Petroleum Resources independent of FEPA, a status which can 
be atti'ibuted to the strategic importance of oil to Nigeria. In theory, the administrative 
competencies of the Ministry of Petroleum Resources and FEPA largely overlap in the 
area of envkonmental protection (see Table 3.1.). It appears that section 23 of the FEPA 
Act may have taken the oil industry out of the purview of the Agency. It is still unclear to
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what extent the abolition of the oil ministry in 1998 has influenced the relationship 
between petroleum officials and the FEPA.
Table 3.1. Administrative Competencies in Environmental Matters in the Oil Industry
Ministry of Petroleum Resources Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA)
• Environmental permitting authority for oil operations •  Environmental permitting authority for all industries
in Nigeria, including the oU industry
• Licensing authority with regard to oil operations ® Regulation of industrial effluent discharges
• Review and approval of Environmental Impacts •  Review and approval of Environmental Impacts
Assessments (EIAs) for oil operations Assessments (EIAs) submitted in support of the
authorisation process
Source: Petroconsultants (1997, 12).
Several sections of the FEPA Act create loop holes which enable the offending oil 
company to escape legal responsibility for pollution. Among other exemptions, the Act 
permits the discharge of hazardous substances into the environment where such discharge 
is authorised by a law in force in Nigeria.^  ^ An example is the OH in Navigable Waters 
Act which permits the discharge of hazardous substances or petroleum in certain 
circumstances.^^ For instance, a vessel may dischaige oil into Nigerian waters if the 
escape of oil was due to leakage and the leakage was not due to any want of reasonable 
care and all reasonable steps were taken to stop or reduce the discharge. Therefore, as 
Adewale (1992, 58) has argued, section 4 of the Oil in Navigable Waters Act desti’oys the 
stringent deterrent which might have been provided by the FEPA Act. Considering the 
above discussion, the text of the FEPA Act bears many limitations.
^ Section 20.
^ Oil in Navigable Waters Act, section 4.
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Perhaps more importantly, the enforcement of the FEPA Act has, until recently, 
been largely ineffective/^ Scientific regulations established by FEPA in 1991, by and 
large, failed to restrict the adverse impact of oil operations on the ground. For instance, 
the ‘emission limit fo r particulates from stationary sources’ was 50-250 mg/m  ^ for oil 
burning (FEPA 1991). Shell’s own figure for emissions from gas flaring in Rivers and 
Delta states of Nigeria was 240 mg/m  ^ (World Bank 1995, volume II, annex I). A more 
comprehensive analysis of FEPA standards was canied out by Environmental Rights 
Action (ERA). Samples taken in Shell’s production area in Akwa Ibom State were 
compared with FEPA standards. Most of the actual values measured by ERA were lower 
than FEPA standaids, except for temperature and sulphur. Yet, at the same time, oil 
operations had an adverse environmental impact on the area (ERA 1995, 19). It therefore 
appears that FEPA’s environmental standards may have been tailored in such a way that 
the oil industry can comply with tliem without taking any additional measures. This fact is 
not surprising since most of FEPA’s oü industry standards were directly taken from the 
Department of Petroleum Resources (DPR), which is primaiily concerned with oü 
production. This once again underlines the significance of section 23 of the FEPA Act. 
Even if the DPR strived to minimise the environmental impact of oü activities, it lacked 
the monitoring and basic office equipment to do so. Referring to environmental control, 
the World Bank concluded that the DPR is ‘currently not able to perform its duties and 
is limited to obtaining oil company spill reports’ (World Bank 1995, volume II, annex J),
As yet Adewale and other Nigerian scholars have largely failed to analyse the enforcement of the FEPA 
guidelines and standards. For instance, a study by Guobadia (1993,413-414) was bmited to a recitation of 
sections of the legal text that deal with enforcement but failed to discuss actual enforcement.
I l l
Like the DPR, FEPA lacks basic equipment and skills to enforce environmental 
controls. According to the World Bank, the FEPA office in Rivers State had 25 staff in 
1995, including 10 environmental professionals of which only 3 dealt with oil pollution, 
and only few activities were being implemented. The World Bank concluded that FEPA’s 
funding and environmental expertise had to be substantially increased in order to be able 
to have a significant impact on environmental control. FEPA’s main deficiencies in Rivers 
State were limited funding, weak monitoring and enforcement capacity, and few 
appropriately trained staff. In 1995, while at least represented in Rivers State, FEPA had 
not even been active in Delta State, the other major oil-producing area in Nigeria (World 
Bank 1995, volume II, annex J). The operations of the FEPA also appeared to be 
hindered by corruption. In October 1996, the chief executive of the FEPA, Dr. Evans 
Aina was arrested for fraud involving 1,115 million Naira (Guardian, Lagos, 27 January
1997). Yet, even if the FEPA were effective and an oil company had to pay a fine, the 
FEPA Act stipulates a fine not exceeding 500,000 Naira and an additional fine of 1,000 
Naira for every day the offence subsists. Based on the 1995 average official exchange 
rate, this has amounted to a little less than US$ 23,000 per incident, which appears to be 
a rather insignificant amount for any foreign oü company.
The State Environmental Protection Agencies (SEPAs), created by different states 
from 1988 onwards, also appear to lack effectiveness. The World Bank investigated the 
ineffectiveness of the SEP A in Rivers State. In 1995, the SEP A had only one vehicle and 
not a single boat, although much of the oü production takes place in riverine areas which 
requires movement by boat. Lacking a laboratory, the Agency was unable to monitor
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water or air quality standards. The Agency commissioned a study on the environmental 
effects of gas flaring, but ran out of funds to complete it. Much of the SEPA’s work on 
the oil industry was limited to visiting sites of oil spills and certifying that clean ups were 
completed. The World Bank concluded that the Agency’s ability to assess and manage oil 
pollution was very limited (World Bank 1995, volume II, annex J). This evidence 
indicates severe limitations in the FEPA Act, the key environmental piece of legislation in 
Nigeria.
The lack of enforcement of the FEPA Act illustrates the inadequacy of 
envii'onmental controls in Nigeria in general. The Associated Gas Re-injection Act 1979 
and the Associated Gas Re-injection (Amendment) Act 1985 are the most significant 
envii'onmental laws dealing specifically with the oü industiy, promulgated in order to 
reduce gas flaring. The 1979 Act required oil companies to re-inject the gas into the 
earth’s crust or, alternatively, to provide detailed programmes for the utilisation of non­
associated gas. The Act also set out the objective of proliibiting gas flaring by January 
1984. The 1985 Act amended some of the provisions of the earlier Act and added new 
ones including a penalty for gas flaring. These gas related laws have no direct impact on 
litigation brought by village communities but they can illustrate the problems of enforcing 
environmental legislation in Nigeria.
^  As Turner (1977, 174) has pointed out, the Petroleum Act 1969 already provided for gas utilisation. The 
Petroleum (Drilling and Production) Regulations stated; ‘Not later that five years after the commencement of 
production from the relevant area the licensee or leasee shall submit to the Commissioner any feasibility study, 
programtne or proposal that he may have for the utilisation of any natural gas, whether associated with oil or 
not, which has been discovered in the relevant area’ (quoted in Turner 1977, 174). The Petroleum (Amendment) 
Decree No.16 of 1973 was further passed to ‘enable the Federal Military Government to take natural gas 
produced along with crude oil ( and presently flared) on terms agreed upon between the Government and the 
producer’ (quoted in Turner 1977, 176).
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Despite the imposition of fines for non-compliance, the gas legislation was hai’dly 
implemented in practice as the government failed to initiate appropriate policy for gas 
utilisation.*^  ^ Non-enforcement was to some extent due to the fact that the Nigerian 
National Petroleum Coiporation (NNPC) was not willing to contribute towards the costs 
of gas development. For instance. Shell’s Associated Gas Gathering Project was 
cancelled in 1994 because of financial problems. Tlie project was aimed at reducing gas 
flaiing in Shell’s Eastern Division by 25% by selling the excess gas to industiial plants 
nearby (van Dessel 1995, 23). Furthermore, gas projects such as the Nigerian Liquefied 
Natural Gas (NLNG) project were delayed as a result of political decisions (Fiynas 
1998^
Gas related legislation has had little effect on the day-to-day operations of oil 
companies for two main reasons. First, the government could grant exemptions to 
companies for non-compliance with legislation. Most oil wells were exempted from 
compliance with the gas related s ta tu te s .A s  many as 55 out of Shell’s 84 oil wells in 
1985 were exempted from the provisions of the gas legislation and over half of the other 
wells (see Appendix C, Table C.15.).
Second, the fines for gas flaiing were insignificant. It was often cheaper for oil 
companies to continue gas flaiing than to invest in gas projects. In 1985, the fine was set
As early as 1969, the ‘Report of the Fact-Finding Mission’ of the Nigerian government alluded to the problems of 
gas related legislation in the following words: ‘...the nation’s interests are not identical with [those of] the 
companies. This is clearly demonstrated in Nigeria by the fact that the companies have as yet not considered it 
necessary to take any action to commercialise the gas which is necessarily produced with the oil and. which right 
now is flared. [Elsewhere] at least equal importance is given to the question of cotnmercialisation and 
conservation of gas as is given to oil. While a nation can legislate about these [matters] or regulate them, it is 
only the positive initiative which it gives which actually means anything or gives rise to concrete results’ (quoted 
in Turner 1977, 172).
^  Exemptions were made on the basis of technical and economic factors rather than environmental ones, for 
instance, in cases where re-injection would not increase production.
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at 2 Kobo per one thousand cubic feet (28.317 standaid cubic metres) of flared gas to be 
paid according to the same procedure as for royalty payments, that is, in foreign cuirency 
into a designated foreign account (Olisa 1987, 51). For instance, Mobil paid 142,172,123 
Naira in gas flaring fines in 1994, which is insignificant if compared with 3,035,262,789 
Naira paid in petioleum royalty in the same year. The payments of other companies were 
similarly insignificant (see Appendix C, Table C.16.). At the end of the 1980s, Chevron 
(formerly Gulf) noted that switching from water injection to gas injection would cost the 
company US$ 56 million (quoted in Akpan 1997, 267). In effect, the compliance with the 
Gas Re-injection Decree would cost the company US$ 56 million, compared with a mere 
U S$1 million which the company had to pay in gas flaring fines. It was therefore cheaper 
for the company to continue gas flaring.
The percentage of flared associated gas fell from around 95% in the 1970s to 
74% in 1985, but the oil companies have so far failed to comply with the gas legislation 
of 1979 and 1985 (Akpan 1997). The World Bank (1995, volume n , annex J) argued that 
the gas flaiing fines „proved to be too small an incentive to induce companies to reduce 
flaring The Bank fuither commented on the impact of gas related legislation:
Although gas utilisation will increase, in the near term it will be based on 
economical non-associated gas supplies and not reduce gas flaring. The 
largest outlet fo r N igeria’s gas, the Bonny LNG plant, will liquefy 
primarily non-associated gas. (World Bank 1995, volume II, annex J).
Recently, the gas flaiing fines have been substantially increased. In 1996, the fine 
was increased from 2 Kobo to 50 Kobo per thousand standard cubic feet (Daily Times,
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20 July 1996) and was further increased to 10 Naha in 1998 (Oil & Gas Update, January
1998). The increase in 1996 did little more than to offset in fla tion .T he increase m 1998 
was substantial. In the meantime, the financial incentives for gas projects were 
substantially enhanced m the late 1990s (see section two of the thesis). As a result, gas 
production was becoming more important. Indeed, Shell aims to eliminate gas flaring by 
the year 2008, wliile Mobü aims to achieve the same seven years earlier {Weekly 
Petroleum Argus, 19 May 1997). In the long-term, gas flaring is hence likely to end 
within the next one or two decades. But it would appear that this is not the result of gas 
related legislation but the result of improved fiscal incentives to oh companies. In the 
short-term, there is little commercial incentive for oil companies to stop gas flaring and to 
comply with the gas related legislation.
Like the FEPA Act and the gas related legislation, the other environmental 
legislation in Nigeria also fahed to significantly curb the adverse environmental impact of 
oil operations. A confidential study commissioned for the SheU-initiated Niger Delta 
Envii'onmental Sui*vey (NDES) of 1996 concluded: „From our investigation all the 
legislation in the Niger Delta as regards environmental pollution control are more in the 
interest o f  industry than the community” (Ogbnigwe 1996, 16). The study provided a 
brief summaiy of the different aieas of legislation, which cleaiiy indicated that 
environmental legislation was generally unenforced, favoured the government and the 
companies or entailed implementation problems (see Table 3.2.). The NDES- 
commissioned report, although too generalised and imprecise, has argued that current
In the decade 1985-1994, Nigerian consumer prices rose by over 1,100%, that means, 50 Kobo in 1994 were 
worth an equivalent of just over 4 Kobo in 1985.
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legislation has so fai* failed to protect village communities from the adverse impact of oü 
company operations.
Table 3.2. L^slation to Protect Communities, compiled for the NDES-commissioned report, 1996
»vwwvwvwvywyvyvwvwvvvvvvvvVyvvvwvvv»vvvvvvw¥VW>vvvvvvvvy<VvvvvvvvvvwvvvvvvvvvvvvvwvvYVYVVVvvvvvYWVyrvvvvvvvvvvvv»Yvvwvvvv^^^ Degrees of Comm^i^ fiotect^  ^ ..................
Noise
Wildlife Conservation
Pest Control
- Worksmen Compensation Acts 1990
- State Environmental Sanitation Edicts
- Factories Act
- FEPA and SEPA Decrees & Edict
- Endangered Species Act Cap 108 LFN* 
1990
- Natural Resources Conservation Council 
Act Cap 286 LFN 1990
- Forestry Law
- Public Health Laws
- FEPA Act Cap 131 LFN 1990
Fishery - See Fisheries Act Cap 404 LFN 1990
Water - Mineral Oil (Safety) Act Cap 350 LFN
1990
- Mineral Resources Act Cap 226 LFN 1990
- Oil in Navigable Waters Act Cap 339 LFN 
1990
- Petroleum Act Cap 350 LFN 1990
- River Basins Development Authorities 
(RBDA) Act Cap 396 LFN 1990
- FEPA Act Cap 131 LFN 1990 
Land - Land Use Act Cap 202 LFN 1990
- Handful Wastes Act Cap 16 SLFN 1990
- Natural Resources Conservation Council 
Act Cap 131 LFN 1990
- FEPA Act Cap 131 LFN 1990 
Industry - FEPA Act Cap 131 LFN 1990
- Harmful Wastes Act Cap 165 LFN 1990
- Enviromnental Impact Assessment (BIA) 
Decree 1992, No.86
- SEPA Edicts
Oil and Hazardous - Petroleum Act Cap 350 LFN 1990
Substance - Petroleum (Drilling and Production)
Regulations of 1969
- Associated Gas Re-Injection Act Cap 20 
LFN1990
Sanitation - Public Health Law
- Environmental Sanitation Edicts
- FEPA Act Cap 131 LFN 1990
Air - FEPA Decree No.56 of 1988
Not in force at all and inadequate laws
Not properly enforced and inadequate laws
Laws are antiquated in terms of penalties, 
implementation and application and have 
been dropped (omitted) in the present laws 
of the federation
Lack of enforcement and poor co-ordination 
and inadequate laws
- Inadequate, antiquated and finally omitted 
in the Federal Laws but still effective in the 
Delta States
- Colonial and not in use
- Not adequately in force and do not favotu 
the communities
- Favour and protect interest of government 
and not communities
- All these laws favour and protect 
government not the communities
- Not properly enforced
- Not properly enforced
- FEPA not equipped to enforce the 
regulation
- ftovisions to witch hunt communities and 
rob them of right to compensation i.e. 
sabotage
- Did not adopt environmental consideration 
and so cannot protect communities interest
- Not effective
- Antiquated
- Not properly in force
- Not properly in force; waste dispersal and 
not waste disposal
* LFN stands for the Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 
Source: Ogbnigwe (1996, 16-17).
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According to the World Bank, there are three major constraints to the regulation 
of the energy and minerals sector in Nigeria. The first constraint is the absence of 
requii*ements for community participation in planning and development of oil activities. 
The second is corruption and inadequate compensation for damage to property. The third 
is lack of enforcement of environmental regulations. In addition, unlike other oü 
producing countries, Nigeria does not have a sepaiate statute for the conseiwation of oü 
(World Bank, volume II, annex J).
Some of these problems can be ülustrated with the help of factual evidence from 
the case Douglas v. Shelf^ , in which Oronto Douglas - an environmental rights activist - 
sued SheU, the NNPC, the Nigerian Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) project, Mobü and 
the Attorney-General for non-compliance with the Envii'onmental Impact Assessment 
(EIA) Decree No.86 of 1992. The EIA Decree required companies and public bodies to 
undertake a so-caUed enviionmental impact assessment (EIA) sui*vey prior to embarking 
on any project or activity where 'the extent, nature or location o f  a proposed project or 
activity is such that is likely to significantly affect the environment’.^  ^ Douglas’ lawyers 
contended that the EIA was not strictly applied in the execution of the NLNG project and 
Mobü’s Natural Gas Liquids (NGL) recoveiy project, having violated section 7 of the 
Decree which intended to give opportunity to members of the public and interested 
groups to make comments on a specific EIA sui*vey. Douglas maintained that no 
adequate opportunity was provided for public comments on the suiweys. The Douglas 
case was dismissed in the fiist instance and was still pending on appeal in 1998.
^ Unreported Suit No. FHC/L/CS/573/96 in the Federal High Court, Lagos. 
Section 2(2).
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The Douglas case revealed the questionable role of the FEPA, which was legally 
bound to certify EIA sui*veys. It appears that the FEPA did not take notice of the public 
criticism of the EIA suiweys for the gas projects. After the commencement of the Douglas 
case on 26 June 1996, the FEPA then turned around and placed a Public Notice in the 
Daily Times (1 July 1996), a Nigerian daily newspaper, requesting information and 
comments on the EIA survey on Mobil’s NGL project, which it had failed to do until 
then. One could conclude that the publication of the advertisement was in direct response 
to the lawsuit. Furthermore, the court case revealed that constmction work on Mobil’s 
gas project was already allowed to start before the EIA survey was submitted to the 
FEPA. The evidence on the EIA Decree reflected two of the problems raised by the 
World Bank study mentioned earlier in relation to environmental protection: lack of 
community participation in planning and development as well as lack of legal 
enforcement.
On the whole, it appears that the implementation of Nigeria’s environmental 
legislation offered little protection to village communities, especially since the 
government was not particularly interested in enforcing environmental legislation. The 
companies meanwhile had Httle financial incentive to comply with environmental laws. In 
this context, government policy and corporate interests resulted in inadequate 
enforcement of statute law. Environmental legislation or rather its loopholes and lack of 
enforcement hence prejudiced the administiation of justice in favour of oil company 
interests at the expense of village communities.
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3.8. Nigerian Court System
In addition to statute law, conflicts between village communities and oil 
companies aie also constrained by the structural character of the legal system. The court 
system in Nigeria has two layers: the federal courts and the state courts. According to 
Nwankwo et a l  (1993, 8-14), the number of courts in Nigeria was well over 3600 at the 
beginning of the 1990s, excluding the vaiious divisions of the same c o u r t . Th e  number 
of courts has increased since then, to a great extent as a result of the creation of new 
federal states. The courts established for the Federation are the Supreme Court, the Court 
of Appeal, the Federal High Court, and the courts of the capital territory of Abuja. The 
Supreme Court, established under the 1954 Constitution, is the highest court in Nigeria, 
headed by tlie Chief Justice of the Federation and consisting of up to 15 justices at a time. 
It exercises exclusive appellate jurisdiction over the decisions of the Court of Appeal and 
valions disputes concerning presidential elections and between states and the federal 
government. The Court of Appeal, first established in 1976, can entertain appeals from 
state courts^  ^ and has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over vaiious issues. It had 7 
divisions in 1993. The Federal High Court, first established in 1973 as the Federal 
Revenue Court, has exclusive jurisdiction over certain matters but no appellate 
jurisdiction. It had 12 divisions in 1993 (Nwankwo et a l  1993, 8-14).®^
^  The numbers of various types of courts quoted here are derived from Nwankwo et al. (1993, 8-14).
^ Appeals can be entertained from the State High Courts, the Sharia and Customary Courts of Appeal and the Code 
of Conduct Bureau. Until 1976, there was no intervening appellate court between the State High Courts and the 
Supreme Court.
^ As Oyakhirome (1995) has pointed out, the Federal Revenue Court was originally constituted as a specialised 
court for cases dealing with federal revenue matters such as the taxation of companies, banking and fiscal policies 
of the government. The court was re-named the Federal High Court under the provisions of the 1979 Constitution 
but its original purpose as a specialised court of revenue matters largely persisted until 1993. The Constitution 
(Suspension and Modification) Decree No.107 of 1993 extended the original jurisdiction of the court to a wide 
range of matters including oil related litigation, drugs and aviation.
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The courts established for the states of the Federation include the State High 
Courts, Magistrates or District Courts, Area or Customaiy and Sharia (Islamic) Couits, 
Customary Courts of Appeal, and Sharia Courts of Appeal.^  ^ District, Aiea and Sharia 
Courts mostly exist in Northern Nigeria. Customary courts exist mainly in Southern 
Nigeria. A state high court exists in each state with jurisdiction that covers the whole 
state. A high court has its divisions in different towns across each state in order to 
facilitate the court’s workings. Customary and Sharia Courts of Appeal only exist in some 
states. At the beginning of the 1990s, only 19 out of 30 states had a Customary Court of 
Appeal. A Customary Court of Appeal has the jurisdiction to entertain appeals on matters 
concerning customary law. A Sharia Court of Appeal has the jurisdiction to entertain 
appeals on matters concerning Islamic law. Magistrates’ courts exist everywhere in 
Nigeria. In many northern states, the magistrates courts only entertain civü cases, while 
district courts entertain criminal cases. In 1993, the number of magistrates ’/district courts 
was estimated at 674. Area or customary courts are at the bottom of the court system. 
Area courts mostly deal with the Islamic law and their number was estimated at 978 in 
1993. Customary courts mostly deal with customary law and their number was estimated 
at 1,924 in 1993 (Nwankwo et al. 1993, 8-14).
^ Other courts may include Rent Tribunals or Sanitation Courts.
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Figure 3.1. Basic Structure of the Nigerian Court System
Supreme Court 
Court of Appeal
State High Courts Federal Bügb Court Customtuy/Sharia Courts of Appealî tMagistrates’ Courts Customary/Area/Sharia Courts
& District Courts
In terms of oil related litigation, the State High Courts were the courts of first 
instance until 1993. That means, a potential litigant was able to file a suit against an oil 
company in any of the divisions of a State High Court. In the then main oü producing 
state of Rivers State, for instance, there were eight High Court divisions in 1992, so a 
litigant could approach the nearest of the eight divisions to sue a company (Fawehinmi 
1992, 664).^® This situation was radicaUy changed in 1993 when the government 
introduced the Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993, 
which extended the original jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to oü related matters. 
The Decree vested the Federal High Courts with the exclusive right to decide on matters 
related to oü mining, seismic studies and related matters.^  ^ Pending oÜ related cases are
The Rivers State High Court divisions were Port Harcourt, Ahoada, Omoku, Yenagoa, Degema, Nchia, Isiokpo 
and Bori.
The original jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to oü related matters was pronounced in the Federal High 
Court (Amendment) Decree No. 60 of 1991. But the 1991 Decree was suspended by Decree No. 16 of 1992. The 
Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No.107 of 1993 re-enacted the provision that any lawsuits 
involving mining operations must be directed to the Federal High Court.
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still tried in the State High Courts and other relevant courts. All new oil related lawsuits, 
which started after 1993, must be brought to the Federal High Court, although the Court 
of Appeal disagreed with such an interpretation of the 1993 Decree. In Shell v. Isaiali^, 
the Court of Appeal pronounced that the 1993 Decree does not affect oil spillage 
m atters.Notwithstanding the impact of the Isaiah case, from the perspective of litigants 
in oil related cases, an important feature of the structural character of the legal system has 
changed as a result of the 1993 Decree.
3.9. Nigerian Legislation and Compensation for Damages
While the venues for legal conflicts between oil companies and village 
communities have changed in recent year’s, statute law on compensation has also 
undergone some changes since Nigeria’s independence in 1960.
A variety of Nigerian laws, including petroleum legislation, describe the numerous 
circumstances under which compensation may be paid to those adversely affected by oil 
operations. The right for compensation was first entrenched in the OH Pipelines Act 1956
[1997]6NWLR.
Katsina-Alu, J.C.A. pronounced that the Decree No.107 of 1993 ‘does not affect the jurisdiction of the State High 
Court to adjudicate this matter. The Decree is inapplicable because the subject matter of the claim in this case 
did not arise from „mines and minerals, oil fields, geological surveys or natural gas”. The subject matter arose 
from oil spillage from the defendant’s oil pipelines onto the plaintiffs’ swampland and farmlands’ (per Katsina- 
Alu, J.C.A. at page 247). This view appears as a very narrow judicial interpretation of the Decree as it could be 
expected that the original legislators have probably intended to include the issue of ‘oil spills’ within the ambit of 
‘mines and minerals’ or ‘oil fields’. In addition to the Decree No.107 of 1993, the federal government pronounced 
the Admiralty Jurisdiction Decree No.59 of 1991, which placed all court cases arising from oil pollution in the 
exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal High Court. It appears that the scope of the Decree was merely confined to 
maritime areas, however. Katsina-Alu, J.C.A. pronounced: ‘The phrase „any claim for liability incurred for oil 
pollution damage ” contained in section 1( 1 )(e) o f the [Admiralty Jurisdiction] Decree cannot be read in isolation 
but within the context ofAdtniralty jurisdiction meaning any claim for liability incurred or oil pollution damage 
by ships, oil tankers and related property. /  am in agreement with the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that the 
decree cannot apply to claims for oil spillage from pipelines onto swampland and farmlands like in the instant 
case’ (per Katsina-Alu, J.C.A. at page 246).
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which obliged a holder of a pipeline licence to pay compensation to any person who
suffers damages caused by oil operations/"  ^ The Oil Pipelines Act stated:
(...) the court shall award such compensation as it considers just in 
respect o f  any damage done to any buildings, lion crops or pi'ofitable 
trees by the holder o f the permit in the exercise o f his rights thereunder 
and in addition may award such sum in respect o f disturbance (if any) as 
it may consider justJ^
The 1956 Act dealt specifically witii pipelines and related damages, particulaiiy oil 
spills. It was not until the promulgation of the 1969 Petroleum Act that more
comprehensive provisions were made in respect of ‘fail’ and adequate compensation’ for
damages from oil operations. In particular, the Petroleum Act 1969 provided:
The holder o f an oil exploration licence, oil prospecting licence or oil 
mining lease shall, in addition to any liability for compensation to which
he may be subject under any other provision o f the Decree, be liable to
1
pay fair and adequate compensation for the disturbance o f  surface or j
other rights to any person who owns or is in lawful occupation o f the \i
licensed or leased lands. '1
The Petroleum Act and the related Petioleum (Di-LUing and Production) j
iRegulations of 1969 list the items for assessment of compensation, including economic |
I
tiees, stmctures affixed to the land, fisliing rights, shiines and venerable objects. In |
Sections 19-23.
Section 20(1).
Paragraph 36 of schedule 1.
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addition, victims of oil operations were entitled to compensation for so-called disturbance 
and injuiious affection. Disturbance meant the depreciation in land value or an interest in 
land due to damages, which could include any consequences of eviction from the land, 
legal costs of pui’chases of comparable property, increased rental or other expenses and 
loss of profits. Injurious affection referred to some anticipated depreciation in the value of 
the land (Omotola 1990).
The right for adequate compensation for compulsory acquisition of property (not 
for environmental damage) was further entrenched by the Nigerian Constitution of 
1979.^  ^ Section 40 provided that any compulsory acquisition of property
‘requires the prompt payment o f compensation thereof; and gives the 
person claiming such compensation a right o f access for the 
determination o f his interest in the property and the amount o f  
compensation to a court o f  law or tribunal or body having jurisdiction in 
that part o f Nigeria
In essence, the text of the Constitution did not simply insist upon the payment of 
compensation but stipulated that compensation paid must be adequate. The payment of 
adequate compensation for damages became a constitutional right, which was important 
since the Constitution ranks above the provisions of the Petroleum Act.
The 1979 Constitution included a number of provisions, which appear to be aimed at environmental protection. 
For instance, section 17(2)(d) required the state to prevent the ‘exploitation of human or natural resources in any 
form whatsoever for reasons other than the good of the community’. Nonetheless, as Ajai (1996, 242) has pointed 
out, the 1979 Constitution did not recognise environmental rights as such. The Constitution did not, moreover, 
contain a provision which explicitly guarantees the right to compensation for environmental damage.
Section 40(1).
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While the Constitution secured the right to adequate compensation for 
compulsory acquisition of property, the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, 
which was ratified and made enforceable in Nigeria in 1983, secured the right to adequate 
compensation for environmental damage/^ In the case Fawehinmi v. Abacha^^, the 
Charter was placed above every other Nigerian legislation, which rendered it even 
superior to constitutional decrees. Article 24 of the Charter provided for the right to ‘a 
general satisfactory environment favourable to their development’. Article 21 provided 
for the right to ‘freely dispose o f  their wealth and natural resources’. In addition, it 
provided that ‘in case o f spoliation the disposed people shall have the right to the lawful 
recovery o f its property as well as to an adequate compensation’.
While ‘adequate compensation’ for damage has become an entrenched right,
Nigeria has no comprehensive legislation dealing with the issue of compensation and 
some types of damage such as psychological damage are not explicitly provided for by
1
legislation. Most importantly, the quantum of damages has not been explicitly defined. j
The term ‘adequate compensation’ can be subjective and vague, thus compensation |
1
appear s to be a matter for the claimants to negotiate or for the judge to resolve. Since no i
comprehensive legislation relating to compensation for damages exists, the open market j
value of the subject matter for assessment has been considered the ‘yardstick for  I
I
compensation’ (Omotola 1990, 289). 1
I
Subject matters of assessment which have an open market value include the land, j
buildings, installations and crops. In addition, there are official government guidelines for i
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act 1983. 
[1996] 9 NWLR.
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compensation payments for crops, trees and land (see Table 3.3.). But official rates for 
crops and trees tend to be considerably lower than the actual market value. For instance, 
in 1995, the value of a mango tree was estimated at 200-300 Naira for the fruit, while the 
official compensation rate was a mere 25 Naira, Since the rates are so insignificant, oü 
companies are even prepared to pay higher rates of compensation than prescribed by the 
government. A sub committee of the Oü Producers Trade Section (OPTS) of the Lagos 
Chambers of Commerce, an association of oü producing companies, periodicaUy releases 
a comprehensive list o f compensation rates.*  ^ These rates are merely recommended to oü 
companies and are not bmding, but companies reportedly use them.*  ^ A simple 
comparison of the official rates and the OPTS rates reveals how insignificant the official 
rates aie. In 1997, for instance, the OPTS rate for rice was 15,860 Naira per hectaie, 
while the 1995 official rate was a mere 1,375 Naira; even if adjusted for inflation in 1996 
and in 1997, the rate would amount to only 1,924 Naira, which would be less than 13% 
of the OPTS rate (see Table 3.3.).
To the author’s knowledge, the last update of the OPTS rates was undertaken in April 1997 and was effective 
from September 1997.
Personal interview with J.U.Jakpa of the Lands Unit, Public Affairs Depaitment, Chevron (Lagos, March 1998).
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Table 3.3. Comparison of official and OPTS rates of compensation for damage from oil operations
Type of crop/ 
tree
1995 official rate 
of compensation 
per hectare/ tree 
(in Naira)
1995 official rate 
adjusted for 
inflation, 1996-97 
(in Naira)*
1997 OPTS rate 
of compensation 
per hectare/ tree 
(in Naira)
1995 official rate 
of compensation 
per hectare/ tree 
(in US$)**
1997 OPTS rate 
of compensation 
per hectare/ tree 
(in US$)***
Rice 1375 1924 15860 62.80 724.66
Beans 290 406 10660 13.25 487.07
Yams 835 1168 48000 38.14 2193.18
Cocoyams 625 874 16000 28.55 731.06
Most vegetables 625 874 5850-16000 28.55 267.29-731.06
Mango tree 25 35 500 1.14 22.85
Banana tree 2.50 3.50 160 0.11 7.31
Plantain tree 2.50 3.50 160 0.11 7.31
Agbono tree 18.75 26.23 340 0.86 15.54
Timber 50 69.95 600 2.28 27.42
hardwoods
* Inflation was 29.3% in 1996 and 8.2% in 1997; ** at 1995 average exchange rate; *** at 1997 exchange rate 
Sources; World Bank (1995, volume II, annex M, 76), Compensation Rates Recommended by OPTS Sub-Committee 
on Land Acquisition (April 1997 Edition).
The compensation rates paid by oü companies, however, cannot be considered 
adequate from either a social or a legal point of view. In 1995, the World Bank calculated 
compensation rates for forest land. Based on an annual rent of 5000 Naira, the Bank 
concluded that the price should be at least 50,000 Naira per hectare. In reality, oÜ 
companies in Delta State actually paid only 1000 Naira per hectare (World Bank 1995, 
volume II, annex M, 75). The rates paid by oü companies are thus considerably lower 
than those recommended by the World Bank. A further problem with the rates paid by oü 
companies is that they are not based on lost profits or some anticipated depreciation in 
the value of the land. The OPTS rates are caUed ‘farm gate rates’, which means tliey 
merely comprise of the market value of buying a crop or a tree plus the tiansport and 
other incidental costs of caiiying those to the vülage. It has been argued that the current
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method of compensation payments for crops and trees, cuixently used by oil companies, 
does not lead to the adequate compensation prescribed by law (Uduehi 1987, 104).- As 
shown earlier, the Petioleum Act includes provisions for payments for disturbance and 
injuiious affection, but these are not being observed by either the oil companies or the 
government.
In order to understand the issues better, consider the example of a coconut with 
the OPTS rate of 600 Naira. A mature coconut tree can possibly yield 30-80 coconuts, 
worth 50 Naira each. If we assume 50 coconuts per harvest on average, we arrive at a 
figure of 2,500 Naira as gross income for a single harvest. Less expenditure (costs of 
labour, maintenance etc.), the net income may be half, say, 1,250 Naira.*  ^ That means, 
the net income from one harvest of one coconut tree would already be considerably 
higher than the 600 Naiia supposedly paid by an oil company. In order to properly 
calculate the loss of profits, the average net income from one harvest would need to be 
capitalised over a given estimated life span of the tree. T ie life span of a coconut tree 
could be 25 years or more. Assuming a period of only 10 years, one would arrive at a 
riguie of 12,500 Naira. According to this conservative estimate, a coconut tree would be 
worth 12,500 Naii’a to a Nigerian farmer, which is roughly 20 times more than the current 
OPTS rate of 600 Naira. All of these calculations are, of course, hypothetical and do not 
take into account the so-called discount rate, which is common in calculating capital 
value. They can, nevertheless, tentatively indicate the gap between the rates paid by 
companies and the considerably higher economic value of trees and crops to the farmer.
^ These insights are owed to a personal interview with Nick Ashton-Jones, Environmental Rights Action (London, 
February 1998). See also Uduehi (1987) for alternative methods of assessment of compensation. Tlie approximate 
market prices used in the example were for early 1998.
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Similar calculations can be made for other economic trees, crops or fishing rights. 
Considering the above discussion, it appears that the current method of compensation 
payments is inherently flawed and fails to reflect both the social reality and the letter of 
the Petroleum Act. In addition to the above problems, there are no compensation rates 
for subject matters winch have no open market value such as loss of expectation of hfe, 
deteriorating health or psychological damage. In essence, there is no adequate statutory 
provision for the quantum of compensation in Nigeria.
In general, some gaps in legislation are not necessarily a crucial problem because 
legislative provision cannot be entirely definite as technology changes, inflation rises and 
human needs change. Legislation needs to be flexible to a certain extent, therefore. 
However, the lack of legislative provision and inadequate government policy in Nigeria 
has had highly adverse effects on village communities. Compensation amounts arrived at 
during negotiations with village communities are still being paid according to the OPTS 
and government rates, which have been shown to be inadequate.
Existing gaps in legislative guidehnes require judicial discretion, although Nigerian 
legislation provides for various ciicumstances under which compensation for damage 
from oil operations can be awarded. Since the phrase ‘adequate compensation’ can have 
different meanings, it is essential to analyse the way in which court judgements have 
evolved on the issue (this will be shown in greater detail in section six of the thesis).
130
3.10. Conclusion
The formal-institutional structure of the Nigerian legal system is highly 
sophisticated, based on an elaborate fusion of English Common Law and typically 
Nigerian features, particularly customary law. Nigerian statute law, especially the FEPA 
Act, offer some scope for the protection and compensation of those adversely affected by 
oü operations but it contains major loopholes. It is not yet clear in what way oü related 
regulations wül be altered under the current Abubakar regime or foUowing the announced 
transition to civilian imle. Since the death of general Abacha in 1998, the Department of 
Petroleum Resources - the government’s monitoring agency for the oü industry - was 
abolished and there have been tentative indications that oü related legislation may be 
altered.^ "^  Untü now, the guidelines for the operation of the oü industry and their* actual 
enforcement have offered little protection for viüage communities.
In contrast to the enforcement problems of environmental laws, Nigerian land law 
appears to be per se biased against vülage communities and their customary rights. With 
the advent of the Land Use Act of 1978, land owners have been deprived of their land J
j
rights to the benefit of oü companies, which can compulsorily acquhe any piece of land 
they desire with the permission of the state governor. In addition, land owners no longer |
receive any rents from oil companies for land acquisition, which underlines the fact that 
the government has favoured the interests of private companies in Nigeria before those of 
viüage communities.
^ In November 1998, for instance, a new regulation was announced which stipulated that the volume of oil in 
drilling mud waste must not exceed 1%, which meant a change from 10% to 1%. If this environmental regulation 
is enforced, the cost of drilling is likely to rise for the oil companies (PostExpress, 30 November 1998). It is yet 
unclear whether recent changes precipitate a fundamental shift in Nigeria’s oil related legislation.
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In general, our discussion of land legislation and environmental law has indicated 
that statute law is either inadequate or unenforced which renders it incapable, of 
restricting the adverse impact of oil operations on the ground. While statutory law has 
offered little protection to village communities, it promised monetary compensation for 
those adversely affected by oü operations. However, statutory provisions for the payment 
of compensation contain gaps and the actual quantum of compensation prescribed by the 
state appears to be inadequate in relation to the damage caused by oÜ companies. 
Considering the inadequate nature of legislation and its enforcement, one can understand 
why vülage communities tend to be aggrieved by the inadequate compensation payments 
of 0 Ü companies. A farmer is hkely not to understand legal or economic concepts such as 
capital value, but he or she is likely to notice that the farm income feU as a result of oü 
operations, while this loss was not matched by the oü company’s compensation payment.
On the whole, this section of the thesis has indicated that Nigeria’s legal system 
tends to be biased in favour of the state and the oü companies at the expense of viüage 
communities. In this context, an aUiance of the political elite and private interests in 
Nigeria (see section two of the thesis) obstructs the development of legal remedies for 
environmental and land related problems. In other words, the rentier nature of the 
Nigerian state continues to prevent the formulation and enforcement of legislation which 
would benefit the interests of society as a whole, as opposed to the interests of the mling 
elite and the oü companies. The inadequate legislative provision and legal enforcement 
may result in social unrest in the oü producing areas by groups dissatisfied with the 
prevaüing economic, social and legal order. This social unrest may result in litigation
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against oil companies. The litigants’ only hope is that the judiciaiy is sufficiently 
independent of state stmctures as well as positively disposed towards them in order to 
give a wider scope to legal remedies, which calls for an analysis of the actual-practical 
operations of the legal system presented in the following section.
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Section 4: Nigerian Legal System in Practice: 
Results of a Survey
Survey Methodology
4.1. Introduction
Another constraint on legal disputes between oil companies and village 
communities are the actual-practical operations of the legal system which are discussed in 
this core section of the thesis. We approach this topic through a survey of Nigerian legal 
practitioners. The survey serves as a window to an understanding of legal conflicts 
between oil companies and village communities in Nigeria, the main focus of the thesis. In 
this context, the tliesis attempts to fill a gap in the existing literatm-e on African legal 
systems in terms of theii* day-to-day operations.
This survey is aimed at evaluating the constraints and opportunities faced by 
potential and actual litigants in oil related litigation. Inevitably, the sui*vey does not 
address all correlates of legal disputes such as socio-economic and political factors 
including the mai'ginalisation of ethnic minorities in the oh producing areas (see section 
two of the thesis). Rather than developing a comprehensive model of litigation in 
Nigeria’s society, the main goal of our survey is to hlustrate the incentives and
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disincentives of the legal process, which can either encourage or discourage litigants from 
engaging in litigation.
In this context, a survey can veiify or falsify two hypotheses as to whether the 
legal system is biased against oil companies or village communities. One of these 
hypotheses is that the fomial-legal system is biased against vhlage communities. Previous 
discussion in this thesis has suggested that there are indications of a bias in Nigeria’s 
statute law in favour of oil companies (see section three of the thesis). The fact that 
statute law may be predisposed in favour of oü companies, however, does not 
automatically imply that the legal system as a whole is biased. Our previous discussion 
did not raise the issues of bias within the cumulation of judicial precedents, the court 
process or the day-to-day behaviour of the judiciary. If the legal system as a whole were 
found to be prejudiced in favour of oü companies, it could be reasonably assumed that a 
number of potential litigants had been discouraged from instituting lawsuits against oü 
companies. This would mean that the current level of litigation against oü companies is 
merely a smaU fraction of the potential court cases, which could arise as a result of valid 
legal claims to compensation for damages from oil operations.
A further hypothesis would be that the legal system per se has no inherent biases 
but rather that the existing distribution of resources favours the claims of oü companies.
This section of the thesis examines those factors within Nigeria’s legal practice 
which may have given rise to an advantageous position for oü companies vis-à-vis 
individual or community litigants. It should be noted at this stage that possible 
explanations are not necessarily mutuaUy exclusive. The day-to-day operations of the
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legal system may embody factors which operate against the interests of village 
communities to a varying degree, while some factors may work in favour of community 
litigants.
Of central importance to our discussion in this section is the question of access to 
courts. The extent of the barriers to justice can indicate the motivations of the potential 
plaintiffs who decide not to pursue a valid legal claim in court. Constraints to the 
institution of lawsuits also influence the perceived image of the formal legal system 
among potential litigants. These constraints could lead to a feeling among potential 
litigants that law is on the side of the opposing litigants. This feeling, combined with 
economic inequality and lack of political representation, could in turn increase the 
likelihood of extra legal forms of protest. An examination of the day-to-day operations of 
the legal system in relation to village community claims can hence serve as a window to 
an understanding of why communities abandon litigation m favour of extr a legal forms of 
protest.
An analysis of the survey does not purport to explain the level of litigation and 
conflicts in the Nigerian oil industry. But we can identify factors which may encourage or 
discourage litigants from engaging in oil related litigation.
4.2. Methodology
As previously stated, the purpose of this section of the thesis is to identify factors 
which can either encourage or discourage individual and community litigants from 
engaging in oü related litigation. We investigate this topic on the basis of a survey of 154
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Nigerian legal practitioners. This approach has to be weighted against alternative 
methodologies. One of those methodologies would be to survey potential and actual 
litigants from village communities in the oil producing areas. Such a survey could 
investigate extra-legal forms of dispute resolution such as informai negotiations and 
settlements, which cannot be analysed through a survey of legal practitioners. A survey of 
village community members, moreover, would be likely to highlight barriers to justice as 
perceived by community members. It is likely that many potential litigants with a valid 
legal claim have never approached a lawyer in the first instance.
A survey of legal practitioners does not account for those potential litigants. 
Lawyers can only report on actual experiences with potential litigants whom they have 
met. But the vast majority of legal practitioners in our survey have had at least some 
experience with obstacles in terms of access to courts. This indicates a high level of 
awareness amongst tlie respondents with regard to the problems encountered by potential 
litigants.
More importantly, a survey of legal practitioners is likely to yield superior returns 
to a survey of potential litigants in village communities. Wliile all legal practitioners speak 
English, a high proportion of the members of village communities do not speak English 
but a local language and/or pidgin English. Surwey questions would need to be translated 
into a number of local languages. The members of village communities, moreover, may be 
illiterate which is likely to render tlie use of standardised multiple-choice questions very 
difficult. By implication, a surwey of village communities would pose severe problems of 
consistency. A survey by Onyige (1979) in the oil producing areas exemplified some of
137
the language and communications problems. For instance, with the question on the 
impact of oil operations, respondents in Onyige’s survey named oil pollution and oil spills 
as major problems of oil operations, without noticing that oil spills are part of oh 
pollution. Onyige’s survey encountered a number of problems, which cannot be solely 
ascribed to the inadequacies of survey design. His study exemplified that a survey of 
village communities may produce misleading and statistically inconsistent results.
An important strength of a suiwey of legal practitioners as opposed to a survey of 
potential litigants is that lawyers can be attributed some ability to answer questions 
accurately; an ability which perhaps exceeds that of the average member of society. All 
Nigerian lawyers have a university degree and have been trained to use language in a 
precise way. This is likely to ensure an adequate standard of the respondents’ replies.
The main strength of a survey of lawyers as opposed to a sui*vey of potential 
litigants is that it can assist an analysis of broader questions regarding the legal system, as 
compared to the individualistic view of litigants. A survey of legal practitioners has thus 
allowed for an assessment of key characteristics of the legal system such as the quality of 
the judicial services provided by courts of different types.
For practical reasons, survey distiibution in Nigeria can be a difficult undertaking. 
Given Nigeria’s problems with communications services, it would have been veiy 
difficult, if not impossible, for a researcher to distiibute questionnaiies to a random 
population of lawyers in different locations. Problems included delayed distribution or 
loss of mail. The reliable alternative taken m our sm*vey was to distiibute questionnaires 
in person. Survey distribution in person does not always lead to a high response rate, hi
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Nigeria, even well-known and established organisations encounter problems in 
conducting standaidised questionnaires distributed in person. For instance, the 
Constitutional Rights Project (CRP), a well-known Nigerian non-govemmental 
organisation, conducted a survey among judges and legal practitioners in 1993. Despite 
repeated efforts by the CRP staff to retrieve the questionnants in person from the judges 
and lawyers, the response rate was relatively low. Out of 1,000 questionnaires, only 511 
were returned, wliich represented a response rate of 51.1% (Nwankwo et al. 1993, 6-7). 
We assumed that Nigerian legal practitioners would be even less likely to respond to a 
research student based at a British university, whom they had never met before and who 
has no affiliation to an established organisation in Nigeria. Therefore, our effoits 
concentiated on finding a way of ensuring an effective distribution and collection of 
questionnaires.
In this context, it was assumed that the distribution and collection of 
questionnaires would be helped by an affiliation with an established Nigerian organisation. 
The author sought the support of Abdul Oroh, executive director of the Civü Liberties 
Organisation (CLO), a Nigerian non-governmental organisation, and Chief Priscilla O. 
Kuye, foimer head of the Nigerian Bar Association. Both Mr. Oroh and Ms. Kuye 
offered to assist in the distribution of the sui*vey by providing lists of names of law firms 
which were said to have had previous contacts with the oil industry. Additional names of 
law firms were provided by several legal practitioners known to the author. The main 
rationale behind the choice of respondents was to find lawyers who had professional 
experience in dealing with oil related cases. It was assumed that, unless the sample
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included a significant number of experienced lawyers, the analysis of the respondents’ 
views would provide little information on oü related litigation. We are confident that the 
names of law firms obtained for our sui*vey probably reflect the best possible sample of 
lawyers, which an outsider would be likely to get in Nigeria. A limitation of the suiwey to 
those locations where personal contacts with legal practitioners could be established has 
yielded an adequate response rate.
Of the names obtained, the vast majority of law fiims were located in Lagos, Port 
Harcourt and Warri. Lagos is Nigeria’s commercial centre where the greatest number of 
lawyers reside and where the major oü companies tend to have theii* headquarters. A 
large proportion of lawyers dealing with the oü industry are employed in law firms in 
Lagos, several of which have a subsidiary in Port Harcourt or in Warn. Port Harcourt is 
the main centre of the Nigerian oü industry being located in Rivers State, the oldest oü 
producing area in Nigeria, which hosts, for instance, the operational headquarters of 
Shell’s Eastern division. Warri is the second most important city in the oü producing 
aieas, which hosts, for instance, the operational headquarters of Shell’s Western division. 
Many law fiims dealing with oü related litigation are based in Port Hai'court and Wairi. 
Port Harcourt rather than Warri was chosen for the location of the sui*vey .because the 
number of law fiims with oil industry work is greater in Port Harcourt than in Wairi. 
Given the concentration of oil activities in the Port Harcourt area, the author felt justified 
in limiting the location of the survey to Lagos and Port Harcourt.
For practical and financial reasons, the author decided to limit his reseai'ch trip to 
Lagos. A volunteer member of the CLO helped to distribute questionnaires in Port
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Harcourt. In the course of sevei'al weeks in February and Maich 1998,240 questionnaiies 
were distributed among Nigerian lawyers in Lagos and Port Harcourt. In Lagos, 180 
questionnaires were distributed in person to the law chambers and were also collected in 
person by the author or by the chief legal adviser of the CLO, Udeme Essien, with whom 
the author collaborated. Visits to the law firms took place between 9:00 A.M. and 7 P.M. 
At each addiess the author introduced himself as a research student and presented a letter 
from the Department of Economics, St Andrews, wliich indicated that the survey was 
supported by the Department, by the CLO and by the Nigerian Bai* Association. The chief 
legal adviser of the CLO did not need an intioductory letter because he could gain access 
to a law film owing to his affiliation with the CLO. This approach proved effective in 
terms of securing an entry into the law firms.
At each address the author or Mr. Essien asked to speak to a senior partner in the 
law firm. If necessaiy, an appointment was made to call again later. If no contact was 
established after two visits, the address was given up. In each firm, between 1 and 5 
questionnaires were left with the senior pai'tner to distribute randomly among the lawyers. 
The number of questionnaires left in a law firm depended on the willingness of the partner 
to support the survey. It was felt that it would have been better to distiibute only one 
questionnaire in each law finn to ensure greater representativeness. But we had feaied 
that, unless several questionnaires were distributed in each fiim willing to support the 
survey, the number of respondents could turn out to be too small to represent a 
significantly high sample of respondents. In order to ensure consistency m the lawyers’ 
responses, all respondents were asked to provide theh personal assessment of the legal
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system, as opposed to the views held by their employers or colleagues. This was 
important in order to avoid the possibility of the lawyers reflecting the perceived views of 
their employers or colleagues on the legal system rather than their own views. All 
respondents were advised that tlieii* responses were anonymous and would be treated 
with confidentiality. It was hoped that this approach would encourage respondents to 
provide a more candid assessment of the legal system. In Port Harcourt, 60 
questionnaires were distributed in person by a volunteer member of the CLO, in a similar 
manner to the one described above for Lagos.
This approach allowed for an effective distribution and collection of 
questionnaires. Out of 240 questionnaires, 154 were returned, representing a response 
rate of 64.2%. This was significantly higher than the response rate of 51.1% in the CRP 
survey mentioned eailier. By the end of the author’s stay m Nigeria, only 19 
questionnaires were retrieved from Port Harcourt, compared with 135 in Lagos, 
representing response rates of 31.7% and 75.0% respectively. The low response rate in 
Port Harcourt can be explained by the fact that a number of lawyers failed to return their 
questionnaires on the date of collection. The high response rate in Lagos can be explained 
by the fact that a significant number of lawyers were visited more than once to collect the 
questionnaires.
4.3. Survey Analysis
Since we aie mostly interested m describing the legal system in relation to the oü 
industry operations and oü related litigation, our survey analysis attempts to assess the
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views of lawyers with experience in dealing with oil related cases. We attempted to 
strengthen this analysis through a series of oil related questions in tlie survey. As it tmned 
out, a number of the law firms surveyed had no or virtually no dealings with oil related 
Htigation. In a significant proportion of firms, oü related litigation constituted only a small 
fraction of the film’s total work. The sui*vey, nevertheless, reflects a significant pool of 
expeit knowledge on oü operations since as many as 128 respondents (83.1%) state that 
they have previously had some professional contact with the oü industry, of which 85 
(55.2%) have previously acted as legal counsel for an oü company, its subsidiary or a 
sub-contractor and 97 (63.0%) have previously acted as counsel in a lawsuit against an 
oil company.
The analysis of the suiwey relies on frequency distributions, percentage tables and 
non-parametric tests. ^  Among other questions, we investigated whether specific sub­
groups of respondents (e.g. lawyers specialised in environmental law or lawyers who 
previously worked for the oü industry) hold different views from those respondents who 
do not fit into the sub-group.^ The views of lawyers who previously worked for the oü 
industiy or those who had previous contacts with the oü industry are likely to reflect their 
professional experiences in dealing with oÜ related cases. A comparison of those lawyers 
with the other lawyers higlüight the differences between oü related litigation and other 
types of htigation. In this context, the presence in our sample of a significant proportion
 ^ In the following analysis of the survey, all results are depicted in percentage terms. The figures may not always 
add up to 100.0% but range from 99.8% to 100.1% as the figures were rounded off.
 ^ We approached this question by conducting non-parametric chi-square (%^) tests. A similar method was applied in 
a study by Adigun and Stephenson (1992), which utilised chi-square tests in an analysis of job satisfaction in the 
UK and Nigeria. In our analysis, the alpha value was set at 10% (a=0.10). If a specific cell was empty or had very 
low values, cells were collapsed into joint cells for the purpose of the cross-tabulation. Low values or empty cells 
could have artificially inflated the chi-square value and were therefore avoided in any cross-tabulations.
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of lawyers with no previous oil industry contacts is useful as it provides a comparative 
reference.
When using the term ‘oü related litigation’, one needs to remember that there are 
different types of oü related cases. These include employment-related litigation, 
environmental cases and commercial disputes. We are, of course, mostly interested in 
court cases between viUage communities and oü companies. These cases involve mainly 
environmental claims. We have thus utiHsed the distinct category of environmental 
lawyers vis-à-vis the other lawyers in order to distinguish between views on oü related 
litigation involving vülage communities and other types of oü related claims.
As previously stated, the question of access to courts is of central importance to 
our survey analysis. The results indicate that access to courts is a major obstacle in the 
functioning of Nigeria’s legal system. The two main problems of access to courts aie 
identified as the potential plaintiffs’ lack of financial resources and thek lack of 
knowledge in terms of general education and legal rights. The survey suggests that oü 
related litigation is heavily impeded by these problems of access.
Once a litigant is able to overcome the access problems, his or her case may stül 
be hampered by the inadequate functioning of the judiciaiy and the court system. An 
analysis of the constraints in the functioning of the judiciary and the court system forms 
the second main theme in our discussion. The results indicate that the Nigerian judiciary 
and the court system face severe problems in thek day-to-day operations. These 
impediments include inadequate funding of the legal system by the government, the 
dependence of the judiciary on the executive arm of the government and the high
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congestion in the courts. A number of the problems noted in the context of the 
functioning of the judiciaiy, notably high congestion in the courts, compound the 
obstacles of access to courts in Nigeria faced by litigants.
A discussion of the problems of access to courts and the functioning of the 
judiciary and the court system, which foims the initial part of the survey analysis, is 
followed by a discussion of secondary survey results concerning characteristics of the 
Nigerian legal system. These comprise three themes. First, we discuss the distinctions in 
the competency of judicial sem ces in different courts in Nigeria. It emerges that there are 
marked differences. The Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal are widely regarded as 
tlie most competent Nigerian courts. Second, we explore in greater detail the lawyers’ 
perceptions of the conduct of oü companies and courts in oÜ related litigation. Issues 
discussed include ethical conduct in court proceedings and the amount of compensation 
awards to litigants. The data indicates that lawyers do not perceive litigants in oü related 
cases being treated particularly unfairiy by the courts. But there appear to exist numerous 
instances, in which oü companies do not conduct themselves ethicaUy in court 
proceedings, and courts are regarded as biased in favour of oü companies. Third, legal 
change and legislation are discussed. It emerges that most lawyers perceive the legal 
changes that occurred in Nigeria as minor. Most lawyers also suggest that legislation is 
not properly enforced.
As a whole, the sur*vey results suggest that the legal system is biased in favour of 
oil companies. This bias is not uniform. Some judges, for instance, may be more 
sympathetic towards opposing litigants rather than the oü companies. However, it could
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be said that the legal process discourages litigation against oil companies. This would 
seem to support the earlier hypothesis that the existing court cases are only a small 
fraction of the potential litigation, which could arise as a result of valid legal claims to 
compensation for damages from oil operations.
4.4. Profile of respondents
Of the 154 respondents, 124 lawyers (80.5%) are male and 28 lawyers (18.2%) 
are female, while 2 lawyers give no response. This broadly reflects the dominance of men 
within Nigeria’s legal profession. The average age of respondents is 40 years. 
Respondents are relatively young, 50% of them are under 36 years of age (see Appendix 
B, Table B.l.).^ Lawyers have been, on average, members of the Nigerian Bar 
Association for 11 years.'  ^ A laige proportion of respondents - 40.9% - have between 6 
and 10 yeai'S of professional experience (see Appendix B, Table B.2). The relatively 
young age and the short experience of the respondents can be attributed to the recent 
expansion in legal education in Nigeria.^
The size of law firms, in which respondents have been employed, varies widely. 
The largest law firm has approximately 55 employees while the smallest has only 2 
employees. The average firm size is approximately 12 employees (see Appendix B, Table
 ^ Birth year MEAN = 1957.97.
Year of admission to the Bar MEAN = 1986.91.
5 Enrolment in the Nigerian Law School, which has recently been relocated from Lagos to Abuja, has increased 
significantly in the last two decades. According to Oko (1994), the Law School had 225 students in 1973. The 
number of Law School students increased to 796 in 1983, to over 2,000 in 1988 and to 2,611 in 19$2. The 
number of Law School graduates is a good indicator of the expansion of Nigeria’s legal profession because all 
prospective lawyers must attend the school before they can be called to the Bar. As a result of the recent 
expansion in Nigeria’s legal education, it is not surprising to encounter so many relatively young lawyers in the 
country.
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B.3.).^ The largest firm has approximately 40 support staff while the smallest has no 
support staff at all. The average number of support staff is roughly 5.5 (see Appendix B, 
Table B.4).^ The majority of law firms - some 61% - has between 1 and 5 support staff. 
In general, one could say that the size of Nigerian law firms is relatively small. 
Respondents, many of whom had dealings with the oil industry, can be expected to work 
for more flourishing firms with a larger number of staff because legal advice for the oil 
industry can be very profitable. Therefore, the average size of the law firms in the sample 
is likely to be greater than the size of the Nigeria’s law firms in general.
Of the 154 lawyers, 30 (19.5%) state that they specialise in criminal law, 93 
(60.4%) in civil law, 47 (30.5%) in envkonmental law and 102 (66.2%) in commercial 
law. The large number of lawyers with specialisation in commercial law can be explained 
by the fact that many respondents work for the oil industry, which requires specialised 
knowledge of commercial law. A number of lawyers indicates that they specialise in aU 
types of law since they are employed by a general law practice. In Nigeria, there is no 
professional distinction between barrister and solicitor so a general practitioner is 
theoretically expected to be familial* with all aspects of the legal practice. However, 
lawyers who declare to be specialists in aU ai'eas of law aie considered ‘unclassifiable’ for 
the puipose of the survey precisely because they do not indicate a paiticular 
specialisation. The replies of lawyers who provide no information on their specialisation
Size of law firm MEAN = 12.09.
 ^ Number of support staff MEAN = 5.49.
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are classified as ‘no response’ (see Appendix B, Table B.5.). This system of classification 
can explain the relatively high percentage of ‘unclassifiable’ and ‘no responses’/
To sum up, respondents are predominantly male, under 40 years old and have 10 
or less yeai's of professional experience. They tend to work in small law firms, with 1 to 5 
support staff, and they are predominantly specialised in civil law. The profile of 
respondents appears to reflect the fact that the Nigerian legal profession is relatively new 
in composition, dynamic and dominated by small, under-funded law chambers.
Main Survey Results: Access to Courts
4.5. Problems of access to courts
The degree of access to courts determines as to whether potential litigants can file 
a lawsuit or nor, so it constitutes a key test of the quality of a legal system. 
Unfortunately, there has been relatively little academic research on the access to courts in 
Africa. Writing on Francophone Africa, Degni-Segui (1995) has identified five basic 
problems of access to courts in Africa: geographical distance to courts, delay in the 
disposal of cases, lack of funds, African political systems and ignorance of legal rights. In 
this sub-section, we analyse whether our survey results support or do not support 
Degui’s study on access to courts.
Respondents have been asked whether they have encountered instances in which 
potential litigants have been discouraged from seeking legal recourse although they have
In the following analysis of the survey results, all unclassifiable responses are counted as ‘no response’.
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had a valid claim to compensation, an injunction or another form of legal recourse. Of all 
respondents, 59.1% state that they have some experiences with those potential litigants, 
even though only 24.7% declare that they have encountered those situations often or very 
often. Only 16.2% of the lawyers state that tliey have never encountered those situations 
(see Table 4.1.). Once we subtract ‘no responses’ and ‘don’t knows’, as many as 78.5% 
state that they have had some experiences with potential litigants who were discouraged 
from seeking redress in court. Some 71.6% note that they have those experiences at least 
sometimes, if not often (see columns 3 and 4, Table 4.1.). These figures indicate that the 
problems of access to justice in Nigeria are very significant indeed.
Table 4.1. Answers to question 11a Have you encountered instances in which potential 
litigants have been discouraged from legal action although they had a valid claim to compensation, 
an injunction or another form of legal recourse?’
1
Percentage of 
respondents
2
Cumulative
percentage
3
Percentage of 
respondents 
(excl. ‘no responses’ & 
‘don’t knows’)
4
Cumulative percentage 
(excl. ‘no responses’ & 
‘don’t knows’)
Veiy often 7.1 7.1 9.5 9.5
Often 17.5 24.6 23.3 32.8
Sometimes 2&2 53.8 38.8 71.6
Rarely 5.2 59.0 6.9 7&5
Never 16.2 75.2 21.6 100.1
Don’t know 20.8 96.0 - -
No response 3.9 99.9 - -
Total 99.9 99.9 100.1 100.1
Lawyers have been asked to rank reasons which would prevent potential litigants 
from seeking legal recourse. The responses suggest that the main constraints of access to
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courts are financial problems and ignorance of potential litigants. Out of 154 lawyers, the 
lack of funds is regarded as a veiy important reason by 75.3% of the lawyers and by 
13.6% as an important reason. The second and tliird most important reasons are the lack 
of general education and ignorance of legal rights. These two problems aie considered 
veiy important reasons by 57.1% and 51.3% respectively, and are considered important 
reasons by 24.7% and 37.7% respectively. These answers suggest that victims of crimes 
and civil wrongs in Nigeria are frequently ignorant about their legal rights. The other 
important problems of access to courts aie: delay in the disposal of cases, intimidation by 
public bodies, intimidation by tort-feasors and uncertainty about the potential success of 
a suit. Other problems such as ethnic origin and the geographical distance to courts aie 
considered less important (see Table 4.2.).
Table 4.2. Answer to question 11b ‘Amongst the following rank reasons which you think would 
prevent potential litigants from seeking legal recourse?’ (per cent)
very important reason important reason less important reason no response
Lack of funds 75.3 13.6 4.5 6.5
Lack of general education 57.1 24.7 9.1 9.1
Ignorance of legal rights 51.3 37.7 3.9 7.1
Delay in the disposal of cases by 
courts
48.7 39.0 7.1 5.2
Intimidation by public bodies 35.1 35.1 16.9 13.0
Intimidation by tort-feasors 24.0 43.5 19.5 13.0
Uncertainty about the potential 
success of a suit
21.4 5^2 13.6 9.7
Ethnic origin 15.6 27.3 42.2 14.9
Geographical distance to courts 10.4 3&8 40.9 14.9
Living in a rural area 10.4 33.1 42.9 13.6
Organisational structure of 
villages
5.8 20.1 57.1 16.9
Being a woman 4.5 20.8 59.7 14.9
Young age 3.2 20.8 59.1 16.9
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A significant proportion of respondents maintain that the problems of access to 
courts are greater in litigation involving oü companies. Excluding ‘no responses’ and 
‘don’t knows’, some 48.9% state that the problems of access to courts are more severe in 
0 Ü related litigation than in other types of litigation, whüe 40.3% state that the problems 
are equal (see columns 3 and 4, Table 4.3.). Tlie high percentage of respondents who 
note that the problems are equal in oü related litigation and in other types of litigation 
suggests that a significant proportion of the potential litigants in oü related cases are not 
particularly disadvantaged if compaied with other types of litigation. But tlie responses 
suggest that, by and large, the problems in oil related litigation are greater.
One commercial lawyer from Lagos states that the problems are more severe in 
0 Ü related litigation because ‘claims against oil companies often occur in rural areas in 
which educational levels are low, there is general ignorance and lack o f funds’^  It 
could be argued that the main reason why problems are greater in oü related litigation is 
the financial imbalance between the affluent oü companies on the one hand and the poor 
village communities on the other hand. Oü companies have clearly more financial 
resources than community litigants, which they can spend on the country’s leading 
lawyers and expert witnesses. The vülage communities in oü producing areas belong to 
some of the poorest income groups in Nigeria. Bayelsa State, one of the main oil 
producing areas, is one of the poorest regions in Nigeria.
Lawyer no.83, 1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers.
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Table 4.3. Answers to question 11c ‘Are the problems [of access to courts] particularly severe in oil
related litigation?’
1
Percentage of 
Respondents
2
Cumulative
Percentage
3
Percentage of 
Respondents 
(excl. ‘no responses’ 
& ‘don’t knows’)
4
Cumulative 
Percentage 
(excl. ‘no responses’ 
& ‘don’tknows’)
Much more severe 11.7 11.7 14.0 14.0
More severe 29.2 40.9 34.9 48.9
The same 33 8 74.7 40.3 89.2
Less severe 6.5 81.2 7.8 97.0
Much less severe 2.6 818 3.1 100.1
Don’t know 9.7 93.5 - -
No response 6.5 100.0 - -
Total 100.0 100.0 100.1 100.1
There appear to be two important reasons why the financial imbalance between oil 
companies and vtQage communities has become less significant in recent yeai's. First, 
those affected by oil operations usually sue oil companies as a group rather than as 
individual plaintiffs so they may share some of the financial costs between themselves. 
Village communities and families have had greater problems in litigating successfully in 
the past (this will be shown in greater detail in section six of the thesis). In the 1970s, it 
was not uncommon for a judge to dismiss a suit or to limit its scope because he or she 
found that the plaintiffs have not proven their authority to sue as a group .Successfu l 
cases, in which oil companies have been sued by plaintiffs representing a village 
community or a family as a whole, have become more widespread. “ Second, many
 ^ For instance, in Chinda v. Shell-BP (1974) 2 R.S.L.R., the plaintiffs’ claim was dismissed as the judge held that 
they ‘have not proved their authority to sue in a representative capacity, and are therefore deemed to be suing 
only in respect of themselves individually’.
Several recent high-profile cases by communities against oil companies from the 1990s can be cited: Geosource v. 
Biragbara [1997] 5 NWLR, Shell v. Tiebo VII [1996] 4 NWLR, Shell v. Farah [1995] 3 NWLR. In all of these 
cases, plaintiffs sued an oil company in representative capacity, not as individuals.
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lawyers in the oil producing areas appear to increasingly view court cases against oil 
companies as a financial investment and no longer demand a standard fee from the 
litigants but instead demand a contingency fee, as pointed out by a number of 
respondents/^ Lawyers increasingly work for free for their client during the legal 
proceedings but in turn demand a high shaie of the compensation payment in return, if the 
suit succeeds. In other words, the lawyer rather than the litigant mcreasingly carries the 
financial risk of losing a case. The attraction of lawyers to oil related litigation may be 
high because the financial rewards are potentially higher than in other types of litigation. 
In Shell V. Farah^^, for example, in which the plaintiffs have been awarded 4,621,000 
Naha by the court in 1994, the lawyers did not receive a standard fee but instead received 
roughly 2,500,000 Naira or 54% of the total compensation p a y m e n tI n  comparison, 
according to Nwankwo et a l  (1993, 28), the Chief Justice of Nigeria, the highest paid 
judicial officer in the countiy, received 77,400 Naira per annum in 1993 (excluding 
housing and other additional benefits). Since the potential earnings in oil related litigation 
are substantial, several lawyers in the oil producing areas such as Lucius Nwosu in Port 
Harcourt have specialised in litigation of village communities against oil companies. In
Lawyers employed by oil companies usually receive a standard fee rather than a contingency fee, so they earn a 
fee independently of the success of a suit. For instance, Shell in Nigeria reportedly pays roughly US$ 2,500 on 
average in lawyer’s fees for a single case, including the standard fee, court fees, tax and other bills, no matter 
whether a suit succeeds or not. Personal interview with J.A. Odeleye, SPDC’s Legal Manager and Company 
Secretary (Lagos, February 1998). A standard fee may be less profitable for a lawyer than a contingency fee but it 
carries little financial risk for the lawyer. A standard fee may still be very profitable for legal practitioners, in 
particular, those working for the oil industry. According to Ibidapo-Obe (1995,186), some Nigerian lawyers 
charge a standard fee of between 250,000 and 1,000,000 Naira for a single brief. The vast majority of potential 
litigants in village communities would not be able to afford those sums. In contrast, a contingency fee may enable 
potential litigants to file a lawsuit.
[1995] 3 NWLR.
Personal interview with Ledum Mittee, one of the lawyers in the Farah case (London, February 1998).
In the Farah case alone, Lucius Nwosu reportedly received roughly 2,000,000 Naira. Personal interview with 
Ledum Mittee, one of the lawyers in the Farah case (London, February 1998).
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some cases, the lawyer may even be willing to pay for expert evidence if he or she can 
expect a high share of the potential compensation payment/^ In effect, lawyers such as 
Nwosu help potential litigants to gain greater access to courts in oü related litigation. Tlie 
two reasons discussed above - group based claims and the nature of lawyers’ fees - may 
explain why the problems of access to courts in some oü related litigation have become 
less severe in recent years, which can help to explain the lise in litigation against oü 
companies.
Whüe the financial burden of litigants m oü related cases appeal's to have 
decreased, the lack of funds remains the most important problem of access to courts in 
Nigeria, whether in oÜ related litigation or other types of litigation. The limited Nigerian 
legal aid scheme, introduced in 1976, initiaUy only provided financial assistance in 
criminal proceedings (Collett 1980). In 1986, the Nigerian legal aid scheme was extended 
to cover civü claims in respect of accidents (Ibidapo-Obe 1995, 188). But the vast 
majority of oil related litigation does not qualify for any legal aid. Vülage communities 
have to liire a lawyer and expert witnesses themselves, which is expensive and 
bui'densome. Several respondents emphasise that plaintiffs in oÜ related cases often lack 
funds to pay for expert evidence, which favours oü companies which can afford to hire 
some of the country’s best scientific experts. According to a 1994 field survey of Okoosi 
and Oyelai'an-Oyeyinka (1995), undertaken in 14 oü producing communities in Delta 
State, the average daily income ranged from 7 Naira (US$ 0.30 at 1994 official rate) in 
Uzere to 50 Naira (US$ 2,27) in Agbasho. In compaiison, in the case Shell v. Farah^^ ,
In the Farah case, for example, Lucius Nwosu reportedly covered the costs of the scientific report presented in 
court. Personal interview with Ledum Mittee, one of the lawyers in the Farali case (London, February 1998).
[1995] 3 NWLR.
154
the two expert referees appointed by the court tendered a bill for 515,800 Naira, which 
included 415,800 Naha for their fees and 100,000 Naira for a soil test. Considering-the 
relatively low incomes of the local people, potential litigants can rarely afford to engage 
lawyers and expert witnesses. Huing a lawyer on a contingency fee could solve the 
financial problems of potential litigants. But it could be expected that access to 
contingency fees may be hmited due to the significant cost of expert witnesses and the 
financial risk faced by legal practitioners.
Even if a lawyer is prepared to forego his standard fee and is also prepared to pay 
himself for expert evidence, there may be other costs related to negotiations with oh 
companies and litigation, in particulai' costs of travel and court fees. Litigants may need 
to travel to visit their legal counsel, to negotiate with oil company staff and to attend 
court proceedings. The geograpliical distance is a problem, since those affected by oil 
operations live mostly in the Niger Delta where it may take many hours or even days to 
find a régulai' means of transport. Transportation in the Niger Delta is relatively expensive 
for the local population. The chief of Okoroba explained that a single trip to Shell’s 
Western headquarters in Port Harcourt would cost him as much as the income from 
several months fish ing.A ccording to the World Bank (1995, 79), a return trip between 
many riverine communities in the Niger Delta and Port Harcourt costs as much as the 
monthly salary of a government employee. Court fees may also be a burden. If a court
In general, a World Bank (1996, 25) report stated that 34.7 million Nigerians out of a population of some 102 
million lived below the poverty Hne in 1992. According to the World Bank (1996, 38), the average per capita 
expenditure of rural households was 780 Naira per annum (at 1985 prices). In Southern Nigeria, the figure was 
937 Naira per annum. Considering those low incomes, it is understandable that the lack of funds is the key 
problem for any potential litigants in Nigeria.
Personal interview (Okoroba, February 1998).
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case is lost, they may amount to a total of over 10,000 Naha/^ If the case is lost on 
appeal, the general costs may be higher, especially if the litigants have to travel to .the 
Supreme Court in Abuja, which is located in Northern Nigeria.
While the lack of funds is the main obstacle faced by potential litigants, the second 
and third most important problems of access to courts are related to ignorance. 
Communities in oil producing areas are often ignorant of their legal rights, as exemplified 
by the village Okoroba in Bayelsa State visited by the author. Prof. Bruce Powell, 
biologist at the University of Port Haicourt, estimated that the number of fish near 
Okoroba fell by approximately 80% as a result of canal dredging by a Shell sub­
contractor. The oil operations clearly damaged the local economy dependent on fishing. 
However, the villagers were unaware that they could sue Shell for the loss of income 
from fishing, although they were aware that tliey could sue oil companies for destioyed 
crops and trees.^  ^ According to a number of lawyers, villagers are usually awai'e that they 
are entitled to compensation for damage from an oil spill while they tend to be ignorant 
that they aie entitled to claim compensation for damages fiom other oil company 
activities. This may partly explain why a substantial quantity of court cases against oil 
companies are initiated in respect of oil spills.^  ^ Ignorance of foimal legal rights can be 
partly explained by the existence of customary laws, which govern Nigeria’s village
^ Personal interview with Mr. Vera-Cruz, partner at Victor & Charles (Lagos, February 1998).
Personal interview with Prof. Bruce Powell, Port Harcourt (February 1997).
^ Personal interviews with villagers at Okoroba, Bayelsa State, Nigeria (February 1997).
^ Another reason for the substantial quantity of litigation involving damage from oil spills may be that the case law 
is relatively well settled and makes it relatively easy to claim damages (see section six of the thesis). In 1998, 
70% of all Shell’s pending court cases in Nigeria involved damage from oil spills. Personal interview with J.A. 
Odeleye, SPDC’s Legal Manager and Company Secretary (Lagos, February 1998).
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communities. Community members usually prefer to resolve disputes according to 
customary law, rather than through the countiy’s legal system (see section three of the 
thesis). Potential litigants from village communities are hkely to be highly familiar with 
their* own customary law rights, but in oil related disputes they must seek redress in the 
formal legal system whose rules are usually alien to tliem. To sum up, the problems of 
access to courts appear to be greater in oü related litigation, which involves viUage 
communities.
4.6. Views on Access to Courts According to Different Sub- 
Groups
The views on access to courts vary across different groups of respondents. Of aü 
chi-square tests of independence conducted on the issue of access to courts, the most 
significant deviations occur in respect of the lawyers’ professional background. 
Environmental lawyers and commercial lawyers hold diverging views from the other 
lawyers in 6 and 5 out of 15 questions respectively. Views also vary according to years of 
professional experience (in 4 questions out of 15), according to size of law firm (in 4 
questions), according to age (in 3 questions) and according to gender (in 3 questions).
It was expected that the views of lawyers who had previous contact with the oil 
industry would diverge from the other lawyers, although no firm predictions were made 
as to how they would diverge. Only one cross-tabulation produces a significant chi- 
square value, namely on the question how often lawyers have met potential litigants 
discouraged from legal action despite a valid legal claim.^ '^  Of the lawyers with previous
yf  = 5.30, which clearly exceeds the critical %\io = 4.605 at d.f. = 2, p = 0.071.
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oil industry contact, 10.9% pronounce that they have met potential litigants who have 
been discouraged from legal redress very often, compared with none of the other lawyers. 
Of the lawyers with previous oil industry contact, 73.3% state that they have met 
potential htigants who have been discouraged from legal redress at least sometimes if not 
often, compared with only 35.7% of the other lawyers (see Table 4.4.). These responses 
are more significant in terms of oil related litigation than the replies by all respondents 
because they are more likely to be based more on experiences with the oil industry. The 
results appear to strengthen the earlier finding tliat the problems of access to courts are 
more severe in oil related litigation.
Table 4.4. Answers to questions 6a and 11a: Responses of lawyers with previous contact with the oil 
industry on whether they met potential litigants who have been discouraged from seeking legal
recourse (per cent)
Very often Often Sometimes Rarely Never
Lawyers with previous contact in the oU industry 10.9 21.8 40.6 7.9 18.8
Cumulative percentage 10.9 32.7 73.3 81.2 100.0
Other lawyers 0 35.7 0 21.4 42.9
Cumulative percentage 0 35.7 35.7 57.1 100.0
As with lawyers who had previous contacts with the oil industry, it was also 
expected that the views of lawyers who previously worked for an oü company would 
diverge from the views of the other lawyers. It was expected that oil company lawyers 
would have had fewer experiences with problems of access to courts because their clients 
may be, on average, wealthier than those of the other lawyers. Another hypothesis 
concerning lawyers representing the oü industry was that they would consider the 
problems of access to courts in oil related litigation less severe than the other lawyers
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since oü companies face fewer constraints of access to court than an average litigant. 
These hypotheses are largely rejected by the data as no dependence can be established 
between the attribute of company lawyer and questions on the access to courts. The only, 
but very significant, exception is the question on intimidation by tort-feasors.^^ Oü 
company lawyers attach less importance to intimidation by tort-feasors than the other 
lawyers, with 24.7% and 45.5% of oü company lawyers consideiing this problem as very 
important and important respectively, compared with 31.6% and 56.1% of the other 
lawyers respectively (see Table 4.5.). Clearly, significantly fewer oü company lawyers 
consider this a problem.
Table 4.5. Answers to questions 6b and lib : Responses of oil industry lawyers on intimidation by
tort-feasors (per cent)
Very important reason Important reason Less important reason
Lawyers who acted for oil industry 24.7 45.5 29.9
Cumulative percentage 24.7 70.2 100.1
Other lawyers 31.6 56.1 12.3
Cumulative percentage 31.6 87.7 100.0
The responses of oil company lawyers do not necessarüy suggest that intimidation 
by tort-feasors is a less severe problem in oü related litigation. On the contrary, several 
respondents emphasise that intimidation by public bodies and oÜ companies is a more 
prevalent problem in oÜ related litigation. Several lawyers have strong views on the 
question of intimidation. Whüe commenting on oü related litigation, one respondent from 
Port Harcourt states that problems are ‘more severe because in oil related matters the
= 5.84, which clearly exceeds the critical %\io = 4.605 at d.f. = 2, p = 0.054.
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interest groups involved are powerful and highly connected, oil being the major revenue 
earner o f  the central government"?^ Another lawyer from Port Harcourt comments that 
in cases involving oil companies the government may „use security agents against 
litigants and their s o l i c i t o r s " An environmental lawyer from Lagos comments on the 
structural links between the government and oil companies: ‘Most litigants are ajraid o f  
taking oil companies to court because o f  their connection with the government’?  ^
Judged by these responses, political influence of oil companies may, therefore, deter 
potential litigants, although in practice it may be difficult to document specific cases 
involving intimidation. It is entirely consistent for oil company lawyers to minimise the 
importance of intimidation. No explanation can be entirely satisfactory, but one may 
expect that oil companies as tort-feasors aie less likely to be accused of intimidation by 
the lawyers working for them. While our speculations on the question of intimidation 
cannot be adequately verified or falsified by the data, it is conceivable that oü company 
lawyers would want to minimise attempts of intimidation by their clients or would simply 
note fewer problems.
It was expected that responses on access to courts would vary according to legal 
specialisation. In particular, it was assumed that lawyers who declare that they are 
specialised in environmental law would regard the problems of access to courts as 
greater, while lawyers who declare to be specialised in commercial law would regard 
them as less severe. It was expected that lawyers specialised in envkonmental law would
26
27
28
Lawyer no. 144,1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers. 
Lawyer no. 146, 1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers. 
Lawyer no.8, 1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers.
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have had more experiences with problems of access to courts because some of their 
clients may be victims of environmental damage beset by problems of lack of funds and 
ignorance. It was expected that commercial lawyers, whose clients tend to be commercial 
enterprises, would be less likely to meet clients who experienced problems of access to 
courts. These hypotheses are confirmed to a significant extent. In 5 out of 6 questions, in 
which the views of environmental lawyers differ from the other lawyers, enviromnental 
lawyers consider problems of access to courts more severe tlian others (see Table 4.6.).^  ^
Perhaps not suiprisingly, they regard the lack of general education as the main problem. 
Of the environmental lawyers, 73.3% consider the lack of general education a very 
important obstacle. This is not necessarily surprising since an understanding of 
environmental damage can be expected to require more technical knowledge than other 
types of legal disputes. Interestingly, environmental lawyers consider intimidation by 
public bodies and tort-feasors a particularly important problem of access to courts. Of the 
environmental lawyers, 60.5% and 44.2% regard the intimidation by public bodies and 
tort-feasors as very important problems respectively, compared with 28.2% and 20.0% of 
the other lawyers respectively. These results suggest that the government and some
In cross-tabulations, in which the responses of environmental lawyers vary from the rest, the p value varies from p I
= 0.065 to p = 0.0002, that means, all results are highly significant at a  = 0.10. The chi-square and p values for 1
cross-tabulations between the attribute of environmental lawyer and attributes of obstacles of access to courts are j
as follows:
• for views on lack of general education: y j ~ 3.39, which exceeds the critical %\io -  2.706 at d.f. = 1, p = 0.065; j
• for views on intimidation by public bodies: %^= 11.61, which exceeds the critical X^ o.io = 4.605 at d.f. = 2, p = |
0.003; j
• for views on intimidation by tort-feasors: yf  = 8.58, which exceeds the critical %\.\o = 4.605 at d.f. = 2, p = t
0.014; ;
•  for views on ethnic origin: y j  = 16.86, which exceeds the critical X^io = 4.605 at d.f. = 2, p = 0.0002; :
• for views on geographical distance to courts; = 12.10, which exceeds the critical %^o.io = 4.605 at d.f. = 2, p = |
0 .002; :
• for views on uncertainty about the potential success of a suit: y  ^= 5.18, which exceeds the critical X^ oio = ' 
4.605 at d.f. = 2, p = 0.074.
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private bodies may attempt to frustrate environmental litigation/® By implication, the 
views of the environmental lawyers appear to indicate that potential litigants seeking 
compensation for enviionmental damage in oil related litigation may be more likely to 
encounter problems of access to courts than litigants in other types of litigation. 
Furthermore, these views imply that lack of general education and intimidation are more 
important problems of access to courts in oil related cases involving environmental 
damage than in other types of cases. These are important facts since lawsuits between 
village communities and oil companies usually involve claims for enviionmental damage.
Table 4.6. Answers to questions 5 and 11b: Responses of environmental lawyers on reasons which 
may prevent potential litigants from seeking legal recourse (per cent)
very important important less important
reason reason reason
Environmental lawyers on lack of general education 73.3 24.4 2.2
Other lawyers 54.7 30.7 14.7
Environmental lawyers on intimidation by public bodies 60.5 25.6 14.0
Other lawyers 28.2 46.5 25.4
Environmental lawyers on intimidation by tort-feasors 44.2 41.9 14.0
Other lawyers 20.0 50.0 30.0
Environmental lawyers on ethnic origin 25.0 45.5 29.5
Other lawyers 11.8 19.1 69.1
Environmental lawyers on geographical distance to courts 16.3 58.1 25.6
Other lawyers 11.8 29.4 5&8
Environmental lawyers on uncertainty about the potential 
success of a suit
15.9 75.0 9.1
Other lawyers 24.0 54.7 2L3
The hypothesis that commercial lawyers would be less likely to meet clients who 
experienced problems of access to courts is only partially confhmed. Commercial lawyers
^ These results also appear to strengthen the argument that the Nigerian government and private corporations 
sometimes frustrate the enforcement of environmental legislation (compare section three of the thesis).
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State that they have met fewer potential litigants who have been discouraged from legal 
action although they had a valid legal claim, which supports our earlier hypothesis. Only 
5.3% of commercial lawyers have met those potential htigants very often, compared with 
20.8% of the other lawyers. Only 31.6% of commercial lawyers have met those potential 
litigants very often or often, compaied with 50.0% of the other lawyers (see Table 4.7.). 
These results suggest that commercial lawyers, many of whom are likely to work for the 
oil industry, may be more isolated from the general problems of access to courts facing 
individual litigants than the other lawyers.
Table 4.7. Answers to questions 5 and 11a: Responses of commercial lawyers on whether they met 
potential litigants who have been discouraged from seeking legal recourse (per cent)
Very often Often Sometimes/iarely/never
Commercial lawyers 5.3 26.3 68.4
Cumulative percentage 5.3 31.6 100.0
Other lawyers 20.8 29.2 50.0
Cumulative percentage 20.8 50.0 100.0
While commercial lawyers appear to meet fewer potential htigants who have been 
discouraged from seeking legal rediess, they seem to be weU awai'e of the problems of 
access to courts, which puts into question our earlier hypothesis on the views of 
commercial lawyers. In 3 out of 4 cross-tabulations, of winch the results were not 
independent, commercial lawyers considered problems of access to courts as more severe 
than the other lawyers.^  ^ Above all, commercial lawyers appear to regaid intimidation by
In cross-tabulations, in which the responses of commercial lawyers vary from the rest, the p value varies from p = 
0.093 to p = 0.003, that means, all results are significant at a  = 0.10. The chi-square and p values for cross­
tabulations between the attribute of commercial lawyer and attributes of obstacles of access to courts are as 
follows:
• for views on intimidation by public bodies: = 11.34, which exceeds the critical X^ oio = 4.605 at d.f. = 2, p =
0.003;
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public bodies and by tort-feasors as more severe than the other lawyers. Of aU 
commercial lawyers, 85.5% and 80.9% consider intimidation by public bodies and by 
tort-feasors respectively an important problem, while the figures for the other lawyers are 
54.2% and 58.4% (see Table 4.8.). These results would suggest that intimidation can be a 
crucial problem of access to Nigerian courts within a commercial environment, which 
appears to strengthen our earlier speculations that intimidation can be a veiy important 
factor in preventing oil related litigation.
Table 4.8. Answers to questions 5 and lib : Responses of commercial lawyers on reasons which may 
prevent potential litigants from seeking legal recourse (per cent)
very important 
reason
important
reason
less important 
reason
Commercial lawyers on intimidation by public bodies 44.4 41.1 14.4
Other lawyers 25.0 29.2 45.8
Commercial lawyers on intimidation by tort-feasors 29.2 51.7 19.1
Other lawyers 29.2 29.2 41.6
Commercial lawyers on ethnic origin 17.0 34.1 48.9
Other lawyers 16.7 12.5 70.8
Commercial lawyers on organisational structure of villages 8.0 21.6 70.5
Other lawyers 9.5 47.6 42.9
It was expected that lawyers who have practised for a long time would be more 
likely to regard problems of access to courts as more severe titan lawyers who have 
practised for a shorter period of time since they would have more experience in dealing
« for views on intimidation by tort-feasors: = 6.07, which exceeds the critical %^o.io = 4.605 at d.f. = 2, p =
0.048;
•  for views on ethnic origin: = 2.83, which exceeds the critical %\io = 2.706 at d.f. = 1, p = 0.093;
•  for views on organisational structure of villages: = 4.54, which exceeds the critical %\io = 2.706 at d.f. = 1, 
p = 0.033.
The results of the cross-tabulation between the attribute of commercial lawyers and problems of ethnic origin 
were only marginally significant at a  = 0.10 as they become significant at p = 0.093. All other results were highly 
significant.
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with potential litigants and would be able to better recognise more subtle distinctions 
between problems of access to courts. Similarly, it was assumed that older lawyers would 
consider problems of access to courts more severe than younger lawyers. These 
hypotheses are lai'gely rejected by the data although the results are not entirely clear. 
Several cross-tabulations indicate relationships of dependence between the attributes of 
professional experience and age on the one hand and questions on the access to courts on 
the other. There aie two interesting trends worth mentioning.
First, the views of lawyers with 21 or more years of professional experience differ 
from the views of the other lawyers on the role of ethnic origin, living in a rural area and 
gender. The most significant results concern ethnic origin as a reason which may prevent 
potential litigants from seeking legal redress.^  ^ Of the lawyers with 21 or more years of 
professional experience, 100.0% state that ethnic origin is a problem of access to courts, 
compared with figures of between 39.1% and 75.0% for tlie other lawyers (see Appendix 
B, Table B.6.).
Second, the views of older lawyers differ from the views of younger lawyers on 
the lack of general education, uncertainty about the potential success of a suit and ethnic 
origin. The most significant results concern ethnic origin as a reason which may prevent 
potential litigants from seeking legal redress.^  ^ Unfortunately, we do not have 
information on the ethnic background of respondents which may have influenced thek 
views. Nonetheless, the data suggests that the older the lawyers, the more concerned they 
are with the problem of ethnic origin. For instance, 92.3% of lawyers aged 46 years and
= 20.73, which clearly exceeds the critical X^ o.io = 10.645 at d.f. = 6, p = 0.002. 
= 26.34, which clearly exceeds the critical X^ o.io = 10.645 at d.f. = 6, p = 0.0002.
165
more regard ethnic origin as a very important or an important problem of access to 
courts, while only 28.0% of lawyers aged between 25 and 30 regard ethnic origin as a 
very important or an important problem (see Appendix B, Table B.7.). These results 
suggest that older lawyers with more professional experience find specific problems of 
access to courts, paiticulaiiy ethnic origin, as more severe than the other lawyers. But the 
results do not support our original hypotheses that older and more experienced lawyers 
would generally find the problems of access to courts as more severe than younger and 
less experienced lawyers.
To sum up, this sub-section has shown that, in the view of legal practitioners in 
Nigeria, the problems of access to courts are very severe in Nigeria. Particularly severe 
obstacles are the lack of funds and the ignorance of litigants. An important part of the 
data, in particular the views of the lawyers with previous oil industry contacts, suggests 
that the problems are more severe in oil related litigation than in other types of litigation.
The survey results suggest that some of Degni-Segui’s earlier speculations on 
barriers to justice mentioned at the outset are not backed by empirical reseaich. Most 
notably, this survey does not identify the geographical distance to courts as a particularly 
severe problem of access to courts. Rather geographical distance is regarded as part of 
financial problems which prevent litigants from travelling to courts. The other 
speculations of Degni-Segui on barriers to justice are largely confirmed by our survey. 
Tluee out of five problems cited by Degni-Segui - lack of funds, delay in the disposal of 
cases and ignorance - feature prominently among the problems of access to courts cited 
by Nigerian lawyers. As Degni-Segui has argued, the obstacles of access to courts are
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further compounded by African political systems such as through authoritaiian rule and 
its impact on the judiciary. The situation of the judiciary and extra-judicial pressures in 
Nigeria are assessed in the next sub-section.
Main Survey Results: The Nigerian Judiciary
4.7. Functioning of the Judiciary and the Court System
That access to courts is only one of the problems in the functioning of Nigeria’s 
legal system is self-evident. Litigants also face problems once they have filed a lawsuit.
These problems result from the deficiencies in the day-to-day operations of the judiciary j
Iand the legal system. Such impediments include interference from the executive branch of j
the government and underfunding. In 1994, the Eso Panel, under the retired judge of the |
Supreme Court Kayode Eso, submitted a report on the situation of the judiciary to the |
I
government. The Eso Panel reportedly described the judiciary as a ‘disaster institution’. i
The report was said to have concluded that ‘after 34 years o f  [Nigeria's] independence, |
there are not the necessaty physical structures - that is, court halls, judges residence, !
libraries, vehicles, stationary, and indeed, toilets’ (CLO 1995, 165-168). The detailed |
findings of the report have never been disclosed in public but leaks to the press suggested i
that the Eso Panel produced four main findings. First, the judiciary was considered too i
dependent on the executive arm of the government. Second, the appointment of judges •
was regarded as too arbitrary. Third, the funding of the legal system was said to be too !
little. Fourth, congestion in the courts was seen as too high. Sur-vey respondents confirm i
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all the findings of the Eso Panel. Of all respondents, 89.6% agree that the judiciary is too 
dependent on the executive arm of the government, 74.7% agree that the appointment of 
judges is too arbiti’aiy and 89.6% agree that the funding of the legal system is too little. 
Some 90.2% consider congestion in the courts too high (see Table 4.9.). If ‘no 
responses’ were subtracted, the results would become even more impressive. What 
emerges is that the Nigerian judiciary faces severe impediments to its functioning.
Table 4.9. Answer to question 14 ‘Do you agree/disagree with the following statements?’
Strongly Disagree Neither Agree Strongly No
disagree agree/disagree agree response
The judiciary is too dependent on the 
executive artn of the govermnent
1.3 0.6 4.5 5.2 84.4 3.9
Cumulative percentage 1.3 1.9 6.4 11.6 96.0 99.9
The appointment of judges is too 
arbitrary
9.1 3.2 9.1 20.8 53.9 3.9
Cumulative percentage 9.1 12.3 21.4 42.2 96.1 100.0
The funding of the legal system is too 
little
3.2 0.6 2.6 2.6 87.0 3.9
Cumulative percentage 3.2 3.8 6.4 9.0 96.0 99.9
Congestion in the courts is too high 3.9 1.3 0.6 0.6 89.6 3.9
Cumulative percentage 3.9 5.2 5.8 6.4 96.0 99.9
While cross-tabulations generally reveal little variation in the respondents’ views 
on the question of the Nigerian judiciary, the views of commercial lawyers differ on 3 out 
of 4 questions. Commercial lawyers regard the problems of the judiciary as more severe 
than the other lawyers. The most significant results concern the question on the funding 
of the legal system. Of all commercial lawyers, 94.9% strongly agree that the legal system 
is underfunded, compared with 69.2% of the other lawyers (see Table 4.10.).^ ^^  It could
11.99, which clearly exceeds the critical %^o.io = 2.706, at d.f. = 1, p = 0.0005.
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be argued that commercial lawyers are predictably more concerned with monetary issues 
than the other lawyers. But this hypothesis cannot explain why commercial lawyers are 
more concerned about the situation of the judiciaiy in general. Of the commercial 
lawyers, 88.9% strongly agree that the judiciary is too dependent on the executive arm of 
the government, compared with 73.1% of the other lawyers.^  ^ A total of 96.0% of the 
commercial lawyers strongly agree that the congestion in the courts is too high, compared 
with 80.8% of the other lawyers (see Table 4.10).^^ An explanation for these differences 
may simply be that the government is more likely to inteiwene in commercial cases than in 
other cases, which could explain why commercial lawyers experience more impediments 
to the functioning of the judiciary.
Table 4.10. Answers to questions 5 and 14: Responses of commercial lawyers on whether they 
agree/disagree with the following statements (per cent)
Strongly
disagree
Disagree Neither
agree/disagree
Agiee Strongly
agree
The funding of the legal system is too little
Commercial lawyers 2.0 0 1.0 2.0 94.9
Other lawyers 11.5 3.8 11.5 3.8 69.2
The judiciary is too dependent on the executive 
arm of the govermnent
Commercial lawyers 2.0 0 4.0 5.1 88.9
Other lawyers 0 3.8 11.5 11.5 73.1
Congestion in the courts is too high
Commercial lawyers 3.0 0 1.0 0 96.0
Other lawyers 11.5 7.7 0 0 80.8
= 2.99, which exceeds the critical X^ o.io = 2.706, at d.f. = 1, p = 0.084.
^ X^  = 5.02, which clearly exceeds the critical x \ io  = 2.706, at d.f. = 1, p = 0.025.
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Lawyers in this survey appear to regard the non-democratic nature of military rule 
as the main cause of the impediments faced by the judiciary. Kayode Eso confirmed this 
view by writing in a newspaper article: ‘Thefe can never be independence o f the 
judiciaty in a non-democratic setting’?  ^ According to Nigerian lawyers, the nature of 
military rule leads to interference from the executive and the arbiti'ary appointment of 
judges and, more generally, to a less favourable treatment of the Nigerian judiciary by the 
government. As we shall see later, the extra-judicial pressures of the military government 
play an important role in court proceedings.
Two of the problems revealed by the Eso Panel and the sui*vey further compound 
the obstacles of access to courts in Nigeria: congestion of courts and the arbitrary 
appointment of the judiciaiy. Congestion of courts leads to the delay in the disposal of 
cases, while the appointment of government-backed judges increases the uncertainty 
about the potential success of a suit.
The congestion of courts manifests itself through the high number of pending 
cases. Cases in Nigerian courts including appeals may take over 10 years before reaching 
a final verdict. Sometimes the original litigants wül have died by the time the judgment is 
made. No figures exist for the whole of Nigeria on the number of pending cases, but a 
report commissioned for the Shell-initiated Niger Delta Envkonmental Survey (NDES) 
provides detailed figuies for Rivers State, one of the key oil producing areas. The number 
of cases in Rivers State carried from the previous year has been steadily growing, for
Kayode Eso, ‘Judicial Independence in the Post-Colonial Bra’ (Guardian, Lagos, 27 January 1997).
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instance, 17,304 cases were carried over from 1995 to 1996, while only 2,847 cases were 
disposed of in 1995 (see Table 4.11.).
Table 4.11. Cases In Rivers State disposed of and carried over for 1993-1996 legal year
1994 1995 1996
Cases filed 6,552 5,045 -
Cases pending - 19,187 18,671
Cases disposed of 4,905 2,847 2,929
Cases carried from previous year 15,215 16,939 17,304
Source: Ogbnigwe (1996).
The delay in the disposal of cases together with uncertainty about the potential 
success of a suit may discourage a potential litigant. In addition, while the court case is 
pending, a litigant may be left without any means to support himself. In Eze v. Agip^^, the 
plaintiff sued Agip for the destruction of his house and his property at the Akii 
flowstation in Imo State. He reportedly lost his house as a result of oil operations but had 
received no compensation from the oil company. He testified that he had been squatting 
with a friend, while his family had to stay peimanently away from him. So when the case 
was adjourned, he felt that he could not wait until the scheduled day of proceeding and 
asked for an accelerated heaiing. The judge refused the application on the grounds that 
the plaintiff failed to ‘show special and exceptional circumstances justifying such 
application’. The above case exemplifies that the delay in tlie disposal of cases may 
discourage potential plaintiffs from instituting a lawsuit
(1979)IMSLR.
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While the delay in the disposal of cases may discourage potential plaintiffs, the 
arbitiary appointment of judges by the military may alter the outcome of court cases m 
favour of the government, its agencies and business partners in the private sector. A 
commercial lawyer from Lagos commented on the appointment of judges: ‘The way our 
judges are being appointed can be said to be responsible for them being subservient to 
the executive arm o f government thus allowing it to manipulate the judges anyhow to 
serve their selfish ends as a result o f  which there is no justice in Nigeria Since the 
return of the military to power in 1983, judges of federal courts and state high courts 
were appointed by the Supreme Military Council, which later became the Armed Forces 
Ruling Council (AFRC). Appointments are made on the advice of the Advisory Judicial 
Committee, whose membership includes the Chief Justice, the Attorney-General and 
valions other judges from the federal states. Judges of inferior state courts are appointed 
by the militaiy governors of the federal states. Judges have theoretically a guaranteed 
tenure of office untü retirement, but they may be dismissed by the AFRC at times on the 
advice of the Advisory Judicial Committee (Nwankwo et al. 1993, 20-26)." °^ In a few 
instances, the military removed judges without advice. For instance, the government 
removed sixty high court judges in 1985 as part of a country-wide purge in the public 
service (Nwabueze 1992, 24).
^ Lawyer no.84, 1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers.
As Eze (1996, 143-144) has pointed out, the 1979 Constitution provided for the appointment of judges through 
democratic processes. The Constitution provided, for example, that Supreme Court judges are to be appointed by 
the Nigerian president subject to a confirmation by a majority in the Senate, on the advice of the Federal Judicial 
Service Commission. However, the re-introduction of military rule in 1983 has shifted the responsibility for the 
appointment of judicial officers from democratic institutions to the military.
172
The problems of the arbitrary appointment of judges appear to be most severe 
with regards to military tribunals, in which government-appointed judges decide upon a 
case jointly with miHtaiy officers. In terms of oil related litigation, the most prominent 
court case of a militaiy tiibunal was that against Ken Saro-Wiwa, leader of the 
Movement for the Survival of the Ogoni People (MOSOP), who was best known for his 
protests against Shell. Ken Saro-Wiwa and 14 other defendants were accused of 
murdering four traditional mlers in May 1994. Rather than allowing the case to be judged 
by a civilian court, general Abacha convened a so-called Civil Disturbances Special 
Tribunal in November 1994, which included two judges and a military officer. The 
tribunal’s decisions were only considered effective upon confirmation by the Armed 
Forces Ruling Council (AFRC) and they carried no right of appeal. A report by Michael 
Bimbaum (y ! (1995), a British barrister, has suggested that the trial was not fair and that 
there were doubts as to its legality. Bimbaum (1995, 8) has concluded that there was no 
reason for the appointment of the military tribunal in the Saro-Wiwa case ‘other than the 
desire o f  the Federal Military government that any tria l, should take place before a 
tribunal which it hopes will favour the prosecution and a desire to avoid the scrutiny o f  
its case by the ordinary courts’. Bimbaum has further aveiTed that, overall, the tribunal 
‘has behaved in a way which strongly suggests that it is biased in favour o f  the 
governm ent.D espite concems over the legality of the trial and the evidence presented, 
Ken Saro-Wiwa and eight others were sentenced to death in November 1995. The Saro- 
Wiwa case may have discouraged potential litigants from seeking legal redress in oil 
related matters. A female lawyer from Lagos comments that ‘after Ken Saro-Wiwa a lot
On the proceedings of the Saro-Wiwa case, see Bimbaum (1995).
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o f people might not sue any oil company again’ In any case, the above lawsuit 
exemplifies how the appointment of judges may influence the outcome of a court case in 
favour of the government, which in turn reduces the certainty of the potential success of a 
case based on the strength of a legal argument.
The delay in the disposal of cases and the uncertainty about the potential success 
of a case compound the problems of access to courts. Combined with ignorance, financial 
problems and intimidation, the problems of the judiciary thus reduce the frequency of oil 
related litigation. Because of barriers to justice, compensation claims in the Nigerian oil 
industry are more likely to be settled before they come to court, even if the potential 
plaintiffs are dissatisfied with the payment offered by a company. Beyond the question of 
access to courts, the above discussion suggests that the judiciary faces substantial extra­
judicial pressures from the government.
4.8. Extra-Judicial Pressures and Enforcement of Court Orders
The respondents confirm the view that the Nigerian judiciary is often under 
serious extra-judicial pressures from public and private bodies. Of all respondents, 50.0% 
state that judges, lawyers and other judicial officers encounter pressures from public or 
private institutions very often or often. According to 44.8% and 4.5%, pressures exist 
sometimes or raiely respectively. Not a single lawyer believes that there aie never 
pressures (see Table 4.12.).
Lawyer no.88, 1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers.
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Table 4.12. Answers to question 8a ‘Would you say that lawyers, judges or other judicial officers 
encounter outside pressures from private or pubhc institutions in their work?’
Percentage of Respondents Cumulative Percentage
Very often 20.1 20.1
Often 29.9 50.0
Sometimes 44.8 94.8
Rarely 4.5 99.3
Never 0 99.3
No response 0.6 99.9
Total 99.9 99.9
A significant proportion of tlie respondents suggest that the extra-judicial 
pressures are greater in oü related litigation. Excluding ‘no responses’ and ‘don’t knows’, 
a clear majority - 54.1% - note that tlie difficulties are greater or much more severe in oü 
related litigation, whüe 35.0% state that the difficulties aie the same. Only 10.8% state 
tliat the difficulties are less severe or much less severe (see columns 3 and 4, Table 4.13.). 
A Lagos lawyer comments that ‘oil cases usually attract political considerations’.^  ^
Another lawyer with 35 years of professional experience comments: ‘oil cases often have 
political implications The relatively high percentage of respondents who note that the 
problems aie the same or less severe in oil related litigation may suggest tliat extra­
judicial pressures are not a paiticularly serious problem in some oü related cases, if 
compared with other types of litigation.
The extia-judicial pressures in oü related cases appear to depend primarily on the 
subject matter of a case. A commercial lawyer from Lagos differentiates between cases 
involving environmental damage and employment related cases. He argues that in court
Lawyer no.58, 1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers.
Lawyer no.74, 1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers.
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cases involving environmental damage, as opposed to employment related cases, extra­
judicial pressures from the government may be applied/^ It is likely that tlie government 
does not intervene in every oil related case as there is a substantial quantity of those cases 
and many cases do not directly infringe on the interests of the government. Nonetheless, 
the majority of respondents suggests that problems m oü related litigation are, by and 
large, greater.
Table 4.13. Answers to question 8b ‘Are the difficulties more or less severe in oil company related
litigation?’
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Percentage of 
Respondents
Cumulative Percentage of Cumulative
Percentage Respondents Percentage
(excl. ‘no responses’ (excl. ‘no responses’
and ‘don’t knows’) and ‘don’t knows’ )
Much more severe 14.3 14.3 18.3 18.3
Greater 27.9 42.2 35.8 54.1
The same 27.3 69.5 35.0 89.1
Less severe 7.8 77.3 10.0 99.1
Much less severe 0.6 77.9 0.8 99.9
Don’t know 16.2 94.1 - -
No response 5.8 99.9 - -
Total 99.9 99.9 99.9 99.9
The views on extra-judicial pressures differ according to professional
background."^ ® The views of commercial lawyers differ significantly from the rest."^ ' Of all4 7
Lawyer no. 108, 1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers.
Lawyers who claim that they specialise in civil law or environmental law claim that the extra-judicial pressures 
are more severe in oil-related litigation. Lawyers who claim to be specialists in criminal law are, overall, more 
likely to believe that the extra-judicial pressures are less severe in oil-related litigation. A cross-tabulation 
between the attribute of size of a law firm and views on extra-judicial pressures also produces a significant chi- 
square value. But there is no discernible pattern as to how the size of a law firm deteimines views on these 
pressures.
f  = 6.04, which clearly exceeds the critical %^ oio = 4.605, at d.f. = 2, p = 0.049.
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commercial lawyers, 21.1% believe that extra-judicial pressures are much more severe in 
oil related litigation, compared with 8.3% of the other lawyers. Some 57.9% of the 
commercial lawyers state that these pressures are much more or more severe in oil related 
litigation, compared with 29.1% of the other lawyers (see Table 4.14). These results 
appeal* to suggest that extia-judicial pressures are greater in litigation involving 
commercial enterprises.
Table 4.14. Answers to questions 5 and 8b: Responses of conunercial lawyers on whether the extra­
judicial pressures are more or less severe in oil related litigation (per cent)
Much more severe Greater The same Less severe Much less severe
Commercial lawyers 21.1 36.8 31.6 9.2 1.3
Cumulative percentage 21.1 57.9 89.5 98.7 100.0
Other lawyers 8.3 20.8 54.2 16.7 0
Cumulative percentage 8.3 29.1 83.3 100.0 100.0
Interestingly, lawyers who had previous contact with oil companies regard extia- 
judicial pressures as more severe than the other lawyers."^  ^ Of the respondents with 
previous oil industry contact, 55.2% state that extra-judicial pressures exist very often or 
often, compared with 29.2% of the other lawyers (see Table 4.15.). These results appear 
to confii*m the earlier finding that there aie more extia-judicial pressures in oil-related 
cases than in other types of litigation.
f  -  6.004, which clearly exceeds the critical x \io  = 4.605, at d.f. = 2, p = 0.05.
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Table 4.15. Answers to questions 6a and 8a; Responses of lawyers with previous contact with the oil 
industry on whether the l^al system experiences extra-judicial pressures (per cent)
Very often Often Sometimes Rarely Never
Lawyers with previous contact in the oU industry 21.3 33.9 40.2 4.7 0
Cumulative percentage 21.3 55.2 95.4 100.1 100.1
Other lawyers 16.7 12.5 66.7 4.2 0
Cumulative percentage 16.7 29.2 95.9 100.1 100.1
Even if the outcome of a court case has not been influenced by extra-judicial 
pressures, the government may stUl attempt to prevent the enforcement of court orders, 
rulings and judgments. Of all respondents, 55.2% state that there are severe or very 
severe problems in the enforcement of court orders in Nigeria. A further 40.9% state that 
there are some difficulties and only 2.6% state that there are minor difficulties (see Table 
4.16.). What emerges from these results is that the non-enforcement of court orders can 
be a major problem in litigation.
Table 4.16. Answers to question 7a ‘Would you say that there are difficulties in the enforcement of
court orders, rulinj^ or judgments?’
Percentage of Respondents Cumulative Percentage
Very severe problems 26.0 26.0
Severe problems 29.2 55.2
Some difficulties 40.9 96.1
Minor difficulties 2.6 98.7
No difficulties 0.6 99.3
No response 0.6 99.9
Total 99.9 99.9
Several lawyers sti'ess that the enforcement of court orders depends piimarily on 
the interest of the government in a specific court case. The only respondent, who states 
that there aie no difficulties in the enforcement of court orders, adds that there are indeed
178
difficulties in cases, in which ‘the government has an interest to protect’f  In order to 
enforce rulings against the government, a fiat of the Attorney-General is needed.®®- By 
implication, the Attorney-General decides in the last instance whether a inling should be 
enforced or not. One lawyer from Lagos comments that ‘It is pretty hard to enforce court 
orders in Nigeria, especially where the government has an interest and in any case one 
needs the blessing o f  the Attorney-General to enforce orders’. The Attorney-General 
has the power to stifle comt judgments against the government.
Government interventions in the operations of the legal system do not only occur 
on behalf of federal agencies but also on behalf of local authorities and other public 
bodies. A lawyer from Lagos narrates a well-known court case in 1995, in which the 
Akwa Ibom State High Court pronounced a judgment against the state government. 
However, the government of the Akwa Ibom State refused to carry out the court order. 
The state government, moreover, put pressure on the high court judges to withdraw the 
court order by instructing the seizme of the official vehicles of all high court judges in the 
state and by evicting the judges from theii* residential quaiters. At a later stage, the 
federal government reportedly mediated between the judges and the state government 
and the matter was settled.®  ^ Instances such as this may sei*ve to intimidate judicial
Lawyer no. 152, 1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers.
Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No.107 of 1993.
Lawyer no.77, 1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers.
Lawyer no.l, 1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers. This incident in Akwa Ibom State has also been reported in 
Olugboji (1996, 87). As another example of non-enforcement of court orders, Olugboji (1996, 89-90) has reported 
a case involving unjust dismissal from the police force. In 1994, the Abeokuta High Court ruled that two police 
officers, who were dismissed from the police force, be re instated in their previous jobs and be paid their 
outstanding salaries and allowances as their dismissal was ‘irregular and unconstitutional’. Police authorities 
reportedly ignored the ruling.
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officers and may discourage judges from pronouncing judgments against government 
institutions.
It is not entirely clear in what way the difficulties in the enforcement of court 
judgments in oil related litigation are different from other types of litigation. Excluding 
‘don’t knows’ and ‘no responses’, some 44.4% of the surveyed lawyers state that the 
problems are the same in oil related litigation and other types of litigation. 39.8% note 
that the problems are more severe or much more severe in oil related litigation. Only 
15.8% state that the problems are less or much less severe in oü related litigation (see 
columns 3 and 4, Table 4.17.). The high percentage of respondents who note that the 
problems are greater in oü related cases suggests that there may be somewhat greater 
problems in oü related litigation, if compared with other types of litigation. Nonetheless, 
the data appears to indicate that the problems in oü related litigation are, by and lai'ge, 
comparable with other types of litigation.
These results suggest that it may be somewhat more difficult to enforce court 
orders in oü related cases but the data is not unequivocal on this point. What appears 
from some respondents’ comments is that the difficulties in the enforcement of court 
orders in different types of litigation depend very much on the subject matter. As with 
general difficulties in the enforcement of court orders, lawyers state that the enforcement 
of court orders depends primarily on the interest of the government. A female lawyer 
from Lagos argues that the difficulties in oÜ related litigation ‘depend on the interest o f 
the government in the matter’P  For instance, Olugboji (1996, 90) has reported a case, 
in which the Federal High Court iu Benin City imposed a court order restraining the Oü
Lawyer no.88,1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers.
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Mineral Producing Areas Development Commission (OMPADEC) from swearing in 
Joseph Popo as the new commissioner for Delta State. The OMPADEC defied the court 
order and went ahead to swear in Popo as the new commissioner. The above discussion 
appears to suggest that a court order against the oü industry or the countiy’s oÜ 
administration may not be enforced, if it is perceived as an infringement of the 
government’s interests in the oil indushy.
Table 4.17. Answers to question 7b ‘Are the difficulties more or less severe in oil company related
litigation?’
1
Percentage of 
Respondents
2
Cumulative
Percentage
3
Percentage of 
Respondents 
(excl. ‘no responses’ 
and ‘don’tknows’)
4
Cumulative Percentage 
(excl. ‘no responses’ 
and ‘don’tknows’)
Much more severe 13.0 13.0 15.0 15.0
More severe 21.4 34.4 24.8 39.8
The same 38.3 72.7 44.4 84.2
Less severe 9.7 82.4 11.3 95.5
Much less severe 3.9 86.3 4.5 100.0
Don’t know 11.0 97.3 - -
No response 2.6 99.9 - -
Total 99.9 99.9 100.0 100.0
The views on the enforcement of court orders vary somewhat according to 
professional background.®"^  Above all, the views of environmental lawyers differ from
^ Interesting findings concern the years of respondents’ professional experience. In both cross-tabulations on 
attributes of years of professional experience and the enforcement of court orders, the chi-square tests of 
independence are significant. In general, the greater number of years of professional experience lawyers have, the 
more likely they are to state that ihere are serious difficulties in the enforcement of court orders. This may be 
explained by the assumption that lawyers with more years of professional experience are more likely to have 
experienced instances, in which court orders have not been enforced.
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those of the other lawyers.®® Of the environmental lawyers, 63.8% state that the 
difficulties in the enforcement of court orders are severe or very severe, compaied with 
only 44.6% of the other lawyers (see Table 4.18.). A clear majority of the environmental 
lawyers - 53.3% - state that these difficulties are more severe in oil related litigation, 
compaied with 23.5% of the other lawyers (see Table 4.19.). This suggests that the 
enforcement of court orders is more difficult in court cases involving environmental 
matters. By implication, it has to be assumed that the enforcement of court orders in oil 
related cases involving environmental damage is Hkely to be mom difficult than in other 
oil related cases such as employment related litigation.
Table 4.18. Answers to questions 5 and 7a: Responses of environmental lawyers on whether there 
are problems in the enforcement of court orders (per cent)
Very severe 
problems
Severe
problems
Some
difficulties
Minor
difficulties
No difficulties
Environmental lawyers 40.4 23.4 31.9 4.3 0
Cumulative percentage 40.4 63.8 95.7 100.0 100.0
Other lawyers 15.7 28.9 54.2 1.2 0
Cumulative percentage 15.7 44.6 98.8 100.0 100.0
Table 4.19. Answers to questions 5 and 7b: Responses of environmental lawyers on whether these 
problems are more or less severe in oil related litigation (per cent)
Much more severe More severe The same Less severe Much less severe
Environmental lawyers 33.3 20.0 40.0 6.7 0
Cumulative percentage 33.3 53.3 93.3 100.0 100.0
Other lawyers 4.4 19.1 52.9 14.7 8.8
Cumulative percentage 4.4 23.5 76.4 91.1 99.9
In respect of question 7a on the general difficulties in the enforcement of court orders, the results of cross- 
tabulations are as follows: f  =■ 10.11, which clearly exceeds the critical %^o.io = 4.605, at d.f. = 2, p = 0.006. In 
respect of question 7b on the difficulties in oil related litigation, the results of cross-tabulations are even more 
significant: f  -  19.76, which clearly exceeds the critical yja.\o = 6.251, at d.f. = 3, p = 0.0002.
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The earlier speculation that the enforcement of court orders may be more difficult 
in 0 Ü related litigation appears to be strengthened by the replies of lawyers who had prior 
contact with oil companies.®® Of those lawyers, 55.2% state that the difficulties are more 
severe or much more severe in oü related litigation, compared with 29.2% of the other 
lawyers (see Table 4.20.). These results appear to suggest that, overall, the enforcement 
of court orders in oü related cases is more difficult than in other types of litigation.
Table 4.20. Answers to questions 6a and 7b: Responses of lawyers with previous contact with oil 
companies on whether problems of enforcement are more or less severe In oil related litigation (per
cent)
Much more severe More severe The same Less severe Much less severe
Lawyers with previous contact 21.3 33.9 40.2 4.7 0
Cumulative percentage 21.3 55.2 95.4 100.1 100.1
Other lawyers 16.7 12.5 66.7 4.2 0
Cumulative percentage 16.7 29.2 95.9 100.1 100.1
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To sum up, this sub-section has shown that the Nigerian judiciary and the court 
system face severe impediments to their functioning. Some of the key impediments 
include inadequate funding of the legal system by the government, extra-judicial pressures 
from the government and the high congestion in the courts. These results support Degni- 
Segui’s contention that the problems of access to courts are further compounded by the 
nature of African political systems, in which the judiciaiy is under pressure from the 
executive branch of the government and is strtiggling to cope with the day-to-day mnning 
of the courts. The impediments to the functioning of the judiciaiy and the legal system 
appeal* to be much greater in court cases involving the government and somewhat greater
f  = 6.00, which clearly exceeds the critical %^o.io = 4.605, at d.f. = 2, p = 0.050.
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in oil related litigation. What must be remembered, nevertheless, is that the quality of 
legal seivices may differ from court to court.
Secondary Survey Results
4.9. Types of Courts
That government pressure on judges or the quality of judicial seivices vary 
according to different types of courts is perhaps unsurprising. Of all respondents, 85.7% 
believe that there are major differences in the quality of judicial services in different 
Nigerian courts, only 8.4% believe the opposite, while 5.8% give no response. The 
Supreme Court, the highest Nigerian court, is regarded as the most competent Nigerian 
court, followed closely by the Court of Appeal. Of all surveyed lawyers, 38.3% and 
50.6% consider the Supreme Court to be very competent and competent respectively. 
Some 31.2% and 59.1% regard the Court of Appeal as very competent and competent 
respectively. The other Nigerian courts are considered markedly less competent (see 
Table 4.21.). This can possibly be best explained by the fact that the Supreme Court and 
the Court of Appeal attract some of the best judicial officers within the court system. 
Judges of these two courts receive higher material benefits, including free housing, and 
enjoy higher prestige than those of the lower courts, which is likely to attract the most 
capable lawyers.®  ^ In addition, a court case in the Supreme Court is usually presided over
^ While judges of the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal earn more than those of other types of courts, their 
remuneration is not excessively high. According to Nwankwo et al. (1993, 28), the Chief Justice of Nigeria, the 
highest paid judicial officer in the country, received 77,400 Naira per annum in 1993 (excluding housing and 
other additional benefits). At the 1993 official rate of exchange, this translated to about US$ 3,500 per annum. In
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by five judges, sometimes seven, while a court case in the Court of Appeal is usually 
presided over by three judges.®* It is thus more likely that these courts can arrive at a 
more balanced and competent decision than all the other courts, which have only one 
judge presiding over a court case.
Of the other courts, the Federal High Court and the State High Courts are 
considered competent. Of aH lawyers, 7.8% and 70.1% consider the Federal High Court 
veiy competent and competent respectively, while 3.9% and 74.0% consider the State 
High Courts very competent and competent respectively. The lower courts, the 
Magistrates Courts and the Customary Courts, are generally considered incompetent (see 
Table 4.21.). These differences can possibly be best explained by the fact that the Federal 
High Court and the State High Courts attract some of the best judicial officers from the 
lower courts. The best judges from the Magistiates Courts are often recruited by the 
State High Courts. The inadequacies of the Magistrates’ and the Customary Courts may 
be explained as a result of the appointments of unqualified judicial officers and inadequate 
remuneration.®  ^ A commercial lawyer from Lagos comments: ‘The level o f experience 
required to be a magistrate (mostly 3 years plus at the Nigerian Bar), low salary scale, 
large volume o f criminal cases, lack o f adequate technological support, inexperience
comparison, Ibidapo-Obe (1995, 186) has revealed that some Nigerian legal practitioners charge a fee of between 
250,000 and 1,000,000 Naha for a single brief. Nwankwo et al. (1993, 28) have commented: 'The low wages 
attributed to judicial officers have discouraged independent-minded lawyers in private legal practice from taking 
up positions in the bench, as such lawyers are reluctant to give up relatively lucrative private practices for poor 
judicial positions ’.
^ Section 214 of the 1979 Constitution provided that the Supreme Court must consist of not less than 5 justices for 
the purpose of an appeal from the Court of Appeal. If an appeal deals with constitutional issues, the court must be 
constituted by 7 justices. Section 226 of the 1979 Constitution provided that the Court of Appeal must consist of 
not less than 3 justices.
A comprehensive report on the administration of justice in the Magistrates and Customary Courts in Southern 
Nigeria was undertaken by the Civil Liberties Organisation (Onyekpere 1996).
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and venality have conspired to make the magistrate court the acme o f gross abuse o f
60judicial process in Nigeria
Table 4.21. Answers to question 16b ‘Which type of court would you judge as particularly 
competent or incompetent?’ (per cent)
Very competent Competent Incompetent Don’t know No response
Supreme Court 38.3 50.6 3.9 1.9 5.2
Court of Appeal 31.2 59.1 4.5 0.6 4.5
Federal High Court 7.8 70.1 8.4 7.1 6.5
State High Courts 3.9 74.0 10.4 2.6 9.1
Magistrates Courts 3.9 16.9 55.8 17.5 5.8
Customary Courts 5.2 7.1 52.6 29.2 5.8
Several respondents emphasise that there are regional differences between courts 
in different federal states and personal differences between different judicial officers. 
Moreover, the quality of judicial services is not the same as the quality of justice. While a 
court may be competent in terms of substantive and procedural law, it is not necessarily 
independent from public or private bodies. The greatest challenge to the independence of 
the court system comes from the military governments. The military, which has governed 
Nigeria for most of the country’s history since 1966, has ruled by decree and courts have 
been forbidden to question the validity of a decree. The military has, moreover, set up 
tribunals made up predominantly of members of the armed forces to try criminals and 
government critics.®^
Lawyer no. 108, 1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers.
On military rule and its effect on the Nigerian legal system, see Nwabueze (1992).
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The views on the court system vary somewhat according to professional 
background.®  ^ Commercial lawyers are more likely than others to observe differences 
between different types of courts.®* Of the commercial lawyers, 94.7% believe that there 
are major differences between the quality of judicial services in different types of courts, 
while the figure for the other lawyers is 78.6% (see Appendix B, Table B.8.).
Commercial lawyers hold different views on the competence of the Federal High 
Court to the other lawyers.®"* Of those lawyers, 93.5% believe that the Federal High 
Court is either competent or very competent, compared with the figure of 78.3% for the 
other lawyers (see Appendix B, Table B.9.). These differences may be explained by the 
fact that the Federal High Court, which was formerly the Federal Revenue Court, is a 
court specialised in commercial litigation. It could be thus expected that the Federal High 
Court is more competent in commercial cases than other courts.
There are differences between lawyers from Lagos and Port Harcourt on the 
competence of the Federal High Court and the Magistrates Courts. The most significant 
difference concerns the general question on the quality of judicial services in Nigeria.®® 
Of the Port Harcourt lawyers, 70.6% believe that there are major differences between the
Some of these differences cannot be easily explained. Enviionmental lawyers view the Supreme Court and the 
State High Courts as more competent than other lawyers. Criminal lawyers view the Supreme Court and the 
Magistrates Courts as more competent than other lawyers. The size of law fitms also influences views on the 
competence of different types of courts. But the author is unable to adequately explain these diverging views.
^ = 6.94, which clearly exceeds the critical X^ o io = 2.706, at d.f. = 1, p = 0.024.
X^  = 3.40, which clearly exceeds the critical x^ o.io = 2.706, at d.f. = 1, p = 0.065.
Three cross-tabulations between the attribute of location of law firm and questions on the court system produce 
significant chi-square tests: on the general view on differences, on the competence of the Federal High Court and 
the Magistrates Courts. The chi-square test results for them are as follows:
• on views on the general differences between judicial services in different types of courts: = 9.86, which clearly 
exceeds the critical xVio = 2.706, at d.f. = 1, p = 0.007.
• on views on the Federal High Court: x  ^= 4.11, which clearly exceeds the critical %\io = 2.706, at d.f. = 1, p = 
0.043.
• on views on the Magistrates Courts: = 6.33, which clearly exceeds the critical %\\o = 2.706, at d.f. = 1, p =
0 .012.
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quality of judicial services in different types of courts, compared with the figure of 93.8% 
for the Lagos lawyers (see Appendix B, Table B.IO.). These results appear to support the 
eaiiier speculation that there are regional differences between the judicial services of 
different types of courts.
Views on judicial services vary according to the years of professional experience. 
Lawyers with 6 or more years of professional experience are significantly more aware of 
differences between the quality of judicial services in Nigerian courts than lawyers with 
less than 6 years of experience.^ Of the lawyers with less than 6 years of experience, 
75.9% believe that there aie major differences between the quality of judicial services in 
different types of courts, compared with the figure of 94.8% for the other lawyers (see 
Appendix B, Table B .ll .) .  These results would suggest that it may take up to 6 yeai's of 
professional experience for some lawyers to realise that there are major differences.
A number of respondents emphasise that the Federal High Court, albeit generally 
competent in tenns of law, is particularly vulnerable to government pressures.^  ^ One 
lawyer, who regards the court as very competent, writes that the ‘Federal High Court 
often seems to see itself as an appendage o f the federal government and this tends to 
affect its judgments especially where the government is a party Another lawyer 
compares the independence of different types of courts and concludes: ‘From my
^  ')d=  8.03, which clearly exceeds the critical x^ o io = 2.706, at d.f. = 1, p = 0.005.
^  This view has also been expressed by a number of Nigerian scholars. Oyakhirome (1995, 177), for instance, has 
commented; ‘...It may be argued that the existence of Federal High Courts exercising exclusive jurisdiction in 
matters or causes on the exclusive list will enable the federal government to protect itself and enforce its own 
laws through its own judicial agencies’. Oyakhirome (1995, 179) has further averred that, in a military 
dictatorship, the Federal High Court ‘could become a ready tool to suppress advocates of human rights and 
democracy’.
® Lawyer no.63, 1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers.
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professional experience, judges o f the Federal High Court are much more timid as 
compared, for instance, with the judges o f the State High Courts’.
The vulnerability of the Federal High Court to government pressures has wide 
repercussions on oü related litigation. The Constitution (Suspension and Modification) 
Decree No. 107 divested State High Courts of jurisdiction over oil matters in 1993 (see 
section three of the thesis). In Nigeria, there are only roughly a dozen Federal High Court 
divisions, compared with over 540 State High Court divisions. Potential litigants may, 
therefore, find it more difficult to travel to the Federal High Court. It can be thus 
expected that the Act wiU effectively reduce the amount of litigation against oü 
companies. Moreover, as indicated by respondents, the Federal High Court appears to be 
more dependent on the executive ai*m of the government. This is likely to result in more 
favourable court judgments for oil companies who have joint-ventures and common 
interests with the government. A number of respondents stress that judges of the Federal 
High Court are also less likely to sympathise with the plight of village communities 
affected by oil operations because they tend to come from outside the oü producing 
areas. For instance, the sole judge of the Federal High Court in Port Harcourt, the main 
0 Ü city, was appointed from Lagos, while a number of the State High Court judges in 
Rivers State have originally come from some of the oü producing areas.
What the above discussion suggests is that the Federal High Court is likely to be 
biased in favour of oü companies. A ruling by the Federal High Court can, of course, be 
appealed against, in which case the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court wül ultimately
Lawyer no. 16,1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers.
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decide upon the case. But any appeal to a liigher court is likely to be limited to questions 
of law. The witness evidence admitted by the Federal High Court is likely to be taken for 
granted by the appellate court. That means, a less sympathetic judge in the Federal High 
Court may dismiss some of the plaintiffs vital evidence. This would in turn decrease the 
chances of success for the plaintiffs appeal in oü related litigation. In other words, it is 
conceivable that the Federal High Court is more likely to dismiss the plaintiffs evidence 
against an oü company or the government than a State High Court judge. For aU the 
above reasons, the 1993 Act and the cuiient structure of the court system benefit the oü 
companies more than the opposing litigants because they limit the access to courts for 
potential litigants and their prospects of success.^®
Whüe the Federal High Court appears to be less independent from the 
government, other courts may face government pressures, too. One lawyer with 20 years 
of professional experience argued that the Supreme Court, the most competent of aU 
Nigerian courts, has become less independent since its relocation from Lagos to the 
capital in Abuja. Whüe important distinctions remain between different types of courts, 
lawyers stiess that, notwithstanding the type of court, the integrity of a particular judge 
and the subject matter of a lawsuit may often be the most important factors in 
determining the quality of justice.
To sum up, this sub-section has shown that there are wide differences in the 
quality of judicial services between different types of courts. The Supreme Court and the 
Court of Appeal appear to be the most competent Nigerian courts. The Federal High
It has to be remembered, however, that the interpretation of the 1993 Decree has not been entirely unambiguous. 
In Shell V. Isaiah [1997] 6 NWLR, the Court of Appeal pronounced that the 1993 Decree does not affect oil 
spillage matters (see section three of the thesis).
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Court, which became the court of first instance for oil related litigation in 1993, appears 
to be somewhat biased in favour of oil companies.
4.10. Oil companies and court procedure
Previous analysis indicates that the court system tends to be biased in favour of oil 
companies rather than the opposing litigants. This sub-section discusses in greater detail 
how oil companies and courts conduct themselves in oü related litigation. This provides a 
background for analysing legal disputes between oü companies and vülage communities.
The answers of all respondents do not suggest that litigants in oü related cases are 
treated particularly unfaniy by the courts. Of aü respondents, 36.3% state that litigants 
are treated unfairly or vei*y unfaiiiy, compared with 32.4% who state that litigants are 
treated fairly or very fairly (see Table 4.22.).
Table 4.22. Answers to question 9a ‘Are litigants treated fairly In court decisions involving oil
companies?’
Percentage of Respondents Cumulative Percentage
Veiy fairly 1.9 1.9
Fairly 30.5 32.4
Neither fairly nor unfairly 10.4 42.8
Unfairly 24.0 66.8
Very unfairly 12.3 79.1
Don’t know 14.9 94.0
No response 5.8 99.8
Total 99.8 99.8
There are significant differences between the views of different groups of lawyers 
on fair treatment in court proceedings. Lawyers, who previously worked for an oÜ
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company, are more likely to state that litigants are treated fairly/^ Of the oil company 
lawyers, 44.4% state that litigants are treated faiiiy, compared with the figure of 31.9% 
for the other lawyers (see Appendix B, Table B.12.). This may be explained by the 
assumption that the oil company lawyers are less likely to observe unfair treatment of the 
opposing party.
Commercial lawyers aie more likely to observe unfair treatment of litigants in oü 
related lit ig a t io n .O f the commercial lawyers, 46.9% state that litigants are treated 
unfaiiiy or very unfairly, compared with 22.7% for the other lawyers (see Appendix B, 
Table B.13.). These results suggest that unfair treatment of litigants is a realistic 
possibüity in a commercial envhonment.
Environmental lawyers, Üke commercial lawyers, are more likely to note unfair 
treatment of litigants in oil related htigation.^  ^ Of those lawyers, 57.5% note that litigants 
are treated unfaiiiy or very unfaiiiy, compared with 31.2% for the other lawyers (see 
Appendix B, Table B.14.). These results suggest that unfair treatment of litigants is a 
realistic possibüity in environmental cases involving oü companies. Unfortunately, 
respondents do not provide examples of instances in which litigants were treated unfairly. 
What the views of commercial and environmental lawyers may indicate is that, whüe 
unfah* treatment is not the norm in oil related litigation, litigants may be treated unfairly in 
specific cases. In particular*, litigants may be more hkely to be treated unfairly in litigation 
involving environmental damage.
y j = 7.79, which clearly exceeds the critical = 6.251, at d.f. = 3, p = 0.051. 
=3.18, which clearly exceeds the critical x^ o.io = 2.706, at d.f. = 1, p = 0.074. 
= 8.55, which clearly exceeds the critical %\io = 4.605, at d.f. = 2, p = 0.014.
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While there may be instances in which litigants have been treated unfairly in court 
decisions, one may also ask whether litigants have been treated fairly by the 
representatives of the oü companies m court proceedings. Excluding ‘don’t knows’ and 
‘no responses’, a significant mmority of aU respondents - 43.4% - state that oü 
companies, their subsidiaiies or contractors conduct themselves ethicaUy in court 
proceedings often or very often. Nonetheless, a majority of the respondents - 56.6% - 
believe that oü companies conduct themselves etIiicaUy only sometimes, rarely or never 
(see columns 3 and 4, Table 4.23.). Unfortunately, respondents do not provide examples 
of such instances. Our results suggest that, whüe the understanding of professional ethics 
may differ between lawyers, there appear to exist numerous instances, in which oÜ 
companies do not conduct themselves ethically in court proceedings.
Table 4.23. Answers to question 9b Do you think oil companies, their subsidiaries and contractors 
conduct themselves ethically in court proceedings?*
1
Percentage of 
Respondents
2
Cumulative
Percentage
3
Percentage of 
Respondents 
(excl. ‘don’t knows’ 
and ‘no responses’)
4
Cumulative Percentage 
(excl. ‘don’tknows’ 
and ‘no responses’)
Very often 6.5 6.5 9.4 9.4
Often 23.4 29.9 34.0 43.4
Sometimes 32.5 62.4 47.2 90.6
Rarely 5.8 68.2 8.5 99.1
Never 0.6 68.8 0.9 100.0
Don’t know 26.0 94.8 - -
No response 5.2 100.0 - -
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
193
Respondents’ views on ethical conduct in court proceedings vary according to 
professional background and location. Oil company lawyers aie less likely to believe that 
oil companies conduct themselves unethically. '^* Of those lawyers, 52.3% note that oü 
companies conduct themselves ethicaUy in court proceedings often or very often, while 
the figure for the other lawyers is 30.0% (see Appendix B, Table B.15.). These results are 
perhaps not suiprising since, by answering the question on ethical conduct, oü company 
lawyers had to effectively assess their own work and the work of their clients in court 
proceedings. It could be expected that fewer oü company lawyers would accuse 
themselves, their colleagues or their clients of unethical conduct.
Commercial lawyers, like oü company lawyers, are slightly less likely to believe 
that 0 Ü companies conduct themselves unethicaUy.^  ^ Of the commercial lawyers, 47.8% 
state that oil companies conduct themselves ethicaUy in court proceedings often or very 
often, whUe the figure for the other lawyers is 45.8%. Some 47.8% of the commercial 
lawyers note that oU companies conduct themselves ethicaUy m court proceedings 
sometimes, compai'ed with only 33.3% of the other lawyers (see Appendix B, Table 
B.16.). These differences may possibly be explained by the fact that many commercial 
lawyers are also oil company lawyers.
Interestingly, the views on etliical conduct vaiy according to location. Lagos 
lawyers ai*e more Hkely to say that oU companies conduct themselves ethicaUy, if 
corapai'ed with Port Harcourt l a w y e r s . O f  the Lagos lawyers, 46.7% state that oil
X = 6.35, which marginally exceeds the critical % o.io = 6.251, at d.f. = 3, p = 0.096. 
X^  = 6.49, which clearly exceeds the critical x \ io  = 4.605, at d.f. = 2, p = 0.039.
X^  = 13.91, which clearly exceeds the critical X^ o.io = 4.605, at d.f. = 2, p = 0.001.
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companies conduct themselves ethically in court proceedings often or very often, while 
the figure for the Port Harcourt lawyers is only 26.6% (see Appendix B, Table B.17.). 
These results indicate that there aie regional differences in the way that oil companies 
conduct themselves in court proceedings. They may suggest that oü companies conduct 
themselves less ethicaUy in court proceedings in the oü producing areas such as Port 
Hai'court.
Whüe there may be numerous instances, in which oü companies conduct 
themselves unethicaUy in court proceedings, one cannot take for granted that judges are 
necessarily biased in favour of oü companies. Some judges, especiaUy those from the oü 
producing areas may indeed be biased against oü companies. A Port Hai'court lawyer 
states: ‘Some judges especially from an oil producing area dislike oil companies 
because o f  their dirty politics in N igeria’ The view that judges fiom the oü producing 
ai'eas are biased against oü companies was supported by M.B. Belgore, Chief Justice of 
the Federal High Court. Belgore stated in an interview with the author that judges from 
Port Harcourt or Warri are more likely to mle in favour of vÜlage communities. Said 
Belgore: ‘Judges, who are from the area in which they are involved themselves, use their 
discretion more freely to the party than a judge who is a little more detached’. 
Nonetheless, roughly half of the respondents state that courts are biased in favour of oil 
companies, whüe only 16.8% state that courts aie biased in favour of opposing litigants 
(see Table 4.24.). These results suggest that the courts are, overall, biased more in favour 
of 0 Ü companies than the opposing litigant.
Lawyer no.l52, 1998 suiwey of Nigerian lawyers.
Personal interview with M.B. Belgore, Chief Justice of the Federal High Court (Lagos, March 1998).
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Table 4.24. Answers to question 9c Would you say that courts are biased in favour of the oil
company or the opposing litigant?’
Percentage of 
Respondents
Cumulative
Percentage
Percentage of 
Respondents
Cumulative
Percentage
Severe bias in favour 5.2 5.2 Severe bias in favour 3.2 3.2
of oil company of opposing litigant
Some bias in favour 44.8 50.0 Some bias in favour 13.6 16.8
of oil company of opposing litigant
No bias in favour of 18.2 6&2 No bias in favour of 34.4 51.2
oil company opposing litigant
Don’t know 19.5 87.7 Don’t know 18.8 70
No response 12.3 100.0 No response 29.9 99.9
Total 100.0 100.0 Total 99.9 994
There are significant differences between oil company lawyers and others on the 
bias of c o u r t s . O f  the oil company lawyers, 44.7% state that courts are biased in favour 
of opposing litigants, compared with 15.6% for the other lawyers (see Appendix B, Table 
B.18.). Lawyers who acted as counsel in a lawsuit against an oil company are of the 
opposite view to oil company lawyers. Some 17.3% of those lawyers note that the courts 
are biased in favour of the opposing litigants, compared with 63.0% of the other lawyers 
(see Appendix B, Table B.19.). These results aie perhaps not surprising since lawyers are 
less likely to regard courts as biased in favour of their own clients.
While the courts appear to generally favour oil companies, respondents have also 
been asked what specific reasons exist as to why courts may encounter difficulties m 
judging oil related cases faiiiy. Respondents’ replies are somewhat distorted because of 
the uneven numbers of ‘no responses’, which range from 16.2% to 21.4% (see Table
= 6.02, which clearly exceeds the critical %\io = 2.706, at d.f. = 1, p = 0.014.
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4,25.). Excluding ‘no responses’, some 51.6% of the surveyed lawyers note that lack of 
funds is a very important reason why courts might encounter difficulties in judging oil 
related cases faiiiy, while outside pressures are viewed as a very important reason by 
49.6% of the respondents. Some 40.5% consider incompetence of witnesses a veiy 
important reason (see Table 4.26.). The former two reasons - the lack of funds and 
outside pressures - aie general problems of the Nigerian judiciary. Incompetence of 
witnesses is a problem lying outside the scope of the judiciary and may be partly ascribed 
to the lack of general education. One could expect that the incompetence of witnesses is a 
particulaily important problem in environmental litigation, in which expert evidence and 
technical knowledge is particularly relevant, if compared, for instance, with employment 
related cases.
Table 4,25, Answer to question 9d ‘Amongst the following rank reasons why courts might 
encounter difficulties in judging oil related cases fairly’ (per cent)
Very important Important Less important No
reason reason reason response
Outside pressures 41.6 33.1 9.1 16.2
Lack of funds 40.9 18.8 19.5 2&8
Incompetence of witnesses 31.8 24.0 22.7 21.4
Lack of knowledge of oil technology 24.0 3&0 19.5 1T5
Lack of time 11.7 44.2 24.7 19.5
Lack of witnesses 9.7 30.5 39.6 20.1
Resources and skill of oil company’s counsel 7.8 41.6 31.8 18.8
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Table 4.26. Answer to question 9d ‘Amongst the following rank reasons why courts might 
encounter difficulties in judging oil related cases fairly’ (per (%nt) (excluding ‘no responses’)
Very important reason Important reason Less important reason
Lack of funds 51.6 23.8 24.6
Outside pressures 49.6 39.5 10.9
Incompetence of witnesses 40.5 30.6 28.9
Lack of knowledge of oil technology 29.1 47.2 23.6
Lack of time 14.5 54.8 30.6
Lack of witnesses 12.2 38.2 49.6
Resources and skill of oil company’s counsel 9.6 51.2 39.2
The respondents’ views differ significantly with regards to reasons of why courts 
may encounter difficulties in judging oü related cases fairly. Of aU cross-tabulations 
performed, the most significant results occur in respect of the lack of funds, which is seen 
as the key reason why courts might encounter difficulties in oü related litigation. Views 
differ according to experience and age. The more professional experience respondents 
have, the more importance they attach to the courts’ lack of funds.^® Of the lawyers with 
1 to 5 yeai's of professional experience, 31.8% consider the lack of funds a very important 
problem, while 80.0% of the lawyers with 21 or more years of professional experience 
consider it a very important problem (see Appendix B, Table B.20.). Simüarly, the older 
the lawyers are, the more importance they attach to the courts’ lack of funds.^* Of the 
lawyers aged between 25 and 30, 26.1% consider the lack of funds a very important 
problem, whüe 83.3% of the lawyers aged 46 yeais and over view it as a very important 
problem (see Appendix B, Table B.21.). If it is assumed that older and more experienced 
lawyers are in a better position to comment on the legal profession, it has to be assumed
i f  -  9.36, which clearly exceeds the critical X^ o.io = 6.251, at d.f. = 3, p = 0.025.
X^  = 21.28, which clearly exceeds the critical x^ o.io = 7.779, at d.f. = 4, p = 0.0002.
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that the lack of funds is the crucial problem facing courts in judging oil related litigation 
fairly.
Environmental lawyers, like older and more experienced lawyers, regard the lack 
of funds as the most important problem which courts face in judging oil related cases.^  ^
Of the envii’onmental lawyers, 68.6% believe that the lack of funds is a very important 
problem, compared with 36.2% of the other lawyers (see Appendix B, Table B.22.). This 
may suggest that lack of funds is more important in oil related litigation involving 
environmental damage than in other types of oil related litigation.
The lack of funds has been identified as the key problem courts face in judging oil 
related cases. Resources and skill o f oil company’s counsel have been identified by all 
respondents as the least important problem. But there is a wide disparity of views on the 
problem of resources and skill of oil company’s counsel across professional background 
and age. Of the lawyers aged between 25 and 30, 39.1% regard resources and skill of oil 
company’s counsel as an impoitant or a very impoitant problem, compaied with the 
figure of 100.0% for the lawyers aged 46 years and over (see Appendix B, Table 
B.23.).*^ This may suggest that resources and skill of oil company’s counsel may be a 
veiy prominent problem, if one looks closer at the respondents’ replies.
Environmental lawyers, like older lawyers, are more likely to state that resources 
and skiU of oil company’s counsel is an important problem that courts face in judging oü
82 ^ 2  _ g which clearly exceeds the critical x^ oro = 4.605, at d.f. = 2, p = 0.007.
X^= 11-68, which clearly exceeds the critical X^ o.io = 6.251, at d.f. = 3, p = 0.009. The cross-tabulation with the 
attribute of professional experience also produces a significant chi-square value: x  ^-  12.30, which clearly 
exceeds the critical x^ o.io = 6.251, at d.f. = 3, p = 0.006. While the results are somewhat less clear-cut than for the 
attribute of age, broadly speaking, one can say that, the more professional experience respondents have, the more 
importance they attach to the resources and skill of oü company’s counsel.
199
related cases than the other lawyers. Of the environmental lawyers, 76.9% consider 
resources and skill of oil company’s counsel an important or a very important problem, 
compaied with 51.4% of the other lawyers (see Appendix B, Table B.24.).** This may 
suggest that resources and skill of oil company lawyers may play a greater role in oil 
related cases involving environmental damage than in other types of oil related litigation.
The earlier discussion suggests that Nigerian courts are heavily impeded in 
deciding upon oil related cases, particularly in environmental litigation, and may tend to 
be biased in favour of oü companies. That these impediments have an impact on the final 
court judgments is self-evident. One indicator of the quality of final court judgments is 
the level of compensation awarded by courts. Respondents have been asked whether 
compensation paid by oü companies for damages in tort is unfair to either oil companies 
or the opposing litigant Excluding ‘don’t knows’ and ‘no responses’, some 79.1% of the 
suiveyed lawyers believe that the compensation paid by oü companies for damages in tort 
is unfair to the opposing litigant, whüe 8.2% believe the opposite (see columns 3 and 4, 
Table 4.27.). These results unequivocally suggest that court judgments tend to be unfair 
to the opposing litigants. Several lawyers, mainly environmental lawyers, note that the 
compensation regime for oil operations in Nigeria is grossly inadequate. One lawyer from 
Lagos, who previously worked for the oü industry, comments that ‘compensation for oil 
pollution is not adequate. An independent commission might make a difference The 
views of environmental lawyers do not differ from the views of the other lavt^ yers, so one 
cannot clearly say that compensation is more or less unfair to opposing htigants in
% = 6.74, which clearly exceeds the critical x^ o.io = 4.605, at d.f. = 2, p = 0.034. 
Lawyer no.24, 1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers.
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environmental litigation. Nonetheless, it can be reasonably assumed that the respondents’ 
views on compensation paid in tort are mainly based on their experiences with oil related 
cases involving environmental damage because tort law in Nigeria’s oil related cases is 
mainly utilised in respect of environmental litigation such as litigation resulting from oil 
spills. By implication, it has to be assumed that compensation paid by oil companies in 
environmental litigation tends to be unfair to the opposing litigant.
Table 4.27. Answers to question 10 ‘Would you consider the compensation paid by oil companies
for damages in tort as...*
1 2 3 4
Percentage of Cumulative Percentage of Cumulative
Respondents Percentage Respondents Percentage
(excl. ‘don’t (excl. ‘don’t
knows and ‘no knows and ‘no
responses’) responses’)
Unfair to oil companies as much too high 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.5
Unfair to oil companies as somewhat too high 5.8 7.1 6.7 8.2
Fair and justified 11.0 18.1 12.7 20.9
Unfair to opposing litigant as somewhat too low 39.0 57.1 44.8 65.7
Unfair- to opposing litigant as much too low 29.9 87.0 34.3 100.0
Don’t know 7.8 94.8 - -
No response 5.2 100.00 - -
Total 100.00 100.00 100.0 100.0
Respondents’ views on compensation payments do not vary greatly according to 
professional background or other personal characteristics of lawyers, if compaied with 
responses to other questions. The only exception concerns oil company lawyers, whose 
views differ significantly from those of the other lawyers.*  ^ It was expected that oil
= 6.22, which clearly exceeds the critical % o lo = 4.605, at d.f. = 2, p = 0.045.
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company lawyers would be more likely to consider compensation payments as unfair to 
oil companies. The data partially confirms this hypothesis. Of the oü company lawyers, 
13.6% consider compensation payments unfair to oü companies, compared with 1.7% of 
the other lawyers. Nonetheless, a cleai* majority of oü company lawyers - 71.6% - regard 
compensation payments as unfair to the opposing litigants, although this figure is smaUer 
than the figure of 88.4% for the other lawyers (see Appendix B, Table B.25.). These 
results are very revealing as oÜ company lawyers openly agree that compensation 
payments paid by their clients in tort are unfair to the opposing litigants.
To sum up, this sub-section has shown that the functioning of the legal system 
largely favours oü companies, which manifests itself in inadequate compensation 
payments to opposing litigants in oü related litigation. The courts aie generaUy biased in 
favour of oil companies.
4.11. Legal Change and Legislation
It is not enthely clear how the potential bias of the legal system may change over 
time. Our analysis so fai* has said little about changes in the legal system and legislation. 
This is the focus of this sub-section. That the legal system changes is self-evident. But 
legal change is by no means apparent to Nigerian lawyers. A lawyer from Lagos with 35 
years of professional experience boldly pronounces: ‘Our laws, especially criminal, are 
virtually the same since the colonialists left’f^ Such a view appears to be shared by 
many Nigerian lawyers, if judged by some of the respondents’ comments and interviews
^ Lawyer no.74, 1998 survey of Nigerian lawyers.
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with lawyers. From the respondents’ comments and interviews, it emerges, moreover, 
that lawyers tend to associate legal change with changes in statute law rather than with 
the evolution of judicial precedents. For instance, lawyers who believe that there has been 
change in enviionmental law, appear to base then* views mainly on the pronouncement of 
the Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA) Act. With this background in 
mind, the respondents’ views on legal change appear to reflect changes in legislation.
The respondents’ replies are somewhat distorted because of uneven numbers of 
‘don’t knows’ and ‘no responses’, which range from 12.3% to 83.1% (see Table 4.28.). 
Excluding ‘no responses’, a majority of 63.2% note that there has been no change in 
criminal law since tiiey were called to the Bar. A majority of respondents state that civil 
law, environmental law and commercial law have undergone some change, albeit not 
major change. Only 6.3% state that there has been major change in civil law, while 19.3% 
and 23.7% note that there has been major change in commercial law and environmental 
law respectively. Some 66.1% believe that there has been some change in civil law, whüe 
64.4% and 57.3% believe that there has been some change in commercial law and 
environmental law respectively (see Table 4.29.). As indicated earlier, changes in 
enviionmental law are usuaUy ascribed to the FEPA Act. Changes in commercial law are 
usuaUy ascribed to legislative changes in laws relating to foreign investment, banking 
laws, company law and petroleum law. Commercial lawyers emphasise, above aU, 
legislative de-regulation and removal of restrictions on foreign ownership of Nigerian 
enterprises as the major source of legal change.
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Table 4.28. Answers to question 12 ‘Which areas of law have undergone changes since you were
called to the Bar?’
Major change Some change No change Don’t Know No response
Criminal law 7.1 22.7 51.3 1.3 17.5
Civil law 5.2 54.5 22.7 1.3 16.2
Environmental law 20.1 48.7 16.2 5.2 9.7
Commercial law 16.9 56.5 14.3 1.9 10.4
Other 2.6 7.8 6.5 4.5 78.6
Table 4.29. Answers to question 12 ‘Which areas of law have undergone changes since you
called to the Bar?’ (excluding ‘don’t knows’ and ‘no responses’)
Major change Some change No change
Criminal law 8.8 28.0 63.2
Civil law 6.3 66.1 27.6
Environmental law 23.7 57.3 19.1
Commercial law 19.3 64.4 16.3
It was expected that the responses on legal change would vary greatly according 
to age and professional experience. This hypothesis can be unequivocally rejected. Out of 
10 cross-tabulations between the attributes of legal change on the one hand and age and 
experience on the other, no chi-square tests render significant results.
The respondents’ views on legal change vary considerably according to 
professional background and location. The most significant deviations can be seen 
regarding environmental law. It was expected that environmental lawyers would be more 
likely to notice legal change in environmental law, a hypothesis which cannot be 
confinned by the data. Somewhat surprismgly, only 16.3% of the enviionmental lawyers 
believe that environmental law has undergone major changes, compared with the figure of 
33.8% for the other lawyers.^  ^ Some 67.4% believe that there has been some change.
f f  = 6.14, which clearly exceeds the critical %\io = 4.605, at d.f. = 2, p = 0.046.
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which is more than the figure of 44.1% for the other lawyers (see Appendix B, Table 
B.26.). These results, overall, fail to confirm our hypothesis on the views of 
environmental lawyers. What appears from the respondents’ views is that there have not 
been any major changes in the area of environmental law.
Lagos lawyers are more Hkely than Port Harcourt lawyers to beheve that 
environmental law has undergone change.®  ^ Only 15.4% of Lagos lawyers believe that 
environmental law has undergone no change, whüe the figuie for Port Hai'couit lawyers 
is 50.0% (see Appendix B, Table B.27.). What these results indicate is that the 
consequences of changes to environmental law aie viewed differently by different groups 
of lawyers but it is difficult to make more sense out of the data.
Interestingly, oü company lawyers are more Hkely to observe major changes in 
environmental law as opposed to the other lawyers.^® Œ  those lawyers, 31.1% believe 
that there have been major changes in envûonmental law, compared with the figure of 
14.0% for the other lawyers (see Appendix B, Table B.28.). These results could suggest 
that changes in Nigeria’s environmental law have affected oü companies more than other 
types of organisations or individuals. But this hypothesis is put into question by the views 
of those lawyers who acted as counsel in a lawsuit against an oÜ company with regards to 
changes m envkonmental law, *^ Of those lawyers, 17.1% beheve that there have been 
major changes m environmental law, compared with the figure of 34.7% for tlie other 
lawyers (see Appendix B, Table B.29.). In other words, the trends in the views of oil
^ j f  = 10.14, which clearly exceeds the critical %\io = 4.605, at d.f. = 2, p = 0.006. 
= 5.30, which clearly exceeds the critical X^ o.io = 4.605, at d.f. = 2, p = 0.071. 
= 6.18, which clearly exceeds the critical %\io = 4.605, at d.f. = 2, p = 0.045.
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company lawyers and lawyers who acted in lawsuits against oil companies mn counter to 
each other. One group is more likely to believe that there have been major changes, while 
the other believes the opposite. What these results suggest is that views on the degree of 
change in environmental law can be highly subjective depending on a lawyer’s personal 
and professional background.^^
The above discussion suggests that paits of civil law, environmental law and 
commercial law have undergone some change. That changes in legislation are not always 
implemented in Nigeria is self-evident. Respondents were asked whether five pieces of 
legislation affecting oil companies have, in practice, been effectively enforced or not. As 
with the expression ‘legal change’, the meaning of effective enforcement may differ 
considerably between lawyers. A useful test case is the Gas Re-injection Act 1979. The 
Act has not been effectively enforced in Nigeria in the sense that a number of its main 
provisions prohibiting gas flaiing have not been obseived (see section thi*ee of the thesis). 
Nonetheless, 23.4% of the respondents consider the Act partially enforced (see Table 
4.30.). This may suggest that a considerable minority of respondents regard a piece of 
legislation as ‘partially enforced’, even if its main provisions are not enforced. In other 
words, some responses, which suggest that a piece of legislation has been ‘partially 
enforced’, may not necessarily indicate that any of the main provisions of a piece of 
legislation have been enforced.
In tenns of views on change in commercial law, the results are more clear-cut and unsurprising, if compared with 
respondents’ views on changes in environmental law. Commercial lawyers and oil company lawyers are 
predictably more likely to beheve that commercial law has undergone major changes than other lawyers. 24.7% of 
the commercial lawyers believe that there have been major changes in commercial law, compared with the figure 
of 4.8% for the other lawyers = 7.69, which clearly exceeds the critical %\io = 2.706, at d.f. = 1, p = 0.006). 
26.6% of the oil company lawyers believe that there have been major changes in commercial law, compared with 
the figure of 8.9% for the other lawyers = 7.25, which clearly exceeds the critical % \io = 4.605, at d.f. = 2, p = 
0.027).
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The respondents’ replies aie somewhat distorted because of uneven numbers of 
‘don’t knows’ and ‘no responses’, which range from 6.5% to 33.1% (see Table 4.30.). 
The Land Use Act emerges as the best enforced legislation out of the five pieces of 
legislation. Excluding ‘no responses’, some 34.0% of the surveyed lawyers beheve that 
the Land Use Act has been effectively enforced, while 50.0% beheve that the Land Use 
Act has been paitiahy enforced. Some 18.8% state that the Petroleum Act has been 
effectively enforced, while 41.0% state that the Act has been partiaUy enforced. Only an 
insignificant minority of respondents beheve that the other pieces of legislation - the 
FEPA Act (1.5%), the OMPADEC Act (3.3%) and the Gas Re-injection Act (2.9%) - 
have been effectively enforced (see Table 4.31.). What emerges from these results is that 
statute law which is hkely to benefit oh companies as opposed to the viUage communities 
in the oil producing areas - the Land Use Act and the Petroleum Act - is more effectively 
enforced than statute law which is likely to benefit communities - the FEPA Act, the 
OMPADEC Decree and the Gas Re-injection Act. But it is difficult to determine to what 
extent legislation has been implemented because of the ambiguity of the term ‘partially 
enforced’.
Table 4.30. Answers to question 13 ‘Do you think that the following piece of legislation has been
effectively enforced?’
Effectively enforced Partially enforced Not enforced Don’t Know No response
Petroleum Act 1969 14.3 31.2 30.5 13.6 10.4
FEPA Act 1988 1.3 48.1 35.7 5.8 9.1
OMPADEC Act 1992 2.6 44.8 32.5 8.4 11.7
Land Use Act 1978 31.8 46.8 14.9 1.3 5.2
Gas Re-injection Act 1979 1.9 23.4 41.6 19.5 13.6
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Table 4,31. Answers to question 13 ‘Do you think that the following piece of legislation has been 
effectively enforced?* (excluding ‘don’t knows* and ‘no responses*)
Effectively enforced Partially enforced Not enforced 
Petroleum Act 1969 18.8 41.0 40.2
FEPA Act 1988 1.5 56.5 42.0
OMPADEC Decree 1992 3.3 56.1 40.7
Land Use Act 1978 34.0 50.0 16.0
Gas Re-injection Act 1979 2.9 35.0 62.1
tfwwvvvvvvwvvvvvvW>rinfVvvrnfWVvv<>vv¥VVWvv>roorinfvvvVvvwV¥VVTtvvvvvvwiririnnr¥vviriri><vvvvY^^
It was expected that the responses would differ according to age and professional 
experience since older and more experienced lawyers could take more of a long-term 
view on legal change and enforcement than younger lawyers. Indeed, the views of older 
and more experienced lawyers tend to differ significantly from younger and less 
experienced lawyers. The most significant results of cross-tabulations can be detected in 
respect of the enforcement of the FEPA Act. The older the lawyers, the more likely tliey 
are to believe that the FEPA Act has not been enforced.^  ^ Of the lawyers aged 46 years 
and over, 75.0% state that the FEPA Act has not been enforced, while only 30.4% of the 
lawyers aged between 25 and 30 years old note that the FEPA Act has not been enforced 
(see Appendix B, Table B.30.). As with age, the more experienced the lawyers, the more 
likely they aie to believe that the FEPA Act has not been enforced. "^  ^ Of the lawyers with 
1 to 5 years of professional experience, 47.6% believe that the FEPA Act has not been 
enforced, compared with the figure of 61.5% for the lawyers with 21 and more years of 
professional experience (see Appendix B, Table B.31.). While the bend is not entirely 
consistent, one can convincingly argue that older and more experienced lawyers are more
= 29.50, which clearly exceeds the critical X^ o.io = 7.779, at d.f. = 4, p = 0.000006.
** i f  -  14.37, which clearly exceeds the critical xVio = 7.779, at d.f. = 4, p = 0.006.
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likely to state that legislation has not been enforced in Nigeria. If it is assumed that older 
and more experienced lawyers are in a better position to comment on the enforcement of 
legislation, it can be argued with more conviction that Nigerian legislation is generally 
unenforced in practice.
An interpretation of the responses on the enforcement of legislation is made 
complicated by the fact that a particular piece of legislation may contain some provisions 
which are enforced and some winch are not. The Petroleum Act, for instance, comprises 
commercial provisions as well as environmental provisions for oil operations. It was 
hoped that an analysis of the views of environmental lawyers and commercial lawyers 
would provide some indication as to which specific provisions have been enforced and 
which have not.
The responses of environmental lawyers are most interesting because their views 
differ from those of the other lawyers on almost all questions regarding enforcement, 
except for the question on the enforcement of the Gas Re-injection Act.^  ^ The views of 
environmental lawyers are particularly interesting on the enforcement of the Petroleum 
Act and the FEPA Act, both of which include explicit legal provisions for environmental 
protection. Of the environmental lawyers, 47.4% and 47.6% state that the Petr oleum Act 
and the FEPA Act have not been enforced respectively, compared with flguies of 26.2% 
and 27.5% for the other lawyers respectively (see Appendix B, Table B.32.). The views
In cross-tabulations, in which the responses of environmental lawyers vary from the rest, the p value varies from p 
= 0.052 to p = 0.005, that means, all results are highly significant at a  = 0.10. The chi-square and p values for 
cross-tabulations between the attribute of environmental lawyer and attributes of obstacles of access to courts are 
as follows:
• for views on the Petroleum Act: = 6.44, which exceeds the critical %\io = 4.605 at d.f. = 2, p = 0.040;
• for views on the FEPA Act: = 3.78, which exceeds the critical X^ o.io = 2.706 at d.f. = 1, p = 0.052;
•  for views on the OMPADEC Decree: yf = 4.92, which exceeds the critical x^ o.io = 2.706 at d.f. = 1, p = 0.027;
• for views on the Land Use Act: i  = 10.45, which exceeds the critical X^ o.io = 4.605 at d.f. = 2, p = 0.005.
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of environmental lawyers may suggest that Nigerian statutory provisions on the 
environment are less likely to be enforced than other types of legislative provisions.
The views of commercial lawyers differ from those of the other lawyers only on 
the enforcement of the FEPA Act.^  ^ Interestingly, commercial lawyers are more likely 
than the other lawyers to state that the FEPA Act has not been enforced at all. Of the 
commercial lawyers, 39.6% state that the FEPA Act has not been enforced, compared 
with the figure of 15.0% for the other lawyers (see Appendix B, Table B.33.). It is 
difficult to speculate on the meaning of these results but the respondents’ views may 
suggest that the FEPA Act had relatively little impact on the business operations of their 
clients.
With regards to the enforcement of land legislation, oil company lawyers are more 
likely to believe that the Land Use Act has been effectively enforced than the other 
lawyers.^  ^ Of the oü company lawyers, 36.6% note tliat the Land Use Act has been 
effectively enforced, compared with the figure of 30.6% for the other lawyers. Only 9.8% 
of the 0 Ü company lawyers state that the Land Use Act has not been enforced, compared 
with the figure of 24.2% for the other lawyers (see Appendix B, Table B.34.). Lawyers 
who acted in a lawsuit against an oü company are less likely to believe that the Land Use 
Act has been effectively enforced than the other lawyers.^  ^ Of the lawyers who acted in a 
lawsuit against an oil company, 26.9% state that the Land Use Act has been effectively 
enforced, compared with the figure of 47.1% for the other lawyers. Of those lawyers,
^ i f  = 3.33, which exceeds the critical X^ o.io = 2.706 at d.f. = 1, p = 0.068.
i f  = 5.48, which exceeds the critical X^ o.io = 4.605 at d.f. = 2, p = 0.064. 
^ i f  = 6.05, which exceeds the critical % \\o = 4.605 at d.f. = 2, p = 0.049.
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18.3% note that the Land Use Act has not been enforced, compared with the figure of 
11.8% for the other lawyers (see Appendix B, Table B.35,). A simple explanation-for 
these results may be that the Land Use Act had a different impact on oU companies, on 
the one hand, and on the opposing litigants from the village communities, on the other. 
On the one hand, the Land Use Act made it easier for oil companies to compulsorily 
obtain land in village communities for oil operations (see section three of the thesis). This 
may explain why oü company lawyers are more likely to believe that the Land Use Act 
has been effectively enforced. On the other hand, the Land Use Act has not, overall, 
changed the communal and famüy ownership structures and the traditional way in which 
land is being aUocated in the oü producing areas (see section three of the thesis). This 
may explain why lawyers who acted in a lawsuit against an oü company are less likely to 
believe that the Land Use Act has been effectively enforced.
To sum up, this sub-section has shown that there has been relatively little change 
in Nigerian statute law. There are severe problems of enforcement of legislation in 
Nigeria. Various questions remain largely unanswered on the question of enforcement 
and legal change, particularly on the nature of legal change in case law.
Conclusion
4.12. Conclusion
This core section of the thesis discussed impediments to the functioning of the 
legal process and the judiciary with a focus on the problems of access to courts. We
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intended to describe the constraints and opportunities that are faced by a litigant in an oü 
related case. This topic was approached through a survey of Nigerian legal practitioners. 
The survey represented a significant pool of expert knowledge on oü industry activities 
and oil related litigation. As such it served as a window to an understanding of legal 
conflicts between oÜ companies and vülage communities in Nigeria, the main focus of the 
thesis.
Our analysis was motivated by the perception of a gap in the literature on African 
legal systems. This gap arises not so much in terms of an analysis of the substantive 
elements of African law, but rather in terms of the day-to-day operations of the legal 
system. This problem is particularly significant in the context of legal disputes between 
multinational companies and the local populace in developing countries. Legal studies on 
Africa have hitherto largely ignored the socio-legal context of law such as the problems 
of access to courts for potential litigants or the actual enforcement of legislation on the 
ground. They have largely confined their analyses to tlie formal legal process and/or the 
analysis of sources of law. In its modest way, this survey has sought to shed light on the 
legal processes associated with the interaction between vülage communities and oü 
multinationals. We believe that the survey has helped in the understanding of some of the 
key obstacles vülage communities encounter when seeking legal recourse for oil related 
damage.
Previous scholars who have undertaken socio-legal studies on Africa have largely 
confined thek analyses to qualitative, often speculative, evidence. Degni-Segui, who 
served as the starting point of our analysis of the barriers to justice, based his study
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mainly on secondary sources. At the outset of his study, he stated that there are five main 
barriers to justice: geographical distance to courts, delay in the disposal of cases, lack of 
funds, African political systems and ignorance of legal rights. Unfortunately, he has failed 
to provide evidence of why we should regai’d those specific factors as more important 
than other potential causes. Ultimately, his assessment of the hierarchy of the problems of 
access to courts hence appears speculative. We have attempted to quantify the hierarchy 
of access problems as perceived by Nigerian legal practitioners. In this context, we were 
able to show that the geographical distance to courts, which features among the key 
problems of access to courts cited by Degni-Segui, is not a particularly severe barrier to 
justice. We believe that oui* quantitative analysis offers many advantages if compared with 
the existing qualitative studies.
As previously stated, the main theme of this section of the thesis was access to 
courts for potential litigants. The results indicated that access to courts is a major 
obstacle in the functioning of Nigeria’s legal system. The two main problems of access to 
courts were identified as the potential plaintiffs’ lack of financial resources and their 
ignorance of general education and legal rights. The lack of funds was considered a very 
important obstacle by 75.3% of the lawyers and an important obstacle by 13.6%. The 
lack of general education and ignorance of legal rights were regarded as very important 
problems by 57.1% and 51.3% respectively, and were regaided as important problems by 
24.7% and 37.7% respectively. The other main obstacles named by the respondents 
included delay in the disposal of cases, intimidation by public bodies, intimidation by tort­
feasors and uncertainty about the potential success of a suit. The significance of the lack
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of funds as the key barrier to justice could be expected since the scope of Nigeria’s legal 
aid scheme is largely limited to criminal cases. This prevents potential low income 
plaintiffs from instituting lawsuits in most civil cases. Access to contingency fees 
meanwhile may be limited due to the significant cost of expert witnesses and the financial 
risk faced by legal practitioners.
An analysis of the constiaints in the functioning of the judiciary and the court 
system formed the second main theme in the discussion of the suiwey results. The data 
indicated that the Nigerian judiciary and the court system face severe problems in their 
day-to-day operations. Of all respondents, 89.6% stated that the judiciaiy is too 
dependent on the executive arm of the government, 74.7% declared that the appointment 
of judges is too aibitrary and 89.6% stated that the funding of the legal system is too 
little. Some 90.2% considered congestion in the courts too high. The respondents were of 
the view that the Nigerian judiciary is frequently under serious extra-judicial pressures 
from public and private bodies. Of aU respondents, 50.0% noted that judges, lawyers and 
other judicial officers encounter pressures from public or private institutions very often or 
often. A further 44.8% noted that pressures exist sometimes. Extia-judicial pressures 
from the government can result in the non-enforcement of court orders in those cases, in 
which the government has an interest. Of all respondents, 55.2% stated that there are 
severe or vei*y severe problems in the enforcement of court orders in Nigeria. A further 
40.9% declared that there aie some difficulties, A number of the problems noted in the 
context of the functioning of the judiciary, notably high congestion in the courts, further 
compound the obstacles of access to courts faced by potential litigants in Nigeria.
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A discussion of the problems of access to courts and the functioning of the court 
system, which foimed the initial part of the survey analysis, was followed by secondary 
survey results, which fell into three themes. First, we discussed the distinctions in the 
competency of judicial services in different couits in Nigeria. The data suggested that 
there are marked differences with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeal being 
rated as the most competent Nigerian courts. Of aU respondents, 85.7% believed that 
there are major differences in the quality of judicial services in different Nigerian courts. 
Of aU surveyed lawyers, 38.3% and 50.6% considered the Supreme Court veiy 
competent and competent respectively. The other Nigerian courts were considered less 
competent.
Second, we explored in greater detail the lawyers’ perceptions of the conduct of 
oil companies and courts in oil related litigation. The data indicated that lawyers do not 
perceive unfair treatment of litigants in oil related cases by the courts as the norm, albeit 
litigants may be tieated unfairly in specific cases. But there appear to exist numerous 
instances, in which oh companies do not conduct themselves ethically in court 
proceedings, and courts are regarded as biased in favour of oil companies. Roughly 
50.0% of the respondents noted that courts are biased in favour of oil companies, while 
only 16.8% declared that courts are biased in favour of opposing litigants.
Third, legal change and legislation were discussed. It emerged that most lawyers 
perceive the legal changes that occurred in Nigeria as minor. There were strong 
indications that statute law which is likely to benefit oil companies as opposed to the 
village communities in the oil producing areas such as the Land Use Act is more
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effectively enforced than legislation which is likely to benefit communities such as the 
FEPA Act.
On the whole, the data suggests that the inadequacies in the actual-practical 
operations of the legal system are not peculiar to oil related court cases or cases involving 
the interests of the government and the ruling elite. The survey results have indicated that 
the Nigerian legal system has many deficiencies in terms of its day-to-day operations. 
There are severe problems of access to courts for potential litigants hi any type of 
litigation, including lack of funds and the ignorance of potential litigants. The functioning 
of the judiciary is also heavily constrained by the lack of funds and extra-judicial 
pressures. Given the inadequacy of the legal system, any litigant, including litigants 
against the oÜ companies, may find it difficult to pursue a court case in a Nigerian court. 
It could be argued that Nigeria as a developing country stUl faces the problem of 
establishing efficient buieaucratic state structures (see sections two and three of the 
thesis). One could then also argue that the legal system suffers problems of bureaucratic 
inefficiency. Nonetheless, our survey has indicated that the specific difficulties of village 
communities, who sue oü companies, are of a different scale than the difficulties faced by 
other potential plaintiffs.
Chi-squaie tests of independence have revealed marked differences in the lawyers’ 
views on the legal system across various sub-groups of respondents.^^ An analysis of the
Of all cross-tabulations between the personal characteristics of respondents and questions on the legal system, 
professional background plays the crucial role in shaping lawyers’ views. The views of environmental lawyers and 
commercial lawyers deviate most from those of the other lawyers. These results suggest that environmental and 
commercial lawyers may often encounter different sets of problems in dealing with the legal system than the other 
lawyers. As previously stated, the views of the oil company lawyers helped to denote specific differences between 
oil related litigation and other types of litigation. The views of the environmental lawyers helped to indicate 
differences between general oil related litigation (which could include e.g. employment cases) and litigation 
involving compensation claims for environmental damage. Somewhat surprisingly, the size of a law firm is also 
an important determinant of lawyers’ views, although in most cases it could not be discerned in what way the size
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differences between oil related litigation and other types of litigation suggested that, in 
the view of the respondent lawyers, litigants are less likely to succeed in oil related cases 
than in other types of litigation. A significant part of the data indicated that the problems 
of access to courts are greater in oil related litigation. Of aH respondents (excluding ‘no 
responses’ and ‘don’t knows’), 48.9% stated that the problems of access to courts are 
more severe in oil related litigation than in other types of litigation. Of the lawyers with 
previous oil industry contacts, 73.3% pronounced that they have met potential litigants 
who have been discouraged from pursuing a valid legal claim in court at least sometimes 
if not often, compared with the figure of 35.7% for the other lawyers. As in other types 
of litigation, the lack of funds and ignorance were rated as the main problems of access to 
courts in oil related cases. Judging by the views of environmental lawyers, it could be 
assumed that the lack of general education and intimidation by the government as well as 
oil companies are more important barriers to justice for village communities suing oil 
companies than they are for other potential litigants.
The deficiencies in the day-to-day operations of the judiciary and the legal process 
also appear to be greater in oil related litigation. Survey analysis indicated that the 
judiciary and the legal process are more biased in favour of oü companies rather than the 
opposing litigants and that judges encounter greater outside pressures in oü related 
litigation. This bias manifests itself, for instance, in the award of compensation payments 
by Nigerian courts. A majority of legal practitioners regarded compensation payments in
of law firms determines lawyers’ views. Somewhat surprisingly, contact with the oil industry does not appear to 
greatly influence the views of lawyers (see Appendix B, Table B.36.). It must be concluded that mere contact with 
oil companies does not change a lawyer’s views on the legal system, whereas work for an oil company or 
specialisation in environmental law is far more likely to alter a lawyer’s views.
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oil related cases as more biased in favour of oil companies. Of all respondents (excluding 
‘don’t knows’ and ‘no responses’), 79.1% stated tliat the compensation paid by-oil 
companies for damages in tort is unfair to the opposing litigant
These findings support the initial hypothesis that the Nigerian legal system as a 
whole, not merely statute law and the structural character of the legal system, favours the 
interests of oil companies. While it is obvious that the Nigerian legal process is 
predisposed in favour of oil companies, it is less obvious which types of oil related 
litigation are more affected. Nonetheless, the responses of environmental lawyers appear 
to suggest that the impediments to the exercise of justice are particularly severe in oü 
related cases involving compensation claims for environmental damage. The greater part 
of environmental litigation in the oü industry involves compensation claims filed by 
members of viUage communities. By implication, it has to be assumed that the legal 
process is particularly predisposed in favom* of oÜ interests in litigation between oü 
companies and viUage communities.
The analysis in this section of the thesis has identified the constraints and 
opportunities faced by litigants in oü related litigation. This sets the stage for the 
discussion of the dynamics of oü related litigation m the consecutive sections of the 
thesis.
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Section 5: Environmental and Social Impact 
of Oil Operations on Village Communities
5.1. Introduction
Oil operations on the ground in Nigeria cause a number of externalities which 
affect the well-being and property of village communities. These externalities are a source 
of conflicts between oil companies and village communities. This section of the thesis 
analyses the nature of these externalities. We focus our analysis on the impact of oil 
exploration and production on village communities including the resulting environmental 
damage. The issues discussed include seismic surveys, construction of roads and oü spüls. 
Furthermore, we discuss land conflicts which arise from land acquisition for oü 
operations. We illustrate the impact of oü operations by using exemplary court judgments 
from Nigerian courts. These court judgments provide examples of specific instances, in 
which viUage communities were adversely affected by oil operations.
The goal of this section of the thesis is not to address comprehensively the 
correlates of the conflicts between viUage communities and oU companies such as 
economic inequaUty or the lack of poUtical opportunities but rather to use the factual 
evidence from court cases to illustrate how the adverse effects of oU operations can be a 
source of confUcts between oU companies and village communities. The data presented in 
this section of the thesis suggests that oil operations are frequently carried out in a 
careless manner, which causes substantial adverse effects in vUlage communities. These 
adverse effects may have caused conflicts between companies and communities or
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amplified existing conflicts. Some of these conflicts are likely to result in litigation against 
0 Ü companies, others may result in informal negotiations and others may result in violent 
protest.
As previously stated, our analysis centres around the discussion of exemplary 
court judgments from Nigerian courts. Rather than using court cases as legal material, we 
use them as factual evidence of the impact of oil operations on village communities. Since 
Nigerian courts produce a substantial quantity of written records on those conflicts, court 
cases provide a significant number of references to particular events and disputes. If 
compared with an analysis of court judgments, one of the alternative methodologies 
would be to conduct a sociological field study. But data gained from field studies can be 
very subjective as the number of objects of study may be highly limited, unless a 
standardised sur*vey is used, a strategy which is difficult in a village setting m Nigeria.^ 
Data gained from court judgments is perhaps less subjective because judges are obliged 
to weigh the evidence of one party against that of the other party.
‘ A recent study by Omoweh (1998) exemplifies some of the methodological pitfalls involved in conducting field 
studies. Being influenced by the subjective perceptions of villagers, Omoweh concluded that oil companies, 
particularly Shell, have caused a land scarcity crisis in Nigeria’s oil producing areas. This view is mistaken as 
studies with a scientific approach have shown that there are more significant causes of the land crisis, particularly 
erosion and population growth (Ashton-Jones 1998, World Bank 1995 and 1990). A study by Onyige (1979) 
exemplified the same methodological problem. Being influenced by the subjective perceptions of villagers, 
Onyige (1979, 166 and 172-173) concluded that reduced crop yields of farmers and fishing losses were due to oil 
operations. Like Omoweh, he likewise failed to investigate other possible causes of these problems.
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Table 5.1. Human activities in the Niger Delta
Ecozone Approximate Area (in sq km) Mfflor Human Activities
Lowland Equatorial Monsoon 7,400 * Oil operations and infrastructure
• Arable agriculture
• Oil palm and rubber exploitation
» Urban and industrial activities
Freshwater 11,700 » Oil operations and infrastructure
# Traditional forest exploitation
# Modem forestry
• Raffia and oil palm exploitation
Rice and arable agriculture
» Fishing
Brackish Water 5,400 # Oil operations and infrastmcture
Traditional mangrove exploitation
# Port and associated activities
Sand Barrier Islands 1,140 • Oil operations and infrastructure
• Fishing
Raffia and oil palm exploitation
Source: adapted from Ashton-Jones (1998, 116).
The key problem in using court cases as a source of factual evidence is that courts 
rely on the interpretations presented by legal counsel and witnesses in court. In this 
context, one of the main obstacles faced by courts is to establish the processes which 
have resulted in oil related environmental damage. Environmental damage in the oil 
producing aieas originates from multiple activities. The oil industry is only one of a 
number of human activities in oil producing areas. In the Niger Delta, an area of 
approximately 25,640 sq km of wetlands where the bulk of oil operations take place, 
other major human activities include faiming, fishing and forestry. All these activities may 
cause adverse environmental and social effects on village communities in the oil 
producing areas (see Table 5.1.).^ As the World Bank (1995, 102) has shown, the Niger
 ^ Since the physical environment of the Niger Delta is dominated by the presence of water, it is instinctive to
indicate the sources of water pollution. Apart from oil pollution, water can also be polluted as a result of domestic 
sewage and other organic waste, infectious disease bacteria, fertiliser residues, pesticides and insecticides, 
industrial effluents, eroded sediments and other solid waste. Since there are no effective local pollution controls, 
sewage and other organic waste are probably the greatest sources of water pollution. The most significant 
consequence of water pollution is the lack of decent drinking water in many areas, which results in illness and 
death from water-borne diseases such as diarrhoea, cholera and typhoid. Fishing, the main economic activity for 
many people in the Niger Delta, has been affected by environmental damage and over-fishing, with many
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Delta faces many significant environmental problems including coastal and liverbank 
erosion, agricultural land degradation, forest degradation and biodiversity loss. A number 
of these enviionmental problems also have social consequences, for instance, agricultural 
land degradation leads to lower crop yields and, as a result, renders farming more 
difficult. At least some of these social and environmental problems would be likely to 
prevail without tlie existence of the oil industry. Considering the multiple causes of 
environmental and social damage, it may be difficult to establish scientifically whether a 
specific adverse activity was caused by oil operations or not. For example, soil 
degradation may result from overfarming or from oil operations. By implication, a judge 
may find it difficult to decide on technical points arising out of oil related litigation. While 
establishing causality may be an important problem, a judge is, nonetheless, obliged to 
admit the most credible factual evidence. On the balance of probabilities, factual 
information derived from litigation can hence yield potentially high returns. The key 
advantage in using evidence from court judgments is the reliability of Nigerian typed 
transcripts as a source of factual information.^
fishennen suffering from declining catches (Ashton-Jones 1998, chapter 11). The above brief discussion indicates 
that oil operations are part of larger problems in oil producing areas.
 ^ In the 1998 survey of legal practitioners, respondents were asked whether typed transcripts of court judgements in 
Nigeria are usually written competently. Excluding ‘no responses’, a majority of the surveyed lawyers - 52.9% - 
noted that typed transcripts of court judgements are usually written competently, while 29.4% disagreed and 
17.6% neither agreed nor disagreed (see columns 3 and 4, Table on the bottom of the next page). Since a 
significant minority of lawyers has doubts about the reliability of typed tianscripts, one needs to exercise some 
caution when interpreting typed court judgements. Nonetheless, our resnlts would suggest that typed transcripts of 
court judgements can generally be utilised as reliable primary evidence of court proceedings. In Nigerian court 
procedure, while the judge does not type the transcripts himself, he must (at least in theory) proof-read each typed 
transcript to ensure that the transcript contains no mistakes before apphending his signature. This ensures an 
adequate standard of the transcripts. On the whole, typed transcripts aie likely to provide a more reliable source 
of information than alternative methodologies.
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5.2. Mechanics of Oil Operations in Viiiage Communities
Before we analyse evidence from court cases, it is instmctive to explain the 
mechanics of oil operations in village communities. This seiwes as a background to the 
subsequent analysis of court cases.
OÜ companies affect village communities through their exploration and 
production activities. In contrast, marketing and refining takes place in urban areas, so it 
can be entirely disregarded here. Exploration operations in rural areas include seismic 
studies and drilling. Production operations include transportation of oil through pipelines 
and gas flaring. In addition, construction of pipelines and oil installations takes place.
On the most basic level, exploration for oil aims at locating sites with geological 
structures in which oü might be trapped. Exploration is mainly carried out by three
Table: Answer to survey question 15 ‘Do you agree/disagree vyith the following statement? „Typed 
transcripts of court judgements are usually written competently” *
1
Percentage of 
respondents
2
Cumulative
percentage
3
Percentage of 
respondents 
(excl. ‘no responses)
4
Cumulative 
percentage 
(excl. ‘no 
responses)
Strongly disagree 20.8 20.8 23.5 23.5
Disagree 5.2 26.0 5.9 29.4
Neither 15.6 41.6 17.6 47.0
agree/disagree
Agree 18.8 60.4 21.3 683
Strongly agree 27.9 88.3 31.6 99.9
No response 11.7 100.0 - -
Total 100.0 100.0 99.9 994
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methods: analysis of existing geological and other infonnation, seismic surveys and 
exploration drilling. The first step for the survey team is to study geological as well as 
geochemical information and to prépaie detailed maps, sometimes accompanied by aerial 
photographic suiweys. Geologists study rock outcrops and analyse rock specimens and 
fossils in order to obtain clues about their origins and ages (Hyne 1995, 221-232). These 
activities involve little or no contact with village communities.
Seismic surveys are intended to gather geophysical infonnation for the oil 
companies. In a seismic sui*vey, sound waves aie sent into the earth’s crust where they 
aie reflected by the different rock layers. The sound energy from a source on the surface 
bounces off the different rock layers and retmns to the surface where it is recorded by a 
detector. Surveys aie caiTied out by seismic crews, which are usually sub-contiactors of 
oil companies. The seismic crew measures the time taken for the wave to return to the 
surface, which reveals the depth of the layers. Such surveys also indicate what types of 
rock He beneath the surface, since different rocks transmit sound at different rates (Hyne 
1995, 233-254).
A seismic survey starts by 'line cutting', that is, clearing the land or water surface 
from any plants in preparation for the survey. In Nigeria, a line is usually at least one 
meter m width. The cutting of plants is almost exclusively done by hand, using machetes. 
After completion of the lines, the seismic survey can start. Most surveys on land in 
Nigeria use explosives as the energy source. Explosives are detonated a few metres below 
the ground surface. In riverine areas, small boats or baiges are used for seismic suiweys, 
equipped with airguns which release compressed air into the water surface. The airgun is
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towed in the water behind the boat. The returning reflections aie recorded on detectors 
contained in plastic tubes called streamers behind the boat (see Figure 1). From the 
1980s, 0 Ü companies have increasingly used the so-called 3-D seismic sm*vey as opposed 
to the 2-D suiwey used in the past.
Figure 1: The Seismic Method at Sea and in Riverine Areas
AIR G U N
STREAM ERH Y D R O P H O N E S SHIPSOURCE
Source: Hyne (1995, 243).
A 3-D survey provides the oil company with a three-dimensional seismic image of 
the subsurface. On land, many seismic cables are laid close to each other to form a grid 
pattern, so that maximum infonnation can be obtained from the suiveyed area. In riverine 
areas, a single boat has two aiTays of air guns being towed behind. The infonnation is 
later processed in a high-speed computer. The subsurface can be viewed on a computer 
from different directions which allows a more accurate geophysical assessment than in a 
2-D survey (Hyne 1995, 251-252).
3-D surveys were fust employed by Shell in 1986 and have ahnost entirely 
replaced 2-D surveys in Shell’s operations since (van Dessel 1995, 14-15). By the late
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1990s, 3-D surveys played a much bigger role than 2-D surveys. Shell was the most 
active oil company conducting seismic surveys in 1997, while Western Geophysical was 
the most hnportant seismic contractor in Nigeria (see Appendix D, Table D.IO.).
Seismic surveys biing oil companies into close contact with village communities. 
*Line cutting' requires a lai'ge number of workers to intrude on communal lands. 3-D 
surveys are particularly labour-intensive. In Nigeria, seismic crews usually cany aU 
equipment by hand so a single 3-D crew can include over 1,000 people (van Dessel 1995, 
14-15). Improved technology resulted in greater contact with village communities as oil 
companies sometimes used 3-D suiweys in areas previously surveyed with the assistance 
of 2-D techniques because 3-D suiweys provide more reliable data. In other words, the 
introduction of 3-D surveys has increased the physical presence of oil companies in 
village communities.
Following seismic surveys, drilling of exploration wells begins by clearing the 
vegetation and building access roads and canals. Clearing of land is usually done by hand 
just as for seismic surveys. In riverine areas, canals are dredged to enable the company 
access to the well site. On land, an access road to the well site is constructed. Wells are 
drilled with rotary cutting tools with tough metal or diamond teeth that can bore through 
the hardest rock. These tools are suspended on a drilling string. During diilling 
operations, information about the oil field at various depths is collected by examining drill 
cuttings which are returned to the surface. The information about the rocks at various 
depths is recorded as a so-called ‘sample’ or ‘lithographic log’. Drilling is the only way to 
exactly determine whether there is oil under the surface. If there is no oü m commercial
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quantity, this so-called 'dry hole ’ is plugged and abandoned. If oil is discovered in the 
exploration well, so-called appraisal wells aie drilled in the area in order to establish the 
size of the field. If the field is to be commercially exploited, some of these appraisal wells 
may later be used as development wells for oil production (Hyne 1995,255-389).
Diilling information is much more precise than that taken from a seismic suivey, 
but drilling costs are substantial which limits the quantity of drilling. For instance, in 1997 
only 49 wells were drilled in Nigeria, of wliich 32 were situated in Nigeria’s continental 
shelf aieas (Petioconsultants 1998, 38-39). Recently, Mobil has been the most active oil 
company in drilling, with 14 exploration and appraisal wells diilled in 1997. Indigenous 
0 Ü companies such as Consolidated Oil are also becoming increasingly active in drilling 
(see Appendix D, Table D .l l .) .  In general, thousands of wells have been drilled in 
Nigeria up to today. For instance, 1,300 wells were drilled by 1995 in Shell’s Eastern 
Division alone, of which about half were still producing (van Dessel 1995, 16). Diilling 
activities involve a substantial number of oil workers using specialised drilling equipment, 
boats, road vehicles and helicopters. During these activities, company staff mainly meet 
with village communities during well site preparation. Dredging and road consti’uction 
tends to infringe on communal lands.
Once the production stage starts, an oil/gas/water mixture flows to the surface. 
Oil companies cannot merely pump oil because gas and water are located in a petroleum 
trap together with the oü (see Figure 2). Gas flows to the surface by itself because it is 
very light. Oil can also flow to the surface by itself if there is enough pressure in the 
reservoir, which is common in Nigeria. If there is not enough reservoir pressure, oü can
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be brought to the surface artificially by pumps or other methods. Once the natural 
reservok diive has finished, water is injected into the earth’s cmst to force some of the 
remaining oil to flow to the surface (Hyne 1995, 8-10). Out of 1,793 producing oü wells 
in Nigeria in 1996, oü was flowing to the surface in 1404 weUs, whüe only 389 oü wells 
requiied an artificial lift {OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin 1997,42). From the weU head 
on the surface, the oü/gas/water mixture is transported through a pipeline caUed a 
flowline to a gathering station caUed a flowstation. A flowstation usuaUy gathers oü from 
a number of different weUs. There, gas and liquids are separated. In Nigeria, most of the 
gas is flared, mainly in a horizontal flare laid on the ground close to the flowstation (van 
Dessel 1995,17).
Figure 2: Petroleum Trap
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Source: Hyne (1995, 3).
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The remaining oil/water mixture is transported from a flowstation through a 
pipeline to an export terminal on the coast where crude oü and water are separated. At 
the terminal, the crude oü is loaded onto tankers and shipped abroad."^  Terminals have a 
strategic importance for oil companies. For instance, SheU alone operated 86 fiowstations 
in Nigeria in 1995 (SPDC 1995), but there were just over 20 oü loading terminals in the 
whole of Nigeria. AU teiininals are situated in the south-east of Nigeria, with the closest 
being 220 km from Lagos and the furthest being 650 km from Lagos. The largest storage 
capacities were avaüable to SheU (approx. 13 miUion baiTels) and Mobü (over 6.5 mülion 
barrels) (see Appendix D, Table D.12.).
The operation of a terminal is more important than that of a single flowstation. If 
the functioning of a flowstation is disturbed, only the production from the connected
wells WÜ1 be stopped. If a teiminal is distui'bed, oÜ export from aU fiowstations in the |
!
region may be stopped. When Biafra puUed out of the Nigerian Federation in 1967 at the !
I
beginning of the Civü Wai% Shell’s fiowstations were located on both sides of the new j
Iborder. However, Shell could not export any oü because the Bonny terminal was |
blockaded by the Biafran government (Forsyth 1969, 169). Unlike today, SheU had only j
one export terminal m 1967 and all SheU fiowstations were connected through pipelines |
to Bonny. Even though there are many more export teiminals today than thirty years ago,
they ai*e stül the wealcest point of the oü infrastructure and can suffer the most from
political instabüity such as viUage community protests and from technical faults. When the 
main loading pipeline of the Qua Iboe terminal was damaged in June 1995, all exports
A small percentage of crude oil is transported to Nigerian refineries and utilised within the country.
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from the terminal were halted and Mobil’s oil production was cut to half of the normal 
production rate of 330,000 barrels/day {Platt’s Oilgram News, 15 June 1995). This 
exemplified the importance of teiminals for oil production.
The construction of permanent production facilities such as terminals and 
fiowstations infringes on village communities because it involves large-scale construction 
work. The construction of fiowstations infringes on village communities to a lar ger extent 
than the construction of terminals because theii* number is significantly greater. In any 
case, the above discussion suggests that the social interactions between oü companies and 
vülage communities are likely to be high. Whether those interactions translate into 
adverse environmental or social effects on village communities is the topic of the 
following two sub-sections.
5.3. Impact of Oil Exploration on Village Communities
That 0 Ü operations such as the construction of fiowstations have had an adverse 
impact on the envhonment and vülage communities is perhaps self-evident. The adverse 
effect of 0 Ü operations has been documented in great detail by van Dessel, Shell’s foiuier 
head of envüonmental studies in Nigeria. According to van Dessel, the most serious 
envh'onmental damage of oü exploration and production activities is caused by: oil spüls, 
gas flares, oily and other waste, land take and production/drainage of water.  ^ The most 
serious damage occurs during oil production, but much environmental damage is also 
done by exploration, paiticulaiiy if seismic sui*veys ai*e carried out. Exploration activities
 ^ J.P. van Dessel had resigned from Shell in protest at the company’s environmental record in Nigeria. His insights 
on Shell’s environmental record were described in van Dessel (1995).
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aie usually temporary but can still be liighly damaging. A seismic crew may only stay in 
an area for a few days but the resulting damage may have long-lasting effects.
As explained earlier, significant areas of land aie cleared in the process of laying 
seismic lines. In some aieas such as farmland and uncultivated bush aieas, the effect of 
line cutting is rather insignificant and little evidence of seismic lines is left after one yeai’. 
In other aieas, however, line cutting leaves long-term damage. The enviionmental impact 
of line cutting is particularly significant in mangrove swamps. It takes two to three yeai's 
for mangrove bushes to recover after their roots are cut into, and it may take 30 years or 
more for mangrove tiees to fully recover from line cutting. According to Shell’s figures, 
56.4 sq km out of 91.4 sq km of land cleared in the company’s Eastern Division by 1995 
was in mangrove aieas (van Dessel 1995, 15). Detonation of explosives can affect the sod 
structure. If the holes for explosives are improperly diilled, a detonation can cause a 
crater. The enviionmental impact of seismic sui'veys in liveiine aieas is mostly restricted 
to seamammals. The release of chemicals during a seismic suiwey is thought to be rather 
insignificant. The long-term ecological effects of sui"veys are largely unexplored. Some of 
the social effects of suiweys, paiticulaiiy losses to propeity, aie meanwhile visible.
In order to illustrate tire impact of oil exploration on village communities, we have 
selected a number of Nigerian court judgments. The issues discussed include the impact 
of seismic surveys, damage from an oil waste pit and the construction of access roads to 
oil installations.
There have been a number of court cases pleading damage from seismic surveys in 
Nigeria from the early days of oil operations. In general, it is difficult to prove a direct
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link between a seismic sm*vey and the particular damage. For instance, in Shell-BP v. 
Usoro^ in 1960, Akpan Usoro sued Shell-BP for damage resulting from detonating 
explosives. Shell-BP came to Usoro’s village to caiTy out a seismic survey and detonated 
explosives twenty yards from Usoro’s unfinished building. The plaintiff claimed that the 
company did not warn him beforehand and that the explosion resulted in cracks in the 
building. The company did not dispute the fact that the explosion was canied out only 
twenty yards away from the building. But they denied that the seismic survey damaged 
the building. The company claimed that Usoro permitted the company staff to detonate 
explosives twenty yards away from his building. In addition, they claimed that the cement 
blocks of the house were of rather poor quality and that the cracks in the building existed 
before the explosion. The issue at the trial was for the plaintiff to prove that damage 
originated from oil company operations rather than fi*om other activities. The plaintiff 
seemed to have a good case. Even witnesses called by Shell-BP appeared to support liis 
case. The company called a civü engineer m the Public Works Department as a wimess 
who testified that there were two types of cracks in the bmlding. Some cracks could be 
ascribed to the poor quality of the cement blocks, but other cracks could have been 
caused by an explosion. He concluded: 7 /  I were building I would not permit an 
explosion as near as that’. Another witness for the company, a so-caUed 'shooter’ 
employed by SheU-BP, testified that he found ‘two new cracks’ after the ‘shooting’. 
Judging by the evidence, the High Court of the Eastern Region in Calabar awarded the 
plaintiffs £644 and 5 shülings in damages. However, dissatisfied with the judgment, SheU- 
BP appealed against the decision to the Nigerian Supreme Court. The higher court
[I960] SCNLR.
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concluded that the evidence was not conclusive enough and ordered a re-tiial of the case. 
The case indicates the difficulties that villagers encounter in trying to prove damage 
caused by seismic surveys.
The damage from seismic operations is not restiicted to buildings. In 
Seismograph Service v. Marfç , the plaintiff claimed compensation for the destruction of 
his fishing nets by a seismic boat. Seismograph Services was carrying out a seismic sui*vey 
as Shell’s sub-contractor in the area. The plaintiff, a fisherman, claimed that he set his 
fishing nets in a fishing port with net floaters and buoys attached to warn approaching 
boats. A vessel called M.V.Verina, belonging to the seismic party, tore through the nets 
and damaged them, some parts were lost and others were dragged away by the vessel. 
The plaintiff won in the High Court of Ikot/Abasi, but Seismograph Services appealed 
against the decision to the Court of Appeal. Among other defences employed, the 
company claimed that seismic operations were not carried out on 20 Febmaiy 1988 as 
the plaintiff alleged but on 21 Febmary 1988. It was impossible for the plaintiff to prove 
the contrary. It was also impossible for the plaintiff to show that the company acted 
negligendy by, for example, the vessel moving too fast.  ^ As a result, the Court of Appeal 
allowed the company’s appeal and dismissed the case.
Even where a judge visited the site of a seismic survey, evidence of damage could 
not always be established. In Seisinograph Service v. Onokpasa^, the plaintiff claimed 
compensation for damage from the destruction of buildings as a result of seismic
’ [1993] 7 NWLR.
® The legal basis of negligence claims is discussed in the subsequent section of the thesis. 
® (1972) All N.L.R.
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operations. The plaintiff Benedict Etedjere Onokpasa claimed that detonations during a 
seismic survey heavily damaged eight college buildings, including a block of twelve class 
rooms and a dormitory block. According to the plaintiff, the oil company sent a 
representative, Paul Ossai, to inspect the building both before and after the ‘shooting 
operations’. Ossai reportedly promised to ‘make good all the damages to the college 
buildings having admitted that the vibrations caused tlie damage. Seismograph Sei*vices 
initially denied that Paul Ossai was sent to the premises. Following the plaintiffs 
statement, the company altered its defence. The revised statement claimed that Ossai was 
only sent to the premises to check the distance to the place of ‘shooting operations’, not 
to inspect the premises. Since there was conflicting evidence in court, the trial judge 
decided to visit the premises. The judge saw a number of cracks in the waU going to the 
foundation, concluded that they were caused by the detonation, and awaided damages to 
the plaintiff. Seismograph Services appealed against the decision. The Supreme Court 
allowed the appeal of the company, reversing the previous judgment, by holding that the 
trial judge’s own obseiwations could not be used as evidence and was is erroneous for 
him to treat them as established facts.
The above cases have shown that it is difficult to establish both that seismic 
operations took place or that they caused any damage. In either case, the court 
encountered difficulty in attiibuting causality.
The drilling for exploration and appraisal wells is less common than seismic 
studies, albeit its impact has also been noted by secondary sources. Clearance of 
vegetation can lead to a long lasting or permanent loss of vegetation. Dredging destroys
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vegetation and life, especially if the dredged material is washed back into the water 
leading to a reduction of living organisms. The most damaging effect of drilling is 
probably the release of waste. Drilling activities require a significant quantity of ‘mud’ or 
drilling fluid. This is a special mixture of clay, various chemicals and water, which is 
constantly pumped down through the drill pipe and comes out through the nozzles in the 
cutting tool. The stream of mud returns upwards to the surface, carrying with it rock 
fragments cut away bit by bit. The waste which is generated is not particularly toxic or 
harmful but its impact is significant because of the substantial quantities. Discharge of this 
waste into water leads to the degradation of living organisms in the water (van Dessel 
1995, 16 and 20-21).
While court judgments provide little factual evidence on drilling per se, there have 
been court cases pleading damages for activities r^ elated to drilling such as collection of 
oil waste or construction of access roads to drilling sites. In Umudje v. Shell-BP^^, the 
plaintiffs on behalf of the Enenurhie-Evwreni community in the East-Central State sued 
SheU-BP for damage resulting from an oU waste pit and the construction of a road. SheU- 
BP dug an oU waste pit during its exploration activities. In 1969-70, the pit was fuU and 
the waste spread over the plaintiffs’ farms, ponds and lakes, damaging the land and kiUing 
fish. The plaintiffs claimed that SheU-BP refused to pay any compensation. The trial judge 
of the lower court believed the evidence of the plaintiffs. His judgment in favour of the 
plaintiffs was later confirmed in the Supreme Court. Idigbe, J.S.C., delivering the 
judgment, said:
5 E.C.S.L.R.
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The evidence which the trial judge accepted was that oil-waste collected 
in the location occupied by, or at least in the control of, the appellants, 
escaped... into Unenurhie land where it damaged the respondents’ ponds.
The trial judge on the evidence before him accepted the above facts as 
proved.^^
In addition to the issue of oil waste, the case Umudje v. Shell-BP^^ also dealt with 
the construction of a road, which is another harmful aspect of oil operations. The oil 
company constructed a road across a waterway and failed to insert enough culverts under 
the road. At the location of the road, fish previously moved across the land into the 
plaintiffs’ artificial ponds and lakes during the rainy season. After the road construction, 
fish could no longer move across. The local people were deprived of earnings from 
fishing. Said the trial judge of the lower court:
I  have no doubt in my mind that the access road blocked the passage o f  
water during the flood season, and made it impossible for water and fish 
to go into the ponds on the right side o f  the access road during the flood  
season. It has definitely starved the ponds and lakes o f water and fish, 
notwithstanding the fact that five culverts were erected under the access 
road.^ ^
The lower court awarded 7,200 Naira to the plaintiffs in respect of the damaged 
ponds, lakes and farm land. The oil company appealed against the judgment. It claimed,
Per Idigbe, J.S .C. at page 571. 
5 E.C.S.L.R.
Per Idigbe, J.S.C. at page 568.
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among other tilings, that ‘the facts alleged by the said plaintiffs in their evidence cannot 
support any o f the reliefs claimed’. The Supreme Court rejected this ground of appeal. 
Subsequently, the appeal by Shell-BP was dismissed and the judgment of the lower court 
was confumed. However, the Supreme Court reduced the award of damages from 7,200 
to 6,000 Naha as there was no sufficient evidence of damage to the plaintiffs’ lakes and 
fai*m land.^ "^  The above case indicates that it may be difficult to prove the consequential 
damages aiismg from oh operations.
There have been a number of other lawsuits dealing with the construction of 
access roads. For instance, in Nwadiaro v. Shelf ^ , the plaintiffs on behalf of the 
Umusaziokwushi family of Obutu Village sued Shell for blockading the ‘Utu ly i Efi 
Creeks and Ponds’. In 1966, SheU constructed an access road to an oU well location 
which blockaded the vUlage creeks, pond and lakes. SheU had never paid compensation to 
the family, although some payments were made to other persons disturbed by Shell’s road 
construction. Meanwhile, the blockage continued and the plaintiffs were prevented from 
using their creeks, pond and lakes for almost three decades. In court, SheU did not file a 
mandatory statement of defence for five years claiming that the plaintiffs had no right to 
sue the company over two decades after the road was constructed. The Court of Appeal 
ordered SheU to fUe a statement of defence, yet tlie case remained umesolved.
In contiast to the Umudje case, in the Nwadiaro case, the court did not encounter 
a difficulty in assessing the consequential damages because SheU had earlier admitted 
liabUity. But the case suggests that, even if damage has convincingly been proved in
There were also legal grounds for this reduction. 
[1990] 5 NWLR.
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court, oil companies may continue to adversely affect village communities without paying 
compensation. As a whole, the cases discussed above would suggest that courts may 
encounter specific difficulties in attributing causality and assessing the consequential 
damages in oil related litigation.
The above cases point to differences between temporary effects of oü operations 
and the effects of permanent oil company infrastructure on village communities. When 
permanent structures such as roads or canals aie constructed, as in Nwadiaro v. Shell^^ , 
the social effects may remain for decades, while the local people receive no 
compensation. Indeed, the effects of road construction or canal dredging may be more 
damaging than the effects of any temporaiy exploration activity. For instance, in
I
Seismograph Service v. Mark^^ , the destruction of fishing nets constituted an externality |
but this externality was temporary. In contrast, a road or a canal wiQ remain in place for j
i
decades or longer. In other words, the impact of oil exploration on village communities is |
likely to be less severe in the long-term than the impact of oil production because it tends
I
to involve temporary work rather than the establishment of permanent production Î
facilities. |
}
!
5.4. Impact of Oil Production on Village Communities
Secondary sources (e.g. van Dessel 1995) have noted that oil production, like oil jiI
exploration, has a significant adverse impact on the enviromnent (see Table 5.2.). Oil 
production and oil exploration activities have a number of externalities in common |
[1990] 5 NWLR. 
" [1993] 7 NWLR.
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including waste management and disturbance during constiiiction of the facilities and 
infrastructure. For instance, burial of oily or chemical waste in the process of exploration 
and production bears enoimous ecological and health hazards as it can affect ground 
water, resurface during the rainy season or dhecdy pollute the surrounding environment 
(van Dessel 1995). The issue of waste and the oü infrastmcture have already been noted 
in the previous sub-section. In this sub-section, we deal with externalities specific to oü 
production.
In order to illustrate the impact of oü production on viUage communities, we have 
selected a number of Nigerian court judgments. The issues discussed include gas flaiing, 
oil spüls and operational accidents such as weU blow-outs.
Table 5.2. Potential environmental impact of oil production activities
lYoduction Activity Potential Environmental Impact
All activities e Loss of vegetation/ arable land
• Hydrological changes
• Disturbance of communities/ flora/ fauna
Waste pits in the field
• Oily waste burned in the flare pit
Well operations • Soil, water pollution
• Disturbance of communities/ flora/ fauna
Howlines, pipelines * Soil, water pollution
• Disturbance of communities/ flora/ fauna
Flowstations » Ambient air quality
» Acid Rain
» Soot/ heavy metal deposition
• Greenhouse effect
e Pollution/ fire affecting flora
Soil/ surface water pollution
Disturbance of communities/ flora/ fauna
Tenninals • Soil/ surface water pollution
Disturbance of communities/ flora/ fauna
Poor ambient air quality
Ozone depletion (fire fighting agents)
Soil, water, air pollution
• Waste problems
» Soil pollution
Source: van Dessel (1995).
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The impact of gas flaring is difficult to evaluate as little is known about actual 
flame temperatures, which can range from 300 to 1400°C, and their effect. According to 
the World Bank, the total emission of coaldioxides from gas flaring in Nigeria in 1995 
was estimated at 35 million tons per year, the total emission of nitricoxides and 
sulphurdioxides was 210,000 and 40,000 tons/year, respectively (World Bank 1995, 
volume II, annex I). According to official figures, Shell was the greatest producer of gas 
emissions in Nigeria in absolute terms, followed by Chevron, Agip, Mobil and other 
companies. In 1994, Shell produced 37.9% of the total amount of gas flared in Nigeria. 
By 1997, Shell’s shaie had declined to 27.7% but the company remained the largest 
source of gas flaring in Nigeria (see Appendix D, Table D.13.). In percentage terms, 
Texaco flared more gas than any other oil company in Nigeria, followed by Agip Energy 
(a joint-venture between Agip and the NNPC). In 1997, Texaco flared 99.7% of the 
associated gas which the company produced, followed by Agip Energy with 99.1%. 
Agip’s subsidiary NAOC flared the lowest percentage of associated gas - 53.5% of the 
company’s associated gas production. Shell and Mobil reportedly flared 64.7% and 
64.3% respectively of tlieii* total associated gas production (see Appendix D, Table 
D.13.). What these figures appear- to suggest is that there are some differences in terms of 
the envir onmental impact of different oil companies in Nigeria.
From a scientific point of view, gas flaring contributes significantly more to the 
greenhouse effect and air pollution wliich affects society at large rather than to specific 
damage in communities, which tends to be limited (van Dessel 1995, 23).^  ^ The low local
A number of harmful effects of gas flaring on village communities have been noted by several non-governmental 
organisations in Nigeria (e.g. ERA 1995). The effects on village communities include the possible destruction of
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significance of the adverse effect of gas flaring on specific communities in Nigeria can 
help to explain why little litigation has arisen from gas flaring and why court cases 
involving damage from gas flaring had little chance of success. However, some village 
communities feel disturbed by gas flares, as evidenced with the example of the case 
Chinda v. Shell-BP^^ below.
In Chinda v. Shell-BP^^, the Rumuokani community in Rivers State sued Shell- 
BP for damage from the 'heat, noise and vibration resulting from a flare \  The plaintiffs 
claimed that gas flaring destroyed trees in the vicinity and damaged nearby houses. 
Holden, C.J., personally visited the site of the gas flare near the village. He could not 
identify any tangible effects of the gas flare on the surrounding environment. Trees and 
crops near the gas flaie seemed 'perfectly healthy’ to him.^  ^ From the evidence before 
him, the judge concluded that 'even if  such damages are considered to be claimable in 
this action, I hold that there is no evidence o f  them so the claims must fa i l  In other
words, the judge encountered a difficulty in establishing causality and hence dismissed the 
plaintiffs’ claim.
While court cases highlight individual instances of the adverse effects of oil 
production with some precision, secondary sources have attempted to give broad 
estimates of externalities. We are reproducing some of the findings of this research. 
According to the World Bank’s figures, there were almost 300 oil spills per year- in the
house roofs. Nigerian houses are often covered with steel roofs which may corrode as a result of acidification. But 
these effects of gas flaring are rather insignificant.
(1974) 2 R.S.L.R.
(1974) 2 R.S.L.R.
Per Holden, C.J. at page 10.
^ Per Holden, C.J. at page 10.
241
Delta and the Rivers states alone between 1991 and 1993, which were the main oil- 
producing Nigerian Federal States at the time (see Appendix D, Table D.14). The key oil 
polluter was Shell, accounting for over 75% of the spills. According to Shell’s own 
figures, the company had 190 spills per year from 1989 untU around 1995, involving on 
average 319,200 US gallons of oil per year, damaging land and polluting water (Rowell
1996, 293). Depending on the location, oil spills can poison water, destroy vegetation
1
and kill living organisms, which has been shown by various 'post impact’ studies (van |
Dessel 1995, 23; Amajor 1985). The environmental impact of oil spills in the Niger Delta |
is increased by floods. During the rainy season, over 80% of the Niger Delta is flooded 
(Moffat and Linden 1995, 527). Water carries the oil onto villages and farm lands, while 
floods also render the clean-up of oil spills more difficult.
Oil spills in Nigeria are an undisputed fact yet their causes are disputed. Oil 
companies often claim that spills are caused by sabotage, while environmentalists claim 
that spills are due to deteriorating equipment. According to the World Bank (1995, 
volume II, annex M), oü spüls are generally caused by companies themselves, with 
corrosion being the most frequent cause. Oü companies appear to have used fictitious 
claims of sabotage to escape liability for compensation payments (this wül be explained in 
section six of the thesis). Even according to Shell’s own figures for the period 1991- 
1994, corrosion was the most frequent cause (see Appendix D, Table D.3.).
While corrosion and equipment faüure are important causes of oil spüls, the age 
of installations appears to play a crucial role. Shell’s own figures suggested that the age 
of pipelmes and Bowlines largely determined tlie frequency of leaks. The older the
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Bowlines were, the more susceptible they were to leaks. 95% of all leaks occurred in 
Bowlines 11 years or older (see Appendix D, Table D.15.).
Evidence from court cases suggests that the impact of oil spills is more visible 
than, for instance, the impact of seismic surveys or gas Baring. The impact of oü spüls is 
dkect, immediate and can be easüy detected by vülagers. Damaged crops and polluted 
water can be easüy identified as a result of oÜ spills, which can partly expiant why a 
significant number of court cases against oil companies m Nigeria are based on oü spüls.
In a recent case Shell v. Isaiah^^ , three plaintiffs sued SheU for damage from an 
0 Ü spill. In July 1988 an old tree feU on an oü pipeline which ran across the plaintiffs’ 
land. A SheU sub-contractor was hired to repair* the pipeUne. In tlie process of repairing 
the pipeline, the oü spiU continued for several hours poUuting the nearby swampland and 
farmland. The plaintiffs claimed that the sub-contractor faüed to construct an ‘oü trap’ to 
contain the oü spiU, which was denied by SheU. Having considered the evidence before 
him, the trial judge concluded that there was no oil trap to contain the oil spill.
Shell denied responsibiUty for the oil spiU by claiming that the oü pipeUne was ‘cut 
by hacksaw’ hence the spiU amounted to sabotage. But Shell’s defence witnesses 
contradicted themselves. Three of them admitted in court that the oil leak was caused by 
a fallen tree. A judge of the Court of Appeal commented in the court ruUng:
[1997] 6 NWLR.
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The issue o f sabotage raised by the defendant [Shell] is neither here nor 
there. Sabotage was discovered after the second investigation. I am, 
having regard to the facts and circumstances o f this case, convinced that 
the defence o f sabotage was an afterthought.^^
The Isaiah case indicates that oil pipelines in Nigeria are not adequately protected 
against external influences. It also suggests that the oil companies’ efforts to clean up oil 
spills may be unsatisfactory in the sense that they negligently fail to contain an oil spill.
As previously stated, the impact of oil spills is more visible than, for instance, the 
impact of seismic surveys. Nevertheless, even if a company admits an oil spill, the 
plaintiffs evidence may be rejected by a judge. In Ogiale v. Shelf^ , Shell was sued by the 
Olomoro Isoko community in Delta State. The plaintiffs claimed compensation for 
damage to the land suffered as a result of oil production and gas flaring. The defence of 
the oil company rested on the contention that the ‘company’s activities were carried out 
on the area o f land which the company legally acquired’. Donald Otoakhia, Shell’s 
Senior Lands Supeiwisor, admitted that the company had five oil spills in the area in the 
period 1973-80, yet he said that: ‘We did not damage anything owned by Olomoro 
community. Individual families and quarters who own lands affected by our operations 
were duly paid. My company is not liable to the plaintiffs ’ claim ’.
The plaintiffs lost in the lower court, based on tlie judge’s conclusion that they 
failed to prove their claim. The appeal of the plaintiffs was also dismissed by the Court of 
Appeal. The court proceedings centred around the question of admissibility of expert
^ Per Katsina-Alu, J.C.A. at page 252. 
^ [1997] 1 NWLR.
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opinion which indicates how difficult it is to prove environmental damage. The long-term 
environmental effects of oil spills were not considered during the trial. T.E. Williams, 
Shell’s lawyer at the appeal trial, claimed that ‘the soil o f the appellants’ land would take 
a period o f  between 6 months and 5 years „to get normal” ‘ again. Such long-terai 
effects of oil spills may not be competently considered by a court, as it has been difficult 
enough to prove short-term effects of visible oil spills.
Apait from gas flaring and oil spills, production activities bear a certain risk of 
operational accidents which can lead to major environmental disasters. An important 
adverse effect of oil operations appears to be well blowouts. Since no statistical data is 
available, it is instructive to analyse a specific case. In Shell v. Farah^^, several families 
sued Shell for compensation from a well blow-out. In 1970, Shell-BP had a well blow-out 
at the Bomu II oil well. It took the oil company several weeks to bring the situation under 
control. Meanwliile, oü and other substances had polluted the adjoining land. Crops and 
trees were destroyed, while tlie farming land was rendered infertile. Sheü had promised to 
rehabüitate a land area of 13.2 h and to hand the land back to the community afteiwards. 
To facilitate land rehabilitation, the land was vacated by the community. 18 years after the 
blow-out, in March 1988, Sheü wrote a letter to the plaintiffs’ solicitor claiming that the 
land had already been rehabüitated and ‘handed back’ to the plaintiffs. Moreover, SheU 
claimed that it had paid £22,000 in compensation for damaged crops, tiees and other 
objects and another £1,000 for damage to the land. However, the company broke the 
promise and rehabiUtation was not carried out. In the meantime, the local people could 
neither farm nor use the land in any other way. The plaintiffs claimed that they had never
[1995] 3 NWLR.
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received any compensation for damage to the land. The families involved finally engaged 
in litigation in 1989, nineteen years after the blow-out.
Shell admitted that the blow-out had occurred. But the extent of the damage was 
disputed. A key witness in the trial was Professor C.T.I. Odu of the Department of 
Agronomy, University of Ibadan. Odu, the project co-ordinator of the land rehabilitation 
exercise, claimed that ‘the area had returned back to normal’ by 1975. In 1989, Shell has 
allegedly sent him to reassess the ecology of the Bomu area. He claimed that only the 
area of about 1 out of 13 hectares indicated poor soil, the rest of the area was allegedly 
rehabilitated. He blamed the poor crop performance on erosion due to poor soil 
management by the community. The witness finished by saying:
We concluded that the poor performance o f the crops in this area was not 
due to the pressure (presence) o f crude oil which several scientists both 
within and outside Nigeria have shown to be beneficial for crop 
production at level o f about 1 per cent or below, [sic]
In effect, Odu’s statement suggested that oil spills can be beneficial for village 
communities, but he failed to quote any environmental study to prove his claim. The trial 
judge doubted the genuineness of Prof. Odu’s evidence. In his view, there was a conflict 
of interest between Odu’s work for Shell and his court testimony. Said he:
What did the defendant [Shell] do? They engaged the same man to go 
back to the area to re-assess the soil and the nature o f  the vegetation in 
the area.
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This is in effect asking the same expert to go back to the land and confirm 
that he actually did the job  that he was commissioned to do some years 
ago. If I may ask, what kind o f report do the defendant [sic] expect from  
Defence Witness 2 [P rof Odu]? The defendant has been sued because 
the land has not been rehabilitated, obviously the Professor would not 
have come back with a report that the land has not been rehabilitated and 
that crops are not growing in the area that is said to be rehabilitated.
Therefore, the court regarded Shell’s main expert as an unreliable witness. The 
main expert of the plaintiffs was Dr. Edward Obiozo, lecturer in Biochemistry at the 
University of Port Harcourt. In his 1988 report he concluded that the soil around the 
Bomu oil well continued to be heavily polluted with patches of crude oil tar and other 
chemicals, eighteen years after the accident. Among other things, the report concluded:
7. On the average, 49-53 per cent o f  the land area affected are 
completely bare i.e. still do not support plant growth, and where there are 
plants at all, these are stunted, pollution-resistant siam weeds and guinea 
grass.
8. Agricultural crop productivity in the area was as patchy as the other 
plants and very low. The land in its present condition cannot support any 
good crop growth.
27 Per Edozie, J.C.A. at page 184.
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9. The area cannot be deemed to have been rehabilitated to its pre­
impact conditions and cannot be so unless certain further actions are 
taken.
The trial judge was initially uncertain about the evidence presented by the 
plaintiffs and by the defendants which contradicted each other. He subsequently 
appointed two referees to re-assess the evidence. One referee was nominated by Shell, 
the other by the plaintiffs. The joint report supported the evidence of the plaintiffs. The 
court established that Shell’s evidence was not reliable. As a result, in the lower court, 
the plaintiffs were awarded 4,621,307 Naira in compensation. Dissatisfied with the 
judgment, SheU appealed against the decision. The Comt of Appeal confirmed the award.
The case Shell v. Farah^  ^ illustrates the long-term damage arising from accidents 
in the oU industry. Two decades after an oU related accident, the area was still considered 
unsuitable for effective faiming. The Farah case as weU as the other cases has 
demonstrated that oU operations may have highly damaging effects on the environment 
and thus on viUage communities. The case Shell v. Farah^  ^ also indicates that oU 
companies are unwiUing to accept responsibUity for damage from oU operations. SheU’s 
expert witness even claimed that crude oU is beneficial to crop fertUity. The same expert, 
Clifford Temple Idigi Odu^° of the University of Ibadan, had claimed 20 years eaiiier in 
Chinda v. ShelŸ^ that damaged leaves neai* a gas flare were due to poor soil fertUity, not
^ [1995] 3 NWLR. 
^  [1995] 3 NWLR.
30 It appears from the court cases that C.T.I. Odu had been retained as an expert by SheU for well over 20 years. 
(1974) 2 R.S.L.R.
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due to the oil operations. Of course, those repeated claims are absurd, yet they have 
helped Shell to escape liability for environmental damage as in the Chinda case.
Evidence from the above cases on oil production confirms the earlier speculation 
that Nigerian courts may encounter difficulties in attributing causality and assessing 
consequential damage. Cases such as the Farah and the Chinda cases exemplify that direct 
proof of externalities arising from oil operations may frequently be disputed. In any case, 
the above discussion of oil production activities points to the significance of the adverse 
impact of oü operations. This adverse impact can directly result in litigation against oü 
companies.
5.5. Land Disputes and Oil Operations
The adverse impact of oü operations cannot be adequately explained without 
reference to land issues. Oü companies are dependent on access to land because they 
derive then* wealth primaiily and directly from below the earth’s surface. Vülage 
communities aie dependent on land as a natural resource for farming, fishing and hunting. j
I
Land disputes between companies and communities may, therefore, arise. This sub- i
section discusses land disputes in the oü producing areas, by using evidence from
Nigerian court judgments. i
j
OÜ operations affect the use of land in vülage communities m a number of ways. ;
I
The use of land is, for instance, affected by the existence of pipelines and flowlines. As ‘
Ashton-Jones (1998, 187) has pointed out, pipelines cut across the footpaths of the local |
people, thus severely dismpting foot communication, a primary method of movement in |
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the oil producing a r e a sP ip e lin e s  also forced some changes to traditional land use 
patterns. In particular*, farmers cannot bum bushes in the vicinity of pipelines because 
pipelines could easily be set on fire (Ashton-Jones 1998). Court judgments on oil related 
land issues do not provide factual evidence on topics such as pipelines and are largely 
limited to land disputes between villagers in the oü producing areas.
From the preliminary analysis of the available court judgments, it would appear 
that there are two main sources of land disputes in oü related litigation: disagreement 
over land titles between families and communities, and disagreement over the quantum of 
compensation to be paid by an oü company. Land disputes involving an oü company 
often arise when the company is prepared to pay compensation to a community in respect 
of land acquisition or damage. If two different communities dispute a piece of land and 
one community receives a payment, the other community may be aggrieved. Also, even if 
there is merely the prospect of receiving a payment, the local people may rush to receive 
a share. Different claimants might dispute the entitlement to compensation in respect of 
the same piece of land.
OÜ companies are not the only source of land disputes associated with oil 
operations. Land disputes may have other* causes such as ethnic conflicts. On the most 
basic level, oÜ operations may have no impact on land disputes, they may aggravate 
existing disputes or* they may cause new ones.
Oil companies have often found themselves caught in long-standing disputes in oü 
producing areas. Those long-standing disputes with regai*ds to land usuaüy centre around
The problem is particularly severe if a pipeline is fenced on both sides.
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issues such as boundaries between plots of land (as in Adomba v. Odies^^ below), ethnic 
conflict (as in Otuedon v. Olughor^^ below), the nature of land ownership or laws of 
inheritance (as in Ogulu v. Shelf ^  below) or a combination of those factors. Some of 
tliese disputes started long before an oil company arrived in a particular area.
In this context, oil companies have often intensified existing disputes, as can be 
seen in Adomba v. O diesf^. In that case, Agip entered communal land neai* Oloibiii in 
Rivers State in 1977. The plaintiffs, representing the Ekoni family of Opomatoba, sued 
the defendants, representing the Ake family, for having received rent and compensation 
arising from Agip’s oil operations. Although land ownership was the disputed matter, 
compensation payments from oü companies appear to have been the motive behind the 
lawsuit. The plaintiffs asked the court for a declaration that they were entitled to aU 
compensation payments, including those aheady paid and 143,234 Naira deposited in 
court by Agip, and they also asked the court to Impose an injunction against Agip to 
prevent them from paying any compensation to any persons other than themselves. The 
plaintiffs won the case and were then entitled to Agip’s compensation payments.
Even though the court case was over compensation from oü operations, there had 
been a long-standing land dispute already lasting for at least 20 years before Agip came to 
the area. The two famihes had been engaged in litigation since the 1950s over the said 
land. There had been two lawsuits Nos. 17/58 and 18/58 in the Oloibhi Native Court 
before the case was later transfeiTed as Suit P/57/58 to the Port Hai'couit High Court.
1 R.S.L.R. (1980). 
^ [1997] 9 NWLR. 
(1975/76) R.S.L.R. 
1 R.S.L.R. (1980).
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From the court judgment, it appears that the defendants had continued to use the land in 
question despite an injunction by the Native Court ’to restrain the defendants from using 
the land in dispute until defendants establish their right o f ownership over the land in 
dispute Oil operations only revived an old dispute.
The case Adomba v. Odiesf^ also shows the problems of determining boundaries 
between different tracts of land. The Ake family did not deny that the Ekoni family won 
the lawsuit in the customary court. However, they denied the land rights of the plaintiffs, 
claiming that the customary court case involved a different plot of land from that in the 
later case. They disputed the boundaries of the land named by the plaintiffs. Similai* 
disputes over boundaries are very common in Nigeria because the local people employ 
imperfect ways of describing land areas. Under English Law, land is usually described by 
reference to an attached plan unless verbal description can accurately identify the land. In 
customary practice, land areas are given specific local names and the description of the 
area is often merely by reference to the name. In land contracts under customary law, 
boundaries are often inaccurately defined, being indicated by 'cairs, mounds, or ridges o f  
earth, trees or grass, or by streams or other natural features’ (Onwuamaegbu 1966, 
105-108).
In Adomba v. O diesf^ , both parties presented plans showing the plot of land, but 
these did not provide adequate evidence to decide the case. The plaintiffs referred to the 
disputed land as ‘Edumanyo’ or ‘EdumatoÆmeni’, the defendants referred to ‘Edum
Per Wai-Ogusu, J. at page 150. 
1 R.S.L.R. (1980).
39 1 R.S.L.R. (1980).
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Ebela’ or ‘E bela \ while Agip referred to ‘Netnbe A Location’. In addition, the plaintiffs 
claimed that the land called ‘Ebela P iri’ of the customary law case of 1958 was the same 
as ‘Edumanyo’ of the lawsuit in 1980, which added to the confusion. In the lawsuit of 
1958 no plan was attached because the case was decided under customary law, so no 
comparison could be made with a plan prepared by a land surveyor for the later case. 
According to the judge, ‘the lands involved in those Oloibiri Native Court Suits cannot 
with certainty be said to be the same land as was involved in P/57/58’.^  Both the 
plaintiffs and the defendants claimed that Agip’s Nembe A Location was within their 
communal land area, but none of them had a formal proof of land ownership.
The Adomba case is an example of a long-standing dispute between different 
communities in the same area. Many land disputes have an ethnic background, too. In 
Otuedon v. Olughof^^, the Gbolokposo people sued the Ugbomoro Village, Shell-BP and 
two other families over compensation owed to them in respect of Shell’s operations. The 
plaintiffs from the Itsekiri ethnic group and the defendants from the Urhobo ethnic group 
had been engaged in litigation from 1925 at the veiy least. That means, the land dispute 
lasted over 70 years. SheU only came to the area in 1963 when the land dispute had 
aheady lasted 40 years. The dispute was exacerbated when SheU paid compensation in 
respect of land acquisition to the defendants rather than to the plaintiffs. The case shows, 
however, that oU companies may find themselves drawn into a long-standing ethnic 
dispute.
Per Wai-Ogusu, J. at page 145. 
[1997] 9 NWLR.
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Sometimes an oü company may be drawn into a land dispute because land 
ownership or the laws of inheritance are disputed within a community. An interesting case 
is Ogulu V. Shell-BP"^ ,^ in which the plaintiff - Oyi Ogulu of Egbeama viUage - sued 
Shell-BP in order to receive rent payments due from the ‘Edum Ogboko Land’. The case 
is different from the Adomba and the Otuedon cases in that the land conflict involved 
members of the same viUage community.
The case Ogulu v. Shell-BP^^ was preceded by two earlier court judgments on 
the same subject matter involving community members in Egbeama. In the first court case 
which stalled in 1970 in the same High Court of Rivers State, members of the Egbeama 
community sued the elder brother of Oyi Ogulu, Chief Ibe Ogulu and Shell-BP."*  ^ The 
community representative sought an injunction against Chief Ogulu to restrain him from 
receiving any further payment from SheU-BP. Oyi Ogulu’s elder brother had received 
payments from Shell-BP for the ‘Edum Ogboko Land’ claiming that the land was famüy- 
owned, whüe other community members claimed it was communal land. Said the trial 
judge: 7  am satisfied that the land on which these two locations are situated is not 
communal land but land belonging to first defendant’s [i.e. the elder brother o f  Oyi 
Ogulu] f a m i l y Oyi Ogulu’s elder brother hence won the suit
After the death of his elder brotlier, Oyi Ogulu claimed that he had succeeded him 
in the exercise of land rights on behalf of the famüy. Another lawsuit foUowed in 1971, in 
which the community representatives sued the Otu-Waiiboko famüy including Oyi
(1975/76) R.S.L.R.
(1975/76) R.S.L.R.
PHC/11/1970, quoted in Ogulu v. Shell-BP (1975/76) R.S.L.R. 
Per Manuel, J. at page 69.
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Ogulu/^ They sought a declaratory judgment that the disputed land is the ‘communal 
property o f the entire Egbe Ogbogolo family including Otu-Wariboko family \  not family 
land. The trial judge concluded that the disputed land was indeed the ‘communal 
property of the entire Ogbogolo people and not the property o f any unit o f the Ogbogolo 
people’ Oyi Ogulu’s family hence lost the case. This court judgment was reaffirmed in 
the case Ogulu v. Shell~BP^^. In this thiid court case, the judge concluded that the 
disputed land became communal, as opposed to family owned, after the death of Oyi 
Ogulu’s elder brother. He thus dismissed the suit.
The three cases above indicate that oil companies may find themselves 
involuntarily drawn into land disputes. Sometimes the company is sued directly as in 
Ogulu V . Shell-BP^^ and sometimes the company is sued as the second or third defendant 
alongside the local community or family as in Adomba v. Odiesf^, though the oil 
companies do not wish to be drawn into land disputes. In the Adomba case, Agip’s 
lawyers did not wish to appear in court. But the judge ordered that ‘as stakeholders in 
the whole dispute it was necessary for them to have been jo ined’ The Agip lawyers 
still attempted to distance themselves from the dispute. Finally, Agip managed to stay 
away from the court proceedings by promising that they would, nevertheless, abide by the 
final decision of the court. Therefore, the oil companies often manage to keep aloof from
^  PHC/84/71, quoted in Ogulu v. Shell-BP (1975/16) R.S.L.R. 
Per Manuel, J. at page 70.
(1975/76) R.S.L.R.
47
48
(1975/76) R.S.L.R.
1 R.S.L.R. (1980).
Per Wai-Ogusu, J. at page 144.
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local land disputes. Most frequently, when communities go to court over land issues, they 
tend to sue tlie neighbouring family or community, not the oil company, as in the case 
V. Okwoshcf^ below.
While oil companies may be involuntarily drawn into disputes, they can 
themselves trigger off land disputes - paiticulaiiy litigation in courts - because of the 
careless way in which they investigate land claims. According to a survey among over 
300 local people in Rivers State by Onyige (1979,148), 56% of the respondents had been 
involved in at least one land-related court case in their Hves. Most of the respondents in 
Onyige's survey largely attributed theii* involvement in land disputes to oil operations.^  ^
In the case Eze v. Okwosha "^^, the Ossai Oriaku Ezeoduwa family of the Umdei village in 
Imo State sued the Umuogini family of Obutu village over title to a plot of land and a 
stream. The lawsuit arose out of oil operations by Ashland. The plaintiffs claimed that 
Ashland had from 1973 entered and damaged their land. The land conflict was a direct 
result of 0 Ü operations. At the time of Ashland’s anival, the land ownership was not 
disputed and the Ossai Oriaku Ezeoduwa famüy was not bothered that the Umuogini 
famüy occupied the land. After the anival of the oü company, both families scrambled to 
receive compensation payments from Ashland. Anthony Alphonso Nwakuche, a 
representative of Ashland, explained how the oü company went about settling the land 
question:
1 IMSLR (1977).
Of all respondents in Onyige’s survey, as many as 12% claimed that they had been involved m a land dispute 
roughly four times during their lifetime (Onyige 1979, 148). Unfortunately, Onyige did not compare his figures 
with the quantity of land disputes in areas unaffected by oil operations. Such a comparison could help to establish 
whether the quantity of land disputes in the oil producing areas is higher than average in Nigeria or not. 
Nonetheless, Onyige’s results appear to suggest that land disputes are a very common type of conflict in the oil 
producing areas.
^  1 IMSLR (1977).
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When he received instructions to acquire the location called Urashi I, he 
placed public notices in the town and the Divisional Office and used the 
town Cryer to inform the people that the Company was to acquire the 
area. Before then the Company demarcated the area by cutting traces on 
the land. 1st defendant applied for compensation because he was there 
with members o f  the family on the day o f  the notice and the assessment.
The Company paid them compensation.^^
Nwakuche did not try to identify the rightful owners but simply paid money to the 
first claimants who approached him. Under cross-examination in court, he admitted that
compensation had already been paid by the time the plaintiffs filed a lawsuit to restrain |IIthe company from paying money. By the time the lawsuit was initiated in court, part of j
the land was aheady damaged by oil operations.
The different parties provided completely different accounts of traditional I
evidence for their respective claims. The plaintiffs claimed that the land belonged to them, i
while the defendants were merely their customary tenants. They claimed that their family I
obtained the land ‘by conquest’ a long time ago. Their ancestor Ossai Oriaku allegedly I
fanned the land, which was originally owned by the Ogwu people. Wlien the Ogwus i
started to steal his crops, he killed or expelled all of them and took possession of tlie land. j
Subsequently, the land remained in the possession of the Ossai Oriaku Ezeoduwa famüy. i
The defendants were merely allowed by the famüy to occupy the land as customary 
‘caretakers’. As caretakers, the defendants had tenants who paid them rent in respect of
Per Chianakwalam, J. at page 313.
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the land. They allegedly performed a customary ceremony called Igo-Ife during every 
farming season. The ceremony, using items such as goats, fowls, kola nuts and palm 
wine, was aimed to certify that the plaintiffs as land owners allocated land to tenants. The 
defendants allegedly shared the rent payments with the plaintiffs.
However, the defendants gave an entirely different evidence in court. They 
claimed that the Umuogini family owned the land ‘from time immemorial’ and denied 
that they were customary caretakers. The plaintiffs were allegedly not the owners of the 
land in question. The defendants performed the Igo-ife ceremony to bless the land for the 
tenants. Each tenant paid the defendants 21 yarms as rent for a farming season. But they 
did not perform tlie Igo-ife ceremony to the plaintiffs. The land conflict only arose with 
the arrival of Ashland when the plaintiffs hoped to receive money from the oil company. 
For three years, the defendants could not fish in the Ugbo Nwaezike stream because the 
plaintiffs threatened them with a gun. The 1st defendant admitted that he had received 
money from Ashland but added that ‘the plaintiffs did not claim the land when all these 
compensations were paid to him in respect o f  the land’. The judge accepted the evidence 
of the defendants and them witnesses and rejected that of the plaintiffs. Chianakwalam, J. 
held that the plamtiffs’ evidence of ownership rights was inconclusive and the defendants 
were the owners of the land.
If Nwakuche of Ashland had investigated the customary land rights more properly 
before negotiations over compensation with the villagers took place, many problems 
could probably have been avoided. Nwakuche negotiated with both parties in respect of 
the disputed ownership of the Ugbo Nwaezike stream without knowing tlie customary
258
land rights properly. He agreed ‘with plaintiffs to pay them 1000 Naira for the stream 
and agreed with the defendants to pay them 1100 Naira for the stream’. He did not pay 
either the plaintiffs or the defendants in respect of the stream. The money was paid into 
court instead to remain there until the final settlement of the land dispute. By leaving the 
final decision to the judge, the company was able to largely keep out of the land conflict. 
However, by that time, Ashland had aheady triggered off the land dispute.
Even in cases when an oil company did not trigger off a land dispute, the 
ignorance of oü companies may have exacerbated an existing dispute. In Adomba v. 
Odiesf^ mentioned earlier, Agip was drawn into a long-standing dispute. The ignorance 
of the company, however, exacerbated the conflict as Agip’s representatives knew little 
about customary land rights in the area. According to Gabriel Chioloji, a land supeiwisor 
of Agip, the company assumed that the Akipelai community owned the Nimbe A 
Location partly because of ‘the nearness o f  Akipelai village to the location ’. The 
Akipelai village was closer to the location than the Opomatoba vülage. However, he 
admitted that in Nigeria a plot of land can be some distance from the land owning 
community. If the Agip staff had been adequately informed about the local customaiy 
rights, it is unlikely that the company would not have paid compensation to the wrong 
community. The above case thus exemplifies some of the problems that may result from 
the oil companies’ ignorance of local land rights.
In general, it appeal's that oü companies may often pay compensation without 
much knowledge of the customary land rights of the area. In the case Shell-BP v.
1 R.S.L.R. (1980).
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A bedf^ , the plaintiffs on behalf of the Abadiama people sued Shell-BP for having 
damaged land previously cultivated by them. Jacob Abedi claimed that Shell-BP-had 
removed soil from the land and that the excavated aiea of approximately 60 yards by 60 
yards was later submerged in water. In addition, he claimed that Shell-BP destroyed 
property in the process, including 534 palm trees, 36 fishing ponds, 35 fishing canals and 
3 religious juju shrines. Abedi claimed compensation from Shell-BP, but the oü company 
refused to pay to the Abadiama people. Instead, they paid 6 Nigerian pounds and 12 
shilhngs to the people of Gbekebor for the use of the land. Subsequently, the Abadiama 
people sued Shell-BP but lost the court case on legal technicalities.
The land conflict was probably unnecessary in this case and reflected Shell-BP’s 
ignorance of the customary land rights in the area. When the oil company entered the area 
in December 1965, the company representatives approached the Gbekebor people but 
failed to approach the Abadiama people. Shell-BP used a suiweyor and a ‘contact man ’ to 
identify the owners of the land. In those days, oü companies sometimes used indigenous 
contact men from their area of operations rather than experts from outside who provided 
local information to the oü companies. In the present case, it appears that SheU-BP’s 
contact man was a native of Gbekebor, whüe the Abadiama people had no contact man. 
Since Shell-BP received information from an indigene of Gbekebor, the company may 
have been misinformed about the Abadiamas’ tme land claim.
If the Land Section of Shell-BP had in this case done its work properly, the 
company would have paid compensation to the Abadiamas as customary tenants for the
(1974) 1 AllN.L.R.
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destroyed ponds and other improvements, while money should have been paid to the 
Gbekebor people as land owners for the use of land only.
In general, the oil companies’ ignorance of local customary rights causes 
problems for communities and companies alike. According to a confidential Shell report 
from 1993, the three main problems in land acquisition are: communication and wrong 
interpretations, identifying rightful owners, and resolving disputes and counter claims 
(SPDC 1993). It could be argued, however, that an even greater problem was the lack of 
an economic incentive for oü companies to conduct land acquisition in a careful manner. 
If there is a land dispute, an oü company is able to compulsorily acquire a piece of land 
notwithstanding an existing conflict between land owners. The regulations introduced 
under the Petroleum Act 1969 provided that, in the event of a dispute, an amount was to 
be deposited by an oÜ company with the Accountant-General of a federal state in full or 
partial settlement, which was eventually due to the landowners.^* The amount of 
compensation deposited was decided by the company. Even though the dispute might not 
have been resolved and families might have been left landless, a company was aüowed to 
enter a piece of land.^  ^ Since 1978, oÜ companies have no longer been required to pay 
compensation for land but only for any crops, buüdings and other objects destroyed on 
the land (see section three of the thesis). As a result, hostüity may arise towards oü 
companies because the compensation payments are either insignificant or non-existent.
^ Regulations 17(l)(c) and (2).
The predicament of land owners under petroleum law was even worse under the Oil Pipelines Act, which did not 
require an oil company to pay a deposit. That means, a company was able to take possession of a piece of land for 
the construction of an oil pipeline notwithstanding a dispute and was not required to pay any compensation.
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Oil companies did not always generate hostility when they entered a plot of land, 
particulaiiy before 1978. Indeed, the relationship between oil companies and communities 
could have been one of co-operation as long as the oil company paid compensation. 
However, compulsory land acquisition and subsequent low compensation payments could 
desti'oy the peaceful relationship between companies and communities, as can be seen in 
Nzekwu V. Attorney-General East-Central State^^ . In that case, the Ogbo family sued the 
government for compulsoiy acquisition of 397 acres of their land neai' Onitsha in the then 
Eastern Region of Nigeria. Initially, the family co-operated with the oil companies. In 
1957, they leased 3.2 acres of land to Total Oil for ninety-nine years at the rate of £945 
per annum. In the same yeai', they let out land to Shell-BP for a ferry ramp at the rate of 
£200 per annum.
However, in January 1960, the government published a notice of its intention to 
acquire almost 800 acres of land in the area, including the 397 acres owned by the 
plaintiffs, who demanded significantly higher compensation than they were offered. The 
government offered a rate of £10 per annum for 20 years, which was significantly lower 
than the rates previously offered by the oü companies. The Ogbo famüy rejected the offer 
and subsequently sued the government. The Supreme Court awarded the famüy a sum of 
£252,600 for tlie land and the houses thereon which was to be paid by the government. In 
this way, a land conflict had rendered the famüy rich. The above case is an example of 
how a community or a famüy could capitalise on land acquisition. Nevertheless, such a
(1972) All N.L.R.
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situation could no longer arise after the promulgation of the Land Use Act of 1978, since 
compensation for land acquisition was no longer paid.
On the whole, the cases discussed in this sub-section illustrate that oil companies 
often find themselves caught in long-standing land disputes in oil producing areas. But 
there is evidence that they may cause fresh conflicts or aggravate existing ones, 
particulaiiy as a result of their ignorance of local ownership structures. In this context, 
land acquisition may present a som*ce of conflicts between companies and communities.
5.6. Conclusion
This section of the thesis assessed the impact of oü exploration and production on 
village communities in terms of the resulting envtionmental and social damage. This 
damage was analysed through the window of litigation. This window excludes those 
disputes which have not gone to court due to financial, technical or other factors. By 
looking at this type of htigation, we inevitably ignore evidence of the direct benefits of oü 
operations to village communities.^^ Court cases also faü to provide evidence of the 
adverse secondary effects of oü operations such as migi-ation of oü workers into oü- 
producing areas as weU as the psychological and cultural effects of oü operations.^^ With 
regards to many secondary effects, it is difficult to say whether oü operations led to
Onyige (1979,189-191) mentioned a number of beneficial effects of oü operations such as the construction of 
access roads and scholarships.
“  Onyige (1979, 151-152,155-156 and 176) has mentioned a number of adverse effects, which cannot be derived 
from court cases. These included the impact of migration of oü workers and the rise in food prices. Court cases, 
moreover, provide little evidence of the psychological and cultural effects of oü operations. Onyige (1979, 188), 
for example, has pointed to the effect of temporary employment of young people by oil companies. Those young 
people who are employed by oü companies are highly paid for a short period of time. By increasing their spending 
habits and imitating a culture alien to them, their lifestyles may quickly become distinctive from the rest of the 
community. Both the young men and the village community at large may find it difficult to adjust to those sudden 
changes. In any case, more in-depth field research is needed into those issues.
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adverse or beneficial changes.^^ Court judgments, moreover, do not allow for a 
comparison between the scope of environmental damage in Nigeria and in other 
countiies.^ In this sense, our view is biased. Yet it was not the goal of this thesis to 
weigh the benefits and costs of oil operations. Rather we set out to analyse sources of 
conflict and civil strife. Evidence from ‘real world’ cases illustrated a number of those 
souices.
White there aie a number of larger envtionmental problems in the oil producing 
aieas such as coastal erosion, winch are not caused by oil company activities, the direct 
effects of oil operations typically result in envtionmental and social externalities affecting 
specific areas and people. Oil pollution may have a limited impact on the ecology of the 
oil producing areas as a whole. The destruction of crops or fishing sites, meanwhile, can 
have a disastrous effect on specific families and communities by depriving tliem of any 
means of subsistence.
That ecological and social damage is incidental to oÜ operations and that it can 
never be fuUy eliminated is perhaps self-evident Commenting on the impact of seismic 
surveys, J.P. van Dessel, formerly Shell’s head of envtionmental studies in Nigeria, 
remarked that ^further reduction o f  the impact o f seismic operations in the mangrove
® Writing on tire Ogba/Egbeba district of Rivers State, Onyige (1979, 164-165) has found that many farmers had 
shifted from yam to cassava production as a result of the influx of oil workers. Oil workers consumed a 
substantial amount of gari, which is made from cassava. It is not entirely clear whether this shift can be classified 
as either beneficial or adverse to the village communities.
^  Secondary sources suggest that, from an international perspective, oil operations in Nigeria appear to cause 
greater environmental and social damage than in many other oü producing countries. For instance, gas flaring in 
Nigeria is more significant as a percentage of total gas production than elsewhere in the world. According to the 
World Bank, up to 76% of the associated gas from oil wells was flared in Nigeria in 1995, as compared with 
0.6% in the US and 4.3% in the UK (see Appendix D, Table D.16.). By 1997, the percentage of flared gas had 
fallen to roughly 71% (Vanguard, October 1, 1998). This percentage was likely to fall further as a result of new 
investments in gas related projects in Nigeria but a continuation gas flaring was likely in the short-term and the 
medium-term. If judged by the example of gas flaring, it would appear that oil companies have taken 
environmental concerns in Nigeria less seriously than in other countries.
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(further reduction o f the line width) is not possible without jeopardising the safety o f  the 
crews or the quality o f  the data' (van Dessel 1995, 19), Similarly, the oil iiidushy cannot 
function without infrastructure such as access roads, which requires interactions between 
oil companies and village communities. Nonetheless, most forms of damage such as oil 
spills cannot be blamed on technical and geographical difficulties alone, but must be 
attributed to a lack of corporate effort and the failure of Nigeria’s legal provisions to 
protect the environment and the village communities (see section three of the thesis).
The adverse impact of oil operations often appears as the result of careless 
operating practises and the lack of funding. By implication, it has to be assumed that this 
impact could be significantly minimised. As shown eailier, oil spills aie often caused by 
operational faults and inadequate maintenance of oü instaUations. Oü companies in 
Nigeria could reduce the impact of oü operations in various ways.*^  ^ For instance, many 
oil spüls could be either avoided or better contained. In Shell v. Isaiah^^ mentioned 
earlier. Shell negligently faüed to contain an oü spill. In Umudje v. Shell-BP^^ mentioned 
earlier, Shell-BP constructed a road across a watemay but faüed to insert enough 
culverts under the road. In both cases, damage from oü operations could have been 
avoided or minimised.
Legal provisions in Nigeria do not appear to have been particulaiiy effective in 
minimising the adverse impact of oil operations (see section three of tlie thesis). Indeed,
^ Secondary sources on oil operations have, for instance, suggested that abandoned wells can be plugged (Hyne 
1995, 293). Yet, according to J.P. van Dessel, a small fraction of Shell’s non-producing wells in Nigeria have 
been adequately abandoned, 'most of them were simply left behind’ (van Dessel 1995, 16).
“  [1997] 6NWLR.
^ 5 E.C.S.L.R.
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Shell’s Health, Safety and Environment Adviser in Nigeria stated in 1998: 'Law is the 
least important factor in terms o f environmental protection\^^ According, to him, the 
three main factors were: contiol over decision-making, culture and the age of 
installations, although the third factor appears to result from the first two. In terms of 
decision-making, funding is the key obstacle to the protection of the rural environment 
and the village communities. Environmental improvements are often costly, while oil 
companies aie hkely to be reluctant to spend money on environmental protection. The 
economic activity of oü companies is dictated by the profit motive, which can also be said 
of the conflicts with oil producing communities. The central government and the oü 
companies have a natural incentive to retain revenue and minimise costs in a competitive 
bidding system. Contractors are under pressure from Shell and the other foreign 
companies to perform seiwices at the lowest possible price, which furtlier forces them to 
minimise costs. Therefore, contractors have little incentive to spend money on the 
maintenance of oü installations and, generally, on any projects related to viUage 
communities and envtionmental protection. Meanwhüe, the purely envtionmental costs as 
pait of the total oü company expenditure aie potentiaUy substantial. According to a 1996 
survey on the Nigerian oü industry by the consultancy firms Arthur Andersen and 
Andersen Consulting, 54% of the oÜ company executives expect envtionmental issues in 
Nigeria such as oü spüls and gas flaring to have the greatest effect on abandonment and 
restoration costs (Arthur Andersen 1997).
Personal interview with Chris Geerling, SPDC’s Corporate Health, Safety and Environment Adviser (Lagos, 
February 1998).
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While the financial costs of environmental protection can be assumed to play an 
important role in decision-making, cultural influences also appear to be very important, 
that means, social values which guide decisions made by company staff. Subsidiaries of 
multinational companies could be assumed to develop specific corporate cultures 
influenced by both the national culture of the country in which they operate and by the 
cultuial values of the corporate headquarters. Unfortunately, there appears to have been 
no prior academic research on the dynamics of cultural change in Nigeria’s oil companies. 
Within the cultural context, the most striking feature of the industry’s environmental 
performance is probably the ignorance of oü company staff with regards to environmental 
and community issues. Referring to the Nigeria Liquefied Natural Gas (NLNG) project, 
Chris Geerling, SheU’s Health, Safety and Environment Adviser, could not understand 
why anyone would be willing to oppose NLNG as tlie project would eliminate gas flaring 
in the long run. In Geerling’s view, the NLNG project presents only beneficial effects to 
the envii'onment and the vülage communities. Geerling obviously faüed to recognise, 
however, that a project of that nature may also have a significant social and 
environmental impact on village communities such as compulsory acquisition of land, 
construction work, laying of gas pipelines or migration of oil workers into the area.^  ^ The 
views of Shell’s envtionmental head in Nigeria may exemplify the oü companies’ cultural 
ignorance of the problems faced by vülage communities as a result of oü operations. This 
ignorance has been reflected, for instance, in the faüure of oü companies to properly
^ Personal interview with Chris Geerling, SPDC’s Corporate Health, Safety and Environment Adviser (Lagos, 
February 1998). As Ashton-Jones (1998, 173) has noted, SheU’s 1995 Environmental Impact Assessment (EIA) 
study of the LNG plant in Bonny, which has been on the drawing board for over 30 years, did not, for instance, 
consider the impact of activities carried out in the process of preliminary works such as clearing of vegetation in 
1979 and the relocation of the Finima village after 1979.
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investigate the local ownership structures before awarding compensation for land 
acquisition. In Adomba v. Odiesf^ mentioned earlier, Agip’s representatives knew little 
about customary land rights in the area. In general, factual evidence from court 
judgments, particularly in relation to land disputes, suggests that oil company staff are 
either ignorant of the problems faced by village communities as a result of oil operations 
or they attach little importance to those problems.
The data presented in this section of the thesis would suggest that cultural 
attitudes rather than funding problems are at the root of careless oil company operating 
practices in Nigeria. In Seismograph Service v. Mark^  ^ mentioned earlier, the destruction 
of fishing nets by seismic boats, for example, could have been easily avoided through an 
adequate warning system and closer co-operation with village communities, which would 
have entailed only insignificant financial costs. In Umudje v. Shell-BP^^ mentioned 
earlier, the impact of the blockage could have been minimised through inserting enough 
culverts under the road at an insignificant financial cost. In general, evidence from court 
judgments indicated that many foims of damage from oil operations stem directly from 
the cai'eless management by oil companies rather than from the lack of funding. From the 
perspective of oil companies, it would make good business sense to minimise the adverse 
impact of oil operations when the financial costs involved are low. By minimising the 
damage from oü operations, oü companies could help to reduce the frequency of 
community conflicts arising from oÜ activities on the ground. But cultural attitudes may
™ 1 R.S.L.R. (1980). 
[1993] 7 NWLR.
5 E.C.S.L.R.
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prevent many initiatives to minimise the adverse social and environmental effects of oü 
operations on viUage communities.
On the whole, factual evidence from oü related court judgments provided various 
indications that the adverse impact of oü operations has led to fresh disputes between 
vülage communities and oü companies or contributed to existing disputes. Some of these 
disputes have, in turn, resulted in litigation.
With regards to the legal side of disputes in the oü industry, our analysis provided 
indications that Nigerian courts may find it difficult to adequately adjudicate claims for 
damage from oü operations which are necessarily of a technical nature. In Shell-BP v. 
Usoro^  ^ mentioned earlier, for instance, viUagers encountered problems in trying to prove 
damage caused by seismic surveys, fri general, evidence from court judgments indicated 
that courts encounter specific difficulties in attributing causality and assessing the 
consequential damages in oü related litigation. This is likely to have reduced the chances 
of success of those affected by oü operations in litigation against oÜ companies in 
Nigeria. In turn, this could explain why the adverse environmental and social impact of oÜ 
operations may result in extra legal forms of protest rather than in litigation.
The analysis in this section of the thesis was confined to the use of court 
judgments as factual evidence. It cannot explain why more court cases filed by vülage 
communities against oil companies have succeeded and higher compensation payments 
were awarded to communities m the 1990s. The legal dynamics of oü related litigation 
are explored in some detail in the following section of the thesis.
[I960] SCNLR.
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Section 6: Compensation Ciaims in Oil 
Related Litigation
Introduction
6.1. Introduction
The evolution of litigation is inevitably related to the success of individual 
litigants. This core section of the thesis investigates how the Nigerian legal system has 
addressed the litigants’ claims against oil companies over time. We observe that a number 
of legal innovations have been introduced in oü related litigation and that these 
innovations may have benefited vülage communities. Oui" analysis indicates that there is 
an increased possibÜity of higher compensation awards to viUage communities. This 
seems to have had an impact on the quantity of litigation.
In the period 1981-86, 24 compensation claims against SheU went to court in 
Nigeria (Adewale 1989, 93). In eai'ly 1998, SheU was reportedly involved in over 500 
pending court cases in Nigeria, out of which 70% or roughly 350 cases dealt with oü 
spills, the other 30% or 150 cases dealt mostly with other types of damage from oil 
operations, contracts, employment and taxation.^ In the whole of the 1980s, Chevron 
reportedly had only up to 50 court cases in Nigeria. In early 1998, Chevron was involved 
in over 200 cases, of which 80-90% or roughly 160-180 cases dealt with oü spüls, other
 ^ Personal interview with J.A.Odeleye, SPDC’s Legal Manager and Company Secretary (Lagos, February 1998).
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types of damage from oil operations or land acquisition for oil operations.^ This 
substantial increase cannot be solely ascribed to expanding oil operations. In the 1990s, a 
number of high profile cases have been won by village communities, notably Shell v.
Farah^, in which ca. 4.6 million Naira (ca. US$ 210,000) was awarded as damages to a 
community.
We have analysed 68 court cases, which involved disputes arising from oil
■ÎIcompany field operations. Reported cases were gathered from publicly available law |
ireports, while a number of umeported cases were obtained from practising lawyers in |
INigeria. The collection of cases was aided by Nigerian legal professionals, a Nigerian |
tjudge and the author’s judgment. The sample of court cases is biased in favour of |
reported as opposed to umeported judgments because they are more easily available. But |
the sample probably represents the best possible judgment an outsider can gain on oü
related litigation in Nigeria. In this section of the thesis, we utilise 31 of the most j
i
representative and relevant court cases. |
Before going into the depth of analysis, we investigate why many disputes cannot I
I
be resolved through informal negotiations and mediation and may thus result in litigation j
Iiand violence. This discussion can serve as a window to an understanding of non-legal 
foims of disputes which in turn can help to understand the dynamics underlying legal 
disputes. This is foUowed by an in-depth analysis of litigation with a focus on legal 
change. We analyse the nature and the dynamics underlying legal disputes between oil
 ^ Personal interview with Ned ‘Temi Mojuetan, attorney at the Law & Contracts Department of Chevron Nigeria 
(Lagos, March 1998).
 ^ [1995] 3 NWLR.
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companies and village communities in Nigeria by investigating the principles of tort law 
upon which oü related litigation is based, the legal defences employed by oü companies 
and legal innovations in oü related cases.
Negotiation and Mediation in Oil Related 
Disputes
6.2. Compensation Payments through Negotiation and Mediation
Before we discuss the legal principles of compensation claims resulting from oü 
operations in Nigeria, we analyse evidence from a number of court cases to ülustrate 
specific instances, in which vülage communities tried to resolve a conflict before they 
actually went to court. In other words, we use court cases as factual evidence of non- 
legal forms of disputing.
Anthropological literature (e.g. Nader and Todd 1978) suggests that disputes can 
take a number of forms. Disputes may go through stages involving informal negotiation,
mediation or violence without involving any litigation. Even if a plaintiff initiates
litigation, a case may be settled out of court before reaching a court judgment. In
As Nader and Todd (1978, 15) have pointed out, 'these stages are not neat nor are they necessarily sequential. 
The aggrieved party may, for instance, fide a court suit without having earlier confronted an offender.
 ^ An example of an out-of-court settlement in oil related litigation in Nigeria is provided by the case GardUne 
Shipping V. Joshua Unreported Suit No. FHC/L/CS/1273/96. In that case, Gardiine Shipping Limited sued 28 
fishermen in order to limit the company’s liability for damages towards the 28 fishermen, who claimed 
compensation for damage from oil operations. A boat owned by Gardiine Shipping, while conducting a seismic 
survey, tore and dragged away fishing nets of fishermen in the Bonny area of the then Rivers State. 28 fishermen 
sought compensation from the company for the destroyed fishing nets. The company initiated a lawsuit against 
those fishermen in the Federal High Court in order to limit the aggregate compensation amount to 47,398 Naha 
for each ton of the tonnage of the ship in line with the Merchant Shipping Act. Subsequently, the matter was 
settled out-of-court at the initial request of the fishermen. In general terms, out-of-court settlements appear to be 
relatively infrequent in oil related litigation in Nigeria. According to SPDC’s legal manager, out-of-court 
settlements at SheU reportedly involve between 5 and 15% of all court cases. Personal intei-view with 
J.A.Odeleye, SPDC’s Legal Manager and Company Secretary (Lagos, February 1998).
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disputes between village communities and oü companies in Nigeria, litigation is an 
important element but it may occur in only a fraction of disputes. For instance, in one of 
Shell’s two divisions in Nigeria alone, 1081 compensation claims were made between 
1981 and 1986, of which 124 claims were settled and only 24 claims went to court 
(Adewale 1989, 93). In 1979, Agip had roughly 600 unsettled compensation claims in 
Rivers State alone, but only 6 court cases were pending in Rivers State courts (Onyige 
1979, 105 and 148-149). Before a compensation claim comes to court, it may be settled 
by informal agreement between those affected by oü operations and the oü company or 
by mediation.
A dispute may start with an attempt at informal negotiation. Once vülagers decide 
to negotiate and to seek compensation for damage from oü operations, they contact the 
oil company. The company can decide whether to agree to negotiations or not. 
Negotiations are usually carried out between the oü company and the community leaders. 
If the company accepts liability, a subsequent assessment of the damage and a 
compensation payment may be made. The oü company tends to detennine the amount of 
the compensation payment, which may then be rejected or accepted by the claimants. A 
confidential report commissioned for the SheU-initiated Niger Delta Environmental 
Survey (NDES) in 1996 criticised the way in which oü companies assess compensation 
payments in infomial negotiations:
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Our investigations revealed that the oil industry operators have their 
yardstick fo r assessing what they pay. The victim may reject the offer; if  
he makes a further appeal [to the company], he may get another paltry 
upward review after a further delay o f about 6  months to a year 
(Ogbnigwe 1996).
Evidence from court cases suggests that an unsatisfactory outcome of informal 
negotiations for those affected by oil operations can lead to litigation. In Odim v. Shell- 
BP^, the plaintiffs were paid compensation by Shell-BP in respect of destroyed crops, 
after negotiations took place. Subsequently, the plaintiffs went to court claiming a higher 
amount of compensation. They claimed that the negotiations with the oil company were 
not carried out in good faith and that the company fixed the compensation amounts 
without the consent of the recipients. A witness admitted that the plaintiffs were notified 
by the company about the assessment of crops for compensation and that they had 
received a payment. But the plaintiffs averred that they regarded the compensation 
payment as merely a temporary payment. When they heard about the promulgation of the 
Rivers State Minimum Crop Compensation Rates Edict of 1973, they instituted a lawsuit. 
Under the Edict of 1973, those adversely affected by oil operations were entitled to 
significantly higher compensation rates for crops than those actually paid by oil 
companies.
In the Odim case, Shell-BP lawyers relied on the provisions of the Oil Pipelines 
Act, under which compensation payments were to be determined in negotiations with the
 ^ (1974) 2 R.S.L.R..
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claimants. There aie indications that the 1973 Edict was biased against oil company 
interests because it involved higher compensation rates than those paid hitherto by the 
companies. Not surprisingly, Shell-BP lawyers argued against the Edict’s provisions. The 
court judgment reported on the testimony of Shell-BP’s Senior Lands Supervisor as 
follows:
The 1st defendants [Shell-BP] do not accept for basis o f  calculation o f  
compensation rates any other law than the Oil Pipeline Law; to accept 
the rates as fixed by the Rivers State Edict No.7 o f 1973 was unrealistic 
and against the trend o f  open market prices J
The Odim case was dismissed because the court regarded the 1973 Edict as 
unconstitutional. The court further concluded that the plaintiffs had voluntarily accepted a 
compensation payment, so that they were not entitled to claim an additional 
compensation payment m respect of the same injury. If the villagers had been aware of 
the Edict during negotiations, it is hkely that they probably would have used it as the 
basis of their compensation claim.
In another case Nvogoro v. Shell-BP^, the oü company constructed a road 
through the middle of a farm occupied by Sunday Nvogoro in the Nweel community in 
the Ogoni area. Whüe Mr. Nvogoro was away, his brother Bomu led negotiations with 
Shell-BP. During negotiations with Mr. Iworima of SheU-BP, Bomu claimed 
compensation for three banana trees and some bamboo ti'ees. He demanded 5 shillings for 
each banana tree and 20 shühngs for each bamboo ti*ee, but settled for a sum of only 17
 ^ Per Wai-Ogosu, J. at page 98.
® 2R.S.L.R.(1973).
275
shillings for all trees combined. In addition, he claimed £30 for an empty yam bam, but 
was only paid £3 by SheU-BP. When Sunday Nvogoro returned home, he was surprised 
that his illiterate brother had been paid compensation. Dissatisfied with the amount of 
compensation, he initiated a lawsuit against the oil company. Shell-BP used a receipt, 
thumb-printed by Bomu, as evidence in court. The plaintiff lost the case because SheU-BP 
had previously paid compensation in respect of the same damage.
The above cases appeal* to indicate that negotiations with oÜ companies are often 
unsatisfactory from the perspective of village communities. When negotiations break 
down, mediation may take place, though this appears to be less common in Nigeria than 
negotiation. Mediation involves a third party, usually officials from the Depaitment of 
Petroleum Resources or the NNPC, who inteiwene in a dispute to help the two parties to 
reach an agreement. In Nwadiaro v. S h e lf , the Umusaziokwushi family of Obutu village 
in Imo State sued SheU after having tried both negotiation and mediation in dealing with 
the company. In 1966, SheU constructed an access road to an oU weU location which 
blockaded the viUage creeks, pond and lakes. SheU had never paid compensation to the 
family, although some payments were made to other persons in 1972. At first, SheU 
denied any liabiUty for damage from its oU operations, but later engaged in negotiations 
with those affected. When negotiations broke down, mediation was convened with the 
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) acting as intermediary, hi late 1984, 
an investigation was caiTied out, which included two SheU employees, two NNPC 
employees and a representative of the Ikesco compensation claims agency, to investigate 
and assess the compensation claim of the Umusaziokwushi family. A report on the
’ [1990] 5 NWLR.
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investigation found that Shell was responsible for the blockage. It recommended that the 
culverts under the road should be reconstructed to allow for a proper flow of water. It 
further recommended that compensation should be paid to the Umusaziokwushi family.
In communication with the NNPC, Shell agreed to pay compensation. In reality, Shell still 
failed to pay the compensation so the plaintiffs filed a court case demanding 100,000 
Naira in compensation. The case Nwadiaro v. Shell shows the inadequacy of mediation.
Although an investigation was canied out by the NNPC, SheU admitted liability for the 
damage in the process of mediation and agreed to pay, the oil company faded to pay 
compensation to the claimants in reality.
In general, the main problem with mediation is that it is not legaUy binding and 
there is no agency in Nigeria to enforce the compensation payments. A further problem is 
that mediation is usuaUy carried out by the NNPC or the od ministry, which aie piimaiily
concerned with the level of od production and od revenues rather than with the 1i
protection of those affected by od operations. Compensation payments increase costs for j
companies, so companies are usuaUy reluctant to pay. The NNPC operates as an oil 
exploration and production company and has itself refused to pay compensation for 
damage to communities in some cases.C learly , the NNPC and the oil ministiy have an 
economic incentive to keep compensation claims to a niinimum, so they are unsuitable to 
act as mediators in disputes between companies and communities. In contrast, as 
Adewale (1989, 98-99) has pointed out, when the State Ministiy of Lands acted as a 
mediator in those disputes on a number of occasions, both paities reportedly expressed 
greater satisfaction.
For instance, in Ebogbe v. NNPC (1994) 10 KLR (Pt 22).
277
In addition to the above problems related to mediation and negotiation, secondary 
sources suggest that there have been many iiTegularities in respect of compensation 
payments made by oil companies. For instance, Onyige (1979, 144-146) investigated the 
payment of compensation to the Umuodogu family of Omoku in Rivers State by Agip. 
Agip acquired 20 acres of land in 1975. According to die directives of the Rivers State 
government at the time, the company should have paid 1,000 Naira per acre, so the 
Umuodogu family claimed 20,000 Naira. But Agip only paid 3,200 Naha to the family. 
Of the final sum, 800 Naira were reportedly retained by the company’s acquisition officer, 
800 Naira were paid to the lawyer who negotiated die settlement, 300 Naira were paid to 
the surveyor, 500 Naira were retained by the company’s ‘contact man’ who provided 
information on the local property rights and another 300 Naha were reportedly paid as 
the lawyer’s expenses. Of the 3,200 Naha paid, the family received merely 500 Naha or 
roughly 15% of the compensation sum m return for 20 acres of land acquhed by the 
company for a period of five years. The above example indicates that neither the 
compensation payment nor the manner in which the money was paid to the family were 
adequate.
IiTegularities in the payment of compensation appear to have persisted. A 
confidential report commissioned for the SheU-initiated Niger Delta Environmental 
Survey (NDES) in 1996 describes some of the problems:
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Oil industry operators approve compensation to be paid to victims whose 
crops, economic trees and shrines have been destroyed in course o f  
operations [sic]. Such compensation (often tagged ‘Ex gratia’ payment) 
is made through various operators who are contractors to the oil industry 
operators. In such a situation the paltiy  sums which normally ranges 
[sic] from 500 to 5,000 Naira in extreme cases are forced down the 
throat o f often dissatisfied victims who are in most cases too poor to 
undertake the expenses o f initiating a suit. (Ogbnigwe 1996).
The World Bank confiims the view that there aie major iiTegulaiities regarding 
the payment of compensation to those affected by oü operations. Said a World Bank 
report in 1995: ‘Compensation may not be paid to the affected community or 
individuals. Instead, other communities, disbursement agents, or powerful individuals 
may keep the compensation funds’ (World Bank 1995, volume II, annex M, 75). Even if 
an oil company pays compensation to those adversely affected by oü operations, the 
inadequate OPTS rates or the official government rates are used (see section thiee of the 
thesis). In addition, damage assessments aie often incomplete, according to the World 
Bank (1995, volume II, annex M, 76).
The above discussion suggests that, from the perspective of vülage communities, 
negotiation and mediation are cuixently unsatisfactory methods of settling compensation 
claims by communities against oü companies in Nigeria. Because of low compensation 
payments and irregularities, communities may often be dissatisfied with the compensation 
procedures. Since mediation and negotiation may not satisfy the claimants and since there
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is no independent agency to monitor compensation payments, those affected by oil 
operations may feel that the only means of redress for them may be to either use violence 
or to initiate a lawsuit in court against an oil company.
The use of violence and community umest against oü companies is by no means 
inevitable. But violence is more likely to escalate over time if those affected by oil 
operations continue to be aggrieved by those operations. Some evidence from court cases 
suggests that social unrest may result from the unresponsiveness of companies to 
demands for social amenities rather than the careless manner in which they operate. An 
interesting example involving violence is the case Adizua v. Agip^^ , in which the Agorua 
Ajukwu famüy sued Agip for 800,000 Naira in compensation for damage. Agip used the 
plaintiffs’ faimlands for its Akii and Akii West oÜ fields from 1967 and 1974 
respectively. InitiaUy, the relationship with the Agorua Ajukwu famüy was entirely 
peaceful as the company entered into an agreement to pay land rents and compensation, 
to award scholarships and to offer employment opportunities.
In the course of its operations, Agip operations reportedly caused severe damage 
to the famüy land, including the contamination of drinking water by oil spills. In 1982, a 
pipeline exploded, causing the death of six of the plaintiffs’ tenants. Agip and the affected 
families engaged in negotiations. The company accepted liability for the accident, but the 
famihes of the deceased were dissatisfied with the insignificant compensation payments 
offered. Oü operations continued to have an adverse impact on the plaintiffs’ land, so
Unreported Suit No. HOG/22/97, Imo State HC.
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some members of the community decided to coerce the company into the payment of 
compensation.
It appears that the local people eventually engaged in violent conduct primarily 
because Agip went back on its earlier promises with regards to compensation payments, 
scholarships and jobs, rather than because of the actual envii’onmental and social damage 
that the company was causing. In 1983, Agip stopped paying land rents, which the 
company had continuously paid from 1967 to 1982. The family claimed that, by 1997, 
only 15 scholarships had been awarded to secondary school pupils in the area in thirty 
years. They further averred that Agip had ceased awarding bush clearing contracts to the 
local people. The conflict between the family and the company escalated when Agip 
failed to respond to letters and representations from the local people.
It is not clear how violence erupted, but it appears that Agip had contributed to 
an atmosphere of fear and intimidation. Rather than engaging in negotiations with the 
local people, Agip decided to call on the security forces. In a letter dated 19 March 1984, 
Agip’s district manager, A. Pirocchi wrote a letter to the Commissioner of Police in Imo 
State, complaining about the Agorua Ajukwu family’s unreasonable demands and asking 
for armed assistance. Wrote A. Pirocchi:
We therefore solicit your urgent action to step into this matter so that our 
production could start immediately and in fact we request that you 
provide a unit o f your men to guard our installations in this area and to 
ensure that our current programmed activities are uninterrupted}^
12 Letter from A .Pirocchi, Agip’s district manager, to the Commissioner of Police, Imo State Police Command, 
Oweni, Agip Ref.No. JPOAVTC/PH/365/84 (19 March 1984).
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Following the company’s requests for armed assistance in the 1980s and the 
1990s, members of the Agorua Ajukwu family claimed that they were repeatedly haiassed 
and intimidated by the police. In November 1996, the company’s Akri flowstation was 
allegedly attacked by around 40 local people. Without investigating the incident, Agip’s 
General Manager of the Port Harcouit District, Umberto Vergine, wrote to the 
Commissioner in Imo State blaming Chief Ugboma Adizua for the attack of ‘some thugs 
carrying dangerous weapons’. Once again Agip stressed that they would not bow to 
local demands. Wrote Umberto Vergine:
Sir, we believe that as good corporate citizens, we should be able to carry 
out our legitimate business without being subjected to blackmail and 
harassment o f thugs and attacks on our staff when a landlord wants a 
contract. We would highly appreciate your intervention to bring book all 
those responsible fo r  this attack.
Agip has yet failed to resolve the conflict, relying on security protection rather 
than peaceful negotiations, which has led to further escalation of the conflict. The enthe 
ti’uth about Agip’s conflict with the Agorua Ajukwu family may never be known, but the 
case indicates that community disturbances are Hkely to result from a combination of 
unfulfilled social demands, broken oil company promises and the companies’ tiaditional 
reliance on the security forces. Since both negotiations as well as the use of violence 
failed, the Agorua Ajukwu family decided to take Agip to court.
Letter from Umberto Vergine, Agip’s General Manager, Port Harcourt District, to the Commissioner of Police, 
Imo State Police Command, Owerri (2 December 1996).
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The Adizua case is indicative of a process in which communities come to use 
violence because they are inadequately compensated for damage from oil operations and 
faced with kregularities in the assessment and payment of compensation. The case also 
suggests that a dispute between a community and a company can evolve in stages from 
negotiation through violence to litigation.
In general, the above discussion illustrates that litigation is pait of a dynamic 
process involving extra-legal and legal forms of conflict. The use of litigation as opposed 
to extra-legal forms of disputing depends on the companies’ legal liability for damage 
from oil operations.
Legal Liability for Oil Operations
6.3. Basic Principles of Tort Law
Legal disputes between vülage communities and oU companies are governed by 
the Nigerian law of torts. A Nigerian textbook on tort law by Kodilinye (1982, 1) has 
defined a tort as follows:
A tort may be defined broadly as a civil wrong involving a breach o f duty 
fixed by the law, such duty being owed to persons generally and its 
breach being redressible primarily by an action for damages.
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The essential aim o f  the law o f torts is to compensate persons harmed by 
the wrongful conduct o f  others, and the substantive law o f  torts consists 
o f the rules and principles which have been developed to determine when 
the law will and when it will not grant redress for damage suffered. Such 
damage takes several different forms - such as physical injury to persons; 
physical damage to property; injury to reputation; and damage to 
economic interests. The law o f torts requires every person not to cause 
harm to others in certain situations, and if  harm is caused, the victim is 
entitled to sue the wrongdoer fo r damages by way o f  compensation.
Therefore, the usual remedy for a tort is monetary compensation for damage. This 
fact distinguishes tort law from criminal law. If the defendant loses a case, he may have to 
pay compensation to the plaintiff, but will not be sentenced to imprisonment. In addition 
to monetary compensation under tort law, a plaintiff can seek an injunction. An injunction 
is a judicial order to the defendant to abstain from or to take a certain action. Whether an 
injunction is granted or not depends on the subject matter. In respect of oü operations in 
Nigeria, injunctions have sometimes been sought by plaintiffs but were virtuaUy never 
granted. In Irou v. Shell-BP^^ ,^ the judge refused to grant an injunction in favour of the 
plaintiff whose land, fish pond and creek had been polluted by Shell-BP. The judge 
explained his reasoning for not granting an injunction as foUows: ‘To grant the order... 
would amount to asking the defendant [SheU-BP] to stop operating in the area... The 
interest o f  third persons must be in some cases considered e.g. where the injunction 
would cause stoppage o f  trade or throwing out a large number o f work people’. The
Unreported Suit No. W/89/71, Warn HC.
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judge mled that nothing should be done to disturb the operations of the oil industiy which 
‘is the main source o f  this country’s revenue’. In other words, the economic interests of 
the oil industry appeared to be more important to the judge than the course of justice. In 
Chinda v. Shell-BP^^, the plaintiffs asked for an injunction on gas flaring. The judge 
rejected tlie request by saying: ‘The Statement o f Claim demands an order that 
Defendants [Shell-BP] refrain from operating a similar flare stack within five miles o f  
Plaintiffs’ village, an absurdly and needlessly wide demand’. The above judgments 
indicate that Nigerian courts are very reluctant to grant an injunction in oil related cases. 
For oil companies, this interpretation of the law by Nigerian judges is favourable because 
the law allows them to continue with theii* exploration and production activities, 
notwithstanding the impact of oü operations on vülage communities. Said Shell’s legal 
manager, J.A.Odeleye, in 1998: ‘The law is on our side because in the case o f a dispute, 
we don’t have to stop operations’.^  ^ According to Odeleye, in early 1998 not a single 
injunction was in place against SheU in Nigeria.
Seeking compensation for damage offers vülage communities greater prospects of 
success than injunctions. Oü related compensation claims in Nigeria are usuaUy based on 
specific torts, notably the ‘tort o f negligence’, ‘tort o f nuisance’ and on the rule of strict
(1974)2R.S.L.R.
Per Holden, CJ. at page 14.
Personal interview with J.A.Odeleye, SPDC’s Legal Manager and Company Secretary (Lagos, February 1998).
While the imposition of injunctions against oil companies is not a realistic option in Nigeria, the substantial 
quantity of litigation continues to constitute a problem for the oil industry and entails financial costs for the 
companies. As a way of avoiding litigation, oil companies could introduce less harmful practices. This would 
ultimately reduce the quantity of litigation because village communities would have fewer legal grounds on which 
to sue. But oil companies have failed to change theti harmful practices despite environmental legislation (see 
sections three and five of the thesis).
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liability. These torts can sometimes overlap in a single case. For instance, a plaintiff could 
plead negligence in combination with nuisance.
6.4. Negligence
One of the main torts applied in oil related litigation is negligence. In 
Seismograph Service v. Mark^^, the plaintiff claimed compensation for damage from the 
destruction of his fishing nets by a seismic boat. It was impossible for the plaintiff to 
show that the company acted negligently. In a negligence claim, the burden of proof is on 
the plaintiff, not the defendant. That means, it is not enough to show that an oü company 
destroyed property or lives, the plaintiff must actually prove that the oü company acted 
negligently. In a negligence claim, a plaintiff affected by oü operations must prove that 
the defendant owes him a duty of care, that the duty was breached and that damage 
resulted from the breach of duty.^° In the present case, the Court of Appeal found that 
the plaintiff did not establish that the oü company breached the duty of care towards him. 
The fact that the seismic boat tore through the fishing nets was regarded as an insufficient 
proof of neghgence in itself. The judge said that ‘the allegation that the vessel ‘tore’ 
through and carried the floaters etc. away is not by itself suggestive o f  excessive speed 
or any amount o f negligence ’}^ He found that the case had to be dismissed since the 
plaintiff had failed to provide details of a breach of duty of care towards him. Said 
Uwaifo, I .e . A.:
[1993] 7 NWLR.
On negligence and duty of care, see e.g. Percy (1983, 10-15).
21 Per Uwaifo, J.C.A. at page 212.
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In the present case, what did the defendants [Seismograph Service] do or 
fa il to do which was the cause o f the accident? Did the captain o f the 
vessel engage in excessive speed in navigating her? D id he fa il to sound 
the alarm or did he do so too late to signal her approach? Did the 
captain fa il to keep a proper look out? Did he fa il to slow down? Did he 
navigate at the time o f  the day he was not expected to? There is nothing 
to indicate as no particulars o f negligence were given by the plaintiff}^ 
Seismograph Service v. Mark^  ^ illusti'ates that proving negligence can be difficult 
in 0 Ü related litigation because of the technical nature of oil operations. The plaintiff must 
prove that the oil company violated against an accepted standard of behaviour. 
Environmental or technical standards are based on sophisticated scientific knowledge and 
data. For instance, the Petroleum Act provides that an oü company must adopt ‘good  
oilfield practice’. The oü industry normaUy has a superior technical knowledge as 
compared to individual litigants. Consequently, it may often be difficult to argue that the 
0 Ü company was unreasonably negligent or did not adopt accepted standards during its 
operations.
^  Per Uwaifo, J.C.A. at page 214. 
“  [1993] 7 NWLR.
24 In a number of oil related cases in Nigeria, the plaintiff won by inferring negligence without proving it. Adhemove 
V. Shell-BP Unrepoited Suit No. UHC 12/70, Ughelli HC is an example of such an instance. In that case, waste 
from an oil waste pit escaped and spread over the plaintiffs property destroying a fish pond and killing a 
substantial number of fish. It is not clear if the principle res ipsa loquitur was applied in this case (see the 
subsequent discussion of the rule). Unless res ipsa loquitur is evoked in a negligence case, the plaintiff must 
prove negligence. In those cases, in which a plaintiff won by inferring neghgence without proving it and res ipsa 
loquitur could not be evoked, the judge did not appear to follow the correct legal procedure under the Common 
Law and, technically, the cases should have been dismissed. According to Percy (1983, 15), ‘any failure to prove 
any one of these component elements [duty of care, breach of duty and resulting damage] must result in the 
plaintiff’s action for damages being dismissed’.
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In certain cases, a lawsuit based on the claim of negligence can succeed, even if 
the plaintiff cannot prove that the defendants breached a duty of care. The principle is 
called ‘res ipsa loquitur', which literally means ‘the facts speak for themselves’. In the 
case Mon v. Shell-BP^^, the plaintiffs claimed compensation for damage from an oü spih. 
They won the case with the court justifying its decision as follows: ‘Negligence on the 
part o f  defendants has been pleaded, and there is no evidence o f  it. None in fac t is 
needed, fo r they must naturally be held responsible fo r  the results arising from an 
escape o f  oil which they should have kept under control’. The plaintiffs were hence 
awarded compensation.
The case Mon v. Shell-BP^^ illustrates that shifting the burden of proof from the 
plaintiff to the defendant can improve the chances of success for village communities in 
oil related Litigation. If the principle res ipsa loquitur is invoked, an oil company must 
prove that the oil operations constituted no harm to the plaintiffs.^^
The discussion of the above cases suggests that plaintiffs in oil related cases can 
sue more easily for some types of damage as opposed to others. As indicated in 
Seismograph Services v. Mark, it may be difficult to prove negligence when a seismic 
boat destr oys property.^  ^ As denoted in Mon v. Shell-BP^^, a plaintiff may find it easier
(1970-1972) I R.S.L.R.25
Per Holden, C.J. at page 73.
^  (1970-1972) I R.S.L.R.
^ In order to rely on the principle, three conditions must be fulfilled. First, the plaintiff must prove that the accident 
occuiTed. Second, he must prove that the occurrence would not have happened ‘in the ordinary course of things 
without negligence on the part of somebody other than the plaintiff. Third, the facts suggest that the defendant 
rather than the plaintiff was negligent. In line with the last condition, the plaintiff must usually show that the 
thing causing the damage was ‘in the management and control of the defendant’ (Percy 1983, 350). An oil spill 
fulfils aU three conditions of the principle res ipsa loquitur, as long as the plaintiff can show that the spill actually 
happened. An oil spill does not happen in the ordinary course of things and the oil installation is in the 
management of the oil company.
^ It is also difficult to prove negligence as a result of gas flaring, see Chinda v. Shell-BP (1974) 2 R.S.L.R.
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to succeed in an oil spDl claim because res ipsa loquitur can be invoked/^ If an accident 
such as an oil spin occurs, a court is likely to conclude that the oü company was 
negligent, unless the defendant company can show that the accident may have occuiTed 
without negligence on its part or on account of uncontrollable influences such as 
sabotage.
6.5. Nuisance
Another type of tort, albeit less common in oü related litigation in Nigeria, is the 
‘tort o f nuisance’. The tort of nuisance allows the plaintiff to sue for interference with the 
enjoyment of his land.^^
There are two types of nuisance: private nuisance and public nuisance. A case of |
I
private nuisance was Seismograph Service v. Akporuovo^^. In that case, the plaintiff j
1
claimed that vibrations destroyed his three buildings, two outhouses and household goods j
!
in the course of seismic operations in the 1960s. The trial judge awarded damages to the *
1
plaintiff. Dissatisfied with the judgment, the company appealed to the Supreme Court. Î
The higher court allowed the appeal and set aside the judgment of the lower court. The j
!court found that ‘the evidence o f  plaintiff did not establish the liability, if  any, o f the
(1970-1972) I R.S.L.R.
Res ipsa loquitur was successfully applied in a number of more recent cases involving oil spills, for instance, in 
Shell V. Enoch [1992] 8 NWLR.
The defendant can cause an interference through vibrations, flooding, fire, noise or other forms of invasion. 
Nuisance is slightly different from negligence, although it can also result from negligence. The plaintiff does not 
generally have to prove a duty of care, but he must show tliat the defendant’s interference was unreasonable and 
that the interference was serious. On the most basic level, the court may ask the question ‘Is it reasonable that the 
plaintiff should have to put up with this interference?’. This is different from negligence where the question is 
asked about the duty of care. On nuisance, see e.g. Baker (1991, chapter 15).
(1974) All N.L.R.
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appellant c o m p a n y The judges argued that there was conflict of evidence as to 
whether the building was actually damaged. Since damage should have been proven, the 
trial judge should have visited the scene. The plaintiff lost the case.
Public nuisance is different from piivate nuisance in that public, not private, 
property is damaged. The plaintiff must prove that the nuisance caused damage which is 
particular to him. In addition, the damage must be much greater to the plaintiff than to 
the rest of the pubhc. A case of public nuisance was Amos v. Shell-BP^^, in which the 
Ogbia community sued Shell-BP and its subcontractor, the Niger Construction Company. 
The subcontractor constructed a large earth dam across a creek, which was public 
property. Originally, the two companies had planned to build a bridge across Kolo Creek. 
Instead of going ahead with the original plan, they constructed a dam to enable heavy 
machineiy to be moved across the creek. Witnesses testified that, as a result of the 
construction of the dam, flooding was caused upstream and the creek dried up 
downstream. Farms were flooded and damaged, canoes could not bring goods to the 
market and the life of the community was disrupted. The defendants denied that there 
was flooding, claiming that water continued to flow across the dam in two pipes. They 
also claimed that labourers helped villagers to carry canoes across the dam night and day. 
The court dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim, holding that ‘Kolo Creek is agreed by both sides 
to be a public waterway. Blocking it up is a public nuisance. No individual can normally 
recover damages for a public nuisance. For an individual claim to succeed there must 
be proof o f the plaintiff having suffered special damage peculiar to himself from
^ Per Sowemimo, J.S.C. at page 106. 
4 E.C.S.L.R.
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interference with a public r i g h t In addition, the court ruled that the plaintiffs should 
have filed separate lawsuits since they had suffered separate losses. The plaintiffs had no 
right to sue as a community, since the losses were considered individual, not communal.
The two above cases suggest that a plaintiffs success in a lawsuit based on 
nuisance is uncertain. It appears, however, that those affected by oil operations are more 
likely to succeed on the basis of private nuisance claims. The plaintiffs in Seismograph 
Service v. Akporuovo^^ lost the case because of conflicting evidence. Otherwise, their 
claim would have been held valid. The plaintiffs in Amos v. Shelf^ lost because the 
nature of the claim itself was considered invalid. The main problem with public nuisance 
is that it has often relied on the goodwill of the executive branch of the government. In 
theory, the Nigerian Constitution provides that judicial power extends to every type of 
legal action except those specifically excluded by the Constitution i t s e l f . I n  practice, in 
a public nuisance case, the attorney-general as the representative of the public is expected 
to sue the defendants rather than an unlimited number of private individuals, which has an 
understandable rationale behind it. In the case Amos v. Shelf ^ , the attorney-general (as a 
representative of the government and the public) rather than the plaintiffs should have 
pressed charges against Shell. The main problem in Nigeria is that the government was 
reluctant to act on behalf of those affected by oil operations.
Per Holden, C.J. at page 488.
(1974) All N.L.R.
4 E.C.S.L.R.
^ Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979, section 6(6b). 
4 E.C.S.L.R.
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6.6. Strict Liability
Apart from the torts of negligence and nuisance, a plaintiff can rely on the mle of 
strict liability in Rylands v. Fletcher Until the introduction of strict liability in the 19th 
century, tort law limited liabüily to those cases where the defendant was at fault. Under 
the rule of strict liability, the defendant is liable for damage from his activities, even if he 
was not at fault and if there was no negligence on his part.
In Umudje v. Shell-BP"^ ,^ the plaintiffs were awarded compensation based on the 
rule of strict liability. In that case, the plaintiffs sued Shell-BP for damage resulting from 
an 0 Ü waste pit and the construction of a road. The oil company constructed a road 
across a waterway and failed to insert enough culverts under it. At the location of the 
road, fish previously moved across the land into the plaintiffs’ artificial ponds and lakes 
during the rainy season. After the road construction, fish could no longer move across. 
While accepting those facts, the Supreme Court, however, found that Shell-BP was not 
hable under the rule of stiict liability. The judge explained his reasoning as follows:
The legal rule was expressed by the British House of Lords in Rylands v. Fletcher (1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330 as 
follows:
We think that the true rule of law is, that the person who for his own purposes brings on his 
lands and collects and keeps there anything likely to do mischief if it escapes, must keep it in at 
his peril, and if he does not do so is prima facie answerable for all the damage which is the 
natural consequence of its escape.
The judgment in Rylands v. Fletcher laid down the rule for strict liability. Four conditions must be fulfilled for 
the rule to apply. First, the defendant must have brought the thing on his land for his own use. Second, the thing 
must be likely to cause harm if it escapes. Third, the defendant’s use of the land must be non-natural, for 
instance, sewage or gas come under the rule, while weeds or flood water are natural things and do not come under 
the rule. Fourthly, the thing must actually escape. On the principles of strict liability, see Baker (1991, chapter 
16). An escape of crude oil or oily waste fulfils all the above four conditions. Accordingly, any dangerous incident 
involving crude oil can be potentially prosecuted. The defendant is strictly liable for damage, which removes the 
plaintiff’s burden of proof. It is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove any negligence or breach of duty of care.
5 E.C.S.L.R.
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There is no doubt that the appellants would be liable under the rule in 
Rylands v. Fletcher fo r damage arising from their interference with the 
natural flow  o f  the Utefe stream and water from Ewu river into 
Unenurhie land had the judge found that the blockade [sic] caused by the 
access road resulted in the flooding o f  the Unenurhie land, together with 
the ponds and lakes therein; for liability under the rule does not arise 
unless there was an ‘escape ’ o f  the dangerous substance from a place in 
the occupation, or control, o f the defendant to another place which is 
outside his occupation or control... The position here... is that the access 
road blocked the flow o f  water through the waterway or channel and in 
consequence definitely starved the Unenurhie land... The award o f  
damages, so fa r  as they relate to the appellants ’ act in constructing the 
access road cannot, therefore, be sustained under the rule in Rylands v. 
Fletcher.
In other words, the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher"^ did not apply in this case 
because the court found that the blockage of the stream did not cause flooding but merely 
starvation of water and fish. If there had been an escape of water from the company’s 
land rather than starvation of water, the mle of strict liability would have applied. For the 
courts, an escape of a substance is hence a necessary condition for the rule in Rylands v. 
Fletche/^ to apply.
Per Idigbe, J.S.C. at pages 572-573.
44
45
(1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330. |
(1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330. II
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While strict liability did not apply in respect of the road constmction, the court 
found that the rule of negligence applied. Shell-BP was found guilty of negligence for the 
blockage of the stream because it failed to insert enough culverts under the road, which 
caused damage. The Supreme Court loled that ‘the five culverts under the access road’ 
were ‘inadequate’ and this ‘inadequacy caused the blockade [s ic ]’ and therefore 
amounted to negligence.'**^
While the rule in Rylands v. Fletche/^ did not apply to the road construction, it 
applied in respect of Shell-BP’s oil waste pit. When the pit was full, the waste spread 
over the plaintiffs’ farms, ponds and lakes, damaging the land and killing a substantial 
quantity of fish. Said Idigbe, J.S.C.:
Liability on the part o f  an owner or the person in control o f an oil-waste 
pit, such as the one located at Location ‘E ’ in the case in hand, exists 
under the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher although the ‘escape’ has not 
occurred as a result o f negligence on his partf^
The Umudje case exemplifies the differences m the application of the rule of strict 
liability and the rule of negligence.'*  ^ In respect of the oil waste pit, the mle of strict 
liability applied but the mle of negligence did not. In contrast, in respect of the road 
constmction, strict liability did not apply but the mle of negligence did. The Supreme 
Court consequently dismissed the appeal by Shell-BP.
Per Idigbe, J.S.C. at page 573. 
(1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
^  Per Idigbe, J.S.C. at page 573.
49 This insight was assisted by a discussion of the Umudje case in Kodilinye (1982, 116-117).
294
The Umudje case illustrates that the legal rule of strict liability in Rylands v.
Fletcher^^ can increase a plaintiffs chances of success m an oil related case because it 
requites merely the proof of the escape of oil or waste rather than the proof of negligence 
by the tortfeasor/* However, the case also exemplifies some of the limitations of the rule 
of stiict liability m oü related cases. The Supreme Court found on appeal that the stiict 
liability rule applied in relation to the escape of waste from an oü waste pit, but did not 
apply in relation to the road construction. In wider teims, incidents such as explosions in 
the course of a seismic sui*vey or the destruction of fishing nets by a seismic boat would 
also not be included under the rule. I
The most important limitations of strict liability are posed by the various j
!exceptions to the mle. Strict liability does not apply if the damage was due to: an ‘act o f  i
G od’\ a default of the plaintiff; the consent of the plaintiff; statutory authority; or an act I
!of a stranger (Kodilinye 1982, 117-121).^^ In Nigeria, oü companies have often alleged }
Ithat damage from oil operations is due to sabotage, which is considered an act of a I
I
stranger. If the oil company can convince the court that sabotage was the cause of |
damage, it is not liable to pay compensation to the plaintiffs. j
By pleading sabotage, oil companies have won a number of lawsuits. In Shell v. I
Otoko^^ , a number of communities in Rivers State sued SheU for damage from an oÜ spül j
in October 1981, which polluted the Andoni River and creeks. SheU claimed that the spill i
(1868) L.R. 3 H.L. 330.
Strict liability was successfully applied in a number of more recent cases involving oil spills, for instance, in S h e ll i
V. T ieb o  V II [1996] 4 NWLR and S h e ll v. I sa ia h  [1997] 6 NWLR. j
An act of a stranger may also be called an ‘in d ep en d en t a c t o f  a  th ird  p a r ty ’ (on limitations of strict liability, see ]
also Percy 1983,855-866). ... j
[1990] 6 NWLR.
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Iwas due to sabotage. The company’s evidence of sabotage was dismissed by the lower j
court, but was allowed by the Court of Appeal. The appeal judge felt that the evidence of 
the plaintiffs supported the company’s evidence. One of the plaintiff’s witnesses testified j
that ‘there was nothing else done again by the defendant company [Shell] to control the 
spillage apart from the corking o f  the manifold’ The judge concluded on the basis of 
this and other evidence that a screw or a bolt was removed by a ‘third party’, which I
caused the oil spill. |
However, oil companies have not always succeeded in blaming oü spüls on 1
sabotage. In Shell v. Enoch^^, the Mumaija community m Rivers State sued SheU for 1
damage as a result of an oU spiU. SheU claimed that the spiUage was caused ‘by the Î
malicious act o f third persons ’. Said the trial judge: '
It is clear here that the plaintiffs had shown that there was an explosion \
at the defendant’s manifold and that there was crude oil spillage which 
was extensive as a result o f that explosion. There were extensive damages 
to economic crops, farm  lands, yams, cocoyams, and so on. There was
1evidence that no third party caused the explosion, and that no one in the 
community did it.^ ^
In another recent case Shell v. Isaiah , SheU also claimed that sabotage was |
involved. The Court of Appeal concluded that ‘the defence o f  sabotage was an \
afterthought’ and dismissed Shell’s appeal accordingly.^^ ;
^ Per Omosun, J.C.A. at page 715. ;
1992] 8 NWLR.
Per Jacks, J.C.A. at page 341. '
^ [1997] 6 NWLR. j
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Oil company allegations of sabotage often lack in merit or may be the result of 
exaggerations/^ While vandalism of oil pipelines may occasionally occur in Nigeria, oil 
companies have an economic self-interest in claiming sabotage in court as they can escape 
the legal liability for damage/®
To sum up, the above discussion suggests that tort law has limitations as far as 
the claims of village communities against oil companies are concerned. The mles of 
negligence, nuisance and strict liability offer a legal remedy for plaintiffs suing oil 
companies but each legal rule imposes specific limitations on the plaintiffs’ ability to sue. 
Even if a plaintiff can invoke a particular mle of tort law, oil companies can apply a 
number of standard legal defences in court
^ Per Katsina-Alu, J.C.A. at page 252. Another recent case was Anare v. Shell Unreported Suit No. HCB/35/89, in 
which four village communities sued Shell over oil spills in the 1980s. Shell claimed that the oil spills were 
caused by sabotage. The court, however, disbelieved Shell’s witnesses and awarded over 30 million Naira in 
compensation to the plaintiffs. Shell appealed against the decision. By claiming sabotage, the company can save 
up to 30 million Naira in a single lawsuit.
^ Secondary sources provide strong indications that oil companies used claims of sabotage to avoid compensation 
payments to local communities in the past. S.K. Igbara of the Ahmadu BeUo University in Zaria carried out an 
independent investigation into the causes of accidents at Shell’s Afam 17 C and T wells in 1975 and at Bomu in 
1973 (Ogbonna 1979, 254). With respect to the blow-out of tlie wellhead at Affam, Shell claimed sabotage. 
Evidence provided by some of the technicians at work revealed that negligence was the cause.
Further evidence is provided by a recent confidential report commissioned for the Shell-initiated Niger Delta 
Environmental Survey (NDES) and prepared by the Anpez Environmental Law Centre in Port Harcourt. It stated 
that ‘Many operators have h idden under the cloak of sabotage to avoid remediation in cases of environmental 
spills, accidents and discharges’ (Ogbnigwe 1996).
“  Interestingly, companies claim sabotage in court, but usually fail to take any action against suspected saboteurs. 
Adewale (1990), who has argued (liat sabotage is an important problem in Nigeria, has pointed out herself that, 
under Nigerian law, sabotage of oil installations can be punished by death. But there appear to have been virtually 
no instances in which saboteurs were tried for sabotage. Oil companies have usually not pressed charges for 
alleged sabotage.
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General Legal Defences of Oil Companies
6.7. Statutes of Limitation
The above discussion has only explained legal defences, which oil company 
lawyers can invoke in court, as far as they relate directly to a specific type of tort. The 
defendants can also employ vaiious general legal defences. From a preliminary analysis of 
0 Ü related cases in Nigeria, one can distinguish at least three general legal defences: 
statutes of limitation, admissibility of scientific evidence, and misjoinder of parties, which 
are discussed below.
Statutes of limitation are laws which bar a lawsuit after a designated period of 
time. Many lawsuits against oil companies are barred by legislation. In this context, the 
most important Nigerian statute is the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC) 
Act 1977. The Act provides that no lawsuit against the NNPC, a member of its Board or 
any employee ‘shall be instituted in any court unless it is commenced within twelve 
months next after the act, neglect or default complained o f  or, in the case o f a 
continuance o f  damage or injury, within twelve months next after the ceasing thereof 
As a result, any lawsuits against the NNPC aie statute barred after twelve months. That 
means, if a community or family does not file a lawsuit against the NNPC withm twelve 
months, it cannot claim any compensation for damage.
In the case Eboigbe v. NNPCf^, John Eboigbe sued the NNPC for damages on 
behalf of his family in Bendel State. He claimed that the NNPC destroyed trees and crops
NNPC Act, section 12(1). 
“  (1994) 10 KLR.
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in the course of laying oü pipelines in February 1979. The NNPC allegedly buüdozed and 
destroyed a large part of his famüy’s farms, which John Eboigbe was unaware of at the 
time. He claimed to have travelled to Northern Nigeria in 1979 where he stayed untÜ July 
1983. On his return, he learnt for the first time about the damage. He claimed that his 
famüy did not institute any court proceedings against the NNPC earlier because five out 
of six famüy members were illiterate and were hence ignorant of their legal rights. John 
Eboigbe took up the matter and wrote to the NNPC in July 1983 informing them of the 
damage. He exchanged letters with the NNPC untü April 1984. The corporation did not 
admit liability. In a letter dated 1 February 1984, the NNPC told the plaintiffs that they 
would not pay any compensation because the claim was ‘not convincing’. In a letter 
dated 9 March 1984, they wrote that ‘In the absence o f any more facts we are regarding 
the matter as closed’
In June 1985, John Eboigbe instituted a lawsuit against the NNPC demanding 
compensation. The NNPC won the court case by claiming that it was statute barred. The 
Supreme Court held unanimously that ‘time begins to run from the date that the cause o f  
action accrues’.^  Accordingly, Eboigbe should have instituted a court case within 
twelve months of the damages to his famüy land in February 1979 by the NNPC. 
Notwithstanding any other legal rights or social problems involved, plaintiffs have no 
rights in respect of damage by the NNPC unless they act quickly. The twelve months 
provision of the NNPC Act can partly explain why little litigation has arisen against the 
NNPC for damage arising from oü operations.
^ Quoted per Adio, J.S.C. at page 78.
^ Per Adio, J.S.C. at page 75.
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Lawsuits against other oil companies must also be filed within a certain period of 
time. Apart from the NNPC Act, there are general statutes of limitation which tend to 
limit the period for instituting a lawsuit to six years from the date on which the cause of 
grievance accrues.^  ^ In most types of litigation, these statutes serve justice because they 
protect the individual defendant from old claims*^  ^ and impose some finality on 
compensation claims. In oil related litigation in Nigeria, they impede justice because of 
problems such as difficulties in obtaining access to courts and a latency period.
As we have previously suggested, the villagers’ access to courts is hampered by a 
number of factors (see section four of the thesis). If a plaintiff is illiterate or if there is no 
nearby court, a lawsuit may be delayed for a long time until he receives correct legal 
advice or collects the necessary funds to file a suit. In the meantime, the lawsuit may 
become statute barred. Courts do not accept excuses such as üliteracy. Said Edozie, 
J.C.A. in Shell v. Farah^  ^:
The period o f limitation begins to run from the date on which the cause 
o f action accrued. It is immaterial that a party was absent fi'om the 
jurisdiction or that there was no court within the jurisdiction to entertain 
the claim. Similarly, illiteracy will also not avail a plaintiff because 
ignorance o f the law is no excuse.
^ On statutes of limitation in general, see e.g. Baker (1991, 436-437). The six year period of limitation was 
confirmed by Kolawole, J.C.A. in Nwadiaro v. Shell [1990] 5 NWLR.
^ The lawyer commonly uses the term ‘stale claim’.
^ The problems of the latency period and scientific uncertainty in relation to court cases involving environmental 
damage are explained in general teims in Eggen (1995, 5-8).
^ [1995] 3 NWLR.
^ Per Edozie, J.C.A. at page 185.
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Even if the plaintiffs have enough funds and are aware of their legal rights, a legal 
claim may become statute barred because of the latency period. Tlie full effects of oü 
operations are not always immediately apparent. Damage such as long-term soü 
degradation requires a latency period for its development. The injury may not be 
immediately visible or may go undiscovered for a period of time. Conducting proper 
scientific studies may take many years to assess changes in vegetation or soü fertüity, 
some of which can only be observed in the long-term. Because of the long latency period, 
potential litigants may not always have enough time to file a suit within the statutory 
period of limitation.
The statutes of limitation in Nigeria do not take account of the delay between 
economic activities and their long-ter*m effects, although judges seem to be aware of the 
problem. In Horsfall v. Shell-BP^^, the judge stated that ‘the cause o f  action accrues at 
the time o f  the negligence because it is then that the damage is caused, even though its 
consequences may not be apparent until later’ Whüe judges may recognise some of 
the constr aints posed by statutes of limitation, statutory limitations remain in place.
6.8. Admissibility of Scientific Evidence
In addition to problems posed by statutes of limitation, plaintiffs face the problem 
of the admissibihty of scientific evidence. In any type of tort - negligence, nuisance and 
strict liability, the key problem is that of credible evidence. As a practical matter, since 
plaintiffs usuaüy bear' the burden of proof in oil related litigation in Nigeria, providing
(1974) 2 R.S.L.R.
Per Wai“Ogosu, J. at page 131.
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scientific evidence in court is more difficult for village communities than for oil 
companies.
In Shell V. Otoko^^,  the plaintiffs sued SheU for damage from an oil spiU in 1981. 
Among other things, the judge doubted the plaintiffs’ evidence of causation. The 
scientific report tendered in court by the plaintiffs was based on sediments and water 
samples taken in 1983. It was not clear to what extent the damage was caused by the oil 
SpiU of 1981. In the Court of Appeal, said the judge: ‘There were spillages in 1980 and 
1983. The question that invariably arises, is what spillage, that o f  1980, 1981 and 1983 
did Exhibit ‘D ’ cover?’ In other words, it was not possible to establish to what extent 
the spiU in 1981 caused the injuiy complained of or other factors, such as other spills. 
Ironically, the frequent occurrence of oil spills in the ai*ea could be exploited by oil 
company lawyers to fmstrate the plaintiffs’ evidence in respect of damage.
In Ogiale v. S h e l f , SheU was sued by the Olomoro Isoko community in Delta 
State. The plaintiff sued the defendants under the mle in Rylands v. Fletcher^^, nuisance 
as well as negligence. Nsofor, J.C.A. said that ‘it was an issue o f  causation and 
consequential damage or liability. And the law, as 1 comprehend it, is that he who 
asserts ought to prove his assertion and this by credible evidence The plaintiffs could 
not prove the causation between oil operations and reduced soU fertiUty. The court 
dismissed the testimonies of the plaintiffs’ witnesses as weU as the experts. According to
[1990] 6 NWLR.
”  Per Omosun, J.C.A. at page 718. 
[1997] 1 NWLR.
(1868)L.R. 3H.L. 330.
Per Nsofor, J.C.A. at page 180.
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the judge, the testimonies of the witnesses amounted to a mere ‘ocular inspection and 
comparism [s ic ]’f^ The testimonies of the experts were not admitted because the court 
doubted thek skills and expertise. Dr. A.U. Salami, chief scientific expert for the 
plaintiffs, had specialist knowledge as a soil scientist and an agronomist. His testimony 
was not considered credible as he did not have additional knowledge of radiation and 
heat. According to Nigerian law, an expert must be specially skilled in the particulai* field 
in question.
The court also doubted the evidence of Chief Birinengi Idoniboye-Obu, an 
environmental consultant. Said Akintan, J.C.A.:
He said his team visited the place several times and wrote a report, 
admitted as Exhibit D. The witness said that he carried out scientific 
investigation o f  water in Olomoro. But he admitted under cross- 
examination that he did not do a quantitative analysis o f water samples 
because o f lack o f  funds for such investigation. He also admitted that 
such laboratory analysis could have shown the chemical contents o f the 
water or other chemicals in the water. He also admitted that he did not 
carry out a scientific laboratory test o f the air and heat radiation in 
Olomoro before arriving at the conclusions he set out in his report.
Exhibit
Per Nsofor, J.C.A. at page 182.
The rule was firmly established in Seismograph Service v. Onokpasa (1972) 1 AU N.L.R. (Part 1) where the 
Supreme Court ruled that the correct test for the relevance of the witness’s opinion as that of an expert is whether 
he or she is specially skilled in the particular scientific subject matter.
Per Akintan, J.C.A. at pages 159-160.
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As indicated by the expert witness, scientific analysis requires financial resources. 
In the present case, the plaintiffs did not have sufficient funds to afford a major scientific 
inquity. Interestingly, Shell’s defence witnesses did not conduct strict scientific analyses 
either. Shell hiied Professor C.T.I. Odu, a professor of agronomy at the University of 
Ibadan, to study the Olomoro field ai*ea in 1983. Akintan, J.C.A. commented in the court 
judgment:
The witness admitted under cross-examination that crops would not grow 
successfully where oil content is high. But he said he did not compare 
crop yield in Evwreni with crop yield in Olomoro. He said further that 
the opinion expressed on page 53 o f their report, Exhibit G, about oil 
contents in soil was based on what he (the witness) was told by one Yomi 
Odewumi.^^
Tlierefore, the quality of the scientific expert analysis did not appear to be much 
better for the defendant than for the plaintiffs. However, the weakness of the company’s 
expert analysis did not assist the plaintiffs’ case as the burden of proof was on the 
plaintiffs, not the defendants. According to Nsofor, J.C.A., ‘the claimant ought to prove 
his case relying on the strength o f his case and not on the weakness o f the defendant’s 
case Accordingly, the defendant had an advantage m terms of evidence. The plaintiffs 
lost in the lower court based on the judge’s conclusion that they failed to prove thek 
claim. The plaintiffs’ appeal was dismissed by the Court of Appeal.
Per Akintan, J.C.A. at page 161.
Per Nsofor, J.C.A. at age 180.
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The Otoko and Ogiale cases exemplify some of the problems posed by the 
possibility that there are multiple causes of the same injury. In addition, they indicate that 
village communities may find it more difficult to provide scientific evidence than oil 
companies because the burden of proof is on them.
Even if a plaintiff can prove that oil operations caused an injury, the plaintiff must 
also provide strict proof of ‘special damages’, that means, evidence of damage to 
specific crops, tiees, buildings and other objects. The plaintiff cannot simply allege that 
oü operations resulted in destruction of tiees or buildings. In Shell v. Otoko^  ^ mentioned 
eai'Her, the appeal judge dismissed the compensation award of the lower court. Among 
other things, the lower court awarded 30,000 Naira in respect of damaged juju slirines.*  ^
On appeal, the judge ruled that the damage to the juju shrines should have been strictly 
proven. Said Omosun, J.C.A.:
It is not clear to me on what basis this award was made. There was no 
scf'ap o f evidence what constituted the desecration or defilement. Is it the 
mere touching o f  the oil to the juju figures that causes desecration? One 
would like to know. The juju priests o f  the shrines would be the ones best 
suited to lead such evidence and for them to say whether the 15,000 
Naira would be fo r the appeasement and purification o f the juju.^^
In the same case, the lower court also awarded 30,000 Nau'a in respect of fisliing 
nets. The appeal judge mled that the damages were not strictly proven. The judge found
[1990] 6 NWLR.
A juju shrine is a sacred religious place worshipped by Nigeria’s Animist communities. 
Per Omosun, J.C.A. at page 720.
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that the plaintiffs failed to prove that the nets were in the water at the time of the oil spül, 
that the oil spül made the nets unsuitable, where the nets were kept after the oü spill, and 
what the costs of the nets were. The valuer, who prepared the valuation report for the 
plaintiffs, was not considered competent by the court because he had no specialist 
knowledge of the different areas of expertise. Said the judge: ‘Plaintiffs’ Witness 5 
[expert valuer] is not competent to offer his opinion as to the chemical composition o f  
the oil and its effect on the nets’ In respect to the juju shrines, said the judge: ‘He 
[expert valuer] is not an expert in juju shrines and the art o f worship o f juju, their 
discretion and purification or appeasement’ In order to prove aU special damages in 
the Otoko case, the plaintiffs would have needed separate experts in juju worship, 
chemical engineering, land management and agriculture. If the plaintiffs decided to hire all 
those various experts, the financial cost of expert valuations would have been 
significantly more substantial indeed.
The Otoko and Ogiale cases indicated that a frequent problem viUage 
communities face is that of establishing a causal link between oü operations and the 
suffered injuiy. Even scientific studies may not always be enthely conclusive. For 
instance, it is often not entuely clear whether soü degradation is the result of oü 
operations or other factors such as intensive fanning. As a consequence, it is often 
impossible to determine the extent to which the damage arose from oil operations and the 
extent to which it would have occurred in any case. Oü companies can thus use the
Per Omosun, J.C.A. at page 721.
^  Per Omosun, J.C.A. at page 720.
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ai'gument of scientific uncertainty and causation as a standard legal strategy to defend a 
case in court.
6.9. Misjoinder of Parties and Causes of Action
In addition to the defences based on statutory limitation and admissibility of 
evidence, oil companies can undermine the plaintiffs so-called ‘locus standi’. To initiate 
a lawsuit, the plaintiff must have a locus standi, which hterally means ‘standing to sue’ 
The plaintiff must have either a special legal right to sue, or a personal interest in the 
lawsuit, or his interest must have been adversely affected, for mstance, if personal 
property was damaged during oil operations. A judge usually decides on a case-by-case 
basis, if the plaintiff has a locus standi. A lawsuit may not be allowed, if the judge thinks 
that different plaintiffs in the same lawsuit suffered separate damage, which is called 
‘misjoinder o f  parties and causes o f action’. That means, the plaintiffs cannot sue jointly 
because their grievances were sepaiate and specific to each individual. In such a case, the 
different plaintiffs must sue sepai'ately in separate lawsuits.
In Horsfall v. Shell-BP^^, the community sued Shell-BP as the first defendant and 
Seismograph Seivices as the second defendant for damage to ‘private buildings, 
communal buildings, churches i n c l u s i v e The lawyers of Shell-BP claimed a 
misjoinder of paities and causes of action. The company argued that the plaintiffs should 
not sue jointly because the different buildings belonged to different individuals, not to the
^  On some problems in the enforcement of locus standi in Nigeria, see Ogowewo (1995). i
^ (1974) 2 R.S.L.R. |
^ Per Wai-Ogosu, J. at page 128. |
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village as a whole. The trial judge concurred by stating that ‘it was only the town hall 
that could be owned by the whole village In his view, even the claims for damage to 
churches should have been brought to court by registered trustees, not the community 
representatives. Interestingly, the judge seemed annoyed that the company filed a motion 
of misjoinder even before the plaintiffs had a chance to prove their allegations in court. 
Said the judge: ‘The very pleading o f the defendants [Shell-BP] here, in my opinion, 
envisaged this, and it was a mere gamble to bring up a separate motion for this’ The 
company lawyers used a standard legal strategy as a defence, without drafting a specific 
legal defence for the case. It would appear that oü companies have used the issue of 
misjoinder as a legal technicality to frustrate compensation claims by communities.
The company defences based on misjoinder succeeded in a number of recent cases 
such as in Shell v. Enochf^, in which the Mumaija Community in Rivers State sued SheU 
for damage resulting from an oü spiU, The plaintiffs testified that the explosion of an oü 
pipeline resulted in an oü spiU. As a result, five chüdren died from drinking polluted 
water, farm lands were damaged and property was destroyed including crops and fishing 
nets. Shell claimed misjoinder of parties and causes of action. The trial judge in the Bori 
Division of the Rivers State High Court agreed with SheU that individual and communal 
claims were lumped together and, therefore, the community lawsuit could not succeed. 
He held that each member of the community should have started a lawsuit by himself for 
specific damages, wkUe the community should also have started a lawsuit on behalf of
^ Per Wai-Ogosu, J, at page 129.
Per Wai-Ogosu, J. at page 131.
[1992] 8 NWLR.
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communal issues. Said the trial judge: ‘The estate or next friend o f  these children who 
died have their own personal action for the compensation and not the community’ He 
ordered a so-called ‘non-suit’ but did not strike out the case. Shell’s lawyers were 
dissatisfied with the judgment and appealed to the Court of Appeal asking for the court 
to dismiss the case. The difference is that, under a non-suit, members of the community 
could again sue Shell in court for the same damage, this time as individual plaintiffs, not 
as the community. In contrast, a dismissal of the case would mean that members of the 
community were not allowed to go back to court again. The Court of Appeal confirmed 
the earlier judgment and ordered a non-suit.
A striking feature of the case is that the trial judge had no doubt that SheU had 
caused major damage to the community. The plaintiffs’ scientific evidence was admitted 
by the court. Said Edozie, J.C.A.:
There was unchallenged and credible evidence that the appellant’s oil 
pipeline exploded and the oil spillage therefore caused extensive damage 
to the respondent community. To that extent, the respondent’s claim in 
negligence did not fa il to warrant dismissal. They were however not 
entitled to judgment, for, as the appellants successfully pleaded and 
contended, the action was bad for misjoinder o f parties and cause o f  
action. In the circumstances, the proper order which meets the justice o f 
the case is a non-suit.^"^
BHC/2/83, quoted in Shell v. Enoch [1992] 8 NWLR. 
^ Per Edozie, J.C.A. at page 346.
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The Court of Appeal judges were tiyiug to do justice to both sides. Said Jacks 
J.C.A.: ‘There are circumstances in which it would be proper for a trial court to non-suit 
the plaintiff instead o f  dismissing his claim in the interest o f  justice to both parties’ 
However, the order of a non-suit destroyed an otherwise credible claim by the 
community. The key problem in this and in other similar cases is that English Law does 
not take foil notice of communal issues in Africa. Nigerian lawyers have tended to be 
reluctant to depart from the established English Law even though they recognise the 
problem. Said the judge in Shell v. Enochf^ : ‘In my view there would be a grave injustice 
if  the respondents’ case was dismissed with the resultant effect o f denying the community 
and the various individuals [sic] o f re-litigating their claims in separate and properly 
constituting actions’ But the key problem with the above reasoning is that the 
individuals are less likely to be able to afford separate litigation. The community as a 
whole may afford a court action but not necessarily an individual villager. Therefore, the 
judgment of non-suit favours the oil companies, contiaiy to the intention of the court to 
do justice to both sides. By claiming misjoinder of parties, oil companies have often 
escaped liability for compensation payments to those adversely affected by oil operations.
Oil companies have not always succeeded in pleading misjoinder. In Mon v. Shell- 
, the plaintiffs claimed compensation for damage from an oil spill. The plaintiffs 
testified that oil destroyed their joint fishponds. Lawyers of Shell-BP claimed that the 
different plaintiffs should sue the company separately, not jointly. The court found that
Per Jacks, J.C.A. at page 344. 
[1992] 8 NWLR.
Per Jacks, J.C.A. at page 345. 
(1970-1972) I R.S.L.R.
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the plaintiffs were working together ‘in a loose sort o f  partnership’ Having obtained 
advice from tlie Ministry of Agriculture, they jointly initiated a scheme to breed fish in 
fishponds for sale. Said the judge: ‘On the evidence I am satisfied that each had 
contributed work or money or both to the jointly needed channel, and that they intended 
to share the profits in due time. Therefore it is proper that they should sue jointly 
However, the case Mon v. Shell-BP^^  ^ is somewhat exceptional since it involved a new 
form of partnership. The judge made it clear that a community could not sue jointly in 
respect of the damaged fishponds. The rationale behind the decision was as follows: ‘If  
plaintiffs had erected fishtraps in the creeks there and those traps had been damaged by 
oil, then they would have been entitled to compensation as individuals in just the same 
way as many others were, including some o f the witnesses before Although the
land was communal, the fishtraps were individually owned.
The above cases suggest that, under normal circumstances, a community cannot 
sue jointly on behalf of individual property. It appears that a community can sue jointly on 
behalf of communal land or buildings. But it cannot sue jointly for damage to individual 
property such as trees, fishtiaps or houses. This paitly miiTors customaiy law, under 
which land does not mclude things growing or attached to the soil, including trees or 
buildings. Neveitheless, court judgments do not entirely take account of customary law. 
As Obi (1963, 94 and 98) has pointed out, among the Ibo, fishing lakes and ponds, as 
well as trees growing wild on communal reserve land ai*e usually communally, not
Per Holden, C.J. at page 72. 
Per Holden, C.J. at page 73. 
(1970-1972) I R.S.L.R.
Per Holden, C.J. at page 73.
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individually, owned. On farmland, trees growing wild are treated as communal, as long as 
the land lies fallow. Where the fanuland is under cultivation, the individuals who farm the 
ai'ea have exclusive rights over the trees. Under customaiy law, trees grown on individual 
landholdings generally belong to the individuals who farm the land. However, among the 
Ngwa, palm trees growing on ‘private’ land were open to communal use for certain 
periods of the year (Obi 1963, 94 and 98). From the analysis of oü related Htigation in 
Nigeria, it appeal's that courts may have sometimes faded to take notice of those 
distinctions in customaiy rights.
On the whole, the above discussion has mdicated that oü companies have at their 
disposal a wide range of general legal defences, which they can use in oü related 
litigation. Companies can rely on statutes of limitation, plaintiffs problems in providing 
evidence and the lule of misjoinder of par ties and causes of action. In addition, it has to 
be remembered that oü companies have superior financial and technical resources as 
compared to village communities. They aie hence more likely to provide superior 
expertise in court. This places a limitation on justice for viUage communities in lawsuits 
against oü companies. Yet the fact that the quantity of litigation against oil companies 
and the quantum of compensation awai'ds have increased would suggest that there has 
been legal Uansfoi'mation in oü related cases which has lessened the limitation on justice 
for viUage communities.
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Legal Transformation in Oil Related Cases
6.10. Locus Standi
The principles of legal liability under tort law and the legal defences employed by 
oü companies have not changed fundamentally since Nigeria’s independence in 1960. 
Nonetheless, our analysis of the court judgments indicates that, by the early 1990s, there 
had been a measure of legal transformation in the judicial interpretation of a number of 
legal rules which resulted in more favourable conditions for compensation claims by 
village communities. From a preliminary analysis of Nigerian litigation, one can 
distinguish at least three main legal changes: a broadening of the locus standi, a 
relaxation of evidence rules, and a broadening of compensation awaids, wMch are 
analysed below.
These findings were, to a large extent, confirmed by a personal interview with M.B. Belgore, Chief Justice of the |
Federal High Court (Lagos, March 1998). Belgore was asked if he agreed with the author whether the three areas |
of law mentioned above have undergone any changes. On compensation awards, Belgore said: |
Ihe law has changed because the law is more robust in awarding compensation now than it was j
before. This is very important where people bring evidence that their livelihood has been much j
affected. Some of them are farmers and the oil has poured on the area where they farm. Some of |
them are fishermen and they can’t fish again. Of course, the law has to give them enough !
compensation, either to give them an alternative mode of livelihood or an alternative method of \
living a decent life. Therefore, on the issue of compensation, compensation is now more robust j
than it used to be. The damage is assessed more than before.
On evidence by experts, Belgore said: 1
An expert is someone who knows the conditions, what it was before, what it is now. He need not j
to be a scientific person. For instance, a hand-writing expert may be somebody who is familiar !
with the hand-writing of Mr. X  fo r a long time, when he looks at it, he is an expert, he doesn ’t I
need to go to any scientific school bffore becoming an expert. To that extent, the court now '
filled the issue of an expert with a broader sense than bffore in the definition of the word i
‘expert’ because one has to do justice. Don’t forget that most of these rural communities cannot |
afford a geologist, a soil expert etc. They may have someone who knows the conditions and who j
can explain things and we accept it. |
This definition of an expert is quite different from the definition of the Supreme Court in Seismograph Service v. \
Onokpasa (1972) 1 All N.L.R. (Part 1) (see footnote 68). On locus standi, Belgore stated:
We [Nigerian judges] are a little more liberal about locus standi. /  had one or two cases, in ’
which you have somebody from the comtnunity. He must be a member of that community but he
may not necessarily be resident. If he is a member of that community, that gives him enough j
standing to issue a writ on behalf o f the community. \
I
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A broadening of the locus standi has the potential of fundamentally changing the 
nature of oil related litigation in Nigeria. In Adediran v. Interland Transport^^, the 
Nigerian Supreme Court broadened the scope of locus standi in terms of the so-called 
public right to sue. In that case, residents of a housing estate formed a housing 
association. The housing association filed a suit against Interland Transport, a tiansport 
film with neai’by offices. Inteiiand Transport used its premises as a workshop and for 
parking hailers. The plaintiffs complained against the traffic of the trailers, which blocked 
the access roads to the estate, knocked down electric poles, damaged the roads and 
generated noise.
In the Adediran case, the court ruled that the nuisance caused by Interland 
Transport was private not public. But the Supreme Court considered the nature of locus 
standi in public nuisance in general terms. Until the Adediran case, in matters of public 
interest litigation the old mle was that only the Attorney-General could bring court action 
to protect a public right. The Adediran case has changed this state of affairs. Kaiibi- 
Whyte, J.S.C. pronounced: 'The restriction imposed at common law on the right o f  
action in public nuisance is inconsistent with the provisions o f section 6(6)(b) o f  the 
Constitution, 1979 and to that extent is void'}'^^ Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C. further stated:
These findings on legal change do not preclude that there have been other, equally significant, changes in the 
judicial interpretation of legal rules in Nigeria. But, based on our analysis of available litigation, the three main 
areas of change mentioned above appear most relevant to oil related cases.
[1991] 9 NWLR.
Per Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C. at page 180. Section 6(6)(b) of the 1979 Constimtion stated; ‘The judicial powers 
vested in accordance with the foregoing provisions of this section shall extend to all matters between persons, or 
between government or authority and any person in Nigeria, and to all actions and proceedings relating thereto, 
for the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations of that person’. Relying on this 
constitutional provision, Kaiibi-Whyte, J.S.C. stated: ‘The Constitution has vested the Courts with the powers for 
the determination of any question as to the civil rights and obligations between government or authority and any 
person in Nigeria. See s.6(6)(b). Accordingly, where the determination of the civil rights and obligations of a 
person is in issue, any law which imposes conditions, is inconsistent with the free and unrestrained exercise of 
that right, is void to the extent of such inconsistency. ’ Per Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C. at page 180. Based on this
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‘Having held that in the institution o f  actions, the distinction between public and private 
nuisance in this country has been abolished by the Constitution 1979, the exercise o f  the 
right o f action fo r nuisance is no longer based on or determined by the distinction’} ^  
In other words, the Supreme Court found that the 1979 Constitution abolished the 
common law distinction between public and private nuisance as far as the right to 
institute actions in nuisance before Nigerian courts is concerned. Kaiibi-Whyte, J.S.C. 
explained the rationale behind the ruling in the following terms:
/  think the high constitutional policy involved in section 6(6)(b) [o f the 
1979 Constitution] is the removal o f  the obstacles erected by common 
law requirements against individuals bringing actions before the court 
against the government and its institutions, and the preconditions o f the 
requirement o f  the consent o f the Attorney-General. This becomes the 
more important when the provisions are procedural encrustments 
designed to protect peculiar social or political institutions.
This suggests that the Supreme Court considered a limitation of locus standi in 
public interest litigation as an impediment to justice. The significance of the Adediran 
case lies in the recognition that private persons no longer require the Attorney-General’s 
consent to press public right’s litigation. They can biing an action themselves as long as 
they show sufficient interest in the matter.
contention, the Supreme Court regarded the restriction on the right of action in public nuisance as inconsistent 
with the 1979 Constitution and to that extent void.
Per Karibi-Whyte, J.S.C. at page 182.
Per Kaiibi-Whyte, J.S.C. at page 180.
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The impact of the Adediran case on locus standi in Nigeria is as yet unclear; As 
Ogowewo (1995) has argued, the law relating to locus standi in Nigeria is still unsettled. 
According to Ogowewo (1995), 'the position now seems to be that the courts proceed on 
a case-by-case basis, intuitively deciding who should have standing’. Courts continue to 
rely on the so-called 'civil rights ’ test laid down in the controversial ruling in Adesanya v. 
President o f the Federal Republic o f Nigeria^^^. The civil lights test was defined by 
Bello, J.S.C. as follows: ‘standing will only be accorded to a plaintiff who shows that his 
civil rights and obligations have been or are in danger o f  being violated or adversely 
affected by the act complained o f’.^ ^^  The Supreme Court judges disagreed on the issue 
of locus standi which left the law relating to locus standi in Nigeria unsettled. Whüe 
subsequent court cases have, to a large extent, followed the civil rights test, a broader 
interpretation of locus standi was, for instance, applied in a criminal case. In Fawehinmi 
V . Akilu^^^, the Supreme Court ruled that the Criminal Procedure Law of Lagos State 
gave every person a right to initiate private prosecution.
In terms of oü related litigation, the new rule in the Adednan case could mean 
that private persons or organisations, e.g. environmental organisations, could sue oü
[1981] 1 All N.L.R.
Per Bello, J.S.C. at page 39.
[1987] 4 NWLR.
In that case, the court had to decide whether the applicant was entitled to apply for mandamus to compel private 
prosecution of certain persons. The Court of Appeal held that the applicant had no standing to sue as his legal 
rights had not been infringed. The Supreme Court set the rule of the Court of Appeal aside and held that the locus 
standi had been broadened since section 342 of the Criminal Procedure Law of Lagos State vests in every person 
a right to initiate a private prosecution. Nnamani, J.S.C. stated: Tt is my view that in these matters which are so 
interlined with the criminal law, our interpretation of Section 6(6)(b) of the Constitution must be approached 
with a true liberal spirit in the interest of the society at large. The Appellant has locus standi as any person to 
make the application he has brought to court, and if all other conditions are fulfilled, to initiate criminal 
proceedings Per Nnamani, J.S.C. at page 855. The controversy on the issue of locus standi has continued. 
Ogowewo (1995) has argued that the ruling in Fawehinmi v. Akilu does not broaden the locus standi.
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companies for damage from oil operations. Until now, only those directly affected by oil 
operations had a locus standi. The case Douglas v. Shell^ ^  ^ could become a test case on 
the broadened interpretation of locus standi in oü related litigation. In that case, Oronto 
Douglas - an environmental rights activist - sued SheU, the NNPC, the Nigerian Liquefied 
Natural Gas (NLNG) project, Mobü and the Attorney-General for non-compliance with 
the Envh'onmental Impact Assessment (EIA) Decree No.86 of 1992 (see section three of 
the thesis). The Douglas case was dismissed in the Federal High Court, which ruled that 
the plaintiff had no right to sue. Belgore, C.J. held that Douglas’s claim was baseless and 
that 'the plaintiff shows no prima facie evidence that his right was affected nor any 
direct injury caused to him\^^^ However, the court appeared to have faüed to take into 
account aU the facts related to the plaintiffs locus standi. The plaintiffs lawyers argued 
that Douglas had both a private interest in the suit as a native of a viUage affected by oÜ 
operations and a public interest as an environmentalist In 1998, the case was stül pending 
on appeal to the Court of Appeal. If the Douglas case or any subsequent oil related cases 
aie able to successfuUy apply the broadened rules of locus standi to oü related litigation, 
this could open a floodgate for non-govemmental organisations and other interested 
parties to sue oü companies in Nigeria. But the implementation of the mle laid down in 
the Adediran case may take some time to take effect since legal transformation is a slow 
process.
Whüe the broadened mles of the public right to sue have so fai' failed to directly 
affect oil related litigation, there ai'e indications that oil related litigation has undergone
Unreported Suit No. FHC/L/CS/573/96 in the Federal High Court, Lagos. 
Per Belgore, C.J. at page 2 of unreported judgment.
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some ti'ansformation in terms of the private right to sue. Those affected by oil operations 
usually sue oil companies as a group rather than as individual plaintiffs. In the 1970s, it 
was not uncommon for a judge to dismiss a suit or to limit its scope because he found 
that the plaintiffs had not proven their authority to sue as a group. For instance, in 
Chinda v. Shell-BP^^" ,^ the plaintiffs sued Shell-BP as representing the Rumuokani 
community in Rivers State for damage to houses and crops from gas flaring, and for 
general inconvenience and discomfort. Their claim was dismissed as the judge held that 
'it is not proved that the six named plaintiffs sue as representatives o f all the 
villagers’ Since they had no authority to sue in a representative capacity, they were 
deemed to be suing only in respect of themselves individually.
More recently, however, cases in which oÜ companies have successfully been 
sued by plaintiffs representing a village community or a family as a whole have become 
more widespread."^ In Shell v. Tiebo W/"^, the plaintiffs sued Shell on behalf of the 
Peremabhi community for damage from an oil spill in 1987. The oü company lawyers 
pleaded misjoinder, among other legal defences. The court held that there was no 
misjoinder and awarded the plaintiffs 6 mülion Naira in compensation. This case 
exemplifies the broader interpretation of communally owned property by Nigerian courts. 
In order to ülustrate this broader interpretation, it is üluminating to compare the Tiebo
(1974) 2 R.S.L.R.
Per Holden, C.J. at page 4.
Several recent high-profile cases by conununities against oil companies from the 1990s can be cited: Geosource 
V. Biragbara [1997] 5 NWLR, Shell v. Tiebo VII [1996] 4 NWLR, Shell v. Farah [1995] 3 NWLR. In all of these 
cases, plaintiffs sued an oil company in representative capacity, not as individuals.
[1996] 4 NWLR.
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case with the cases of Chinda v. Shell-BP^^  ^ and Mon v. Shell~BP^^ .^ In the Chinda case, 
the court pronounced that the plaintiffs suing in representative capacity could not receive 
compensation for damage to trees. Said the trial judge: 'each separate tree owner has a 
separate personal claim fo r damage to his or her trees’ In the Tiebo case, the 
plaintiffs were awarded compensation for damage to raffia palms. In the Mon case, the 
judge indicated that a community could not sue jointly in respect of damage to communal 
fishponds. In the Tiebo case, the plaintiffs were awarded compensation for damage to 
communal fish ponds.
While the facts in the above cases are different, the Tiebo case illustrates that 
Nigerian courts have interpreted the right to compensation for damage to communally 
owned property in broader terms. This does not imply that the private standing to sue has 
been broadened per se. It is yet too eaiiy to say whether there has been a general shift in 
judicial attitudes towar'ds claims instituted in representative capacity. But a broader 
interpretation of communal claims is likely to frustrate the oil companies’ legal defence 
based on misjoinder of paities and causes of action. By implication, communal claims of 
village communities are more likely to succeed. This m turn is likely to ease the access to 
courts for communities. In other words, the changing interpretation of locus standi 
appeal's to allow a greater number of individuals to sue oü companies.
(1974) 2 R.S.L.R. 
(1970-1972) I R.S.L.R.
Per Holden, C.J. at page 3.
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6.11. Evidence Rules
In respect of the rules on expert evidence in oil related cases, there are also 
indications of legal changes which may have benefited village communities. In E lf v. 
Sillo^^^, in which the Sillo family sued Elf for damage aiising from oil operations, the 
Supreme Court partially relaxed the rules on expert evidence. The court pronounced a 
new interpretation of the standaid of proof for damage where the evidence in support is 
unchallenged. Said Onu, J.S.C.:
The standard o f  proof required in establishing the amount o f damages in 
a case such as the one in hand, namely a case where the evidence in 
support is unchallenged, the law is that the burden assumed by the 
plaintiff/respondents hereis, is discharge upon a minimum o f proof 
The application of this minimal standaid of proof is limited to cases in which 
evidence is not challenged by the opposing litigant. This mle, nonetheless, presents a 
marked contiast with the previous insistence of the Supreme Court on a high standaid of 
proof and expert evidence in oil related litigation.
In addition to its mling on the minimal standaid of proof, the Supreme Court in 
the SiUo Case held that a court would be correct in preferring the credible evidence of a 
non-expert witness on an issue to the evidence of an expert on the same issue where the 
former is an independent witness whilst the latter prepaied his evidence specifically for
[1994] 6 NWLR.
Per Onu, J.S.C. at pages 279-280.
See, in particular, judgments of the Supreme Court in Seismograph Service v. Onokpasa (1972) All N.L.R. 
Seismograph Service v. Akporuovo (1974) All N.L.R. and Seismograph Service v. Ogbeni (1976) 4 S.C.
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the case on hand on the direction of the party calling him. In the particular case, Adio, 
J.S.C. said:
The P.W.3 [third p lain tiffs witness] made an inspection o f the area on 
the direction o f the Hon. Attorney-General o f the state at a time when the 
possibility o f the matter being settled amicably out o f court was being 
explored while the D .W .l [first defendant’s witness] prepared his own 
report specifically for this case on the basis o f the direction o f the 
appellant [Elf] to the firm  o f  the witness. The learned trial Judge felt, 
rightly, that the P.W.3 was an independent witness and his report [more] 
acceptable than the report prepared, specifically for use in this case, at 
the instance o f the appellant. In preferring the evidence o f  the P.W.3 to 
the evidence o f  the D .W .l, the learned trial Judge had regard, rightly in 
my view, to other evidence before the court.^ "^^
This attitude of the court departs from the earlier insistence of the Supreme Court 
and the Court of Appeal on the use of specially skilled experts in providing evidence. In 
Seismograph Service v. Onokpasa^^^, the Supreme Court declared:
Per Adio, J.S.C. at page 272. 
(1972) All N.L.R.
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If the learned trial judge had applied the correct test [o f  the relevance o f 
the witness’s opinion as that o f an expert] he would have come to the 
conclusion that the only expert opinions before him were those o f the 
defendant’s experts, and so unless fo r good reasons otherwise should 
have accepted themf^^
In other words, the Supreme Court held that the evidence of an expert is 
absolutely necessaiy. In another important precedent Seismograph Service v. Ogbenf^^, 
the Supreme Court reinforced the opinion that expert evidence is necessary to connect 
the damage with oil operations. A Supreme Court judge commented on the court ruling 
of the lower court: 'Surprisingly, the learned trial judge, while accepting that the 
evidence o f an expert was necessary to establish that the damage to the house was 
traceable to seismic operations, held that it was not absolutely necessary’ In contrast 
to the above two cases, the significance of the case Elf v. Sillo^^  ^ lies in its departure 
from the notion that an expert opinion is absolutely necessary to establish evidence in 
court, if only in relation to ‘independent’ non-expert evidence.
The application of the new interpretation of the mles of evidence laid down in the 
Sülo case has not been unifonn as yet. Although a new precedent was set, the judiciaiy 
has resisted change to some extent, often preferring to rely on older judgments. Today 
there is some evidence that the mles on evidence have been relaxed in oil related
Per Sowemimo, J.S.C. at page 357.
(1976) 4 S.C.
Per Obaseki, J.S.C. at page 171.
[1994] 6 NWLR.
See, for instance, Ogiale v. Shell [1997] 1 NWLR, in which the court relied on the evidence rules in 
Seismograph Seivice v. Onokpasa (1972) All N.L.R. and Seismograph Service v. Ogbeni (1976) 4 S.C.
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litigation. In Shell v. Isaiah^^^, the Court of Appeal relied on the minimal standaid of 
proof established in the SiUo case, although the court judgment also cited the cases 
Seismograph Service v. Onokpasa^^^ and Seismograph Service v. OgbenP^. In that 
case, the more relaxed rules of evidence assisted the plaintiffs in winning a compensation 
award for damage from an oil spill. In general, it is still too early to say how the courts 
have altered their attitude towards the rules of evidence. But the existence of a new trend 
towai'ds relaxed mles of evidence in oil mlated litigation cannot be denied.
6.12. Quantum of Compensation Awards
The changing judicial attitudes towards locus standi and evidence mles in Nigeria 
have the potential of significantly affecting the outcome in oil related cases. But the most 
significant precedent in oil related litigation was created in 1994 in relation to the 
quantum of compensation awards with the case Shell v. Farah}^^. In that case, several 
families sued Shell for compensation for a well blow-out in 1970. The court established 
that Shell’s evidence was not reliable and the plaintiffs were awarded 4,621,307 Naira in 
compensation. Dissatisfied with the judgment, SheU appealed against the decision. The 
Court of Appeal confirmed the award.
The Farah case is an important judicial precedent regarding the quantum of 
compensation for damage. In order to understand the impact of the Farah case, it is 
necessaiy to understand the principles of compensation payments before 1994. In order
[1997] 6 NWLR. 
(1972) All N.L.R. 
(1976) 4 S.C. 
[1995] 3 NWLR.
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to illustrate the different approaches taken by courts to compensation in the 1990s,-it is 
illuminating to compare the 1975 case Umudje v. Shell-BP^^  ^ mentioned earlier with the 
Farah case.
In the Umudje case, the plaintiffs demanded a sum of 100,000 Naira for the 
destruction of their ponds and lakes as a result of oü spills and the construction of a road. 
The lower court awarded 14,400 Naira for the damage to 300 ponds, lakes and the land. 
Dissatisfied with the judgment, Shell-BP appealed against the decision. The Supreme 
Court confirmed the judgment but lowered the compensation payment from 14,400 Naira 
to 12,000 Naira for the damage to the ponds. The court found that there was no credible 
evidence for the damage to the lakes and the land.
On the surface, the basic principle of compensation in the Umudje case was 
identical to the Farah case. In the Umudje case, the judge said: 'The primary theoretical 
notion is to place the plaintiff in a good a position [sic], so fa r as money can do it, as if  
the matter complained o f  had not occurred’ In the Fai'ah case, the principle of 
compensation was defined by the judge as to 'restore the person suffering the damnum 
[damage] as fa r as money can do that to the position he was [sic] before the damnum or 
would have been but for the damnum’ What distinguishes the Farali case from the 
Umudje case is the interpretation of the above principle by the court. In the Umudje case, 
this basic principle was interpreted very narrowly. Said the judge: 'We concede that a 
claim which asks for „a fa ir and reasonable compensation” ...is most inappropriate in
(1975)9-11 S.C.
Perldigbe, J.S.C. at page 162.
Per Edozie, J.C.A. at page 192. Lawyers call the principle ‘restitutio in integrum’. See Percy (1983, 251-252 and 
588).
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an action for damages in tort’ In the Farah case, the judge accepted that the plaintiffs 
were entitled to fa ir and adequate compensation ’, as stipulated by the Petroleum Act. 
Onalaja, J.C.A. defined and broadened the basis of adequate compensation as 'market 
value o f property when taken. It may include interest and may include the cost or value 
o f the property in the owner for the purposes for which he designed In other
words, compensation must also be paid for the subsequent consequential and prospective 
future losses, not merely for the destioyed property. In addition, the court ruled that 
compensation should also be paid for the suffering of individuals as a result of the 
damage to land. The judge cited a textbook on damages as follows:
Beyond physical damage to the land, however, a nuisance may cause 
annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort, or even illness to the plaintiff 
occupier. Recovery in respect o f these principally non-pecuniary losses is 
allowable and may be regarded as part o f the normal measure o f 
damages.
The above pronouncements in the Fai'ah case changed the basis of the awai'd of 
compensation payments to those adversely affected by oil operations. In the Umudje 
case, the social effect of oil operations was not even considered, while the Supreme 
Court set aside the lower court’s award of 800 Naira for 'injurious affection’ of the 
plaintiffs’ farm land and 1,600 Naira for the damage to the plaintiffs’ lakes. The plaintiffs 
merely received a single lump sum payment for the destiuction of ponds. In contiast, in
Perldigbe, J.S.C. at page 162. 
Per Onalaja, J.C.A. at page 199.
140 Per Edozie, J.C.A. at page 194.
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the Farah case, the plaintiffs were awai'ded compensation under multiple heads as 
follows; 2,371,307 Naira for the loss of income, 250,000 Naira for the 'social 
effect/general inconvenience’ and 2,000,000 Naira for the rehabilitation of the land. 
Before the Farah case arose. Shell had previously paid compensation to the community 
for the crops damaged as a result of oil operations. But the court found that the victims 
should also have been compensated for the loss of income. In the course of the two 
decades after the accident, the victims could not use the land for farming. On that basis, 
they were awarded 2,371,307 Naira for the loss of income for the period of 19 years. 
Since Shell failed to rehabilitate the land in that time, the community was also awarded 
2,000,000 for rehabilitation of the land.
The compensation award in the Farah case is a marked departure from earlier 
court judgments in a number of respects. In earlier cases, oil companies often relied on 
federal legislation to limit the amount of compensation payments. On the question of the 
quantum of compensation, in Odim v. Shell-BP^"^ ,^ the judge ruled that the Constitution 
of 1963 and the Public Lands Acquisition Act 'are there to guide us on this poin t’ In 
contrast, m Shell v. Farah '^^ ,^ the judge refused to accept the Public Lands Acquisition 
Act as the basis for the quantum of compensation. The oü company lawyer relied on 
federal legislation by refeiiing to the Public Lands Acquisition (Miscellaneous Provisions) 
Act No.33 1976. The 1976 Act fixed the sum of 1,250 Naira per hectare as the maximum 
compensation for outright acquisition of ar able land. If applied to 7 hectares, the plaintiffs
(1974) 2 R.S.L.R.
Per Wai-Ogosu J. in Odim v. Shell-BP (1974) 2 R.S.L.R. 93 at 109.
[1995] 3 NWLR.
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in the Farah case would only receive 8,750 Naira (US$ 397 at 1994 exchange rate). Since 
the amount was rather insignificant, an application of the provisions of the Public Lands 
Acquisition Act in the Fai*ah case would have favoured the interests of the oil industry. 
By relying on federal legislation and official compensation rates. Shell would not have to 
pay for loss of income and some other types of losses. The value of official rates also 
decreased over time because of currency depreciation and inflation. For instance, the 
maximum compensation rate of 1,250 Naira per hectare was worth US$ 1994 when the 
Act was promulgated in 1976 but declined to 56.83 US$ when tire Farah case was 
decided in 1994. The consumer prices in Nigeria rose by over 1,100% between 1976 and 
1994.^"" Because of inflation, it made sense for oil companies to delay compensation 
payments and to rely on official rates. In contrast to some earlier court judgments, in the 
Farah case, the court objected to the use of official compensation rates and to the 
application of legislation in determining the compensation sum. Said Edozie, J.C.A.: 
Where a tortuous act is committed, the injured party is entitled to 
damages in accordance with the measure o f  damages applicable to his 
injury. The measure o f  damages for injury affecting land bears no 
relevance to the amount o f compensation for outright acquisition o f the 
land under the Public Lands Acquisition Actf^^
The new principles of compensation payments established in the Farah case 
worked against a number of the previous legal strategies employed by oil companies to 
avoid substantial compensation payments to village communities. A common strategy
Based on the IMF figures for Nigerian consumer prices, see IMF Financial Statistics Yearbook 1995. 
Per Edozie, J.C.A. at page 195.
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was to pay paltry sums for the destruction of crops in order to avoid other forms of 
compensation. In Nvogoro v. Shell-BP^"^ mentioned earlier, the oil company paid a small 
sum of money to the plaintiffs illiterate brother, who thumb-printed a receipt for the 
money. Shell-BP used the receipt in court, saying that any compensation due had been 
paid, and the plaintiff lost the case on those grounds. In the Farah case, SheU also tried to 
use the same strategy by arguing that the plaintiffs had already been paid compensation 
for damage to crops as a result of the weU blow-out. The company argued that the 
plaintiffs should not receive more money as further compensation. The company lawyer 
ai'gued that it was wrong for the court not to have held that SheU paid compensation for 
aU the losses aiising from the blow-out. As evidence of its payments, SheU tendered a 
receipt with the thumb prints of 84 UUterate vUlagers. The trial judge dismissed the 
company’s evidence because the receipt did not include the names of the plaintiffs and 
referred to a different piece of land. He also pointed out that the plaintiffs claimed 
compensation for damage to land, not crops. In other words, in contrast to the Nvogoro 
case, the judge held that compensation for damage could be paid more than once in 
respect of the same cause of damage, if the claim was made in respect of different items 
of assessment.
The court further averred that a mere payment of compensation by an oil 
company in respect of a specific item did not necessaiily dischaige the company’s 
obUgation to make a fair and adequate payment to those affected by oU operations. Shell 
claimed that it had paid 2,000 Naha compensation for the damage to the land, but the
2 R.S.L.R. (1973).
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trial judge rejected this objection by arguing: ‘Even if  the sum ofN 2,000 was paid ta the 
plaintiffs, it cannot be a fair and adequate compensation for the damage to the land’}'^  ^
In other words, the court found that the mere fact of paying compensation is not an 
excuse, the payment must also be fair and adequate. This decision clearly frustrated 
previous oil company strategies, which relied on receipts signed or thumb printed by local 
people in respect of token compensation payments. It was a departure from previous 
court judgments in the sense that the court compelled an oil company to pay 
compensation more than once in respect of the same injury.
On the whole, the significance of tlie Farah case as a landmark ruling in teims of 
compensation payments lies in the court’s departure from the previous narrow 
understanding of the basis of compensation awards. The precedent in the Fai'ah case 
broadened this understanding to include items such as e.g. non-pecuniary losses. As a 
result of these innovations in the assessment of compensation, the understanding of what 
constitutes fa ir and adequate’ compensation was broadened. If the precedent in the 
Farah case is followed in future case judgments, an oil company wiQ no longer be able to 
discharge its legal obligation to pay fa ir and adequate’ compensation for damage from 
oil operations by paying a paltry sum to those affected.
In the wake of the Fai'ah case, substantial compensation payments were awai'ded 
in a number of court cases between village communities and oil companies. A comparison 
of compensation awaids before and after the Farah case illusUates the changes. In Mon v. 
Shell-BP '^^ ,^ the plaintiffs did not prépaie a valuation of tlieir claims, so the judge
Per Edozie, J.C.A. at page 175. 
(1970-1972) I R.S.L.R.
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assessed the compensation figui'e himself at 200 Naira (US$ 304 at the official exchange 
rate). The compensation payment was only 0.1% of the plaintiffs’ original demand. One 
of the notable exceptions was Fufeyin v. Shell-BP^ "^  ^ in 1978, in which the plaintiffs were 
awarded as much as 55,691 Naiia (approx. US$ 88,189) for the destruction of houses, 
crops, fishing creeks, canals, fish ponds, tiaps and other property. The reason for this 
substantial payment was that Shell-BP had earlier agreed to the amount of compensation 
anyway. It is difficult to compare different court cases because the facts in each case are 
unique and they involve different types of damage. But there is evidence that, in the wake 
of the ruling in the Farah case, higher compensation payments were paid to those 
adversely affected by oil operations. In Shell v, Tiebo V I , 6,000,000 Nana (US$ 
274,173) was awarded, while in Shell v. Isaiah^^\ 22,000,000 Naira (US$ 1,005,208) 
was awarded (see Table 6.1.).
(1978) 2 ANSLR.
[1996] 4 NWLR.
[1997] 6 NWLR.
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Table 6.1. Compensation Awards in Selected Oil Related Cases
Year of 
Judgment
Court Case Plaintiff’s 
Claim 
(000s Naira)
Defendant’s 
Offer 
(000s Naira)
Compensation 
Award 
(000s Naira)
Compensation
Award
(US$)
Compensation 
Award as 
Share of 
Claim
1972 Mon V. Shell-BP 200 0 0.2 304 0.1%
1975 Umudje v. Shell-BP 50 0 12 19,481 24%
1978 Fufeyin v. Shell-BP 56 56 56 88,189 100%
1978 SheU-BP V. Cole n.a. 0 35 55,118 n.a.
1994 Shell V. Farah 26,490 0 4,621 210,084 17%
1996 Shell V. Tiebo VII 64,146 50 6,000 274,173 9%
1996 Shell V. Udi 50 0 39 1,782 78%
1997 Geosource v. Biragbara 2,000 0 197 9,001 10%
1997 SheU V. Isaiah 22,000 0 22,000 1,005,208 100%
Source: official currency exchange rates were derived from IMF International Financial Statistics 
(various years).
In Shell V. Tiebo , two years after the judgment in the Farah case, the 
plaintiffs sued Shell on behalf of the Peremabhi community in the then Rivers State for 
damage from an oü spÜl in 1987. The oÜ spill, estimated at 600 banels of crude oü, 
polluted the River Nun, which had previously been used as a source of fresh water and 
for fishing. Members of the community who drank the water after the spiU suffered from 
water-borne diseases. In addition, the oü spül damaged swampland, streams, ponds and 
the community’s juju slirines. SheU did not deny the oü spill, but claimed that it had only 
affected an area of 2.3 hectares of seasonal swamp and fish flats. It offered the 
community 5,500 Naira as fa ir  and adequate compensation’}^  ^ The lower court 
awarded 6,000,000 Naira to the plaintiffs and the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. 
The substantial compensation sum awarded in the Tiebo VII case exemplified the tiend
152 [1996] 4 NWLR.
According to plaintiffs’ witnesses, the sum was 50,000 Naira, not 5,500 Naira as Shell’s witnesses maintained.
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towards higher compensation awards in the 1990s in respect of damage from oil
operations
As a whole, this sub-section indicated that there have been a number of legal 
transformations in relation to locus standi, evidence mles and quantum of compensation. 
These tr ansformations appear to have lar gely benefited village communities in oil related 
litigation.
Understanding Legai Transformation
6.13. Changing Approach to Law
The previous sub-section has highlighted a number of changes which occurred 
within Nigerian judicial decision making. It is less clear why legal change has occurred. In 
this sub-section, we propose a framework for explaining this legal transformation.
Obviously, any analysis of the causes of legal change must remain speculative. 
Amongst the most likely explanations are, first, a different approach to law by judicial 
officers, second, the increased professional ability of legal counsel working for village 
communities, and third, the impact of changing social attitudes on judges. We have 
attempted to investigate these explanations m the context of an inteiwiew with a senior 
Nigerian judge M.B. Belgore, Chief Justice of the Federal High Court.
Interestingly, the Tiebo VII case did not cite the Farah case as a legal precedent. But Onalaja, J.C.A. who 
delivered the judgment, was one of the Court of Appeal judges in the Farah case. This would suggest that the 
Farah case, while important as a legal precedent, is in itself a reflection of a broader shift in judicial attitudes 
towards higher compensation payments.
Personal interview with M B. Belgore, Chief Justice of the Federal High Court (Lagos, March 1998). Belgore 
largely confirmed our speculations that legal change was affected by the three factors: different approach to law 
by judicial officers, the increased professional ability of legal counsel working for village communities, and the 
influence of changing social attitudes on judges. He also maintained that legal change could also be attributed to 
the increased frequency of accidents in the oil industry and the resulting legal disputes. It is possible that the
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First, contemporary Nigerian judges appear to approach law in a different manner 
from their predecessors. Said Belgore, C.J.: 'One possible explanation [for legal 
change] is that judges everywhere today are moving away from Common Law o f the 
17th and 18th centuries. We approach the 21st century. We are moving towards a new 
modem law tradition According to Belgore, one of the differences in the judges’ 
approach is the greater importance attached to substantive rules as opposed to procedural 
ones.^^  ^ One of the indicators of these changing attitudes is that judges have increasingly 
cited court precedents, particularly Nigerian ones, rather than legislation. For instance, in 
Seismograph Service v. Akporuovo^^^, only one Nigerian court case was referred to in 
the judgment. In the more recent case Shell v. Farah^^ ,^ 36 Nigerian and 12 foreign court 
cases were cited (see Table 6.2.). Evidence from court cases indicates that there is a dual 
development. Nigerian courts appear to move away from statute law towaids a greater 
application of judicial precedents. Moreover, courts move towards a Nigerian case law.
increased frequency of litigation has accelerated the process of social learning among judges. But the quantity of 
litigation cannot explain per se why courts have changed their interpretation of legal rules.
Personal interview with M.B. Belgore, Chief Justice of the Federal High Court (Lagos, March 1998). On the 
shifting attitudes of Nigerian judges in general, see e.g. Nweze (1996).
The case Fawehinmi v. Aminu^^ ,^ which was adjudicated by Belgore, illustrates that courts have come to 
interpret legal statutes and legal rules in a less narrow fashion. In that case, a Nigerian legal practitioner sued the 
Minister of Petroleum Resources Jubril Aminu and other defendants, including the NNPC, over the use of 
Nigeria’s oil revenues in 1990. The NNPC requested the court to discharge them on the grounds that the plaintiff 
did not give them 30 days statutory notice as required by section 12(2) of the NNPC Act 1977. The judge 
concluded;
The right to access to Court should not be impeded by a process giving special advantage to the 
defendant fo r no other reason than that it is an organ or semi-organ of the Government. Any law 
putting it in such a position is certainly against the Constitution, void and invalid.
Belgore, therefore, dismissed the NNPC’s application and declared the aforementioned section of the NNPC Act 
1977 as unconstitutional.
(1974) A11N.L.R.
[1995] 3 NWLR.
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Table 6.2. Number of Nigerian and Foreign Cases Cited in Selected Oil Related Cases
Year of 
Judgment
Court Case Court Number of Foreign 
Cases
Number of Nigerian 
Cases
1972 Seismograph Service v. Onokpasa Supreme Court 3 0
1974 Seismograph Service v. Akporuovo Supreme Court 0 1
1975 Umudje v. Shell-BP Supreme Court 8 0
1976 Seismograph Service v. Ogbeni Supreme Court 0 2
1978 Shell-BP V. Cole Supreme Court 1 6
1994 Shell V. Farah Court of Appeal 12 36
1994 Eboigbe v. NNPC Supreme Court 3 11
1994 Elfv. Sillo Supreme Court 0 32
1996 Shell v. Tiebo Vn Court of Appeal 9 46
1996 Shell V. Udi Court of Appeal 0 11
1996 Ogiale V. SheU Court of Appeal 9 20
1997 NNPC V. Elumah Court of Appeal 0 4
1997 SheU V. Isaiah Court of Appeal
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An analysis of Nigerian court cases provides examples of a changing approach to 
law. In the past, courts have seemed reluctant to adjudicate matters related to legislation 
and government affairs. In oil related litigation, this could amount to the courts’ 
reluctance to prosecute oil companies or to raise petroleum matters. In Amos v. Shell- 
, the trial judge commented:
4 E.C.S.L.R.
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I do not think the courts have any jurisdiction to hear any claims for  
compensation under the Minerals Law. Section 78 lays down clearly the 
method o f assessment, which in the absence o f agreement is purely 
administrative, first through the divisional or district officer with an 
appeal to the Governor, who may order arbitration. Such an order would 
in my view be the only way in which the courts could acquire 
jurisdiction.
According to the above logic, courts could only decide matters related to 
compensation, if a specific piece of petroleum legislation mentioned the word ‘court’. 
This narrow interpretation would imply that the government could dictate whether the 
courts could decide a particulai* type of lawsuit or not. In this context, the judge 
somewhat misinteipreted the role of courts under English Common Law.^ ^^  In general, 
the Amos case exemplified the courts’ unwillingness to interfere with legislation and 
government affairs.
In more recent cases, the courts were more witling to interfere with legislation 
and government affairs. In Shell v. Isaiah}^^, the court ruled on the meaning of the 
Constitution (Suspension and Modification) Decree No. 107 of 1993, which extended the 
original jurisdiction of the Federal High Court to oü related matters (see section three of 
the thesis). The Court of Appeal pronounced that the 1993 Decree does not affect oü
Per Holden, CJ. at page 490.
Under Common Law, statutes of limitation can limit the period of limitation, within which a lawsuit can be 
brought to court. But legislation cannot limit the jurisdiction of courts to hear a tort case. Under some 
circumstances, courts may also override statutory limitations. On limitation of action, see Percy (1983, 199-230).
[1997] 6 NWLR.
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spillage matters. Notwithstanding the impact of the Isaiah case on legislation, the court 
judgment illustrates that contemporary courts are more willing to re-inteipret statute law.
A greater willingness to re-inteipret statutes was accompanied by the courts’ |
I
greater reluctance to apply procedural or substantive rules which impede or delay justice j
to the plaintiffs. In Nwadiaro v. Shelf ^ , the oil company claimed that the compensation 
claim was statute barred according to the English Statute of Limitation 1623. The statute 
prescribes that a plaintiff must begin a lawsuit within six years of the cause of grievance.
In the present case, the community staited the lawsuit in 1985, nineteen yeai'S after SheU 
constructed a road which resulted in damage to communal ponds. The Court of Appeal 
found that the statute of limitation was not applicable because the oil company had 
admitted liability for damage during negotiations in 1985. Said the judge: 'If there has 
been admission o f  liability during negotiation and all that remains is fulfilment o f the 
agreement it cannot be just and equitable that the action would be barred after the 
statutory period o f limitation’ The judge dismissed, what he considered, a too narrow 
interpretation of the statute.
In Shell V. Udf^^, the Court of Appeal indicated that it was not prepaied to 
tolerate undue delays to justice brought about by oil company lawyers. In that case, the 
plaintiff claimed compensation for the destruction of fish ponds and trees during oil 
operations. On the date of the hearing in the Ughelli High Court, neither a company 
representative or a lawyer were in court. I.E. Shakarho, company lawyer, merely sent a
[1990] 5 NWLR. 
Per Kolawole, J.< 
[1996] 6 NWLR.
.C.A. at page 339.
336
letter requesting an adjoui'nment since he had to travel to a law conference. Tlie -two 
other lawyers working with Shakai'ho did not appear in court either and failed to give a 
reason for their absence. The lawyers also failed to file a statement of defence, even 
though the company had over four months to prepare it. The judge felt that the lawyers 
and company representatives did not take the case seriously. In his words, the behaviour 
of company lawyers was an ‘example o f  wilful refusal or neglect to comply with Rules o f  
Court’ The judge hence refused to grant adjournment of the case and the plaintiffs 
were awarded compensation. The oil company lawyers appealed against the judgment to 
the Court of Appeal. The court dismissed the appeal and confirmed the judgment of the 
lower court. On the issue of adjournment, the judge ruled that 'the grant o f an 
adjournment in a case is a matter entirely within the discretionary jurisdiction o f the 
court which the court should exercise in accordance with the particular facts and 
circumstances o f  the case’f^  ^ The judge’s uncompromising attitude towards the oil 
company was reflected in the following statement:
Per Akin tan, J.C.A. at page 495.
Per Akintan, J.C.A. at page 496.
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The request fo r  an adjournment was merely to further delay the court 
giving judgment in favour o f the respondent since there was nothing done 
by the appellant [Shell] to show that it was going to oppose the 
application made to the court by the respondent. Similarly, no 
explanation was given fo r the absence o f the representative o f  the 
appellant. This also could only be interpreted as showing lack o f  interest 
in the matter by the appellant.^^^
The above two cases suggest that Nigerian judges are no longer prepared to 
tolerate legal technicalities and delay tactics by legal practitioners as a reason for 
preventing plaintiffs from instituting claims. This appears to support the earlier 
speculation that there has been a change in the judges’ approach to law in the sense that 
they have come to attach greater importance to the substance of law,
6.14. Increased Professional Ability of Legal Counsel
As another explanation for legal change, we suggest that increased professional 
ability of legal counsel working for village communities has influenced the outcome of oü 
related court judgments. One of the indicators of this increased professional ability is the 
sophisticated use of evidence by plaintiffs. Again Belgore, C.J. confirmed: The damage is 
assessed more than before. Plaintiffs increasingly bring scientific evidence o f the effects 
of oil on the soil.^^^
Per Akin tan, J.C.A. at page 497.
Personal interview with M.B. Belgore, Chief Justice of the Federal High Court (Lagos, March 1998).
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A number of Nigerian court cases provide examples of a more sopliisticated use 
of evidence by legal counsel for village communities. In the past, the quality of witness 
evidence was frequently of an inadequate standard. In Odim v. Shell-BP^^ ,^ there was 
only one witness for the plaintiff - the second plaintiff and two witnesses for the
defendant, two Shell-BP employees, but there were no expert witnesses. In contrast, in II
more recent cases, legal counsel for village communities has often used sophisticated i
expert evidence. In Shell v. Tiebo , nine witnesses testified for the plamtiffs. They |
included a licensed surveyor. The plaintiffs’ success in Shell v. Farah^^  ^ was to a large |
extent possible because the community provided credible and sophisticated evidence of j
damage. The plaintiffs were assisted by a joint team of scientists from the University of 
Port Harcourt. When the lower court was faced with conflicting evidence from the 
plaintiffs and the defendant, the plaintiffs’ lawyer moved the court to appoint two referees I
to investigate the disputed facts. The lawyer’s pro-active stance was rewarded as the j
referees’ subsequent report largely supported the plaintiffs’ evidence. t
It is not entii'ely clear' to what extent the legal innovations in the 1990s have been I
induced or aided by the sophisticated and innovative use of legal rules by legal counsel. j
But there are examples which indicate that the judge’s views on the legal issues involved ■
in a case and expressed in a court judgment reflect arguments in the lawyer’s brief. In |
Shell V . Farah^^^, the court judgment reflected the legal reasoning of the legal counsel for |
!
the plaintiffs, L.E. Nwosu, on a number of points. For instance, the court accepted
(1974) 2 R.S.L.R..
[1996]4NWLR. j
[1995] 3 NWLR. j
[1995] 3 NWLR. I
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Nwosu’s reasoning that the Public Lands Acquisition (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act was 
iiTelevant in the assessment of compensation in the Faiah case.
Court judgments cannot fully reveal the extent to which courts follow arguments 
presented by legal counsel. But the increased professional ability of legal counsel may 
reflect a process of social learning among village communities and their legal counsel. 
This process could be pai’tly explained by the increased reliance of village community 
lawyers on contingency fees (see section four of the thesis). A  lawyer hired on a 
contingency fee does not receive any payment if he or she loses a case. It could be thus 
argued that contingency fees provide an economic incentive for a lawyer to be more 
innovative and pro-active in court proceedings in order to increase tlie chances of success 
in a case.
6.15. Impact of Changing Social Attitudes on Judges
While legal change has been affected by the attitudes of judges and the ability of 
legal counsel, it may also have been influenced by changing social attitudes. Said Belgore, 
C.J.:
Judges o f today have seen a lot more development than twenty years ago.
They are more aware now o f oil industry problems than thirty years 
ago... As one American jurist said, the current affair doesn’t pass by the 
judges. The judge cannot be isolated from what is currently going on in 
society in line with a particular subject.^^^
Personal interview with M.B. Belgore, Chief Justice of the Federal High Court (Lagos, March 1998).
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Couit judgments cannot portray the mode by which changing social attitudes have 
influenced the judges. But evidence from court cases indicates that judges have become 
more critical of the behaviour of oil companies and their legal counsel which may reflect 
the increasingly critical attitudes towards oil operations in Nigeria in recent years.
In Shell V. Uzoaru^^ ,^  oil company lawyers argued that the plaintiffs’ claim was 
statute baiTed. Relying on the previous precedent in Nwadiaro v. Shell^ ^  ^ mentioned 
earlier, the Court of Appeal found that the statute of limitation was not applicable 
because the oÜ company had previously admitted liability. The judges hence considered 
Shell’s claim unwarranted and criticised the behaviour of Shell’s legal counsel. Said 
Onalaja, J.C.A. :
I put it succinctly, that abuse o f  judicial process is misuse o f judicial 
procedure intentionally to feather one’s interest to the detriment o f one’s 
adversary, no court shall support or permit the abuse o f its process. With 
the decision in Nwadiaro v. Shell the further pursuit o f this appeal is 
vexatious knowing fully well following the rule o f judicial precedent that 
the Court o f Appeal is bound by its previous decision as the issues 
decided therein are the same, the present appellant is estopped by record 
from pursuing this appeal which is frivolous and [sic] abuse o f process o f 
this court.^^^
[1994] 9 NWLR.176
[1990] 5 NWLR.
Per Onalaja, J.C.A. at page 73.
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In other words, the judge suggested that the oil company used a standard legal 
strategy to ‘intentionally feather’ its interest to the detriment of those affected by oil 
operations. Onalaja’s statement may reflect the increasingly more critical attitudes of the 
judiciaiy towards the oil industry.
One of the indicators of the judges’ changing attitude towaids the oil companies 
and village communities is the amount of compensation awarded to those affected by oil 
operations. Said Belgore, C.J.:
While the law is there, the human element counts in the judge’s 
discretion. If there is compensation and maybe the plaintiffs claim 5 
million Naira, you cannot award 5 million but, at the same time, you 
cannot award 500 Naira. You go in-between and that’s where the 
discretion and the sympathy o f  the judge comes in.^ ^^
As previously shown, courts have recently come to award higher compensation 
payments to village communities. By implication, the increased compensation awai'ds are 
likely to reflect the increased use of discretion by Nigerian courts to the benefit of village 
communities.
In conclusion, there appear to be multiple reasons why legal change has occurred. 
We have identified thi'ee paiallel developments, which may explain more favourable 
judgments in favour of those affected by oü operations: a different approach to law by 
judicial officers, the increased professional ability of legal counsel working for village 
communities, and the influence of changing social attitudes on judges. Of these three
Personal interview with M.B. Belgore, Chief Justice of the Federal High Court (Lagos, March 1998).
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developments, changing social attitudes is probably the key one. As Haü (1989, 245-246) 
has noted, the business of the courts mirrors the economic and social changes brought by 
economic development, while judges play a part in allocating the costs, risks and benefits 
of this development. Even if the judges’ approach to law changes and the skill of legal 
counsel improves, a judge will not use his discretion in favour of one party unless he or 
she is convinced of the merits of a pai ticular allocation. In that sense, legal change in oil 
related litigation has to be ultimately rooted in social attitudes towards the allocation of 
the benefits and externalities arising from oü operations in Nigerian society. No longer 
does the judiciaiy view itself as merely a part of the economic and political elite but it 
shows a greater concern with j u s t i c e . T h i s  concern could be attributed to a number of 
factors including public pressures and the existence of a new generation of judges.
Conclusion
6.16. Conclusion
This section of the thesis has provided an in-depth analysis of the nature of the 
legal disputes between oü companies and vülage communities. To this end, we have 
utilised the evidence from a number of Nigerian court cases. We have focused on 
substantive rules applied in those disputes and on legal changes.
We set out by investigating why many disputes cannot be resolved through 
infoi’mal negotiations and mediation and may thus result in litigation and violence. This
In Iron v. Shell-BP Unreported Suit No. W/89/71, Warri HC mentioned earlier, the judge ruled that nothing 
should be done to disturb the operations of the oil industry which ‘is the tnain source of this country’s revenue’ 
Such pronouncements in support of the oil industry cannot be found in more recent judgments.
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discussion has served as a window to an understanding of non-legal forms of disputes 
which in turn can help to understand the dynamics underlying legal disputes.
We have employed a number of court cases to illustrate how the legal remedies of 
tort law have been used by village communities in their suits against oü companies. We 
have focused on three types of remedies from tort law: negligence, nuisance and strict 
liability. Evidence from litigation indicated that the success of claimants was often limited 
because oü companies were able to use a number of substantive and procedural rules as 
effective legal defences in oü related litigation. There were some indications that the 
principles of the Common Law worked in favour of oü c o m p a n i e s . F o r  instance, in 
Shell v.Enoch^^  ^ mentioned earlier, the plaintiffs had a valid legal claim to compensation 
for damage from oü operations but Shell’s legal counsel was able to successfuUy invoke 
the defence of misjoinder of paities and causes of action. The Enoch case ülustrated that 
legal defences provided by Common Law such as misjoinder of parties and causes of 
action may act to reduce the ability of Nigerian vülage communities to assert their legal 
rights in compensation claims arising from oü operations.
Our analysis was partly motivated by the perception of a paucity of studies on 
judicial law-making in Africa. This problem is paiticulaiiy significant in the context of 
legal disputes between multinational companies and the local populace in developing 
countiies. These disputes have increased in quantity over the past few decades, in part as 
a result of legal changes in favour of the local populace. Legal studies have too often
A number of general, theoretical problems involved in introducing European legal concepts to Africa have been 
discussed in Nunn (1995).
[1992] 8 NWLR.
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overlooked this dynamic process. In respect of oil related litigation in Nigeria, previous 
scholars who have discussed court cases have generally confined their analyses to a 
description of substantive law but have failed to discuss the dynamic aspects of litigation. 
For instance, Adewale (1987, 1989, 1995), who wrote a number of academic papers 
dealing with oil related cases in Nigeria, has failed to investigate legal change. This failure 
has led scholais to believe that the principles of tort law cannot offer a remedy to those 
affected by oil operations. As recently as 1997, Okonmah (1997) wrote in the Journal o f  
African Law that ‘victims o f  oil pollution... are left to the vagaries o f  the common law 
regime based largely on the torts o f  trespass to land, nuisance, negligence and the rule 
in Rylands and Fletcher’. Emphasising the problems of burden of proof with respect to 
causation, Okonmah (1997) concluded: ‘Where he [a claimant] succeeds in discharging 
this burden, the amount o f  damages awarded by the courts is inadequate to assuage his 
losses’. This analysis failed to take any account of important court judgments such as 
Shell V. Farah^^  ^ or E lf v. Sillo^^  ^ which were published in the Nigerian Weekly Law 
Report several yeai's before the publication of Okonmah’s article. The studies by Adewale 
and Okonmah exemplify that the dynamic aspects of litigation have been ignored by 
Nigerian scholais wliich has left a gap in the literature on legal change in oil related 
litigation. We have attempted to fill this gap by examining 68 Nigerian court cases. In this 
context, we were able to show that legal change plays an important role in oil related 
litigation in Nigeria.
[1995] 3 NWLR.
[1994] 6 NWLR.
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The evidence presented in this section of the thesis suggested that there has been 
a trend towards the adoption of substantive and procedural rules which render it easier 
for village communities to successfully litigate against oil companies in Nigeria. The 
liberalisation of locus standi and evidence rules and a broader interpretation of the 
quantum of compensation have all helped village communities to win recent court cases 
against oü companies. Important precedents have been set in Adediran v. Interland 
Transporf^^ and Elfv. Sillo^^^. Above all, the precedent in Shell v. Farah^^  ^ has assisted 
with higher compensation awards for communities. It is perhaps too early to foresee the 
fuU impact of legal change on legal disputes between oü companies and vülage 
communities since legal transfoimation is a slow process. But legal change appears to 
have already resulted in tangible material benefits to community litigants. In a number of 
recent high profile cases, including Shell v. Tiebo Vlf^^ and Shell v. Isaiah^^^, vülage 
communities won substantial amounts of compensation for damage from oü operations. 
The increased possibility of higher compensation awards may partly account for the 
increased quantity of litigation against oil companies.
We speculated that legal change could be explained by thi'ee parallel 
developments: a different approach to law by judicial officers, the increased professional 
ability of legal counsel working for village communities, and the impact of changing 
social attitudes on judges. We suggested that the key factor in legal change in oil related
[1991] 9 NWLR.
[1994] 6 NWLR.
[1995] 3 NWLR.
[1996] 4 NWLR
[1997] 6 NWLR.
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litigation was probably the changing social attitudes towards the allocation of the benefits 
and externalities arising from oü operations in Nigerian society.
While there are indications that legal change may have benefited vülage 
communities, it has to be remembered that most plaintiffs face significant barriers in 
accessing courts and that legal practitioners tend to regard courts as biased in favour of 
0 Ü companies (see section four of the thesis) and that there aie indications of a bias in 
Nigeria’s statute law in favour of oü companies (see section three of tiie thesis). The 
scope for law-making by Nigerian judges is also limited because they have to apply 
English Common Law, which ties judicial decisions to the pattern of development in the 
British Commonwealth. By relying on foreign legal precedents, Nigerian courts may 
sometimes be prevented from fuUy addressing specific local issues. English legal 
traditions, including strict standards of scientific evidence or statutes of limitation, 
decrease the chances of success for potential litigants in oü related cases. Even if a 
plaintiff is able to win a lawsuit, litigation can only address the damage suffered by a 
specific individual, famüy or viUage community but not the impact of oil operations on 
the oil producing areas as a whole. Since courts aie reluctant to make use of injunctions 
against oil companies, they are unlikely to be able to compel companies to reduce the 
externalities arising from oil operations.
These basic limitations could help to explain why legal change in favour of vülage 
communities has so far failed to reduce the quantity of violent forms of protest against oil 
companies. Indeed, the ambiguous nature and the uncertainty of legal outcomes could 
partly help to explain why a significant number of frustrated litigants and potential
347
litigants in oil related disputes may resort to violence. In that sense, legal change could be 
said to have not gone far enough to discourage extra legal forms of protest such as the 
kidnapping of oil company staff. In its modest way, our analysis has contributed to an 
understanding of one of the elements of disputes between oil companies and village 
communities in Nigeria.
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Section 7: Conclusion
7.1. Findings of the Thesis
This thesis has analysed legal disputes between vülage communities and oü 
companies in Nigeria. This analysis has been guided by three principal aims. First, the 
thesis was an attempt to provide a detaüed analysis of the nature of legal disputes 
between oü companies and vülage communities in Nigeria, particularly in the light of the 
rise in oil related litigation. Second, the study of litigation was meant to serve as a 
window to an understanding of social conflicts between viUage communities and oil 
companies. Thud, the thesis was aimed at making a contribution to the research and the 
debate on the role of multinational companies in developing countries and on the day-to- 
day operations of Afiican legal systems. Above all, we attempted to fill a gap in the 
academic writing on the Nigerian oü industry in tenus of a socio-legal analysis of legal 
disputes between oil companies and village communities.
The framework of analysis was provided by the contemporary Nigerian legal 
system. An analysis of the available evidence, including exemplary cases from Nigerian 
courts and a surwey of 154 Nigerian legal practitioners, has Ülustrated the conflicts 
between oil companies and communities and has elucidated the relevant issues. Using 
legal materials, the thesis portrayed the social and legal dynamic in relation to disputes 
arising from oü operations.
It is perhaps evident that an investigation of legal materials cannot address all 
correlates of legal disputes such as socio-economic and political factors including the
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mai'ginalisation of etlinic minorities in the oil producing areas. We have thus looked at the 
political and legal context of oü operations with the aim of providing the background for 
an analysis of legal disputes. This investigation has confirmed our initial expectation that 
an adequate investigation of legal conflicts cannot be undertaken without reference to the 
social context.
In the range of secondary material to which reference has been made in section 
two it has been instructive to trace the making of Nigeria’s oü industry. A discussion of 
secondary sources was not exhaustive but selective. It suggested that the rise in social 
umest and litigation may be partly attributed to the unequal aUocation of benefits and 
exterualities arising from oü operations within Nigerian society which cannot be derived 
from an analysis of court cases. This discussion has indicated that the relationship 
between oil companies and village communities is an unequal one, in which oü companies 
can muster greater political support and economic muscle. By implication, it could be 
expected that the Nigerian state would be reluctant to support litigation against foreign 
oil companies since litigation could disrupt the flow of oil rents to the government and 
private middlemen.
This speculative finding on the bias of the state in favour of oil companies found 
tentative support in the analysis of the formal legal system. Section three, which has 
discussed statute law and the structural character of the legal system, has provided a 
number of indications that the formal legal framework in Nigeria tends to be predisposed 
in favour of oü companies at the expense of viUage communities. The formal-institutional 
structure of the Nigerian legal system is weU developed and sophisticated but oil related
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statute law appeared to offer little protection for village communities in the oü producing 
areas. In this context, it could be argued that an alliance of the political elite and private 
interests in Nigeria obstructs the development of legal remedies for externalities arising 
from oil operations. The inadequate legislative provisions and lack of legal enforcement 
may thus lead to social unrest and litigation against the oil industry.
The analysis of the survey of legal practitioners in section four examined the 
constraints and opportunities that are faced by litigants in oü related cases. Our findings 
suggested that the Nigerian legal system as a whole, not merely statute law, government 
policy or superior resources of oü companies, favours the interests of oil companies. 
Being a developing country, Nigeria faces many inadequacies in the day-to-day 
operations of the legal system. But, in the views of legal practitioners, litigants who sue 
0 Ü companies face greater constraints than other litigants. A significant part of the data 
indicated that the problems of access to courts aie greater in oü related litigation. In this 
context, the lack of funds and ignorance were rated as the main problems of access to 
courts in oil related cases. There were indications that intimidation by the government as 
well as oil companies is a more important barrier to justice for vülage communities suing 
oil companies than it is for other potential litigants. This supports the view that the 
Nigerian regime is biased in favour of oü companies. Survey analysis also indicated that 
the judiciary and the legal process tended to be biased in favour of oil companies rather 
than the opposing litigants and that judges encounter greater outside pressures in oil 
related litigation. This bias manifests itself, for instance, in the inadequate payment of 
compensation for damage from oil operations awar ded by Nigerian courts.
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The existence of these biases was not surprising given the speculative finding of 
the contextual chapters that the Nigerian state tended to favour oil companies although 
this may ultimately contribute to tiiggering violent responses from viUage communities. 
The constraints faced by individual and community litigants can help to explain why 
viUage communities may abandon litigation in favour of extra-legal forms of protest.
The persistence of conflicts between oU companies and viUage communities can 
be partly explained by externalities caused by oU operations on the ground. Section five 
analysed the nature of those extemaUties by focusing on the impact of oU exploration and 
production on viUage communities including the resulting environmental damage. We 
have found evidence that the traditional operating practices of the oU companies 
combined with their unwUUngness to commit funds towards environmental protection 
have prompted disputes between oil companies and viUage communities. It is clear that 
only some of these disputes have resulted in litigation. From an economic perspective, it 
is somewhat surprising that oU companies have continued to create a number of 
externalities which could have easily been avoided with smaU expenditure on their part. 
An analysis of the nature of oil related extemaUties in Nigeria suggests that many 
economic activities of the oU industry cannot be adequately understood without reference 
to cultural attitudes which may prevent otherwise rational economic choices.
Considering the importance of extemaUties from oU operations and the bias of the 
legal system, one could expect that the existing court cases between viUage communities 
and oil companies are only a small fraction of the potential Utigation, which could arise as 
a result of vaUd legal claims to compensation for damage from oU operations. In other
352
words, if the Nigerian legal system were less predisposed in favour of oil companies, then 
the quantity of litigation against oil companies would be likely to rise. This speculation of 
a suppression of litigation against oil companies lends support to the hypothesis that 
difficulties in obtaining legal recourse may have contributed directly and. indirectly to 
informal foims of conflict such as seizure of oil industry equipment or the kidnapping of 
oil company staff. These activities aie undeskable from the point of view of oü 
companies. But it could be expected that they are also partly caused by the companies’ 
use of their superior resources to frustrate the legal claims of viUage communities. The 
resulting paradox is that the companies’ abUity to stifle one form of protest may lead to 
different, perhaps more troublesome, forms of protest.
On the surface, it may seem surprising that, despite severe baiiiers to justice and 
despite the bias of the legal system in favour of oü companies, the frequency of litigation 
between oü companies and vülage communities has substantially increased in the 1990s. 
This seeming paradox could be attiibuted to a number of factors including state 
fragmentation on the micro-level, public pressures and the dynamic character of Nigeria’s 
legal system. For instance, several respondents indicated that a number of judges have 
become more sympathetic to the claims of viUage communities than judges of the past.
Nonetheless, the bias of the legal system and the rentier nature of the Nigerian 
state remain important obstacles m terms of access to courts for those affected by oü 
operations. We have, therefore, speculated that there may be other reasons why oil 
related Utigation has increased in the 1990s. It was expected that a shift in judicial
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pronouncements in favour of village communities played a role in encouraging a greater 
quantity of litigation against oil companies.
Section six of the thesis, which provided a detailed analysis of litigation between 
oil companies and village communities, largely confirmed the initial expectation that legal 
innovations in oil related cases have benefited village communities. The success of 
litigants in oil related cases was limited because oil companies were able to use a number 
of substantive and procedural lules as effective legal defences. But there has been a trend 
towards the adoption of rules which render it easier for village communities to litigate 
against oil companies. Above all, village communities have recently been awarded higher 
compensation payments for damage from oü operations foUowing the ruling in Shell v. 
Farah .^ We speculated that the key factor in legal change in oil related litigation was 
probably the judges’ changing social attitudes towards the aUocation of the benefits and 
externalities arising from oil operations in Nigerian society. This would support our initial 
assumption that court judgments reflect the economic and social changes in society. 
FoUowing the same logic, the higher compensation payments to viUage communities 
could be assumed to reflect society’s greater preoccupation with the plight of the vülage 
communities in the oil producing areas. The increased possibüity of higher compensation 
payments may partly explain the rise in oü related litigation in the 1990s. In this context, 
this thesis not only portrays the legal disputes between viUage communities and oil 
companies but also tlie legal dynamics underlying those disputes.
' [1995] 3 NWLR.
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7.2. Relevance of the Thesis
It may be held that a study of legal disputes in the Nigerian oil industry is an 
irrelevant and futile exercise, given the assumption that there is no rule of law in Nigeria 
and that the judiciary is little more than an extended arm of the executive branch of the 
federal government. The evidence presented in this thesis, however, demonstrated such a 
judgment to be superficial and a mistaken one which fails to take full account of the 
complex nature of the judicial process in Nigeria, dynamic processes of legal change and 
the possibility of using court cases as factual evidence. While our findings differ from 
some of the conventional analyses in the literature, they have not necessarily been 
unexpected. In this sense, the originality of this thesis does not stem so much from 
unanticipated new insights on the nature of multinational business or legal systems in 
developing countries but rather from its socio-legal approach and from its treatment of a 
hitherto neglected subject
Above all, our analysis has been guided by the perception of a lack of a socio- 
legal study on the legal disputes between oil companies and village communities in 
Nigeria and the role of the legal system as mediator and adjudicator. We have been able 
to identify a number of the sources of those disputes, particularly in terms of externalities 
arising from oil operations on the ground (see section five). The core chapters of the 
thesis (sections four and six) have provided an analysis of the legal system in the light of 
oil related litigation. The discussion of legal transfomiation in oil related litigation has 
contributed to an understanding of a subject which has either been overlooked or simply 
neglected in academic publications. With regards to the academic writings on the
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Nigerian oil industr y in general, our analysis has filled a gap in the literature. It may serve 
as a starting point for further future research on conflicts between oü companies and 
vülage communities in Nigeria.
Our socio-legal analysis, particularly in section four, was also motivated by the 
perception of a gap in scholarly knowledge on African legal systems. This gap arises not 
so much in terms of an analysis of the substantive elements of Afiican law, but rather in 
terms of the day-to-day operations of the legal system. This problem is particularly 
significant in the context of legal disputes between multinational companies and the local 
populace in developing countries. Legal studies on Africa have hitherto largely ignored 
the socio-legal context of law such as the problems of access to courts for potential 
litigants or the actual enforcement of legislation on the ground. They have largely 
confined their analyses to the formal legal process and/or the analysis of sources of law. 
In its modest way, our survey has sought to shed light on the legal processes associated 
with the interaction between vülage communities and oü multinationals. The 
methodology adopted in the survey has aUowed us to quantify the hierarchy of access 
problems as perceived by Nigerian legal practitioners and to quantitatively assess the 
extent of the practical impediments in the day-to-day operations of the legal system. We 
believe that only an interdisciplinary framework such as the one devised for this thesis can 
fuUy account for the legal disputes between the companies and the local people, which is 
not offered by either a purely socio-economic or a purely legal study.
One of the goals of the thesis was to malte a contribution to the research and the 
debate on the role of multinational companies in developing countries in the field of
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litigation. While numerous studies have addressed the role of multinational companies, 
there is still ample need to analyse the interactions between those affected by business 
operations and the companies, particularly in the field of litigation. In contrast to the field 
study method and macro-analytical studies, we have utilised court cases to portray 
conflicts between oil companies and village communities and the legal dynamic 
underlying those conflicts. We have used court cases as factual evidence and as legal 
material which has allowed a more in-depth analysis than conventional legal studies which 
limit their analysis of litigation to a discussion of substantive and procedural rules. In 
addition to the investigation of substantive and procedural I’ules, our socio-legal analysis 
of litigation has served as a window to an understanding of the sources of disputes and 
non-legal forms of disputes.
7.3. Directions for Future Research
As we have noted at the outset of this project, legal materials are not the only 
sour'ce of information on conflicts between oil companies and village communities. In this 
context, it may be instructive to consider the merits of potential alternative avenues for 
future research. Our discussion of legal materials could be complemented by alternative 
methodological approaches.
One of those alternative approaches would be a comprehensive sociological and 
social-anthropological field study of village communities m the oil producing areas. Such 
a study could investigate in greater detail the effects of oil operations on village 
communities on the ground such as the migration of oil workers and the resulting shifts in
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cultural attitudes. More importantly, a field study could examine the motivations of 
villagers when engaging in conflicts with oÜ companies. Issues discussed could include 
the villagers’ perception of economic inequality in Nigerian society and their lack of 
political opportunities. In the context of oil related litigation, a field study could highlight 
haulers to justice as perceived by community members. In general, it could analyse extra 
legal forms of dispute resolution including informal negotiations and settlements. A study 
of this nature would potentially allow for the development of a compmhensive model of 
social protest in village communities which would take into account all correlates of 
conflicts between companies and communities. Prior field research on village 
communities in the oil producing areas has failed to adequately identify why villager 
engage in conflicts with companies.
Another alternative approach would be to analyse the internal workings of 
business organisations with a view to an understanding of the motivations of company 
staff when choosing a specific strategy to deal with conflicts. In particular, such a study 
could investigate the cultuial attitudes of oü company staff towards vülage communities 
in the oü producing areas. Subsidiaries of multinational companies could be assumed to 
develop specific corporate cultures influenced by both the local cultures of the countiy in 
which they operate and by the cultuial values transmitted from the corporate 
headquaiters. Unfortunately, there appears to have been no prior academic research on 
the dynamics of cultural change in Nigeria’s oil companies.
In terms of legal change, an alternative approach would be to survey Nigerian 
judges. Such a survey could investigate the motivations of judges when adjudicating legal
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disputes. A study of this nature could potentially establish to what extent judicial 
decisions are influenced by the transformations in the wider society. Moreover, it could 
potentially explore the natuie and scope of legal change as perceived by judicial officers.
In terms of public policy implications, there is a lack of prior academic research 
on institutional - state and company - responses to local conflicts. A cost-benefit analysis 
of different institutional responses could explore the alternative strategies pursued by oil 
companies in dealing with local conflicts and the financial costs attached to each of those 
strategies. Such a study, moreover, could investigate the implications of changes in the 
forms of protest adopted by village communities vis-à-vis oü companies. For instance, 
one could explore the implications for oü companies of a shift from one fonn of protest 
(e.g. litigation) towards another form of protest (e.g. vandalism).
WhÜe many benefits could be gained from the aforementioned methodological 
approaches, particularly from the anthropological and sociological perspective, there are 
problems with these methodologies. Interviews and written sources may be biased or ill- 
informed and, in any case, reflect personal perceptions of the issues. Data on the oil 
industry is generally thought to be particularly vulnerable to manipulation for a number of 
reasons (Stevens 1995). Data gained from field studies can be very subjective as the 
number of objects of study may be highly limited, unless a standardised survey is used, a 
strategy wliich is lücely to be difficult in a viUage setting in Nigeria. For practical reasons, 
it may be difficult to find a sufficient number of respondents for conducting a survey 
amongst judges because there are fewer judicial officers than legal practitioners and 
access to them is likely to be limited for an outside researcher. In comparison with the
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above methodologies, the methodology adopted in this thesis hence has the advantage of 
providing a consistent framework of analysis and a wealth of reliable legal materials.
Beyond our immediate concern with conflicts arising from oil operations in 
Nigeria, our analysis suggests a number of avenues for future research on conflicts 
between business organisations and the local populace in developing countries.
Our research highlights the importance of further study of litigation and of legal 
change in relation to disputes between companies and the local populace in developing 
countries. With the rise in litigation against multinational companies in those countries, 
scholars can no longer neglect the study of the dynamics of legal systems m relation to 
multinational investment. Recognising the capacity of the Nigerian judiciary to act 
autonomously from the executive arm of the government would weaken the temptation 
of scholars in the African Studies field to dismiss legal systems as unworthy of study. We 
hope that this thesis has served to undennine the mechanistic view that the judiciary in 
Africa, as an integral part of the state structures, lacks a dynamic of its own. 
Relinquishing this conceptualisation of the judiciary wÜl not only allow scholars to make 
greater use of litigation in the analysis of social conflicts but also to re-discover the study 
of legal systems and their underlying dynamics.
Future research on the disputes between the local populace affected by business 
operations and firms in developing countries could make greater use of litigation as an 
alternative to the study of open conflict. While this thesis has not attempted to explicitly 
formulate a methodological tool of analysis, we feel that a study of litigation should 
combine an investigation of the social context, a discussion of the day-to-day operations
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of the legal system and a detailed analysis of oil related litigation, both in terms of factual 
evidence and legal principles. We believe that such a interdisciplinary mixture can provide 
explanations which aie both causally and meaningfully adequate in the Weberian sense.
Our socio-legal approach could be modified to the study of conflicts in other 
regions and in respect of other issues. Our research focused on the Nigerian legal system. 
This has demonstrated a capacity to act autonomously from the executive aim of the 
government. Could the same methodology be applied to a country with significantly less 
developed legal institutions and a judiciary more dependent on the executive arm of the 
government? We focused on conflicts between oil companies and the local populace in 
rural areas. To what extent could the same methodology be applied to an analysis of 
employment-related conflicts or to conflicts arising from externalities from business 
operations in urban areas? We had at our disposal a significant number of court cases 
which illustrated the analysed conflicts. To what extent could the same methodology be 
applied if a researcher had at his or her disposal a significantly smaller number of court 
cases? With the rise in litigation between multinational companies and indigenous 
populations the need for a rigorous methodology to analyse these legal disputes is 
perhaps evident. Hence, the ultimate contribution of this thesis could be to lay the 
foundations for the study of a hitherto neglected subject.
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Map of Nigeria: Distribution of the Survey in Lagos and Port 
Harcourt
Lagos:
135 questionnaires 
(out of 180 distributed)
Port Harcourt: ^
19 questionnaires 
(out of 60 distributed)
Ni«jdueuri
M in n a  g j
/A B U JA
■ Makurdi
J k e ja  ^ M o a u mL ■ E nuguBenin
Aladja
W amPort HmicouA
bxisanfç product depot 
Exuoni; product pipeline
 Existing crude pipeline
A Crude oil storage 
A Refinery a te : and depots 
Ejdsnng natural
Guinea
Area show n in larger scale m ap
200 Miles
400 Kilometers gas pipicline
SOUTH EASTERN 
NIGERIAGilli Gilli
Ogliarcic O bcn N 
ObcnVv kaiî
rarabc
Ibiiuuni ^
Delta
Okaii
Oduli
O F orcudoados Yokn
Abibaw.
Ilcitiscdc
)pukusb 
N ) CalalCreek C)/.<
 ^^  P^ rt^ »rcourt
E l e m a ^  Yi.ria
Utap.ur i>
Otlrania g C m r T " C ^ ° " " '
Opoliii I,lull, 
'  O so  Kalarkwc
Cioiiuh Creek
\ ) 0  C r e e kOloibiriCreek O b am aPcnmagtoi 
Mtililietoii
Ncnibc CkA K chnciy sites 
Oitliclds
CasHcUs (in nulles) 
Tanker iciininal
40 Mlles
10 0  K iio m c i
Source: Khan (1994).
Appendix
Survey of Nigerian lawyers
Your views are very Important for this survey. You 
can help to assess the condition of the legal 
profession in Nigeria. Please fill in the following 16 
questions. It should only take approx. 10 minutes of 
your time. Your answers will be kept anonymous 
and confidential.
1. What is your Birth Year? 19
2. Are you
0  Male G Female
3. When were you called to the Bar?
19
4a. What is the approx. size of your law firm and/or 
organization including support staff?
4b, How many persons would you categorize as 
support staff?
5. What are you specialised in?
D  Criminal law 
D  Civil law 
D  Environmental law 
D  Commercial law 
D  Other
Please feel free to be more specific
6a. Has your work involved contacts with an oil 
company?
D  yes 
n  no
6b. Have you acted as
D  counsel for an oil company, its subsidiary or a 
contractor
G counsel in a lawsuit against an oil company 
(tick both if applicable)
7a. In your professional experience, would you say 
that there are difficulties in the enforcement of 
court orders, rulings or judgments?
G very severe problems 
G severe problems 
0  some diflSculties 
G minor difficulties 
G no difficulties
7b. Are the difficulties more or less severe in oil 
company related litigation?
O much more severe 
G greater 
O the same 
G less severe 
0  much less severe
G don’t know
8a. In your professional experience, would you say 
that lawyers, judges or other judicial officers 
encounter outside pressures from private or public 
institutions in their work?
G very often 
G often 
G sometimes 
G rarely 
G never
8b. Are these pressures more or less severe in oil 
company related litigation?
n  much more severe 
□  greater 
D  the same 
n  less severe 
D  much less severe
G don’t know
9a, In your professional experience, are litigants 
treated fairly in court decisions involving oil 
companies?
G very fairly 
G fairly
G neither fairly nor unfairly 
G unfairly 
G very unfairly
G don’t know
9b. Do you think oil companies, their subsidiares 
and contractor's conduct themselves ethically in 
court proceedings?
G very often 
G often 
G sometimes 
Q rarely 
G never
G don’t know
9c. Would you say that courts are biased in favour 
of the oil company or the opposing litigant?
G severe bias in favour 
of oil company 
G some bias in favour 
of oil company 
G no bias in favour 
of oil company 
G don’t know
G severe bias in favour 
of opposing litigant 
G some bias in favour 
of opposing litigant 
G no bias in favour
of opposing litigant 
G don’t know
9d. Amongst the following, rank reasons {l=very 
important reason, 2=important reason, 3=less 
important reason] why courts might encounter 
diffîculties In judging oil related cases fairly?
lack of knowledge on oil technology 
lack of funds 
lack of time 
outside pressures
resources and skill of oil company’s counsel 
lack of witnesses 
incompetence of witnesses
[feel free to use the same number as often as you wish 
or simply ignore specific fields]
10. In your professional experience, would you 
consider the compensation paid by oil companies 
for damages In tort as
G unfair to oil companies as much too liigh 
G unfair to oil companies as somewhat too high 
G fair and justified
G unfair to opposing litigant as somewhat too low 
G unfair to opposing litigant as much too low
G don’t know
11a. Have you encountered instances in which 
potential litigants have been discouraged from legal 
action although they had a valid claim to 
compensation, an injunction or another form of 
legal recourse?
G very often 
G often 
G sometimes 
D  rarely 
G never
G don’t know
[please tick one field on each side]
lib. Amongst the following, rank reasons [l=very 
important reason, 2=important reason, 3=less 
important reason] which you think would prevent a 
potential litigants from seeking legal recourse?
12. In your professional experience, which areas of 
law have undergone changes since you were called 
to the Bar?
ignorance of legal rights nochange
some
change
major
change
don’t
know
lack of funds Criminal law D □ □ □
lack of general education Civil law n □ □ □
geographical distance to courts Environmental law D  
Commercial law D
□
□
□
□
□
□
intimidation by tort-feasors Other D □ □ □
  intimidation by public bodies
organisational structure of villages
  uncertainty about the potential success of a suit
  delay in the disposal of cases by courts
  ethnic origin
  living in a rural area
  being a woman
  young age
[feel free to use the same number as often as you wish 
or simply ignore specific fields]
11c. In your opinion are the problems particularly 
severe in oil related litigation?
D  much less severe 
D  less severe 
D  the same 
D  more severe 
D  much more severe
D  don’t know
Please feel free to be more specific
Please feel free to be more specific
13. Do you think that the following piece of 
legislation has been effectively enforced?
not partially effectively don’t
enforced enforced enforced know
Petroleum Act 1969 D □ □ □
FEPA Decree 1988^  □  , □ □ □
OMPADEC Decree 1992  ^ □ □ □ □
Land Use Act 1978 D □ □ □
Gas Re-Injection Act 1979 D □ □ □
’ Federal Environmental Protection Agency (FEPA)
 ^Oil Mineral Producing Areas Developm Commission
14. The Eso Panel in 1994 submitted a report on the 
situation of the judiciary. Do you agree/disagree 
with the following findings of the Panel? For each 
statement, give a rating between 1 and 5 [1 = 
strongly disagree, 5=strongly agi'ee]
the judiciary is too dependent on the executive 
arm of tiie Government 
the appointment of judges is too arbitrary
the funding of the legal system is too little
congestion in the courts is too high
15. Do you agree/disagree with the following 
statement? [1 = strongly disagree, 5=strongly 
agree]
typed transcripts of court judgements are 
usually written competently
16a. Do you think that there are major differences 
in the quality of judicial services in different 
Nigerian courts?
n  yes D  no
16b. Which type of court would you judge as 
particularly competent or incompetent?
very don’t 
competent competent incompetent know
Supreme Court D □ □ □
Court of Appeal D □ □ □
Federal High Court D □ □ □
State High Courts D □ □ □
Magistrates Courts D . □ □ □
Customary Courts D □  . □ □
Do you have additional comments you would like to 
make? Please write below or attach pages if you 
want
To 4.4. Profile of Respondents
Table B .l. Age of Respondents
Age Group Percentage of Respondents Cumulative Percentage
25-30 17.5 17.5
31-35 32.5 50.0
36-40 21.4 71.4
41-45 13.0 84.4
46 and over 10.4 94.8
No response 5.2 100.00
Total 100.00 100.00
Table B.2. Years of Professional Experience of Respondents
Years of Experience Percentage of Respondents Cumulative Percentage
1-5 19.5 19.5
6-10 40.9 60.4
11-15 18.2 78.6
16-20 13.0 91.6
21 and more 8.4 100.0
Total 100.0 100.0
Table B.3. Size of Lavy Firm
Number of Staff Percentage of Respondents Cumulative Percentage
1-5 13.0 13.0
6-10 43.5 56.5
11-15 18.8 75.3
16-20 4.5 79.8
21-25 3.9 83.7
26 and more 10.4 94.1
No response 5.8 99.9
Total 99.9 99.9
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Table B.4. Number of Support Staff
Number of Staff Percentage of Respondents Cumulative Percentage
0 0.6 0.6
1-5 61.0 61.6
6-10 15.6 77.2
11-15 11.0 8&2
16 and more 4.5 92.7
No response 7.1 99.8
Total 99.8 9^ 8
Table B.5. Professional Specialisation of Respondents (per cent)
Criminal law Civil law Environmental law Commercial law Other
Specialised 19.5 60.4 30.5 66.2 9.1
Not specialised 65.5 24.7 54.5 18.8 76.0
Unclassifiable/No Response 14.9 14.9 14.9 14.9 14.9
To 4.6. Views on Access to Courts According to Different Groups
Table B.6. Answers to questions 3 and lib : Responses according to professional experience of 
lawyers on ethnic origin as a problem of access to courts (per cent)
vei-y important reason important reason less important reason
Lawyers with 1-5 years of experience 20.8 20.8 58.3
Cumulative Percentage 20.8 41.6 99.9
Lawyers with 6-10 years of experience 9.4 30.2 60.4
Cumulative Percentage 9.4 3&6 100.0
Lawyers with 11-15 years of experience 13.0 26.1 60.9
Cumulative Percentage 13.0 3&1 100.0
Lawyers with 16-20 years of experience 35.0 40.0 25.0
Cumulative Percentage 354 75.0 100.0
Lawyers with 21 and more years of experience 364 6^6 0
Cumulative Percentage 364 100.0 100.0
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Table B.7. Answers to questions 1 and 11b; Responses according to age of lawyers on ethnic origin as
a problem of access to courts (per cent)
very important reason important reason less important reason
Lawyers between 25 and 30 years old 8.0 20.0 72.0
Cumulative Percentage 8.0 28.0 100.0
Lawyers between 31 and 35 years old 7.7 23.1 69.2
Cumulative Percentage 7.7 30.8 100.0
Lawyers between 36 and 40 years old 27.6 31.0 41.4
Cumulative Percentage 27.6 58.6 100.0
Lawyers between 41 and 45 years old 29.4 47.1 23.5
Cumulative Percentage 29.4 76.5 100.0
Lawyers 46 years old and over 30.8 61.5 7.7
Cumulative Percentage 30.8 92.3 100.0
To 4.9. Types of Courts
Table B.8. Answers to questions 5 and 16a: Responses of commercial lawyers on whether there are 
major differences between the quality of judicial services in different types of courts (per cent)
There are major differences There are no major differences
Commercial lawyers 94.7 5.3
Cumulative percentage 94.7 100.0
Other lawyers 78.6 21.4
Cumulative percentage 78.6 100.0
Table B.9. Answers to questions 5 and 16b: Responses of commercial lawyers on whether the judicial 
services in the Federal High Court are competent (per cent)
Very competent Competent Incompetent
Commercial lawyers 8.6 84.9 6.5
Cumulative percentage 8.6 93.5 100.0
Other lawyers 8.7 69.6 21.7
Cumulative percentage 8.7 7&3 100.0
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Table B.IO. Answere to question 16a: Responses of Lagos and Port Harcourt lawyers on whether 
there are major differences between the quality of judicial services in different types of courts (per
cent)
There are major differences There are no major differences
Lagos lawyers 
Cumulative percentage 
Port Harcourt lawyers 
Cumulative percentage
70.6
70.6 
938  
93.8
29.4
100.0
6.3
100.1
Table B .ll. Answers to questions 3 and 16a: Responses according to professional experience of 
lawyers on whether there are major differences between the quality of judicial services in different
types of courts (per cent)
There are major differences There are no major differences
....................'ü " ï.....................
100.0
5.2
100.0
Lawyers with 1-5 years of experience 
Cumulative percentage 
Lawyers with 6 or more years of experience 
Cumulative percentage
To 4.10. Oil companies and Court Procedure
Table B.12. Answers to questions 6b and 9a: Responses of oil company lawyers on whether litigants 
are treated fairly in court decisions involving oil companies
Very fairly Fairly Neither fairly nor unfairly Unfairly Very unfairly
Oil company lawyers 0 44.4
Cumulative percentage 0 44.4
Other lawyers 0 31.9
Cumulative percentage 0 31.9
18.1
62.5
6.4
384
234
86.1
424
80.9
134
100.0
19.1
100.0
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Table B.13. Answers to questions 5 and 9a; Responses of commercial lawyers on whether litigants
are treated fairly in court decisions involving oil companies
Very fairly Fairly Neither fairly nor unfairly Unfairly Very unfairly
Commercial lawyers 2.5 34.2
Cumulative percentage 2.5 36.7
Other lawyers 4.5 63.6
Cumulative percentage 4.6 68.1
16.5
53.2 
9.1
77.2
30.4
83.6
22.7 
99.9
16.5
100.1
0
99.9
Table B.14. Answers to questions 5 and 9a: Responses of environmental lawyers on whether litigants 
are treated fairly In coiiit decisions involving oil companies
Very fairly Fairly Neither fairly nor unfairly Unfairly Very unfairly
Environmental lawyers 5.0 32.5 5.0
Cumulative percentage 5.0 37.5 42.5
Other lawyers 1.6 45.9 21.3
Cumulative percentage 1.6 47.5 68.8
35.0
77.5
24.6 
93.4
22.5
100.0
6.6
100.0
Table B IS. Answers to questions 6b and 9b: Responses of oil company lawyers on whether oil 
companies, their subsidiaries and contractors conduct themselves ethically in court proceedings
Very often Often Sometimes Rarely Never
Oil company lawyers 9.2 43.1 41.5 6.2 0
Cumulative percentage 9.2 52.3 90.8 100.0 100.0
Other lawyers 10.0 20.0 57.5 12.5 0
Cumulative percentage 10.0 30.0 87.5 100.0 100.0
B.16. Answers to questions 5 and 9b: Responses of commercial lawyers on whether oil
lies, their subsidiaries and contractors conduct themselves ethically in court proceedings
Very often Often Sometimes Rarely Never
Commercial lawyers 10.1 37.7 47.8 4.3 0
Cumulative percentage 10.1 47.8 95.6 99.9 99.9
Other lawyers 8.3 37.5 33.3 20.8 0
Cumulative percentage 8.3 45.8 79.1 99.9 99.9
Appendix
Table B.17. Answers to question 9b: Responses of Lagos and Port Harcourt lawyers on whether oil
companies, their subsidiaries and contractors conduct themselves ethically in court proceedings
Very often Often Sometimes Rarely Never
Lagos lawyers 8.9 37.8 48.9 4.4 0
Cumulative percentage 8.9 46.7 91.1 100.0 100.0
Port Harcourt lawyers 13.3 13.3 40.0 33.3 0
Cumulative percentage 13.3 26.6 66.6 99.9 99.9
■VWVWWVyVWWVVWVYWW^
Table B.18. Answers to questions 6b and 9c: Responses of oil company lawyers on whether courts
are biased in favour of the opposing litigant
Severe bias in favour of 
opposing litigant
Some bias in favour of 
opposing litigant
No bias in favour of 
opposing litigant
Oil company lawyers 8.5 36.2 55.3
Cumulative percentage 8.5 44.7 100.0
Other lawyers 3.1 12.5 84.4
Cumulative percentage 3.1 15.6 100.0
Table B.19, Answers to questions 6b and 9c: Responses of lawyers who acted as counsel in a lawsuit
against an oil company on whether courts are biased in favour of the opposing litigant
Severe bias in favour Some bias in favour No bias in favour of
of opposing litigant of opposing litigant opposing litigant
Lawyers who acted in a lawsuit against 3.8 13.5 82.7
an oil company
Cumulative percentage 3.8 17.3 100.0
Other lawyers 11.1 51.9 37.0
Cumulative percentage 11.1 63.0 100.0
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Table B.20. Answer to questions 3 and 9d: Responses according to professional experience of lawyers 
on whether lack of funds is an important reason why courts might encounter difOculties in judging
oil related cases fairly (per cent)
Very important reason Important reason Less important reason
Lawyers with 1-5 year s of experience 31.8 22.7 45.5
Cumulative percentage 31.8 54.5 100.0
Lawyers with 6-10 years of experience 46.0 22.0 32.0
Cumulative percentage 46.0 68.0 100.0
Lawyers with 11-15 years of experience 57.1 28.6 14.3
Cumulative percentage 57.1 85.7 100.0
Lawyers with 16-20 years of experience 68.4 26.3 5.3
Cumulative percentage 68.4 94.7 100.0
Lawyers with 21 and more years of experience 80.0 20.0 0
Cumulative percentage 80.0 100.0 100.0
Table B.21. Answer to questions 1 and 9d: Responses according to age of lawyens on whether lack of 
funds is an important reason why courts might encounter difficulties in judging oil related cases
fairly (per cent)
Very important reason Important reason Less important
Lawyers between 25 and 30 years old 26.1 26.1 47.8
Cumulative percentage 26.1 52.2 100.0
Lawyers between 31 and 35 years old 39.5 21.1 39.5
Cumulative percentage 39.5 60.6 100.1
Lawyers between 36 and 40 years old 60.0 28.0 12.0
Cumulative percentage 60.0 88.0 100.0
Lawyers between 41 and 45 years old 75.0 18.8 6.3
Cumulative percentage 75.0 93.8 100.1
Lawyers 46 years old and over 83.3 16.7 0
Cumulative percentage 83.3 100.0 100.0
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Table B.22. Answer to questions 5 and 9d: Responses of environmental lawyers on whether lack of
funds is an important reason why courts nught encounter difffculties in judging oil related cases
fairly (per cent)
Very important reason Important reason Less important reason
Environmental lawyers 
Cumulative percentage 
Other lawyers 
Cumulative percentage
68.6
68.6
36.2
17.1
85.7
29.0
14.3
100.0
34.8
36.2 65.2 100.0
Table B.23. Answer to questions 1 and 9d: Response according to age of lawyers on whether 
resources and skill of oil company’s counsel is an important reason why courts might encounter 
difficulties In judging oil related cases fairly (per cent)
Very important reason Important reason Less important reason
Lawyers between 25 and 30 years old 4.3 34.8 60.9
Cumulative percentage 4.3 39.1 100.0
Lawyers between 31 and 35 years old 7.9 42.1 50.0
Cumulative percentage 7.9 50.0 100.0
Lawyers between 36 and 40 years old 14.8 44.4 40.7
Cumulative percentage 14.8 59.2 99.9
Lawyers between 41 and 45 years old 11.8 58.8 29.4
Cumulative percentage 11.8 70.6 100.0
Lawyers 46 years old and over 8.3 91.7 0
Cumulative percentage 8.3 100.0 100.0
Table B.24. Answer to questions 5 and 9d: Responses of environmental lawyers on whether resources 
and skill of oil company’s counsel is an important reason why courts might encounter difficultly in 
judging oil related easy fairly (per cent)
Very important reason Important reason Less important reason
Environmental lawyers 12.8 64.1 23.1
Cumulative percentage 12.8 76.9 100.0
Other lawyers 8.8 42.6 48.5
Cumulative percentage 8.8 51.4 99.9
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Table B.25. Answers to questions 5 and 10: Responsy of commercial lawyers on whether
compensation paid by oil companies for damagy in tort is fair
«wwwwvwwwvuvs Unfair to oil Unfair to oil
companies as companies as
much too high somewhat too high
Fair and Unfair to opposing Unfair to
justified litigant as somewhat opposing
too low litigant as much
too low
Oil company lawyers 1.4
Cumulative percentage 1.4
Other lawyers 1.7
Cumulative percentage 1.7
12.2
13.6
0
1.7
14.9
28.5
10.0
11.7
43.2
71.7
46.7 
58.4
28.4
100.1
41.7
100.1
To 4.11. Legal Change and Legislation
Table B.26. Answers to questions 5 and 12; Ryponses of environmental lavyyers on whether 
environmental law has undergone changy
Major change Some change No change
Environmental lawyers 16.3 67.4 16.3
Cumulative percentage 16.3 83.7 100.0
Other lawyers 33.8 44.1 22.1
Cumulative percentage 33.8 77.9 100.0
Answers to question 12: Ryponsy of Lagos and Port Harcourt lawyers oi
environmental law has undergone changy
Major change Some change No change
Lagos lawyers 23.9 60.7 15.4
Cumulative percentage 23.9 84.6 100.0
Port Harcourt lawyers 21.4 28.6 50.0
Cumulative percentage 21.4 50.0 100.0
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Table B.28. Answers to questions 6b and 12: Ryponsy of oil company lawyers on whether 
environmental law has undergone changy
Major change Some change No change
Oil company lawyers 31.1 52.7 16.2
Cumulative percentage 31.1 83.8 100.0
Other lawyers 14.0 63.2 22.8
Cumulative percentage 14.0 77.2 100.0
Table B.29. Answers to quytions 6b and 12: Ryponses of lawyers who acted as counsel in a lawsuit 
against an oil company on whether environmental law has undergone changy
Major change Some change No change
Lawyers who acted in a lawsuit against an oil company 17.1 59.8 23.2
Cumulative percentage 17.1 76.9 100.1
Other lawyers 34.7 53.1 12.2
Cumulative percentage 34.7 87.8 100.0
bie B.30. Answers to questions 1 and 13: Responses according to age of lawyers on whether th
FEPA Act has been effectively enforced (per cent)
Effectively enforced Partially enforced Not enforced
Lawyers between 25 and 30 years old 4.3 65.2 30.4
Cumulative Percentage 4.3 69.5 99.9
Lawyers between 31 and 35 years old 2.7 81.1 16.2
Cumulative Percentage 2.7 83.8 100.0
Lawyers between 36 and 40 years old 0 62.1 37.9
Cumulative Percentage 0 62.1 100.0
Lawyers between 41 and 45 years old 0 21.1 78.9
Cumulative Percentage 0 21.1 100.0
Lawyers 46 years old and over 0 25.0 75.0
Cumulative Percentage 0 25.0 100.0
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Table B.31. Answers to questions 3 and 13; Responses according to professional experience of 
lawyers on whether the FEPA Act has been effectively enforced (per cent)
Effectively enforced Partially enforced Not enforced
Lawyers with 1-5 years of experience 0 52.4 47.6
Cumulative Percentage 0 52.4 100.0
Lawyers with 6-10 years of experience 3.8 71.7 24.5
Cumulative Percentage 3.8 75.5 100.0
Lawyers with 11-15 years of experience 0 58.3 41.7
Cumulative Percentage 0 58.3 100.0
Lawyers with 16-20 years of experience 0 30.0 70.0
Cumulative Percentage 0 30.0 100.0
Lawyers with 21 and more years of experience 0 38.5 61.5
Cumulative Percentage 0 38.5 100.0
Table B.32. Answers to questions 5 and 13: Ryponses of environmental lawyey on the enforcement 
of different piecy of legislation (per cent)
Effectively enforced Partially enforced Not enforced
Environmental lawyers on the enforcement of the Petroleum Act 10.5 42.1 47.4
Other lawyers 27.9 45.9 26.2
Environmental lawyers on the enforcement of the FEPA Act 2.4 50.0 47.6
Other lawyers 1.4 71.0 27.5
Environmental lawyers on the enforcement of OMPADEC Decree 2.5 47.5 50.0
Other lawyers 4.7 68.8 26.6
Environmental lawyers on the enforcement of the Land Use Act 18.2 61.4 20.5
Other lawyers 47.4 41.0 11.5
Table B.33. Answers to quytions 5 and 13: Responses of commercial lawyers on whether the FEPA
Act has been effectively enforced (per cent)
Effectively enforced Partially enforced Not enforced
Commercial lawyers 2.2 58.2 39.6
Cumulative Percentage 2.2 60.4 100.0
Other lawyers 0 85.0 15.0
Cumulative Percentage 0 85.0 100.0
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Table B.34. Answei*s to questions 6b and 13: Responses of oil company lawyers on whether the Land
Use Act has been effectively enforced (per cent)
Effectively enforced Partially enforced Not enforced
Oil company lawyers 36.6
Cumulative Percentage 36.6
Other lawyers 30.6
Cumulative Percentage 30.6
53.7 
90.3 
45.2
75.8
9.8
100.1
24.2
100.0
s-wwvwv
Table B.35. Answers to quytions 6b and 13: Responses of lawyers who acted in a lawsuit against an 
oil company on whether the Land Use Act has been effectively enforced (per cent)
Effectively enforced Partially enforced Not enforced
Lawyers who acted in a lawsuit against an oil company 26.9 54.8 18.3
Cumulative Percentage 26.9 81.7 100.0
Other lawyers 47.1 41.2 11.8
Cumulative Percentage 47.1 88.3 100.1
To Conclusion
Table B.36. Ryults of all cross-tabulations: Deviations from trend by different variably
Variable Number of deviations from general trend
Environmental law specialisation Environmental law specialist versus rest* 21
Commercial law specialisation Commercial law specialist versus rest* 21
Size of law firm 4 groups 20
Lawyers working for oil industry Previous work for oil company versus rest 13
Location of law fiim Lagos versus Port Harcourt 12
Professional experience 5 groups 11
Age 5 age groups 10
Lawyere working against oil Previous work against oil company versus rest 7
industry
Gender Male versus female 7
Criminal law specialisation Criminal law specialist versus rest* 7
Civil law specialisation Civil law specialist versus rest* 5
Contact with oil industry Previous contact with oil company versus rest* 3
* No responses and unclassifiable responses were excluded
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APPENDIX C 
Political Economy of Oil in Nigeria: 
Seiected Tables
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Table C l. Nigeria’s exports (in thousand tons), 1919-1960
lVVW»*^ »VVVVVVV-.*nf>VVWW>-yi<VWVVV^ VVVWWYWVVVVV»VyVVWVVVVV¥VVVVWVVVVVyV»VVVVV>rtftAVVYVVVVVVVWWVVVW^
1919-21 1929-31 1935-37 1951 1960
Pakn oU 80 129 150 150 183
Palm kernels 192 255 346 347 418
Ground-nuts 45 151 242 141 333
Cocoa* 20 53 91 122 154
Crude oil - - - - 847
Tin ore - - 15 12 10
Columbite - _ 1 2 2
* Cocoa exports aie shown in thousand pounds sterling 
Source: Meier (1975,457).
Table C.2. Production of Crude Petroleum within the Commonwealth (in long tons) ,^ 1956-1971
Nigeria Canada Qatar Trinidad Brunei Total
Commonwealth
1956 0 22,930,855 5,783,812 4,132,681 5,547,433 40.769,100
1957 1,200 24,246,401 6,504,814 4,866,278 5,458,923 43,626,000
1958 270,000 22,066,159 8,091,813 5,336,437 5,089,492 43,803,000
1959 557,000 24,637,133 7,866,650 5,845,542 5,262,702 47,334,000
1960 867,000 25,271,229 8,083,032 6,051,047 4,473,867 47,985,000
1961 2,302,000 29,448,165 8,249,305 6,538,253 4,015,618 53,812,000
1962 3,373,000 32,548,687 8,670,919 6,982,306 3,720,253 59,887,000
1963 3,824,000 34,354,904 8,953,349 6,954,038 3,383,789 64,323,000
1964 6,027,000 36,612,711 8,802,292 7,103,495 3,488,000 73,496,000
1965 13,564,000 39,437,267 9,013,660 6,979,848 3,874,000 88,629,000
1966 20,881,000 42,856,000 8,915,387 7,943,355 4,619,000 105,909,000
1967 15,962,000 46,838,000 9,069,839 9,284,320 5,095,000 109,422,000
1968 6,900,000 50,586,170 n.a. 8,557,000 5,884,000 109,396,000
1969 25,600,000 54,798,657 n.a. 8,204,000 6,005,000 134.036,000
1970 51,970,000 61,490,674 n.a. 7,292,000 6,700,000 176,702,000
1971 74,100,000 66,729,895 n.a. 6,833,000 6,433,000 180,100,000
Source: Overseas Geological Surveys, Mineral Resources Division, Statistical Summary of the Mineral Industry 
(London, Her Majesty’s Stationary Office, various years).
' 1 long ton is equal to approx. 7.45 barrels.
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Table C.3. Nigerian Crude Oil Production, 1958-1997
Year Production 
(000s barrels/day)
Percentage share 
of world total
Year Production 
(000s barrels/day)
Percentage share 
of world total
1958 5 0.03 1978 1,895 3.01
1959 10 0.05 1979 2,300 3.50
1960 20 0.09 1980 2,055 3.28
1961 55 0.23 1981 1,440 2.43
1962 70 0.27 1982 1,285 2.25
1963 75 0.27 1983 1,235 2.18
1964 120 0.41 1984 1,390 2.41
1965 275 0.87 1985 1,500 2.61
1966 420 1.22 1986 1,465 2.42
1967 320 0.87 1987 1,325 2.18
1968 145 0.36 1988 1,445 2.28
1969 540 1.23 1989 1,715 2.67
1970 1,085 2.25 1990 1,810 2.75
1971 1,530 3.01 1991 1,890 2.89
1972 1,815 3.39 1992 1,950 2.97
1973 2,055 3.51 1993 1,985 3.01
1974 2,260 3.86 1994 1,990 2.97
1975 1,785 3.20 1995 2,000 2.95
1976 2,065 3.44 1996 2,150 3.09
1977 2,085 3.33 1997 2,285 3.16
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (various years).
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Table C.4. Growth of Nigeria’s Oil Exports, 1963-1996
Total
Exports
(Naira)
Crude Oil
Exports
(Naira)
Annual Change in 
Official Consumer 
Prices (per cent)
Annual Change 
in Total Exports 
(per cent)
Annual Change 
in Oil Exports 
(per cent)
Oil Exports as 
Percentage of 
Total Exports
1963 372 40 -2.7 10.75
1964 429 64 0.9 15.32 60.00 14.92
1965 535 136 4.1 24.71 112.50 25.42
1966 568 184 9.7 6.17 35.29 32.39
1967 484 145 -3.7 -14.79 -21.2 29.96
1968 422 74 -0.5 -12.81 -48.97 17.54
1969 637 262 10.2 50.95 254.05 41.13
1970 886 510 13.8 39.09 94.66 57.56
1971 1,293 953 16.0 45.94 86.86 73.70
1972 1,434 1,176 3.5 10.90 23.40 82.01
1973 2,278 1,894 5.4 58.86 61.05 83.14
1974 5,795 5,366 12.7 154.39 183.32 92.60
1975 4,829 4,630 33.9 -16.67 -13.72 95.88
1976 6,623 6,196 24.3 37.15 33.82 93.55
1977 7,631 7,083 13.8 15.22 14.32 92.82
1978 6,328 5,654 21.7 -17.08 -20.18 89.35
1979 10,398 9,706 11.7 64.32 71.67 93.34
1980 14,199 13,632 10.0 36.56 40.45 96.01
1981 11,023 10,681 20.8 -22.37 -21.65 96.90
1982 8,206 8,003 7.7 -25.56 -25.07 97.53
1983 7,503 7,201 23.2 -8.57 -10.02 95.97
1984 9,088 8,843 39.6 21.12 22.80 97.30
1985 11,215 10,891 7.4 23.40 23.16 97.11
1986 9,044 8,368 5.7 -19.36 -23.17 92.53
1987 29,578 28,209 11.3 227.05 237.11 95.37
1988 31,193 28,436 54.5 5.46 0.80 91.16
1989 57,971 55,017 50.5 85.85 93.48 94.90
1990 109,886 106,627 7.4 89.55 93.81 97.03
1991 121,534 116,857 13.0 10.60 9.59 96.15
1992 205,613 201,384 44.6 69.18 72.33 97.94
1993 218,801 213,779 57.2 6.40 6.15 97.70
1994 206,059 200,936 57.0 -5.82 -6.01 97.51
1995
1996
748,368 716,206 72.8
29.3
263.18 6.39 95.70
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Table C.5. Nigeria’s oil exports by destination (per cent), 1984-1996
1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
United States 14.1 16.8 34.8 49.7 49.9 52.6 50.7 43.6 44.2 45.9 41.8 40.4 45.2
Western Europe 72.3 62.4 54.4 40.4 40.0 37.1 39.5 45.3 43.6 32.7 38.4 33.0 41.0
Latin America 8.1 16.1 4.1 1.7 1.8 1.6 1.6 2.5 2.8 4.0 4.1 5.4 3.8
Africa 3.7 3.3 4.4 6.0 6.1 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.0 5.3 4.8 8.4 2.4
Far-East Asia n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a 0.1 n/a 0.6 7.4 6.9 9.6 5.4
Other* 1.8 1.4 2.3 2.2 2.2 4.1 3.3 3.6 3.8 4.7 4.0 3.2 2.2
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
* mainly Canada.
Source: computed from OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (various years).
Table C.6. Nigerian Gas Production, 1971-1997
Year Production (million 
tonnes oil equivalent)
Percentage share 
of world total
Year Production (million 
tonnes oil equivalent)
Percentage share 
of world total
1971 0.2 0.02 1985 2.4 0.16
1972 0.2 0.02 1986 2.8 0.18
1973 0.3 0.03 1987 2.7 0.17
1974 0.4 0.04 1988 3.3 0.19
1975 0.4 0.04 1989 3.8 0.22
1976 0.6 0.05 1990 3.6 0.20
1977 0.5 0.04 1991 3.5 0.19
1978 0.3 0.02 1992 3.8 0.21
1979 1.2 0.09 1993 3.8 0.20
1980 1.0 0.07 1994 4,0 0.21
1981 1.6 0.12 1995 4.1 0.21
1982 1.1 0.08 1996 4.2 0.21
1983 1.3 0.10 1997 4.3 0.21
1984 2.5 0.17
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (various years).
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Table C.7. Oil Revenuy of the Nigerian Federal Government, 1970-1992
Total Federally 
Collected Revenue 
(million Naira)
Oil Revenue 
(million Naira)
Annual Change in 
Official Consumer 
Prices (per cent)
Annual Change 
in Total Revenues 
(per cent)
Annual Change 
in Oil Revenues 
(per cent)
Oil Revenue as 
Percentage of 
Total Revenues
1970 632 166 13.8 26.27
1971 1169 510 16.0 84.97 207.23 43.63
1972 1405 764 3.5 20.19 49.8 54.38
1973 1695 1016 5.4 20.64 32.98 59.94
1974 4537 3726 12.7 167.67 266.73 82.12
1975 5515 4272 33.9 21.56 14.65 77.46
1976 6766 5365 24.3 22.68 25.59 79.29
1977 8081 6081 13.8 19.44 13.35 75.25
1978 7371 4654 21.7 -8.79 -23.47 63.14
1979 10913 8881 11.7 48.05 90.83 81.38
1980 15230 12354 10.0 39.56 39.11 81.12
1981 12183 8564 20.8 -20.01 -30.68 70.29
1982 10618 6868 7.7 -12.85 -19.8 64.68
1983 10509 7253 23.2 -1.03 5.61 69.02
1984 11193 8210 39.6 6.51 13.19 73.35
1985 15042 10915 7.4 34.39 32.95 72.56
1986 12302 8107 5.7 -18.22 -25.73 65.90
1987 25100 19027 11.3 104.03 134.7 75.80
1988 27595 19832 54.5 9.94 4.23 71.87
1989 47798 39130 50.5 73.21 97.31 81.87
1990 69788 55215 7.4 46.01 41.11 79.12
1991 78640 60315 13.0 12.68 9.24 76.70
1992 138617 115393 44.6 76.27 91.32 83.25
* budget estimates
Sources: data on government revenue from the Economic and Financial Review and the Annual Reports of the Central 
Bank of Nigeria (various issues); consumer prices from the IMF International Financial Statistics Yearbook (various 
years).
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Table C.8. Nigeria’s Foreign-exchange Revenue, 1995-97
1995 (miUion US$) 1996 (million US$) 1997 (million USS)
Oil sales, petroleum profit tax & royalties 7898 10891 11994
Currency purchases by oil companies 366 551 559
Other currency purchases* 92 433 473
Other receipts 214 150 50
Total 8570 12025 13076
Foreign-exchange revenue from oil as percentage of 96.43 95.15 96.00
total
* Mainly currency purchases by banks.
Source: Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report: Nigeria (2nd Quarter 1998).
Table C.9. Petroleum Ministers, 1971-1998
Years in Office Name of Minister Appointed by Title of Post
1971-1975
1975-1978
Philip Asiodu 
Dr. Mofia Akobo
General Gowon 
General Mohammad
Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Mines and 
Power
Minister of Petroleum & Energy
1984-1985* Prof. Tam David-West General Buhari Minister of Petroleum & Energy
1985-1987 Prof. Tam David-West General Babangida Minister of Petroleum Resources
1987-1989 Alhaji Rilwanu Lukman General Babangida Minister of Petroleum Resources
1989-1993 Prof. Jubril Aminu General Babangida Minister of Petroleum Resources
1993 Philip Asiodu General Babangida Secretary for Petroleum & Mineral Resources**
1993 Don Etiebet General Babangida Secretary for Petroleum & Mineral Resources***
1993-1995 Don Etiebet General Abacha Minister of Petroleum Resources
1995-1998 Dan Etete General Abacha Minister of Petroleum Resources
* There was no minister of petroleum during the civilian rule 1979 
Energy in the office of the President performed the role of minister; 
in the Interim National Government.
Sources: various newspapers and periodicals.
-1983, chairman of the NNPC and the Adviser on 
** Served in the Transitional Council; *** Served
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Table C.IO. Evolution of Government Participation in the Major Oil Companies, 1971-1998
Government Participation 
(percent)
Date of Acquisition
Shell-BP 35 April 1973
55 April 1974
60 July 1979
Shell* 80 August 1979
60 June 1989
55 August 1993
Mobil 55 April 1974
60 July 1979
Gulf (Chevron) 55 April 1974
60 July 1979
Agip/Phülips 33.33 April 1971
55 April 1974
60 July 1979
Safrap (Elf) 35 April 1971
55 April 1974
60 July 1979
Texaco 55 May 1975
60 July 1979
Pan Ocean 55 January 1978
60 July 1979
* Shell-BP until August 1979
Sources; Khan (1994, 69); Petroleum Economist (October 1993),
Table C .ll. Share of Foreign Capital in Nigeria’s Mining Industry, 1971-1977 and 1985-1989 (per 
cent)*
1971
Too""
1972
983"
1973
"65.0"
1974
i r r
1975
"37.6
1976
39.2"
1977
"To.’s ”
1985
20.0 "
1986
20.0'"
1987
2o!o
1988
2(Ï0"
1989
"2T.8”
* This represents foreign paid-up capital (excluding reserves) in all foreign (wholly and jointly) owned mining 
companies in Nigeria as a share of total paid-up capital.
Source: Economic and Financial Review of the Central Bank of Nigeria (various issues).
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Table C.12. Changy in Selected Financial Incentivy in the Nigerian Oil Industry
1977 1982 1986 1991
Guaranteed Fiscal Margin (US$ per barrel) 0.80 1.60 2.00 2.30
Guaranteed Technical Cost (US$ per barrel) 1.00 1.60 2.00 2.50
Source: Alii (1997).
Table C.13. Nigerian Private Oil Companies in 1998
Issue Date of Current 
First Licence Activity in 
1996
Nigerian Firm (equity share) Partner (equity share) Oil Area of Oü
Licence in Licence in 
1998 1998 (in sq
km)
Dubri Oil (100%)
Queens Petroleum (100%)
Cavendish Petroleum (57.5%)
Consolidated Oil (100%)
Express Oil & Gas (57.5%)
Summit Oil (100%)
International Petrol Energy Co. 
(IPEC) (100%)
Paclantic Oil (n/a)
Inki Petroleum (renamed 
Oriental Energy) (97.5%)
Ultramar Energy (100%) 
Solgas (60%)
Atlas Petroleum
Supra Investments (renamed 
Amalgamated) (100%) 
Union Square Petrogas (n/a)
Geo International (40%)
Tuskar Resources (40%); 
Camac International 
(2.5%)
Du Pont (40%); Camac 
International (2.5%)
n/a
Camac International 
(2.5%)
Niko Resources (40%) 
Canadian Occidental 
Petroleum (20%); Profco 
Resources (10%); Summit 
Partners Management 
(10%)
n/a
OML96
OPL135
OPL228
OMLllO
OML103
OPL458
OML108
OPL205
OPL206
OPL202
0PL229
n/a
OPL224
OPL227
OPL226
232
820
1,960
966
950
1,600
500
2,130
2,310
1,930
1,460
n/a
305
900
1,500
OML109 785
OPIA52 520
Aug. 1987 Producing
Nov. 1990 Inactive
Nov. 1990 Developing
Nov. 1990 Producing
Nov. 1990 Producing
Nov. 1990 Drilling
Nov. 1990 Inactive
Nov. 1990 Inactive
Nov. 1990 Drilling
Nov. 1990 Inactive
Feb. 1991 n/a
Feb. 1991 Developing
n/a n/a
May 1991 Inactive
July 1991 Inactive
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Seagull (n/a) n/a n/a n/a July 1991 Inactive
Moncrief Oil (100%) OPL471 1,375 July 1991 Inactive
Yinka Folawiyo Petroleum (60%) Abacan (40%) OPL309 1,600 July 1991 Drilling
Alfred James Petroleum (60%) Abac an (40%) OPL302 1,900 July 1991 Drilling
General Oil (100%) OPL304 1,580 July 1991 Inactive
Allied Energy Resources (60%) StatoU (20%); BP (20%) OPL210 1,700 June 1992 Drilling
Noreast Petroleum (100%)* OPL840 2,535 June 1992 Exploring
OPL902 2,450
Amni Petroleum (60%) Abacan (40%) OPL237 51 1993 Producing
OPL469 440
Peak Petroleum (60%) NTI Resources (40%) OPL460 1,632 1993 Drilling
In toil (n/a) n/a n/a n/a 1993 Inactive
Optimum Petroleum (60%) Abacan (40%) OPL310 1,850 1993 Exploring
Famfa Oil (60%) Texaco (40%) OPL216 2,550 1993 Exploring
Azenith (n/a) n/a n/a n/a 1993 Inactive
Crescent Oil (100%) OPL234 1,380 1993 Inactive
First Aries (100%) OPL235 1,280 1993 Inactive
Asaris n/a n/a n/a 1993 Inactive
Petroleum Products (60%) Abacan (40%) OPL233 127 1993 n/a
Nyemoni Petroleum (n/a) n/a n/a n/a 1993 Exploring
Sunlink Petroleum (n/a) n/a n/a n/a 1993 Inactive
MLM Petroleum (n/a) n/a n/a n/a 1993 Inactive
Mareena (100%) OPL231 237 1993 Inactive
Brass Petroleum (100%) OPL208 1,880 1993 Inactive
Dania Oil (100%) OPL236 1,160 1993 Inactive
Lament Oil (100%) OPL207 1,700 1993 Inactive
«WKVWVWVWWWWWVWyYVI* Noreast was also part of a joint-venture with Mobil (40% equity share in the Noreast venture) to exploit OPL215. 
Sources: Avuru (1997, 294); Petroconsultants (1998).
Table C.14. After Tax Profit Oil Split
Country Government Share (percentage) Contractor Share (percentage)
Nigeria 35-65/20-80 65-35/80-20
Albania 80 20
Egypt 81 19
Gabon 67-87 33-12
Indonesia 85 15
Libya 81-90 19-10
Malaysia
Source: Omalu (1996, 74).
80-84 20-16
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Table C.15. Gas flaring exemptions and Any, 1985
Shell Mobil Gulf* Texaco Elf Ashland Tenneco Pan Ocean
Wells fined 29 5 10 2 2 2 0 0
Wells exempted 55 10 7 3 4 1 1 1
Total wells 84 15 17 5 6 3 1 1
* today Chevron 
Source: Synge (1986, 37).
Table C.16. Gas Flaring Fines and Royalty Payments of Selected Oil Companies, 1994 (in Naira)
Mobil Shell Agip Chevron Texaco Elf Pan Ocean
Flaring Fine 142,172,123 45,812,536 19,121,464 41,127,877 4,886,242 5,631,705 8,792,372
Royalty 3,035,262,789 7,867,852,174 1,780,944,892 3,436,626,704 714,578,719 3,178,406,934 123,856,301
Fine as 
Percentage of
.......
4.68% 0.58% 1.07% 1.20% 0.68% 0.18% 7.10%
Source: Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Publications (1996, 52).
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APPENDIX D 
Selected Technical and Economic 
Data on Nigeria’s Oil Industry
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Table D.l. Number of Wells Completed by Shell-BP, 1952-1960
1952 1953 1954 1955 1956 1957 1958 1959 1960*
Exploration Wells 2 8 10 8 4 2 18 37 16
Appraisal Wells - - 2 4 2 8 15 16 6
Total Wells 2 8 12 12 6 10 33 53 22
* Until October 1960. 
Source: Shell-BP (1960,13).
Table D.2. Spot price of ‘Nigeria Light’ crude, 1979-1997 (in US$/barrel)
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
32.00 37.18 36.67 33.75 30.01 28.96 27.74 14.60 18.46 15.10
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
18.50 24.27 20.50 19.92 17.60 16.21 17.35 21.17 19.44
Source: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (1998).
Table D.3. Caiisy and volume (in thousand barrels) of Shell’s oil spills in Delta State, 1991-1994
1991 1992 1993 1994
Number Volume Number Volume Number Volume Number Volume
of spills of spills of spills of spills of spills of spills of spills of spills
Corrosion of equipment 17 266 24 183 26 131 25 124
Equipment Failure 22 178 20 126 17 275 15 89
Sabotage 7 26 9 642 13 161 13 235
Other 23 233 19 269 16 50 20 65
Total 69 705 72 1220 72 617 73 515
Source: World Bank (1995, Annex M).
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Table D.4. Frequency of Nigerian Oil Fields by Size, 1995
Field size 
(million barrels)
Number of onshore 
fields
Number of offshore fields 
(below 50m water depth)
Number of offshore fields 
(above 50m water depth)
Total number of fields
700-800 3 3 6
500-699 2 1 3
400-499 5 2 7
300-399 3 3 6
200-299 8 7 15
100-199 32 12 2 46
80-99 7 4 1 12
60-79 11 6 17
40-59 22 13 1 36
20-39 23 7 5 35
5-20 57 11 1 69
Total 173 69 10 252
Source: Thomas (1995).
Table D.5. Comparison of wells completed in selected countriy and regions in 1996
Oil Gas Dry Suspended Service Total Wells Dry Wells as % of Total
Nigeria 118 2 7 10 1 138 5.07
United States 14,896 12,864 8,420 471 1,600 38,251 22.01
Indonesia 337 24 67 42 388 858 7.81
Vietnam 28 18 10 0 0 56 17.86
Peru 89 0 16 0 0 105 15.24
Africa 496 82 126 26 35 765 16.47
South America 2,538 96 244 99 83 3,060 7.97
Western Europe 328 196 139 24 69 756 18.39
Middle East 604 60 53 6 75 798 6.64
Source: World Oil (August 1997).
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Table D.6. Proved Oil and Gas Reserves, 1984-1997
vw w w w w w v Oil
r>r<vvvvvyiivi#v>iw»wiOf¥wwvvvvvvvy¥vvvvvvvwvvv Gas
Reserves Reserves as Reserves/ Reserves Reserves as Reserves/
(billion Percentage Share Pioduction Ratio (trillion cubic Percentage Share Production Ratio
barrels) of World Total (years) metres) of World Total (years)
1984 16.7 2.4 328 1.0 1.1 over 100
1985 16.6 2.3 31.0 1.3 1.4 over 100
1986 16.0 2.3 30.2 1.3 1.3 over 100
1987 16.0 1.8 34.1 2.4 2.2 over 100
1988 16.0 1.7 32.2 2.4 2.2 over 100
1989 16.0 1.6 27.5 2.5 2J: over 100
1990 17.1 1.7 27.1 2.5 2.1 over 100
1991 17.9 1.8 26.0 3.0 2.4 over 100
1992 17.9 1.8 2&6 3.4 2.5 over 100
1993 17.9 1.8 25.8 3.4 2.4 over 100
1994 17.9 1.8 26.1 3.4 2.4 over 100
1995 20.8 2.1 30.2 3.1 2.2 over 100
1996 15.5 1.5 19.9 3.0 2.1 over 100
1997 16.8 1.6 20.2 3.3 2.2 over 100
Sources: BP Statistical Review of World Energy (various years).
Table D.7. Comparison of selected crude oil streams
Nigerian Crude Oil 
Stream
Sulphur Content 
(Percentage)
°AH Non-Nigerian 
Crude Oil Stream
Country of 
Origin
Sulphur Content 
(Percentage)
°AH
Bonny Light 0.12 36.7 Arabian Light Saudi Arabia 1.80 33.4
Bonny Medium 0.23 25.2 Bachequero Venezuela 2.40 16.8
Brass River 0.09 40.9 Dubai Dubai 1.68 32.5
Escravos 0.14 3&2 Ekofisk Norway 0T8 35.8
Forcados 0.29 29J Iranian Light Iran 1.40 33.5
Pennington 0.07 36.6 Kuwait Kuwait 2.50 3L2
Qualboe 0.12 35a North Slope United States 1.04 2&8
Sources: Hyne (1995, 16) and Thomas (1995).
Appendix
Table D.8. Percentage share of Nigeria’s crude oil production by company, 1970-1996
«vvvvvvvvwvirtvvwv-. Shell-BP Gulf* Mobil Agip Elf Texaco Ashland** Others
1970 74.47 20.05 4.68 0.45 0 0.35 0 0
1971 72.96 17.76 4.79 2.17 1.54 0.68 0 0
1972 67.50 16.86 9.17 2.87 3.04 0.56 0 0
1973 63.41 17.76 10.90 4.60 2.93 0.40 0 0
1974 59.99 16.36 13.14 6.86 3.55 0.10 0 0
1975 63.50 12.38 10.64 829 3.91 0.42 0.36 0
1976 59.53 14.14 11.14 892 3.67 1.67 0.47 0.46
1977 58.18 13.85 10.64 10.21 3.79 2.53 0.33 0.47
1978 57.20 13.80 10.52 11.08 4.08 2.27 0.46 0.59
1979 56.93 16.27 10.57 9.62 3.40 2.34 0.35 052
1980 56.69 16.57 10.59 893 4.17 2.10 0.41 0.54
1981 51.37 19.58 11.17 8.79 5.05 2.39 0.66 0.99
1982 50.82 16.37 10.57 9.96 7.21 2.91 1.26 0.90
1983 50.15 14.13 13.15 9^8 7.24 3.56 1.26 0.93
1984 50.27 13.47 12.82 9.09 7.05 4.71 1.77 0.82
1985 49.89 16.56 11.98 995 6.23 3.10 15# 0.73
1986 48.30 16.85 12.30 9.12 5.87 4.45 2.44 0.67
1987 49.26 15.96 12.31 8.83 6.18 4.38 255 0.54
1988 n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a n/a
1989 52.72 15.58 12.42 7.70 5.28 3.41 2ri2 097
1990 51.18 15.29 13.16 9^0 5.30 3.24 2.11 092
1991 50.74 16.23 14.45 7.42 593 3.12 1.62 1.39
1992 49.50 16.18 16.76 7.15 4.96 2.96 1.26 1.22
1993 48.15 16.48 21.19 6.99 5.07 0 0.96 1.17
1994 48.15 16.48 21.19 6.99 5.07 0 0.96 1.17
1995 46.11 19.87 14.81 7.70 6.56 2.80 0.96 1.18
1996 46.11 19.87 14.81 7.7 6^6 2.80 0.96 1.18
1997*** 42.14 18.08 20.83 6.55 5.90 3 j8 1.09 1.83
* now Chevron; ** Ashland lost its oil licences in 1997, Addax bought the licences in 1998; *** April figures
Sources; 1970-85 data from NNPC (1986); 1986-96 data from OPEC Annual Statistical Bulletin (various years),
1990 figures from Quinlan (1992: 23); 1997 data from Petroleum Argus (April 21, 1997).
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Table D.9. Oil Companies in Nigeria with Oil Prospecting Licences and Oil Mining Leases in 1966, 
1986 and 1998
Company 1966 Concession 
Area (sq km)
Company 1986 Concession 
Area (sq km)
Company 1998 Concession 
Area (sq km)
SheU-BP*
SAFRAP(Elf)
Gulf (Chevron)
Tennessee
Agip
Mobil
Amoseas
Phillips
Total
Concessions
48,946
23,600
17,754
8,721
5,260
5,245
5,001
3,629
118,156
Shell
Elf
Gulf (Chevron) 
MobU/Tennessee 
Agip/Phillips 
MobU
Phillips 
Texaco 
Pan Ocean 
Nigus
Agip Energy 
NNPC
31,309
8,256
14,138
2.259
5.259 
2,562
232
2,570
1,005
1,025
360
40440
Total Concessions 109,415
Shell
Elf
Chevron
Agip/Phillips
Mobil
Texaco 
Pan Ocean
Agip Energy
Statoü-BP
NNPC
NPDC**
NAPIMS**
over 40 others
43,052
21,542
23,726
5,259
5,619
2,570
503
5,060
6,059
690
2,625
24,000
84,739
Total Concessions 225,444
* Shell from 1979; ** NNPC subsidiaries.
Sources: 1966 data computed from Schatzl (1969, 8); 1986 data from Khan (1994, 21); 1998 data from 
Petroconsultants (1998).
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Table D.IO. Seismic surveys in Nigeria in 1997
Operator Concession Block Terrain Duration Type 2-D Line/ 3-D Area Seismic Contractor
Agip (NAOCy OPL211 Marine Jul.96-Feb.97 3-D 2,000 sq.km Western Geophysical
Agip (NAOC) OPL316 Marine Dec.96-May 97 3-D 1,487 sq.km Western Geophysical
Agip (NAOC) OML60 Swamp Jan.97-Sep.97 3-D 405 sq.km Western Geophysical
Ashland OPL98 Marine Nov.96-May 97 3-D 436 sq.km Western Geophysical
Consolidated Oil OML103 Swamp Nov.97- 3-D n/a Western Geophysical
Esso (EEPN) “ OPL209 Marine Feb.97-Feb.97 2-D 1,805 km n/a
Famfa Oil OPL216 Marine Dec.96-Mar.97 3-D 1,650 sq.km GECO-Prakla
FamfaOil OPU16 Marine Jun.97-Jun.97 2-D 1,187 km GECO-Prakla
Mobil OPL94 Marine Dec.96-Jan.97 3-D 530 sq.km Western Geophysical
NPDC* OPLllO Land Mar.97-Jul.97 3-D 142 sq.km United Geophysical
Noreast Petroleum OPL215 Marine Dec.97- 3-D n/a GECO-Prakla
Peak Petroleum OPL460 Marine Jun.97-Jun.97 3-D n/a n/a
SheU (SNEPCO)’" OPL803 Land Jan.97-Jun.97 2-D 750 km n/a
Shell (SNEPCO) OPL212 Marine Nov.96-Feb.97 3-D n/a Western Geophysical
Shell (SPDC)" OML29 Land Oct.96-Jul.97 3-D 437 sq.km GECO-Prakla
Shell (SPDC) OMLll Swamp Nov.96-Feb.97 3-D 329 sq.km Western Geophysical
Shell (SPDC) OML22 Land Feb.97-Oct.97 3-D 209 sq.km Western Geophysical
Shell (SPDC) OML28 Land Jul.97-Oct.97 3-D 258 sq.km GECO-Prakla
Shell (SPDC) OML38 Land Jul.97- 3-D 397 sq.km CGG
Shell (SPDC) OML18 Swamp Oct.97- 3-D 103 sq.km Western Geophysical
Shell (SPDC) OML34 Land Nov.97- 3-D n/a United Geophysical
Shell (SPDC) OMLl Swamp Dec.96-Jun.97 3-D 163 sq.km CGG
Statoil OPL213 Marine Mar.97-May 97 3-D 1,086 sq.km CGG
Statoil OPL217 Marine Dec.96-Mar.97 3-D 1,675 sq.km CGG
Yinka Folawiyo OPL309 Marine Jun.97-Jul.97 3-D 325 sq.km PGS (Petr.Geo-Services)
‘ Nigerian Agip Oil Corporation (NAOC); ” Esso Exploration and Production Nigeria (EEPN); “ Nigerian Petroleum 
Development Company (NPDC), owned by the NNPC; Shell Nigeria Exploration and Production Company 
(SNEPCO); '' Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC)
Source: Petroconsultants (1998, 30).
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Table D .ll. Exploration and Appraisal Wells Drilled in Nigeria in 1997
Concession Block No. of Wells Terrain Name of Well
Agip (NAOC)’ OML61 1 Land Ebegoro Deep 1
Ashland OPL90 1 Continental Shelf Okwori South 3
Atlas Petroleum OML109 Continental Shelf Ejulebe 3, 4 and 5
Chevron OML95 1 Continental Shelf Azama 1
Conoco (Du Pont) OPL220 1 Deep Water Ebitemi 1
Consolidated Oil OML103 Continental Shelf Bella North Deep 1, Ebisan 1 and 2
Elf OPL223 1 Continental Shelf Ine 1
OPL222 1 Deep Water Okpok 1
OML102 1 Continental Shelf Ekanga1
Express Petroleum & OPL74 1 Continental Shelf Ukpokiti 2
Gas
Mobil OML70 4 Continental Shelf Ekepkep 1, Adua 15, Ebeiso 1, Ikut 1
OPL221 1 Deep Water Adaka 1
OPL94 2 Continental Shelf Yoho 7, Awawa 2
OML67 7 Continental Shelf lyak Southeast 12ST, Esuk 1, Edop 40 and 
41, Offiong 1, Inuen 2, Itut North 2
Moni Pulo OPL230 4 Continental Shelf Efiat 1, Cross River 1, Obio 1, Abana 1
NAPIMS’^ OPIA18 1 Chad Basin Kadaru 1
OPL421 1 Chad Basin Wushe 1
NPDC” OML65 Land Abura Southeast 2, Owopele North 2
Peak Petroleum OPL460 1 Continental Shelf Preye 1
Shell (SNEPCO)’" OPL219 1 Deep Water N’Golo 1
OPL212 Deep Water Bonga 2 and 3ST
Shell (SPDC)" OML38 1 Swamp Omoja 1
OML20 1 Land Egbema West 21
OML35 1 Swamp Seibou 2
Statoil OPL218 Deep Water Sehki 1, Gbigiri 1
Texaco OML88 1 Continental Shelf Chioma North 2STK-1
OML86 1 Continental Shelf Akuku1
Yinka Folawiyo OPL309 1 Continental Shelf Aje2
‘ Nigerian Agip Oil Corporation (NAOC); “ Nigerian Petroleum Investment Managment Service (NAPIMS), owned by 
the NNPC; “ Nigerian Petroleum Development Company (NPDC), owned by the NNPC; Shell Nigeria Exploration 
and Production Company (SNEPCO); " Shell Petroleum Development Company (SPDC)
Source; Petroconsultants (1998, 38-39).
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Table D.12. Principal Crude OU Loading Terminals in Nigeria
'vvvwvvMWVvwwyvvyw’iivvvwvvvvvvvvwvwvvyyvorvvvvywwvvwName of Operator 
Terminal
Location Distance from 
Lagos (to the south­
east in km)
Max. Tanker Size 
(in thousands dwt)
Loading
Capacity
(tons/hour)
Storage Capacity 
(in million barrels)
Anten Ashland/
Anten
offshore n/a 270 n/a 1.75
Bonny Shell onshore 560 135 5,000 n/a
Bonny Shell offshore 560 320 6,000 n/a
Brass Agip offshore 470 300 5,000 3.5
Escravos Chevron offshore 220 300 4,000 3.6
Forcados Shell offshore and 
onshore
260 254 9,000 13 (Bonny and 
Forcados storage 
capacity combined)
Ima Amni n/a n/a 270 8,200 n/a
Odudu Elf n/a n/a 280 n/a n/a
Oso Field MobU n/a n/a 140 n/a n/a
Pennigton Texaco offshore 370 250 3,000 2
Port Harcourt NNPC onshore n/a n/a n/a 1.1
Qua Iboe MobU offshore 650 300 7,200 6.5
Sources; OECD (1997,11.22); Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Publications (1996, 32).
Table D.13. Gas Flared in Nigeria in 1994 and 1997 (in thousand cubic feet)
Shell Chevron Agip Mobil Elf Texaco Ashland Pan-Ocean AENR* Total Gas 
Flared
Gas Flared (cubic 
feet) in 1994
294,908 186,407 97,260 92,645 29,249 25,573 32,169 12,015 8,500 778,726**
Gas Flared (cubic 
feet) in 1997
222,013 176,966 150,690 116,465 3&MW 44,770 3%#9 16,576 7,914 801,847**
Gas Flared as 
Percent of N igeria’s 
Total in 1994
37.9 234 12.5 11.9 3.8 3.3 4.1 1.5 1.1 100.0
Gas Flared as 
Percent of Nigeria’s 
Total in 1997
27.7 22.1 18.8 14.5 4.2 5.6 4.1 2.1 1.0 100.1
Gas Flared as 
Percent of the 
Company’s Total in 
1997
64.7 9L3 53.5 64.3 95.1 99.7 90.6 95.2 99.1
* Agip Energy; ** excluding the smaller oil producing companies such as Amni 
Sources; 1994 figures from Nigeria’s Oil and Gas Publications (1996, 51); 1997 figures from Vanguard (1 October 
1998).
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Table D.14. Oil spills in the Delta and Rivers States of Nigeria, 1991-1993
Delta State Rivers State
Number of spills Quantity spilled Number of spills Number of spills Quantity spilledYear
1991
1992
1993
Average per year
78
129
116
107
(in barrels) 
950 
12,232 
909 
4,697
at Shell 
50
55 
58
56
98
223
232
184
(in barrels) 
5103 
21,480 
8,101 
9,893
Number of 
spills at Shell 
86 
143 
248 
159
Source; World Bank (1995, volume H, annex M).
Table D.15. Age of flowlines and number of flowlines in SPDC’s Western Division in Nigeria
Age (in years) Number of Flowlines Percentage of Total Flowlines Percentage of Leaks
0-5 115 12.79 2.5
6-10 49 5.45 2.5
11-15 102 11.35 12
16-20 168 18.69 29
21 and over 465 51.72 54
Source; adopted from Ashton-Jones (1998, 187).
Table D.16. Flaring of Natural Gas in Major Oil Producing Countries
OPEC countries Percent of Gross Production Non-OPEC countries Percent of Gross Production
Nigeria 76.0% USA 0.6%
Libya 21.0% Holland 0
Saudi Arabia :W4% Britain 43%
Iran 19.0% Former Soviet Union 1.5%
Algeria 4.0% Mexico 5.0%
OPEC Total 184% World Total 4.8%
Source; World Bank (1995, volume I, 59).
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APPENDIX E 
Map of Nigeria with Oil Concessions,
December 1992
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